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Protest, a vital signal of shared discontent, requires courage and coordination. Despite South Africa’s 
transition to democracy, it continues to experience numerous community and labour-related protests 
daily; by some claims, more than any other country. While state measures to curtail such gatherings are 
often fierce, a sharp rise in public protests has nonetheless been perceived since the early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, quantifying protests remains problematic, and the drivers behind protests – whether 
community-based, labour-related or some other type – are contested. Scholars hypothesise a range of 
factors in their explanations – some conflicting – for the apparent rise in protests. However, these 
commonly advanced theories lack quantitative rigour. Applying machine learning algorithms to the 
world’s largest publicly-available single-country protest event database, this thesis classifies over  
150 000 police-identified incidents between 1997 and 2013, as protest or non-protest events, and the 
former by levels of “tumult”. Each of the 89 000 identified protest events is differentiated, considering 
count, count per capita, and “general propensity”, as well as “tumult” models; and then located within 
one of the country’s 234 municipalities. Combining that analysis with demographic, socio-economic, 
governance, and voting-behaviour official statistics, the study tests proxies for hypothesised factors 
associated with protest. It finds that “general propensity to protest”, representing the number of 
protesters per capita in the respective municipalities, is a more accurate measure to quantify protest than 
simply counting “protest occurrences” or protests per capita. Further, it finds that municipal-level Gini 
inequality, unemployment, voter turnout, and the dependency ratio, expressed as the proportion of 
people aged 17 to 64 in the population, offer the most explanatory power for protests in South Africa, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
South Africa is a land of protest. Daily, millions of South Africans awake to a country they experience 
as fundamentally unjust, evidenced by their own hardship, landlessness, and unemployment, or, for 
those employed, by the exploitative nature of jobs that labour in the humiliating face of proximate 
wealth in a highly unequal society. It is in this context that thousands take to the streets, ostensibly 
moved by a sense of injustice. Between 1997 and 2013, on average, more than eleven protests occurred 
every day across the country (Alexander et al. 2018: 30), with scholars projecting increases since that 
time, such that the number of protests in South Africa has nearly doubled over 20 years (Runciman et 
al. 2016: 5) or increased by 96% between 2010 and 2015 (SAIRR 2015). As such, South Africa has 
been dubbed “the world’s protest capital” (Rodrigues 2010; see also Odendaal 2016: 287), and the 
apparent rise of protests in the early 2000s as a “Rebellion of the Poor” (Alexander 2010).   
 
While protests (and protesters) are often seen as “the problem” from the perspective of stewards of the 
state, they are in fact a weapon of the weak, at once signalling desperation and representing the fruits 
of civil discontent. However, this weapon may have emancipatory potential, and the discontent it 
transmits often underscores the state’s failures to achieve the “development” implied in both official 
rhetoric and solemnly assured political-party electoral campaigns (also including travesties of justice 
that are deepened by the state’s failure to enforce the letter and spirit of its laws upon commercial 
enterprises). So it is that the discourse of protest has the potential to threaten the social order and 
position of those benefiting from the present dispensation. Further, protest’s emancipatory potential 
may foreshadow a desire whose object transcends mere reintegration of a neglected community into the 
state’s vision of society or rectification of an aberrant corporate law, and rather orients towards actual 
revolution. Protests thus represent a censure of the state and the condition of society. The state has 
responded to this reality accordingly, taking seriously the “threat” protest poses to social stability 
(Hough 2008: 7), and summoning, among others, the South African Public Protector and National 
Intelligence Agency to investigate the causes of protest. 
 
In light of this, South Africa (SA) has been a hotbed for theories about why people protest, and why 
they protest so much, given the levels of violent and bureaucratic repression seemingly making it ever 
more dangerous to do so. Theorists have included both scholars and journalists, some circumspect and 
scrupulous, others sensationalist. Regardless of the rigour of the majority of scholarly theory, within 
the multitude of (sometimes-incompatible) claims, the ways protests have been measured and evaluated 
remain inconsistent. Amid the contradictory claims concerning the causes of protest (contradictions that 
are often subtle, but in some cases, theories are plainly at odds – for instance, those assigning culpability 
to ‘deteriorated municipal services’ vis-à-vis those allotting blame to ‘rising expectations in the wake 
of an improvement of services’), scholars have yet to exhaust the available data about protests (at the 
aggregate level). This is especially true for the period in the early 2000s, when protests seemed to 
become ubiquitous, and most of these theories were established. That said, to my knowledge, no study 
has yet examined each recorded case of protest for any period of post-apartheid history.  
 
This thesis, then, is about protests in post-apartheid South Africa: their size, distribution, and in 
particular, the measurable local conditions associated with these protests, notably in the 2009-2013 
 
 2 
period. By using the largest dataset available for this timespan, I will compare local protest data with 
local demographic, economic, and political data, allowing me to draw inferences on which claims 
endure best under analytic testing. In doing this, I will also show that how one measures levels of protest 
matters, and in the process, will propose a method for analysing protests elsewhere.  
 
The remainder of this chapter will elaborate on the context of protests in South Africa – expanding on 
the problem statement, and then introducing research aims, objectives, and key concepts, and move on 
to outline the methodology, and present closing thoughts.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Context  
According to Runciman et al. (2016: 5; see also Alexander et al. 2018: 30), South Africans have 
participated in well over 70 000 protests between 1997 and 2013. Protest is often seen as a means of 
last resort (Nyar and Wray 2016: 30) inasmuch as it implies that other, official channels of addressing 
collective grievances, are not available or have been exhausted. Protest is also a dangerous act 
(particularly in South Africa, although this is increasingly true globally). The calculation of potential 
gain and present discomfort against potential personal harm nevertheless resulting in so many protests 
indicates a level of desperation among ordinary South Africans which merits attention.  
 
Many scholars have attempted to explain SA’s profusion of protests, often by proposing what may 
amount to “causes”. For instance, Alexander suggests that ‘income inequality must rank highly among 
the structural determinants of the protests’ (Alexander 2010: 32). Whereas Mottiar and Bond offer a 
litany of ‘reasons’ offered by protesters themselves, including the ‘lack of access to water, sanitation, 
electricity, housing and employment, discontent over a lack of political accountability, and specific 
grievances associated with student and worker strikes’ (2011: 2). In contrast, Cronje (SAIRR 2015), 
writes about ‘the deeper reason’ for the protests, which he sees as ‘youth unemployment and 
dependency on the state’. Cronje and others, for example Hough, also cite ‘rising expectations’ once 
services are improved, which may then lead to a mismatch between actual ‘services’ and what is 
expected, as one of the ‘main causes’ (Hough 2008: 5). Nwafor, too, cites high expectations, but in the 
face of poor or non-existent services, as the cause of Community protest (2016: 3). Others, such as 
Twala, point to poor services by themselves as a cause of protest (2014: 159). In addition, many scholars 
also assess international protest trends, and often identify larger, structural causes, including age 
profiles, gender balances and migratory patterns.1   
 
Throughout history, scholars and social commentators have studied events and episodes of social 
disruption by aggrieved communities. Since the second half of the 20th century, different disciplines 
and discourse communities have commented on protest, seeking to answer ‘why men rebel’2 within the 
confines of their fields. This includes the Continental philosophical tradition’s interest in “biopolitics” 
and “resistance as dialectical”, psychological studies on “motivation”, “threshold phenomena” and 
“group dynamics”, sociological works on “social movements” and “deviance”, economists’ interest in 
“incentives”, demographers’ concern regarding mismanagement of the “demographic transition”, 
political scientific attention towards “internal conflict” and “civil resistance” and military scientists’ 
study of “grey wars”. To various degrees, these theories are also coloured by different ideological 
                                               
1 Such factors are also sometimes linked to “xenophobic” attacks in SA. See Claassen (2017) for an overview of 
explanations of xenophobia. 
2 While not intended as a gender-loaded title, Gurr wrote Why Men Rebel in 1970.  
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factions and schools of thought, which may account for differences in the proposed causes of protest. I 
will argue that these claims are not all equally valid.  
 
Scholars rely on several methods of studying protests. The use of case studies, examining three to five 
intensely studied protest-prone sites, is a common approach, as is studying protest events from media-
aggregated data. In 2015, Alexander and colleagues altered the South African protest studies landscape 
by taking a 4 000-case sample from administrative data routinely collected by the South African Police 
Service on all “crowd incidents” they are made aware of – which began to reveal different trends from 
those previously hypothesised in small-n studies. For instance, Runciman and colleagues found that 
only 10% of police-reported protests in their 4 000-sample set were “violent” events, while 80% were 
classified as “orderly” and the other 10% as “disruptive” (Runciman et al. 2016: 53). Despite these 
initial inroads, the police database of crowd incidents, known as IRIS (The South African Police 
Service’s Incident Registration Information System), has not been studied in its entirety, in part owing 
to its sheer volume.  
 
1.3 Aims, Objectives and Thesis Layout  
Focusing on the 2009-2013 period, in this thesis, I used empirical analysis to comment on the degree to 
which certain local conditions account for local levels of protest, thus shifting the coordinates of the 
discourse of protest in South Africa away from speculation and towards certitude. To achieve this, five 
objectives needed to be met.  
 
My first objective was to clarify terms and concepts; that is, framing what I and others understand 
protest to be (or not to be), as well as delineating different types of protest. This is necessary owing to 
the diverse conceptions of protest, as well as the subcomponents of “the protest event” (such as 
organisers or actors), all of which communicate useful information. This framing is the subject of 
Chapter 2.  
 
A study claiming to consider causes of protests ought not to be conducted without social and historical 
context, especially in the case of South Africa, which has a long history of protest, civil unrest, and 
rituals of resistance. My second objective was to contextualise the existing theories of protest, and the 
social conditions they describe as influential on the likelihood of local forms of protest. Chapter 3 
performs this task.  
 
My third objective was to identify the most common claims about causes of protest, and to bring them 
into commensurable formulations. Chapter 4 corrals several writings on South African protest into 
formulations that can be operationalised for statistical testing.  
 
My fourth objective was to produce a usable dataset that can ease the building and testing of explanatory 
models. This involved selecting proxies for the theories of protest, reviewing different data sources of 
protest aggregations, studying the merits and limitations of IRIS, and turning to Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) to “data wrangle” this information into a practical data frame, iteratively improving the set. This 
is all done in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 reports on what are essentially descriptive statistics – the outcomes of the AI process will 
reveal central characteristics of South African protests, hitherto unpublished, including measures of 




My fifth objective was to build and test statistical models that would enable me to assess the explanatory 
power of the various theorised claims around protest. This involved standard regression analysis, aided 
by innovations in AI, such as recursive feature elimination. This will be covered in Chapter 7. The slate 
of candidate variables includes change in population, percentage unemployed, percentage poor, voter 
turnout, mean age, percentage small households, percentage youth, the dependency ratio, percentage 
white, percentage households without water, the Gini coefficient, percentage people with matric, 
percentage non-South Africans, percentage tribal, percentage male, percentage informal, percentage 
rural, along with governance metrics, and aided by post-hoc analysis of other important but non-
animating variables, such as province. 
 
Achieving the above, returned me to the main aim – to evaluate the proxies that support causal claims 
with regards to protest – which, along with summarising the research, is the purview of Chapter 8.  
 
In the process of following the above steps, this study proposed a framework for analysing protest in 
other places and time periods. It also provides the basis for evaluating theories of protest with regard to 
their causal claims, as well as to how changes in levels of protest are formulated.   
 
1.4 Definitions and Limitations 
In this study, protest is approached as ‘a popular mobilisation in support of a collective grievance’ 
(Runciman et al. 2016: 5). For my purposes, protests (and metrics about sites of protests) share three 
key dimensions: type, tumult, and tally.     
 
Types of protest include Community protests and Labour-related protests (which enjoyed the most 
attention in this thesis, owing to their describing the majority of protest in SA), but also health- and 
education-related protests or police- and crime-related protests, among others. Types of protest are 
identified primarily by their actors. They also have other subcomponents - grievances, and triggers 
being the most prominent. Tumult relates to the most disruptive action that is part of the protest. It is 
often a function of the tactic, which is the enactment of a gesture. Notably, I will show that police 
actions during a protest may turn a non-violent event into a violent one, irrespective of the protesters’ 
intentions. “Level of tumult” refers to the average tumult for a geographic unit over a certain period. 
Tally refers to metrics such as those regarding the number of participants. These concepts will all be 
developed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
The study uses IRIS data from the South African Police Service, as well as data from Statistics South 
Africa, and the South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(COGTA), and is thus limited in many ways. Firstly, having restricted its consideration to protest in 
South Africa over the stated timespan, the data cannot claim validity outside of these temporal and 
geographic bounds. Moreover, using IRIS confines one to “what the police see” – that is, restricting 
protests to “gatherings”, when protests can, of course, take many non-gathering forms. Finally, one 
must assume good faith on the part of police reporting as to particulars such as location, crowd size, 
grievances, level of tumult, and so on.  
 
Another data limitation stems from the use of proxies for social conditions such as levels of humiliation, 
trauma, or PTSD. While these involute and intimate human conditions are measurable in the sense that 
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we can metricise them, reducing such intricate phenomena into simple percentages or mere metrics will 
inevitably strip them of their complexity and richness.  
 
Finally, the study mainly used multiple linear regressions, and I did not test for relationships using 
interaction terms, nor did I test for higher-order relations among variables – both of which are left for 
ensuing studies.  
 
1.5 Overview  
This chapter introduced two fundamental questions begged by the abundance of protests in South 
Africa: what brings about this concerning and vexing phenomenon, and how can one account for such 
high and increasing levels of protest in the post-apartheid period? While many – often opposing – 
theories attempt to account for protest (particularly as increased incidents edge the phenomenon into 
what could be termed “rebellion”), scholars have yet to consider all the available evidence relating to 
post-apartheid protests. As such, in this chapter, I have intimated a framework to locate protest within 
other direct political actions, and outlined a strategy to distinguish between protests based on type, 
tumult, and geographic tally.  
 
The idea of a tally led to my establishing what I call the “General propensity” to protest, that is, the 
number of protesters per capita, which represents an improvement of previous measures based on 
protest counts. I found that, using this measure, certain local characteristics (referring to the conditions 
within municipalities) – such as levels of unemployment, voter turnout, the dependency ratio, 
inequality, levels of education, and levels of governance – are important indicators of the propensity to 
protest, while many other candidate conditions failed to be validated. 
 
To embark on this journey, I established the need for a brief review of the South African context, as 
well as theories of protests. This sets the scene by highlighting causative claims from across the 
catalogue of academic discourses regarding South African protests. Above, I have set out a strategy of 
how to convert these theories into hypotheses and then into measurable proxies, and suggested using 
AI to process the voluminous and unwieldy protest data that is available, so as to render it into a form 
suitable for statistical testing. Finally, I proposed grounds for statistical testing to be used for evaluating 
the aforementioned theories of protest.  
 
This thesis is founded on the belief that protest matters - whether as indicator of social malaise, or 
harbinger prefiguring the potential for profound social change. As such, understanding the forces 
animating protest matters. If protest is to be analysed with rigour, we must first accept that the old ‘I 
know it when I see it’3 adage used to ‘test’ for graphic obscenity will not suffice here. In other words, 
protest classification must involve more science than art, and it is to this firmer, analytical ground, that 
Chapter 2 quests.   
  
                                               
3 “Justice Stewart’s test” after the US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961: 4), Wittgenstein writes that ‘if I can imagine objects 
combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such 
combinations’. This dictum is particularly apt when examining a phenomenon – protest – that is itself 
an emergent outcome of other phenomena, and where explanations of the progression towards it tend 
to use multiple words4 signifying roughly the same thing, and where any of those single words. (e.g., 
“movement”) contains a spectrum of possible meanings. 
 
In an effort to avoid such obfuscation, this chapter of conceptual housekeeping will define protest (and 
different types of protests), place protest within the larger context of what I call direct political action 
(or political resistance), and define and set out a stylised scheme of relationships for its theoretical 
components. Moving from a wide-lens view towards a close-up view of protest, I then reveal a field of 
interrelated notions, its components comprising personal concerns; collective grievances; trigger 
events; actors; protest gestures; protest tactics; and levels of tumult.  
 
2.2 Overarching definitions: direct political actions, protests, and grievances 
Before defining protest, the distinction between direct and indirect political action must be made. 
Indirect political actions refer to “politically mediated” actions, or those spanning the breadth of 
electoral politics, but also including diplomacy, negotiation, and arbitration. While these may be 
important elements in political discourse, these are not the subject under consideration here. Direct 
political actions – of which protest is a subcomponent – refer to actions taken by a group or individuals 
highlighting or addressing a social or political problem themselves, as opposed to relying upon 
institutionalised intervention by authorities (Moore and Woolley 2016). Direct5 political action 
therefore also includes Tilly’s formulation of “contentious politics”; that is, ‘the use of disruptive 
techniques to make a political point’ (Tilly 2017: 92), or Klandermans’ ‘unconventional political 
participation’ (Klandermans 2003).  
 
The most basic from of direct political action could be said to be the protest. Protest is a social action 
and a political strategy. It is social, in the Weberian sense of reacting against certain social conditions, 
and in the sense of being performed for objectification and interpretation by the neighbour (c.f. Gilbert 
1992). It is political, inasmuch as it relates its performance to prevailing power relations and modes of 
resource allocation. It is a strategy, insofar as it seeks to alter social relations in some way, and does so 
by causing some deviance from everyday civic routines.  
 
With these notions in mind, I take a common formulation of protest (or, in Tarrow’s understanding, a 
“protest event”), which situates it as a ‘disruptive direct action of collective interest, in which claims 
                                               
4 One only needs to consider popular usage of gathering, demonstration, remonstration, protest, intervention, 
disturbance, picket, march and riot, to see that terms are used interchangeably.    




are made against some other group, elites or authorities’ (Tarrow 1989: 359), elegantly widened to ‘a 
popular mobilisation in support of a collective grievance’ by Runciman et al.  (2016: 19). I  use the 
latter as my operative definition6. A protest, then, is an act intending to lead to social change, which, 
like other forms of direct political action, exists along a “continuum of contestation” (Della Porta and 
Diani 2015), which itself extends from opposition politics to rebellions, revolts, terrorism, and civil 
war. This continuum is, I claim, best understood not as a one-dimensional range between peaceful and 
violent actions, but a complex, multidimensional field. I briefly consider elements of the continuum 
below.  
 
On one end of the continuum we find opposition politics, which refers to organised political parties 
seeking to alter resource allocation and patterns of state-level recognition, but generally supportive of 
the present social order (i.e., proposing progressive/conservative steps, not revolutionary change) and 
upholding the norm of nonviolence.  
 
Against this, rebellions and revolts7 are instances of direct political action by subnational groups openly 
resisting the social order, where the established authority is seen as responsible/complicit in prevailing 
conditions (Heywood 2014: 412). While rebellion seeks to undermine established authorities (whether 
through peaceful actions like civil disobedience or nonviolent resistance, or violent ones such as 
sabotage or terrorism), a revolt seeks to overthrow authorities and the social order, which all but 
necessarily involves extra-legal violence, and is thus typically labelled as terrorism by established 
authorities (Heywood 2014: 412).  
 
The leaders of both rebellions and revolts regard the prevailing authorities as illegitimate, as adjudged 
against a social norm.8 As such, revolt (and the violent strain of rebellion) are sometimes located as 
“irregular wars”9 (of which terrorism and insurgencies are subsets),10 formally described as violent 
subnational struggles over influence and political resources (Hoffman 2009). Whether violent or not, 
direct political actions can operate with varying goals. For instance, some protest actions seek to draw 
attention to a cause without removing established authorities,11 while others – truer to the label of 
                                               
6 See also definitions by Duncan (2016: 122) and Von Holdt (2012: 5). 
7 Depending on context, also described as uprisings and insurrections. 
8 See US Department of State (2001) Statutes 22 U.S. Code § 2656f and 18 U.S. Code § 2383. 
9 Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such change or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government (Cunningham and Lemke 
2014: 334). 
10 Terrorism typically targets non-combatants, while insurgencies typically targets combatants. 
11 For example, activists for Greenpeace, the Environmental Non-profit, who have been described as “eco-
terrorists” (e.g., Eagan 1996).  Perhaps a better example of post-ideological protests is discussed by Žižek, who 
considered the Paris banlieue riots in 2005 as such as case – a protest with no particular demands, and an absence 
of any utopian prospect. This post-ideological protest was, however, an insistence on recognition, Žižek claims. 
As such it is paradigmatic with what Lacan called a passage a l’acte – ‘an impulsive movement into action which 
can’t be translated into speech or thought and carries with it an intolerable weight of frustration’. On the one hand, 
this bears witness not only to the impotence of some protesters (consider the influence a protest in Gaza is likely 
to have on the policies of Israel, or one in Afghanistan on the US’s position), but, even more, to the lack of 
cognitive mapping’, an inability to locate the experience of their situation within a meaningful whole. Such 
protests are, in Žižek’s terminology, phatic – they serve as an attempt to check the communication channels (much 





“terrorist” so easily applied by the state, owing to its intent to bring about fear – may be entirely void 
of a political project.  
 
At another extreme of the continuum is civil war.12 A war between citizens of the same country, civil 
war uses overt violence with the clear goal of taking control of a country or region to achieve 
independence or change government policies (Heywood 2014: 402). What separates terrorism from 
civil war often comes down to scale: a single gunman cannot wage civil war, and at a certain scale, a 




Figure 2.1: Stylised depiction of selected political actions 
 
In an attempt to picture the continuum, Figure 2.1 visualises certain political actions and strategies 
within the three schemas of 1) recognition (by official political parties and agents); 2) reintegration (into 
official politics); or 3) revolution (i.e., the obliteration of certain political institutions with the aim of 
establishing an alternative utopia). While there is overlap between the three, we see that actions that are 
not revolutionary are nominally comfortable with maintaining the present social order, while those not 
interested in recognition may be considered political projects. Meanwhile, actions not aiming to 
maintain the present order are free from the constraints of the norm of nonviolence.  
 
The above classification (i.e., recognition, reintegration, revolution) has at least two significant 
implications. The first is that terms like rebellion and revolt are to be used with trepidation, not simply 
owing to their emotive associations (rebels, rebel fighters/forces, revolutionaries, insurgents, 
insurrectionists, and, ultimately, terrorists) that may muddy conceptual waters, but also, and primarily, 
because some (but not all) protest is a form of rebellion. At the same time, much of the category of 
                                               
12 Which, confusingly, is also sometimes used interchangeably with “insurgency”. 
13 How Russian and Western media respectively comment on Chechen “freedom fighters” is instructive (see for 




revolting/rebellion involves no protest whatsoever.14 The other implication is that civil war and protest 
(and indeed all other political strategies) cannot be seen as unrelated. The “continuum of contestation” 
is nonlinear, and civil discontent often moves along it such that civil war can be linked to the escalation 
of violent protests (Bodea and Elbadawi 2007: 2) and protests can easily coincide with civil war.15 
Instead of this being a proto-causal argument, it is a reminder of a complex relationship between 
different elements of contestation, and, to paraphrase Shaheen and Hayo (2015), that the categorical 
distinction between protest and violent direct political actions is often assumed, but not demonstrated.  
 
Protest is mostly excluded from discourses on political conflict both in military studies and international 
relations, where violent political conflicts must cross a threshold of a set number of “battle” deaths per 
year to qualify for consideration (as evidenced by definitions in the work of, among others, Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009;  Porto and Francis 2008). Similarly, datasets 
(e.g., the Correlates of War Project, the UCDP⁄PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, and Polity IV) tend to 
classify civil conflicts based on a corresponding metric of deaths.  
 
While the measure may be questioned, the real problem is the neglect of instances that do not cross the 
threshold, resulting in large swaths – arguably the biggest part – of political conflict being excluded 
from consideration by scholars of civil war (as argued by Kaldor 2013). As such, significant political 
upheavals are ignored, as are the contextual insight they offer, owing to overly restrictive definitions 
that rule out instances with a low body count (Mundy 2011). The effect of this myopia is far-reaching, 
including misinterpreting the factors causing civil conflicts, but extending as far as recent ruminations 
that contemporary international relations may have a poor grasp on ‘what war actually is’.16 This 
ontological crisis is seemingly corroborated by epistemological unease, as evidenced by the slew of 
recent terminology (e.g., “New Wars”, “New New Wars”, “Grey Warfare”, “High-Intensity 
Participation”, etc.).  
 
Having located protest among direct political actions, I next explore the concept in more detail. My 
aims is to broaden the notion, which will help set up defining different types of protest.  
 
2.3 Expanding the conception of protest 
In the 1970s, Albert Hirschman explained that social actors have essentially two possible responses to 
untenable unfairness or dissatisfaction: “exit or voice”.17 In the political context, one can exit (move or 
emigrate), or exercise voice (vote, or failing that: campaign, protest, or promote revolution) (Hirschman 
1970). This argument’s pedigree goes back at least to Clausewitz’s canonical definition of war, which, 
perhaps counterintuitively (given the abovementioned exclusions within contemporary military studies 
and international relations scholarship), proves insightful in framing protest. In Clausewitz’s (1832: 71) 
influential discussion on the salient dimensions of warfare, he in fact gets close to describing most direct 
                                               
14 There is a wealth of recent scholarship on rebellion formation, rebel organisation, rebel alliances, rebellion 
fractionalisation (Warren and Troy 2015), and datasets (such as Polity IV) which all use “revolt/rebellion” in the 
conventional sense i.e., as cognates of “rebel fighters”. 
15 Direct political actions are to a large degree practised in parallel. 
16 The most overt admittance of this nature may be Hew Strachan, an Oxonian military historian, who suggested 
that ‘one of the central challenges confronting international relations today is that we do not really know what is 
a war and what is not’ (cited in Betz 2012: 25). 
17 With “loyalty” later added. 
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political actions. War, he suggests, is (1) a continuation of political commerce, (2) and part of a series 
of political acts which should not be seen in isolation, (3) which aims to modify (political) reality, part 
of which includes (4) disarming the enemy. Moreover, war is (5) a serious and risky endeavour, 
requiring (6) courage and organisation, (7) necessitating the utmost use of force, and (8) leading to a 
result that is never absolute. 
 
Removing points 4 and 7, and permitting a slight rephrasing, I argue that protest is a continuation of 
political commerce, and part of a series of political acts which should not be seen in isolation, which 
aim to modify political reality. Protest is also a serious and risky endeavour, requiring courage and 
coordination, even though the outcome is never absolute.  
 
As with other forms of direct political action, protest also bears witness to events, policies, or conditions 
that are experienced as repression, neglect, or injustice. As such, protest is a contextually rational 
response,18 a reactive counterweight,19 or part of an emancipatory project, enacted to change a 
prevailing violation and establish what is anticipated to be a more humane or just social order. In this 
mode, courage and coordination are exerted to better participants’ quality of life, not to lower the quality 
of life of another. If understood this way, protest is not merely altruism, but an outflow of care towards 
another. Put differently, protest is an act of love. 
 
While numerous conceptions of the relationship between protest and power exist,20 I argue that the 
above claims about protest as quintessentially an “act of love” do not mean that protest should have an 
uneasy association with violence: protests react against inhumanity, and often violently so. Besides, it 
is not uncommon for such commitments to motivate violent acts.  Nevertheless, the violence attending 
protest – whether by design or as response to provocations (such as police brutality) – is not analogous 
to violence in civil war; as the relationship is more complex, with the former seeking to remove 
suppression, while the latter may view subjugation as part of the ideal outcome.   
 
In sum then, three points. First, protest is necessarily against something (i.e., it is always-already 
reactive to overt or ambient violence) – whether exploitation, the lack of dignity owing to government 
neglect or poor services, or another injustice – and that something may be as abstract as the “negative 
peace”21 of inequality, or the systemic violence of global capitalism.22 Second, protest is an instrumental 
device in the category of power relations (i.e., it involves an expression against a political reality or 
perception), and usually seeks to alter those relations in some way. Third, people protest when other 
                                               
18 Cf. Simon (1990). 
19 ‘…to expose heartlessness, or show solidarity to those crushed by it.’ (Chomsky 2012: 12). 
20 Von Holdt claims that one can extend this argument to posit protest as a political discourse the aims of which 
are to empower, not to overpower. This dimension of standing outside hegemonic structures, and not included in 
a project seeking to become it (which presents a conceptual discontinuity with opposition politics and 
rebellion/revolting) is the foundation of thinking of protest as subaltern (2012). However, this social-
psychological shibboleth, suggesting “grievances and aspirations” distinguish protests from say civil wars, has 
the drawback that it is demonstrably false. South Africa sees many protests by members of political parties, who 
earnestly believe their party to be better equipped to govern. 
21 Galtung introduced the idea of “negative peace” (in a Hegelian triad with “positive peace” and “violence”), as 
a social condition characterised by structural violence (1990). 





means of political participation are restricted or perceived as ineffective (i.e., protest generally is a 
political action of last resort). 
 
Apropos protest as politics of last resort, the idea of protest as a continuation of politics ‘by other means’ 
is contentious, owing to other political avenues becoming ineffective, or not being available in the first 
instance (Tilly 1977). This limited register of social technologies is frequently described as a set of 
“weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985) , or “resources of the powerless” (Lipsky 1968) – although 
characterisations of protest ranges from “strategic” (e.g., Samuel 2013) to “delinquent” (e.g., 
Kepplinger 2009).23 
 
Arriving at a succinct but sufficiently inclusive definition for protest, then, I suggest: the mobilisation 
of direct political actions by members of a less-powerful group against a more powerful group whose 
behaviour has in some way deteriorated living conditions or perceptions thereof, leading to collective 
grievances among the less powerful group. Or, we can further distil the definition to the previously 
stated ‘popular mobilisation in support of a collective grievance’ (Runciman et al. 2016: 5).  
 
Considering the definition above: ‘those who are mobilised’ I call the actors.24 Actors are thus 
groupings of people or organisations, formal or informal, which focus on specific political or social 
issues. Actors also define the type of protest. Actors may indicate a neighbourhood or an association 
representing a geographic community; but it may equally be a community of workers or a union 
representing labourers across an industry. Community protests are thus protests mobilising community-
based actors, and Labour-related protests occur when work-based actors are mobilised. From this, 
Labour-related protests emerge as a broader concept than that permitted by definitions that limit this to 
industrial action solely to improve wages and workplace conditions.25 Labour-related protest here 
includes strikes and acts of solidarity by workers in support of non-workplace issues, such as political 
oppression. The nature of the collective is thus the key determinant of the type of protest (this would 
also be true of student protests).26   
 
 
                                               
23 Others include Williams’ “radical forms of participation” (2006), “violent politics” (Addison, 2002), and 
Mitra’s “complementary channels of participation” (1991). Protest is also described as a non-routine behaviour 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006: 165), anti-social behaviour (Ngwane 2011: 35), insurgent behaviour (Mottair and 
Bond 2012: 5), and unacceptable behaviour (Posastiuc 2013: 3). In line with the “weapons of the weak” thesis, 
several scholars claim that disruption is one of the few interventions available to the politically marginalised 
(Chambers, Piven, and Cloward 1977; Raleigh 2015). The South African context, too, has produced theories of 
how the poor communicate with the state, with protest often the only viable social technology (e.g., Ballard et al. 
2005). Sinwell (2010) characterised this move from officially sanctioned repertoires of political engagement to 
unsanctioned repertoires as a transition from “invited” to “invented” spaces. The nature of this thesis, and that 
data with which it engages, encumbers exploration of institutional channels are how they are used. 
24 I use this at the expense of “movements”, see 2.5.6. 
25 E.g., Flippo (1976: 945) who defines labour-related protest as ‘a concerted and temporary withholding of 
employee services from the employer for the purpose of extracting greater concessions in the employment 
relationship than the employer is willing to grant at the bargaining table’. 
26 For the purpose of my own data analysis, and to somewhat disentangle the Community Protest, I will add two 
“grievance-driven” types of protest: gatherings over concerns about crime or actions of the police, and gatherings 
over concerns about education and health. 
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2.4 Grievances: concerns, grievances, groups and beyond 
I now draw the lens forward, and consider the subcomponents of protest. Figure 2.2 provides a 
simplified view of the constituent parts discussed in this section – concerns, grievances, gestures, and 
tactics – which may develop into what I term “protest arcs”.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Stylised depiction of the interrelation between the processes leading to protest arcs 
 
Grievances drive history. Together with potential gains, grievances form the basis of political 
mobilisation (Collier 1999; Cf. Hume 2014). What follows below works toward a simple formulation: 
that an agglomeration of individual concerns may congeal and form collective grievances, and that 
collective grievances – which concern fictitious commodities and thus fall under the ambit of the state 
– carry the potential for collective action. 
 
If concerns are individual anxieties or fears that spring forth from the disconnect over how things are, 
and how they ought to be, grievances can be understood as shared articulated dissatisfactions about 
perceived injustices,27 While both contain elements of ethical judgements, concerns manifest as 
emotions, making them notoriously hard to capture (Gratz and Roemer 2004).28 Further complicating 
matters is that those emotions – and our endless stream of anxieties and hopes – exist in a subject 
                                               
27 cf. ‘...feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life such as housing, living standard, income, 
employment, health care, human rights, safety, and education’ (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier 2001: 42). 
28 Moreover, the link between combinations of grievances and the will to action may be overdetermined.   
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always-already cast into a context of “background violence”. A potent reformulation of Pericles’ dictum 
that all humans are subject to political systems, whether they take interest in them or not, is the 
Heideggerian concept of geworfenheit (“thrownness”) – being subject to social systems and material 
conditions. Marx (1852: 1) offers an analogous observation on the inescapable reality of contextual 
inequity: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under 
self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past’.  
 
Background violence refers to the ever-present violations to moral ideas of goodness, fairness, and 
justice (e.g., Thompson 1971) and may lead to concerns and, eventually, grievances.29 Thus, if concerns 
are “the anxieties of individuals”, then grievances can be seen as the agglomeration of these.30 
Moreover, grievances are born of the mismatch of expectations and reality with regard to the 
distribution of public goods and the factors of production, and operating at the group level,31 whether a 
family, clan, geographic community, or virtual community (union, religious group, work colleagues). 
In fact, by generating a shared social identity,32 grievances may also “create” a community (Tajfel et 
al., 1979).   
 
Once the combination of identifiable grievances and contextual inequities (which may not be easily 
articulated by its subjects) becomes sufficiently unbearable, conditions for protest may be said to be 
“ripe”.33 In other words, protests do not occur without “relative frustration” (Allal and El Chazli 2012). 
However, while scholars generally agree that collective action is the outcome of perceived injustice;34 
the nature of the link between grievances and direct political action is, as a rule, poorly formulated. 
Among others, political scientists Blattman and Miguel state that ‘the economic motivations for conflict 
are better theorised than psychological or sociological factors’ (2010: 18).35 They go on to appeal to 
scholars to present innovative ways of modelling and measuring individual political grievances, 
bemoaning the coarseness of existing data on grievances (2010: 35). Part of the problem is likely to be 
related to the need to approach grievances econometrically, or at least as “label-able” and countable.36 
This thesis directly addresses this gap. 
                                               
29 When social norms are violated, groups and individuals are willing to incur nontrivial costs to sanction such 
violence, an allowance that may be explained at the neural-physiological level (e.g., De Quervain et al. 2004) or 
the group level. For an in-depth discussion on this, see for instance Jasper (1997). 
30 Which may be mediated by class consciousness, or in the contemporary American political slang becoming 
“woke” to social injustice. 
31 Classical theories of rebellion (understood in the conventional sense, i.e., taking up arms) talk about “shared 
grievances” (Gurr 1970). 
32 This forms the basis of both identity-based conflict (Murshed and Gates, 2005) and class-based conflict (Tilly, 
1977). 
33 Arnson and Zartman (2005); for a  discussion of the concept of ripeness in the contexts of conflict resolution,  
see Zartman (1991). Apropos South African protest, using an Afrikaans expression for “fed-up”, gatvol, Duncan 
enumerates ways and instances of South African communities ostensibly crossing a mental threshold, whereafter 
direct action appears the likely outcome (Duncan, 2016).  
34 c.f. a meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008). 
35 One may safely assume that leading scholars in fellow social sciences such as psychology and sociology will 
offer divergent opinions. 
36 The metrification of social sciences means that, parallel to the trend of commodification (and the discovery of 
a “dollar price” to all goods), there is also a preference to present the richness of human sentiments and morality 





The above allows for four short elaborations. Firstly, although economic considerations are vital and 
tend to be relatively easy to enumerate and metricise, they are by no means the only concerns that may 
develop into grievances. The insight from the moral economy literature is that any norm, when violated, 
may lead to unacceptable conditions. The second consideration is that grievances are complex: they 
may appear in clusters, are never uniformly experienced,37 and can be described with reference to 
feedback loops, nonlinearity, emergence and the language of complex systems. A third point of 
attention is how grievances are metricised (typically by using proximate measures). Collier and 
Hoeffler’s “greed versus grievance” debates from the 1990s and early 2000s is an influential example, 
where proxies such as local “cultural diversity” were used as an indicator of “country-wide grievances” 
(a move widely criticised e.g., Bensted 2011; Keen 2012; Nathan 2003). Lastly, is the consideration 
that moral goods (such as recognised rights), public goods, and the state-created factors of production38 
– land, labour, and livelihood inputs – are functions of the dominant ideology, or mode of production, 
and the distribution of all private goods, common-pool resources, club goods, and public goods are also 
allocated or regulated by the state39 (Samuelson 1954: 19). The significant and often unrecognised 
implication hereof is that all protest relates to the state.40 This argument will be developed further in 
Section 2.7, below. 
 
2.5 Towards a project: gesture and tactic, events, arcs, and aims 
When social conditions are ripe for protest, or when a trigger moment precipitates physical intervention, 
actions tend to follow. However, there is a gap between the intended signal and the actual performance. 
In order to explore this, I now consider a useful theory within psychoanalysis.  
 
2.5.1 Imaginary, Symbolic, Real  
Drawing on the insights of Lacan’s theory of subjectivity, one may distinguish between the Imaginary, 
the Symbolic, and the Real, as the three orders that structure human existence (Wegner 2009). Using 
the analogy of a game of chess,41 one may say that the Imaginary order is operative when a pawn is 
understood to signify a foot-soldier. Thus, the Imaginary is the register of definitions, of that-which-is-
simulated, or what one imagines others to be or objects to mean. Returning to the chess analogy, one 
deals with the Symbolic order when considering the rules of the game and the structure and setup of the 
board (Feldstein, Fink, and Jaanus 1995: 70). Our intersubjective relations, ideological conventions, 
and most importantly, linguistic communication, constitute the Symbolic. With the world carved up by 
                                               
This is what Gramsci (1971) called “economism” – the fallacy of presenting causes as immediately operative 
when in fact they function indirectly. i.e., “goods” or “capital” such as water, friendship, justice or music are 
needed and enjoyed not in economic terms; when economic terms are superimposed upon such desires, this is a 
misrepresentation of the value of the good. 
37 E.g., Alexander’s (2013: 5) explanation of how mineworkers at Marikana’s demands were significantly more 
complex than mere wage increases. 
38 Owing to this “created” or “legislated” quality, these are also referred to as “fictitious commodities”. 
39 Or equivalent established authorities. 
40 Of course, state neglect may be bad, but state persecution is arguably worse. One has to consider both state 
incompetence, such as when public infrastructure is not built or maintained (poor roads in rural South Africa, say), 
and state competence (e.g., the creation of Apartheid Bantustans) as conditions to be resisted. 
41 I borrow this analogy from Žižek (2006).  
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language, and with social events mediated by customs, laws, norms, and rituals, the human subject is 
thus “trapped” as a subject within the Symbolic order (Zalta et al. n.d.).  The contingent circumstances 
left out by the interplay between the Symbolic and the Imaginary is the Real. In the chess example, the 
actual playing of the game by two persons – with ill-conceived strategies, but also the phone call that 
interrupts the game and the dog that upsets the pieces (which become part of “what happened during 
the game of chess”) – constitutes the Real. The Real thus implies some dysfunction of the other orders. 
Thus while the Symbolic and the Imaginary structure reality (though never completely), the remainder 
is the Real (Lacan 2001: xi). Let us now consider how these orders relate to protest.  
 
2.5.2 Protest Gesture 
Somewhere upon crossing the threshold from individual concerns to collective grievances – a process 
that may slowly evolve from communal disquiet, or be suddenly precipitated by a traumatic event – the 
seed for direct political action is planted. The nature of this seed can be thought of within the coordinates 
of the Imaginary order. Differently put, when some conspiracy of circumstances evokes the need for a 
category of actions that represent a rejection of those circumstances, the “idea of rejection” operates, in 
the Lacanian sense, at the Imaginary level. Once this option finds hospitable ground, and the question 
moves from ‘why are things this way?’ towards ‘what are the actions that can be taken?’, we have 
reached into the Symbolic order.42  
 
Thus the Symbolic order question ‘what are the actions that could be taken?’ opens a catalogue of 
possible protest gestures. To categorise those protest gestures, I return to our Clausewitz-derived 
formulation of protest, which included ‘…requiring courage and coordination’, and which understands 
protest as a function of social capital.43 Using the measure of social resources the gesture (in the 
abstract) might require, I distinguish and visually locate gestures on a Cartesian plane (see Figure 2.3 
below). Measuring the social resource of coordination, the y-axis measures the degree to which a 
gesture requires prior arrangements to be made, or the “level of coordination” involved. The x-axis, 
considering the social resource of courage,44 measures the degree to which the gesture may hurt the 
participants, or the “danger of harm to self” that may reasonably be associated with the gesture.  
 
                                               
42 Explaining the psychoanalytic principle behind this two-stage transition, Lacan in fact mentions the idea of 
protest. In Écrits, the Symbolic function is presented as the point at which  ‘…a man who works at the level of 
production in our society...’ sees his reality differently, and begins to ‘consider himself to belong to the ranks of 
the proletariat… (at the first stage, and once this identity is internalised, can move to the second stage where) in 
the name of belonging to [it], he joins in a general strike’ (Lacan 2001: 61-2).  
43 Social capital is understood as ‘the realization of community resources by an individual or collective entity 
aimed at improving the local quality of life…’ (McMichael 2012: 387). 




Figure 2.3: Stylised gesture plot 
 
Deploying types of social capital to define a gesture, Figure 2.3 offers a novel depiction of protest 
repertoires, and reveals the varying levels of coordination and/or courage a gesture requires.   
 
2.5.3 Tactics 
An abstract gesture becomes a tactic upon enactment. Thus, tactics are the means of signalling to other 
parties, the wider community, and state, the severity of the grievances to the people represented by 
those acting out the gesture. While disruption or violence may be implied by the selected tactic, orderly 
tactics do not guarantee that the event, when it takes place, will be orderly or non-violent. Differently 
put, the tactic is the performance of the Symbolic intention, and includes all the messiness of geographic 
particularities, actual turnout, and general human disorder (e.g., changed plans, the initiative of rogue 
factions, the weather, responses by authorities, and all other contingent factors): in other words, the 
Real. Of the concepts developed so far, the enunciated content of tactics is the easiest to observe and 
measure (as opposed to emotions and intentions); as such, formal studies of protest, especially the 
tradition of Protest Event Analysis (discussed in Chapter 5.3) rely heavily on this construct.   
 
2.5.4 The Protest Event 
An event45 is the occurrence of a tactic, akin to what Favre (1990) calls a “protest moment”. An event 
contains at least one, and potentially multiple, tactics. For example, a single event may involve the 
                                               
45 There are, of course, other conceptions of the event/Event. I offer a more restrictive conceptualisation than that 
of Chaos theory, where the proverbial dragonfly flapping its wings over Alexandra may trigger a rainstorm in 
Alexandria: for Chaoticians, all events are significant since everything is interconnected in a web. Contrariwise, 
my position is more generous than the formulation of Events as only those occurrences which are so significant 
that one is forced to question the nature of one’s web of meaning, as Žižek would have it. To Žižekians, ‘an Event 
is not what happens in reality but something that shapes our subjective perception’ of the Real, some intervention 
into social and ideological relations which ‘transforms the entire symbolic field’ (Žižek 2014: 6). Instead, an 
Event, as I formulate it, is an act or interconnected series of acts which alter the politico-symbolical field. When 













































display of banners, a gathering, a march, and the handing-over of a list of grievances. As with 
everything operating within the order of the Real, the event is a performance for the gaze of the Other, 
and as such, as soon as it is carried out, is “lost control over”, inasmuch as the event (including its 
unintended dimensions) is never hermetically sealed, but is reported and interpreted from the outside. 
Hermeneutically revisited, it is guaranteed to be misinterpreted to some degree.46 
 
The event, which presents a rupture from the appearance of social normality, also becomes a social fact, 
to which authorities must respond – knowing that a non-response is a reaction in itself. Many theorists 
suggest that a true event will inevitably be met with attempted repression, although a full set-theoretical 
exploration of the event is beyond the scope of this dissertation (e.g., Badiou 2007). 
 
2.5.5 Protest Arc 
A protest arc is a series of protest events, happening over time, and addressing a related set of social 
concerns. It is an especially helpful concept when considering that protests are generally not once-off 
happenings, but are clustered spatiotemporally. The image of the arc – evoking a start, middle, and end 
– intimates that the collection of related events is somehow distinct from previous events, and is thus 
more accurate than terms like “episode” or “series”, which neglect the rise-and-fall dynamic of protest 
arcs that eventually culminate in temporary dénouement47 or abeyance (Castells 1983: 215-288). 
  
2.5.6 Social Movement Theory 
While the protest arc is the extent to which the present work surveys and develops protest theory, it is 
of course not the biggest picture. Protest arcs are, at the meta-level, structured within “big projects”, or 
struggles. Clusters of protest arcs may be theorised as waves (e.g., Almeida 2008) or cycles48 of protest, 
emphasising instances of ‘heightened conflict across the social system’, with ‘intensified interactions 
between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution’ 
(Tarrow 2016: 153). Such waves may even be international in nature, acting in a quasi-contagious 
manner, as was witnessed in the so-called Arab Spring of 2011-2016.49  
 
                                               
46 In the way that all of history has a hermeneutic life of its own, i.e., that events are interpreted through iterations 
of symbolically mediated practices (Dilthey 2010). 
47 Which may be victory or defeat of the objective. Recall, however, Slovo: “heroic failures have a way of 
contributing to eventual victory” (1997).  
48 One vein of inquiry illustrates the tendency of protests, and revolutions in general, to follow a predictable 
pattern, or cycle. For instance, Brinton (1938) distils the revolutionary process as cycling through financial 
collapse; the organisation of the discontented to remedy the collapse; revolutionary demands on the part of the 
organised discontented; attempted repression by the government in the face of the demands; the failure of the 
repression; the attainment of power by the revolutionists; the fractionalisation of the revolutionists; and the violent 
clashes between the competing factions of the revolutionaries, typically moving from Right to Left.  
49 It is unclear if one can really assign an end date to the Arab Spring, given ongoing events. Rosa Luxemburg 
(Luxemburg 2003: 61), among others, wrote about the power of the “revolutionary wave”, where a series of 
revolutions occurs in various locations within a similar timespan in different countries: ‘The most precious thing… 
in the sharp ebb and flow of the revolutionary waves is the proletariat's spiritual growth. The advance, by leaps 
and bounds, of the intellectual stature of the proletariat affords an inviolable guarantee of its further progress in 




To the scholar of protest events, it will be obvious that the standard canon of Social Movement Theory 
(SMT) is somewhat tacit in the conceptual development presented thus far. For reasons that follow, I 
have not evoked mass society theories or theories of collective behaviour by name, and I have used 
actors instead of “movements” to refer to individuals or organisations which mobilise vis-à-vis political 
or social issues. I do nevertheless owe a debt to SMT, not only in how I conceive of movements50 (which 
informs my understanding of actors), but also for the process by which a group acquires collective 
control over the necessary resources to overcome collective action problems (i.e., resource 
mobilisation) (Tilly 1977: 10). While locating this dissertation within the coordinates of SMT would 
have certain benefits – for example, helping to frame how the collective action problem is overcome, 
and providing a theory of the factors facilitating events to materialise – SMT is not without problems.  
 
Firstly, SMT is unclear (at least a priori) about what stage of the stylised protest formulation process 
the movement forms. It may be that a movement is borne out of the event; meaning that once an event 
(or a second event, depending on one’s definition) occurs, we are also dealing with a movement.51 
However, the movement may also form earlier, at the moment of the trigger, and may thus be 
transcendental52 to event formation. Or, the movement’s genesis may occur even earlier – perhaps at 
the transition from concern to grievance. It is plausible that movements in fact facilitate the formation 
of the grievances, and of course, the presence of multigenerational civil organisations, trade unions, 
political parties, separatist groups, etc. suggest that many social movements predate their present 
members, who “found” them as always-already there.  
 
A second problem is the sometimes-overlooked fact that throughout history many protests have 
occurred without a social movement present ( Engels and Muller 2019; Piven and Cloward 1977). There 
is abundant evidence of protest arcs without a body answering to the definitions of SMT anywhere in 
the picture. While alternative projections of SMT onto such “non-orthodox” protests have been 
explored, this appears a fudge: I am not so much interested in non-social movements as in the possibility 
of non-movement events.  
 
The third problem is that the SMT-frame may be inappropriate to evaluate non-Western protest events. 
Mamdani, Mkandawire and Wamba-dia-Wamba have shown how the structural settings problematised 
SMT-based lenses within the African setting (1988). More recently, Runciman (2016), following Cox 
and Nielsen (2007), argued that the entire concept of social movements would benefit from being 
“decentred” on the grounds of its Eurocentric baggage. That “baggage” includes an analytically 
constraining organisation-oriented approach that sacrifices the view of complex, contingent, context-
specific processes and the material experiences of everyday life in order to maintain a fiction of 
movements as stable political “agents”. Notwithstanding recent claims that social movements in Africa 
are not principally different from those in other world regions (Engels and Müller 2019), reality (and 
                                               
50 The most-cited definition of a Social Movement is ‘a group of people acting together in pursuit of common 
interests’ (Tilly 1977: 14) or more elaborately, ‘organisational structures and strategies that aim to empower 
oppressed populations to mount challenges and resist the more powerful elite’ (Glasberg and Shannon 2010: 150), 
the latter definition putting more emphasis on the collective aim. Social movements, according to the classic 
definition, must have an identity, an adversary, and a societal goal or vision of a better social order (Touraine, 
1988). In the political science tradition, they are seen as ‘collective bodies distinguished by a high level of 
commitment and political activism, but which may lack clear organisation’ (Heywood 2014: 413). 
51 For an overview of various definitions of “movement”, see Opp (2009).  




the Southern experience) is markedly messier than agent-based thinking permits, and events in the South 
are ostensibly less bound-up in traditional Western notions of movement history, hierarchy, and the 
dangerously-reified societal triumvirate of government-business-civil society.53 Moreover, collective 
action outside of movements, as they are typically defined, may be more effective than collective action 
organised through social movement organisations (Piven and Cloward 1977). Like Cox and Nilsen 
(2007), Runciman suggests an improved approach would be simply to consider a spectrum of 
organisational and non-organisational forms which may mobilise people into counter-hegemonic 
collective action,54 dynamically shaped by varying cultural, historical and socio-economic factors, all 
of which reside in the icy shade of global capitalism. This is therefore not to discard SMT outright,55 
but to comment that since movements are not essential to the phenomenon, one should take care not to 
perpetuate SMT’s fictions, lest they become reified.   
 
2.6 Further discussion about the components of the event: triggers, tactic, and tumult 
2.6.1 Triggers  
As intimated above, protest is not only reactive. Involving the potentially restrictive and/or 
disincentivising qualities of courage and coordination, the initiation of a protest event – a move that 
implies energy expended, opportunity costs incurred, and risks undertaken – requires actors to 
overcome the collective action problem. Indeed, collective action problems – the associated costs that 
reduce the possibility that any individual will rationally undertake a certain action alone, despite the 
fact that people may benefit from it – are offered as a main explanation for why people who share 
serious concerns about their socio-political conditions continue living under repression instead of 
rebelling.  
 
Often, the collective action problem is overcome when the magnitude of the grievance becomes 
unbearable, or a “grievance saturation point”56 is reached. However, the notion of “creeping 
normality”57 (Diamond 2005) offers a strong argument for how conditions, when altered gradually over 
time, are accepted/tolerated by the subject community, almost no matter how dire they become. That 
is, the same changes occurring in a single step would be experienced as a shock, offering those rejecting 
social conditions a strong rallying cry towards mobilisation. Thus it appears that small changes, or 
                                               
53 Part of the problem, Runciman explains, is the chasm between scholarly abstractions which purport to neatly 
theorise direct political actions, on the one hand, and the understanding and interpretations which the activists-as-
subjects-of-academic-inquiry hold of themselves and their actions. She cautions scholars about essentialism, 
reductionism, and romanticism, suggesting they be more aware of ‘the messy and often contradictory realities of 
social movement activism’ that often implies ‘fragmented forms of resistance across a diffuse range of identities 
and interests’ and apparently illogical and nonlinear counter-hegemonic challenges (Runciman 2011: 609-612). 
The core of this line of argumentation follows Scott (1985), who points out that ivory-tower prescriptive ideas of 
‘real’ resistance ‘fundamentally misconstrues the very basis of the economic and political struggle conducted 
daily by subordinate classes’. 
54 ‘...disruptive power... (which resides) outside of formal organisations’, lay at the heart of the success of ‘poor 
people’s movements’ (Chambers et al. 1979). 
55 As elsewhere, the contemporary academic landscape sees frequent exhortations to decolonise discourses and 
curricula (e.g., Heleta 2016). Perhaps the decentering of SMT presents a modest contribution to this ideal.   
56 See discussion of ripeness, above. 




simply harrowing conditions that have “always been this way” may not be enough to catalyse direct 
action. 
 
A compelling concept is that of the trigger event, an occurrence that, once breached or met, catalyses58 
the protest event’s occurrence (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002: 80). As illustrated in Figure 2.2, 
triggers may play the role of an event that adds to ripeness (i.e., at the interface of concerns and 
grievances), or may be an event that catalyses mobilisation (i.e., at the interface of grievance and 
action). I contend that such events typically turn out not to be, strictu sensu, a sudden worsening of 
conditions, but rather incidents that reveal the true nature of the social system. This “seeing conditions 
for what they are” is Lacan’s second step of subjectivation: the trigger presents the consummation of 
the grievance-response nexus unto the Symbolic order, and summons the necessity of a gesture. Among 
many possible examples, such a trigger may be a police-killing of an unarmed civilian, a summary 
dismissal of a colleague for a minor offence, or an interrupted water supply to a community – 
respectively validating the impunity of the police, demonstrating the racism of a company’s 
management, or confirming the incompetence of a municipal manager.  
 
Beyond blaming “social conditions” – nebulous as they are, and difficult to assign culpability for – a 
trigger event also offers a perpetrator (which may be the actual source of dissatisfaction, or simply a 
metonymic figurehead or scapegoat of convenience). Without a main, unifying concern, perhaps tied 
to a “culprit”, mobilisation (and direct action, reasonable or not) is difficult, if not highly unlikely.59 
Without the ripeness (i.e., propitious conditions to mobilise) that comes with a collective grievance, 
trigger events are likely to remain personal tragedies to their victims and kin. At the same time, without 
a trigger event, a collective grievance around unjust conditions may never precipitate action. While 
triggers could be listed on a scale based on effect, emergent behaviour is complex and unpredictable. 
In other words, it is easy in hindsight to cite emotionally arresting events that served as a spark in a 
room long-laden with gunpowder – the murder of Khalid Said (Egypt, 2010), or the self-immolation of 
Mohammed Bouazizi (Tunisia, 2010) – less so to determine in advance the effect of a possible trigger. 
 
2.6.2 Tactics questioned 
Tactics, as developed above (2.5.3), are the post-hoc description of the gesture performed at the event. 
Classic Anglo-American protest literature (1970s onwards) refers to a repertoire of contentious politics 
– or direct political actions. In a series of seminal papers, Tilly distinguishes tactics as part of old versus 
new repertoires. The “old repertoire”, practised until roughly the 1830s, consists of parades and 
turnouts,60 land invasions, destruction of toll-gates and other barriers, the expulsion of foreign workers, 
pulling down of private houses, forced illuminations,61 rough music, etc. The “new repertoire” was a 
                                               
58 To catalyse here used in the sense as Fireman et al. (1976) – to bring about, induce.  
59 The specific local conditions – the subject of Chapter Four – are ostensibly more important than the trigger. 
However, one of the aims of this dissertation is to see to what extent both local conditions and trigger events can 
be retroactively assigned. Other studies have shown how, in the absence of a trigger event, collective grievances 
need to be harnessed by “protest brokers” (Lockwood 2017).   
60 ‘…were the routines by which workers in a given craft who had a grievance against their employer of their 
locality went from shop to shop, calling out the workers to join them in a march through town…’ followed by 
behaviour that looks suspiciously “unionised” – caucusing demands and negotiating with the bosses (Tilly 1983: 
14) 
61 Where supporters of a cause run through streets, demanding that households light lantern or fires to show 
solidarity with a cause (Tilly 1977: 13). 
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sign of its times. That is, a socio-political order with fewer land barons running feudal estates, more 
political power centred upon the capital (i.e., London – this is a rank Eurocentric position), and the rise 
of mass literacy and newspapers resulted in new forms of protest: electoral campaigns, electoral rallies, 
social movements, public meetings, strikes, petition marches, and invasion of official assemblies. I 
argue that this distinction needs updating, or at least benefits from being decentred from its conventional 
use, particularly when considering forms of protest in the present global South, where the “old 
repertoire” seems not to be rejected at all, albeit modified in line with contemporary technology. 
Chapter 6 considers Tilly’s position in light of contemporary evidence.  
 
An inconclusive catalogue of tactics observed in current South African protests includes blocking of 
thoroughfares (including the construction of barricades); boycotts (including elections); burning of 
tyres; cacerolazo or other forms of public noise (e.g., katzenmusik/charivari); chasing unpopular 
individuals out of townships; confrontations with police; dancing (toyi-toying); demonstrations; 
destruction of buildings; disruptions to speeches and public events; extrajudicial killings; forcing the 
resignation of elected officials; gatherings; go-slows; hostage-takings; hunger strikes; land occupations; 
letter-writing; looting; mass meetings; memoranda of demands; mock awards; petitions; picketing; 
processions; refusal to work; sabotage; sit-ins; work to rule. 
 
2.6.3 Tumult: the emergent reality of events  
A mobilised group’s chosen tactic does not necessarily determine the level of violence of the actual 
event. Of course, if the tactic is essentially violent (an attack on an official, perhaps) violence is pre-
baked into the event.62 However, if the gesture is not essentially violent (e.g., a march), how the 
corresponding tactic plays out as a real-world event is contingent, and while violence may not be 
planned, it also cannot be precluded. A key factor in this emergence is the counter-tactic used by the 
target or authorities. If, for example, police attack a large but peaceful march, there is, of course, some 
likelihood that the marchers will retaliate in a way that will be declared violent (Alexander and Pfaffe 
2014: 207). This consideration, elementary though it is, makes the evaluation of events precarious,63 If 
data analysts do not take care to determine whether violence was initiated by protesters or authorities,64 
then all violence attending protest events necessarily taints the event, regardless of the protesters’ 
intention. 
 
Another salient consideration is that the non-violent/violent distinction conceals more than it reveals: 
what if protesters want to unsettle the everyday patterns of repression without hurting anyone (for moral 
reasons, to maintain public sympathy, or simply not to evoke further repression)? To consider one 
example, is the blocking of a company’s entrance-gate a violent tactic? The need to appeal to the 
standard media canon of only reporting on matters ‘current, close by, controversial, conflictual, 
consequential, scale or sensational’65 also dictates that, below a certain disruptive threshold, media do 
not report on protest events.    
                                               
62 By Tarrow’s conception, violent events imply the intentional damage to persons or property, beyond merely 
interrupting the routine operations of a target or everyday social life – which is thus a different set of tactics that 
lead to merely disruptive events (2016: 99). 
63 Apropos using labels as violent/non-violent. 
64 i.e., whether or not “Han shot first”. 





Several scholars have jettisoned the dichotomous violent/non-violent distinction by suggesting an 
important overlap: all violent protests are disorderly, but not all disorderly protests are violent: some 
are disruptive but peaceful. To account for this, Runciman et al. use a three-way categorisation of 
protests: orderly, disruptive and violent66 (Runciman et al. 2016: 25), which corresponds to Wang and 
Piazza’s (2016)  ‘non-disruptive, nonviolent disruptive and violent disruptive’ categories of tactics, 
which adopts Tarrow’s (2016: 270) recommendation to divide protest events into ‘contained, disruptive 
and violent’ incidents. 
 
Figure 2.4: Visual representation of three-way tumult distinction 
 
Figure 2.4 offers a visual presentation of this idea. Here, orderly events are ones where neither the 
intention nor the actual event contains tactics that cause direct harm to people; disruptive events are 
said to have taken place if the event succeeded in interrupting the normal flow of daily proceedings, 
without causing direct harm to people; and an event is designated as violent when its emergent reality 
causes direct harm to people or things.67 
 
2.7 Encapsulated by the state 
A final principle is that protest cannot be de-linked completely from the sovereign state in which it takes 
place.68 Because power and social relations are structured not only between humans, but at the level of 
society (Althusser 2006), social structures regulates how roles and statuses, and ultimately actions, 
manifest. Thereby, protests are often directed at a party other than the state, but the context of the protest 
is indelibly coloured by the context of history, culture, and especially the operative legal framework. 
                                               
66 This assumes that, by definition, all orderly protests are peaceful. 
67 Using the “blocking of a thoroughfare” example – the blocking of the entrance to a hospital would of course be 
a tactic of violence, while the blocking of the entrance to the mortuary, as happened in Durban in South Africa, 
2011, would not.  
68 This claim – that protest and the state are linked – is contentious: it assumes that the fully-formed state is always-
already there. Such a lens discounts political conflict in ancient times. That said, one could easily make a case 
that Jeroboam's secession of the southern tribes of Israel from Rehoboam's formerly unified kingdom (circa 900 
BCE), the slave revolt in Egypt (205-186 BCE), or the secessio plebis of 494 BCE in ancient Rome, or any number 
of other premodern events, should be considered acts of protest. However, while many examples of gatherings, 
demonstrations, boycotts, disobedience, mutinies, rebellions, assassinations, and wars may be enumerated, one 
may claim that there is an important distinction between resistance to power (the Foucauldian “imperative”) and 
resistance to perceived injustice. For this distinction to hold, justice cannot mean “interest of the strong” (e.g., 
Plato’s Thrasymachus68, nor can it rely upon a metaphysical claim (the veracity of which is subject to competing 
dogma), but has to be derived from the mutual agreement of (almost) everyone concerned, that is, the idea of a 
Grotian-Hobbesian-type social contract. 
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To wit, states with laws proscriptive of public protest, will of course still be home to people with 
dissatisfactions, but the observer may possibly not witness any protest. 
 
In particular, the latter requires a system of rule of law, since rule-of-man systems are, by design, unjust 
insofar as the outcome of conflict is by design decided largely by the holders of power, and not by some 
objective measure, nor by “the people”. Thus, for a direct political action to be a protest, three 
preconditions must be met: 
 
a) Rational-legal domination: a political order not determined by charismatic decree or traditional 
authority (O’Neill 1986; Owen and Strong 2004). 
b) A modern state: a set of governing and supportive institutions that have sovereignty (the 
independent exercise of legal jurisdiction) over a definite territory and population insofar that 
the authority of the ruling regime is largely tied to legal rationality, legal legitimacy, and 
bureaucracy. 
c) Inclusion into the modern world order:69 the presence of at least some private property, wage 
labour, voluntary exchange, a price system, and a measure of competitive markets. Note that 
this does not present modernism as anathema to class rule. Wolpe (1986) reminds us that, on 
the contrary, the capitalist project is a specific instrument of the maintenance of class rule. 
 
If one accepts this condition, protest should be regarded as a purely modern phenomenon, where the 
modern state has in one entity consolidated social, political, and economic function.70 This Hegelian 
“secular deity” presents its stated goal as the defence and expansion of public welfare, and rests on a 
social contract based on codified or implied rights. Only once a state exists to extend rights (instead of 




This chapter explained the need for clarity when considering ‘what we talk about when we talk about 
protest’, and suggested a scheme of conceptual relations for various direct political actions – including 
civil war, rebellion, and terrorism. The act of protesting can be analysed at different levels. Up close, 
there is the gesture, the abstract notion of the tactic to be carried out. Using a medium-shot focus, one 
sees the protest event, or the immediate context in which the gesture plays out. Zoomed out, one might 
observe the “arc”, which in turn is a series of events, which also then forms part of the context of any 
singular event. 
 
                                               
69 Modernity here indicating the Foucauldian historical category marked by the ‘questioning or rejection of 
tradition; the prioritization of individualism, freedom and formal equality; faith in inevitable social, scientific and 
technological progress, rationalisation and professionalisation, a movement from feudalism (or agrarianism) 
toward capitalism, industrialization, urbanization and secularization, the development of the nation-state, 
representative democracy, public education…’ (Foucault 1977: 170–77). See also Giddens (1991: 94). 
70 Of course, there is a marked difference between protests signalling “the state is doing something unjust” and 
“the state is permitting circumstances for something unjust to happen” (i.e., a company has been allowed to 
summarily dismiss a shop steward without breaking any laws). In many instances the link to the state may not be 
contemplated at all (unless the state’s tools of maintaining order and social form – i.e., the police, courts, jails, 




I have rationalised my working definition of protests –  ‘a popular mobilisation in support of a collective 
grievance’ – and explained how I classify different types of protest going forward. Chiefly, Community 
protests are actions involving community-based actors, and Labour-related protests occur when work-
based actors are mobilised.  
 
I established that protests can be viewed as having at least one of three aims – reintegration, recognition, 
or revolution, and developed the interrelations of these narratives. I then expanded on the definition of 
protest, at once locating it as politics by other means, and, at root, as a commitment in the same ethical 
category as love. This non-hegemonic dimension distinguished protest as quintessentially subaltern – 
this, and the fact that it typically does not involve “battle deaths”, means that it generally falls outside 
the purview of military studies (and even largely outside the study of International Relations), which 
presents a significant analytical blind-spot of these disciplines.  
 
From the insights presented by psychoanalysis, I identified the value of distinguishing the 
imaginary/symbolic/real split, and how that yields a gesture/tactic/tumult split when studying protest.  
In addition, I teased out the tensions between “Northern” Social Movement Theory, and contributions 
from the global South. However, I also claimed that certain components should be thought of as 
operating consistently, and while their interactions are characterised by heterogeneous agents, phase 
transition, and emergent behaviour (i.e., complex systems), the principles of grievances, triggers, 
tactics, and outcomes appear sufficiently universal to be used in the analysis that will follow. 
 
Finally, I considered the state’s role in social relations, and saw that the modern state may be said to be 
presupposed in and necessary to experience protest, and that the study of protest must be contextualised 
by history, culture, and the state’s legal framework. The next chapter will do just this – offering a brief 





Chapter 3: South African Context 
3.1 Introduction  
Protest is a product of history – it echoes back traditions of resistance, and of the inequities that the past 
has produced in the present. This makes protest, to a high degree, location- and culture-specific. It 
follows that protest analysis needs to be rooted in place and time. 
 
To offer any sort of historical overview in a few pages is fraught with dangers, more so for a thesis on 
South African protest. But providing no context would hazard supposing that protest rose ahistorically, 
and therefore risk irrelevance, as short-sighted explanations are bound to be.  
 
I claim that a given protest is framed by a local “protest culture”, which is linked to social and material 
conditions, to the violation of moral economies, and to how these were brought about. Much of what 
constitutes protest is, therefore, a continuation of the traditions which formed in opposing a state’s legal 
order – in South Africa’s case, a history typified by dehumanising laws, land theft, racially-based 
geographic assignment, and social stratification, also primarily based on race. 
 
This chapter seeks to highlight that protest is part of the struggle against the repressions of the state (pre 
and post-1994), that strikes contain elements of the political, that there is a protraction of residents of 
townships using disruptive tactics, and that people generally experience few political alternatives. I will 
also discuss the concept of a “Rebellion of the Poor” developing over the last 15 years, and the theory 
of “Popcorn” protests. Then, I consider statements made by South African officialdom about protests, 
and what that conveys about the state’s conception of the phenomenon. Finally, I reflect on community-
state relations, probing the frame of the social contract. 
 
3.2 Bonsai history  
This section does not offer an overview of South Africa’s history. Instead, it highlights five 
considerations which will help to locate contemporary protest. 
 
3.2.1 Modern statehood 
One may argue that South Africa was incorporated into the global capitalist order by 1902. The South 
African War, fought, from the British perspective, primarily over the control of goldfields (and to a 
lesser degree, diamonds), ended in a victory to the British, who took over administration of the formerly 
Dutch/Afrikaans Orange Free State and Transvaal. These were incorporated, along with Natal and the 
Cape Province, into the Union of South Africa in 1910. The war was, according to Luxemburg, the final 
ruination of the peasant economy of the Afrikaner, and of the natural economy of the African blacks, 
and proved how ‘non-capitalist organisations [provided] fertile soil for capitalism ....and [the economy 




Over the next seventy years, the state embarked on a series of programmes, many of which developed 
to facilitate the upliftment of poor whites, improve internal statecraft, and to build a nation-state (see  
Seekings 2007). Notable milestones were reached in 1926 and 1931 (with the Balfour Declaration  and 
the Statute of Westminster respectively confirming sovereignty), and in 1961, when it became a 
republic. By the time full self-governance was achieved, SA could be regarded as a fully functional 
state, with industrial policies, mass employment schemes, bilateral international trade agreements, a 
reserve bank, etc. 
 
3.2.2 Various forms of institutionalised discrimination  
Founded on systems of slavery, indentured labour, and systematic land-theft, South Africa’s history of 
the 17th century onwards saw the population of South Africa subjected to various forms of prejudices, 
officially codified. A sample of such laws are listed below. 
 
a) Racial divisions in the workplace, particularly in the mines, were reinforced by the Mines and 
Works Act, and Native Labour Regulations Act, both of 1911. 
b) The Natives Land Acts of 1913 decreed that whites were not allowed to buy land from ‘natives’ 
(and vice versa), limiting black landholding to around 10%. The law vested ‘traditional land’ 
in chiefs (and not in their ‘subjects’), and outlawed sharecropping, which had a devastating 
effect on black small-scale farmers and labour tenants. 
c) A series of Pass Laws were introduced from 1919 onwards, limiting the movement of ‘non-
whites’. These were not a new invention, however, South Africa had pass laws since the 18th 
century. Moreover, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act was the framing legislation for all 
industrial relations, including conduct of strikes going forward. 
d) From 1950 onwards, the state introduced a raft of laws to repress liberation-oriented 
movements, including the Unlawful Organisations Act and the Suppression of Communism 
Act, which together forbade any organisation to subscribe to communism or ‘ideological 
positions intent on disrupting social harmony’. The former also gave the state increased power 
to ban meetings and arrest leaders of subversive organisations. In addition, The Population 
Registration Act (1950) was passed with the aim of permanently classifying the entire 
population according to race, and that members’ set racial classes were allowed to only live in 
predetermined areas, as outlined in the Group Areas Act (1950). This demarcated separate 
living areas for the four ‘groups’. Critically, it separated living and working areas, with 
profound implications for separating community and labour protests, it also effectively 
excluded non-whites from white urban areas and business districts. The Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act (1951) allowed the state to demolish informal houses, among others. 
e) Through a series of laws, the ten Bantustans, or ‘black homelands’, were established – 
rendering blacks ostensibly as citizens of these states, thus for practical purposes stripping 
people of claims to citizenship in South Africa. These Bantustans functioned, in part, as labour 
reserves – with the masses geographically fragmented to retard mass movement formation, and 
sufficiently impoverished as to make exploitative employment in mining and agriculture 
nonetheless desirable. 
 
3.2.3 Pendulation between resistance and repression  
The struggle for emancipation can be dated back further, but gathered momentum with the formation 
of the South African Native National Convention (SANNC, antecedent of the African National 
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Congress) in 1910. However, it is possible to contrive the struggle as an elaborate cat-and-mouse game, 
where the actions of the leaders of the liberation were almost-inevitably met by countermeasures by the 
regime. Below I list seven instructive episodes. 
 
a) In May 1918, black workers embarked on strike action against low wages, poor housing, and 
the pass laws, joined, among others, by the Bantu Women’s League. The next year the state 
enacted stricter pass laws. This was answered by numerous groups, including the SANNC, who 
led several campaigns against pass laws throughout the 1920s. Resistance was mostly in the 
form of civil disobedience campaigns, calling for people not to carry passes, or to refuse to 
present their passes to the police when instructed to do so (to overwhelm the state bureaucracy). 
The state responded with mass arrests. 
 
b) South Africa has a long history of strikes, even predating the 20th century. In 1920, around 
70 000 black miners went on strike to demand, among others, a wage increase, bringing 21 
mines to a standstill. The “Rand Rebellion” took place in 1922. In 1946, 60 000 black miners 
in the gold industry went on strike for improved living conditions in the inhumane, dirty, 
dangerous, and segregated mining compounds, and for higher wages – in both instances, the 
government supressed the strike, assaulting strikers and arresting their leaders. 
 
c) In 1950, the recently formed ANC’s youth league, growing in members and influence, led by 
Nelson Mandela, began arguing for direct political action beyond strikes and boycotts, guiding 
the ANC towards ‘a more radical and revolutionary’ path. When the slew of apartheid laws of 
1950/1 was passed (and to grieve the deaths at a recent massacre, at Bulhoek) the ANC and 
others organised a day of mourning, known as the “National day of protest”, which was to be a 
general strike. In its wake, the ANC and affiliates launched the “Defiance Campaign”, which 
included strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience such as flouting pass laws. The state arrested 
more than 2 000 people over six months, regarding their actions as ‘anarchy, communism and 
disorder’ (Pillay 1993: 16). It also raided the offices of the campaign’s organisers, and banned 
some of the leaders (Newport Daily News 26 Jun 1952). 
 
d) The Defiance Campaign was mostly nonviolent (on the side of the campaigners), but after riots 
broke out (such as over the killing of a person by railway police in October 1952, leading to 
people attacking police officers and station buildings), the state ordered that rioters be shot ‘on 
sight’ if necessary (The Age 13 November 1952). A few months later, parliament also passed 
the Public Safety Act (1953), which included penalties for participating in protests. 
 
e) In support of several grievances, including the pass laws, laws prohibiting gender equality 
(regarding pay, property rights, and the guardianship of children), and injustices concerning 
housing and education, in August 1956, a multiracial group of 20 000 women marched on the 
Union Buildings, where they handed over thousands of petitions, stood in silence for 30 
minutes, and sang political chants (i.e., struggle songs). The previous year, a mass meeting, 
known as “The Congress of the People”, was called by the Congress Alliance, which included 
the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and several others. Here, the Freedom 
Charter, a script proposing universal human rights, including equal education and legal rights, 
and a radically alternative vision of the ownership of land and industry, was drawn up. Police 
raided the meeting, detained more than 150 people (confiscating their documents and 
photographing them) and charged the arraigned with high treason, relating to espousing 
communism, plotting to subvert the state by violent revolution, and seeking money to buy 
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firearms. The detentions and consequent court days were marked by protests that consisted, 
among others, of gatherings, road blockings and stoning of police vehicles. The ensuing 
“Treason Trial” collapsed in 1961, citing insufficient evidence; the state responded by passing 
the Indemnity Act (1961), which allowed police officers to commit certain acts of violence, 
including torture, in the pursuit of official duties. 
 
f) Countrywide protests followed after police attacked a peaceful protest in Sharpeville in March 
1960, killing more than 60 people. In one case, 30 000 people marched on parliament in Cape 
Town, in another, crowds attacked Bantustan government offices. The state responded by 
declaring a state of emergency, mobilising the army, and arresting over 11 000 people (Lodge 
2011: 167). The ANC and PAC were consequently banned, and now, operating underground 
(or via members in jail or in exile), formed military wings. The 1960s also saw the arrest, trial 
and sentencing of several ANC and PAC leaders, including Nelson Mandela.  
 
g) With the heads of the ANC and PAC jailed or exiled, organising community strikes became 
increasingly arduous (Sibeko 1976: 14), and in some cases, resistance took the form of work-
based protest, and to a lesser degree through the student-led Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM). For example, in 1973 trade unions organised a series of protests for improved living 
and working conditions, against the migrant labour system, against barriers to free association, 
and for increased wages. By March that year, around 100 000 workers had come out on strike. 
Similarly, in 1975, 50 000 workers broke their contracts with mines owing to unacceptable 
living conditions. Between 1979 and 1981, recorded strike incidents increased from 101 to 342 
per year (Plaut 1986). The BCM, despite focusing on the organisation of community clinics, 
aiding entrepreneurs, and holding “consciousness” classes and adult literacy classes, 
propagated a clear revolutionary ideology (Makino 1997). Its leader, Steve Biko, was arrested 
and died in police custody in September 1977. One month after Biko’s death, the South African 
government declared 17 groups associated with the BCM to be illegal. 
 
3.2.4 A mass insurrection during the 1980s, with townships the hotbed for resistance  
Repression and resistance increased in the last decade of apartheid, as the regime grew more militaristic 
and dictatorial in a fight against internal and external enemies. Several factors amplified the anxieties 
of the apartheid regime, these included: 
 
a) The independence of Mozambique and Angola, and the transfer to democratic rule in 
Zimbabwe, which presented the state with ‘hostile frontiers’, drawing it into a brutal and costly 
‘counter-insurgency’ war. 
b) The Bantustans proved to be economic disasters, with highly unpopular leaders, and drained 
resources from Pretoria. 
c) International sanctions (imposed by the US and EC in 1986), and divestment campaigns, put 
strains on capital flows and international borrowing. 
 
In South Africa, over 400 groups formed the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, a heterogeneous 
movement comprising organisations of communities, students, women, and youth which were 
“ideologically varied” but nonetheless committed to armed struggle and revolutionary change. The 
UDF organised strikes, school boycotts, leaflet campaigns, general awareness strategies, and a series of 
attacks on black police officers, urban councillors, official buildings, and state property. Moreover, the 
ANC, via the exiled Oliver Tambo, denounced PW Botha’s “new” constitution (1983), and called for 
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townships to be rendered “ungovernable”, including blocking of roads, and attacking police and 
damaging government property (Sales 1984). 
 
Botha responded by declaring a state of emergency in 1986, and stated that his aim was to ‘eliminate 
all resistance to the policies of apartheid’71 (South African History Online, no date). From 1986 to 
1989,72 soldiers and policemen patrolled townships in armed vehicles, destroyed illegal homes, and 
tortured and killed “insurgents”, using censorship laws to conceal much of this to the public.  
 
However, pressures increased, and with the “fall of communism”, the argument of South Africa as a 
bulwark against communism (Office of the Historian, n. d.) became increasingly tenuous. The result 
was a slow move towards reform. In 1990, FW de Klerk unbanned political parties and groups, and 
freed Mandela from prison. The apartheid regime had, during this time, trained Zulu paramilitary units 
(Ashforth 1991); an estimated 15 000 people died in inter-ethnic clashes leading up to the election, 
chiefly involving the large Zulu minority. 
 
3.2.5 Resistance to the government did not stop in 1994 
Formal Apartheid was dismantled following a series of negotiations in 1990 and 1991. In April 1994, 
multiracial, multiparty elections heralded the dawn of democracy for South Africa. Over 20 million 
votes were cast, of which the ANC received 63% of the vote, the National Party 20%, and the IFP 10% 
(Southall 1994). However, killings between Zulu members of the IFP and ANC, primarily in KwaZulu 
Natal, continued at well over 1 000 per year (Mare 1996).  
 
The multiparty government of National Unity initiated a project to redress apartheid legacies of poor 
social services and mass poverty, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This 
involved extending access to potable water, electricity, sanitation, housing, health services, and 
education. By 1998, the RDP had produced housing for around 5 million people (with water, electricity 
and sanitation connections, as well as title deeds). Roughly 2 million people were given access to water, 
around 500 clinics were built, and the state rolled out several health campaigns, such as a National 
hepatitis vaccination programme.  
 
However, the RDP was not without its critics, and led to resistance of its own. In some instances, RDP 
housing delivery led to violent conflicts within communities over bribery relating to the drawing up of 
lists and list queue-jumping. Communities protested the quality of the new houses, the poor interior 
layout, the process of compiling the waiting lists, and the sluggish pace of completion (Wines 2005). 
Poor bureaucratic systems meant that water quality, as well as the payment systems (administered at 
the municipal level), were often below an acceptable level, while critics of the healthcare system argue 
that access to healthcare only improved slightly under the RDP and that, even with moderately improved 
access, standards at many medical institutions declined rapidly. Severe pressure on the healthcare 
system, caused by the mass of new eligible patients, poor state administration, and an exodus of white 
specialists, doctors, and medical staff, meant that, for example,  the 1 million visits to a Soweto hospital 
in 1994 was attended by 800 nurses – but alarmingly by the year 2000 the number of patients had 
spiralled to about 2 million, but the number of nurses had fallen to less than 650 (Von Holdt and Murphy 
2007: 312-339). 
                                               
71 While also setting in motion the disassembling of some apartheid legislation, splitting NP support.  
72 During this time, the 1987 miners’ strike, led by NUM, took place – it was at the time South Africa’s largest 




Land reform was another serious challenge.  The RDP had aimed to resettle families on 300 000 square 
kilometres of land—in reality only just over 1% of this goal was achieved. Moreover, the advances in 
many other areas of public services came partly through the removal of agricultural subsidies—which 
subsequently created massive job losses. Between 1994 and 1998, the number of workers on 
commercial farms declined from 1.4 million to below 640 000 (Lodge 2003: 60). 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic wreaked havoc on the South African populace. By 1999, South Africa had 
the world’s largest HIV burden ( Birx 2014; Chigwedere et al. 2008). A significant death toll mounted, 
such that life expectancy fell by just about 10 years (from 63 in 1998 to under 53 in 2005) (Shisana et 
al. 2009). Mortality and morbidity had far-reaching, long-term effects – many households became more 
vulnerable, indigent, and food-insecure, with families losing breadwinners, women and girls were often 
required to perform the unpaid caring work for the sick, and household conditions often prevented 
young people from using education opportunities or achieving  their potential.  Many children were 
orphaned. Companies lost human capital, with consequent economic knock-on effects.  A financial 
burden was also shouldered by the state, the health department became underfunded, as evidenced in 
several hospitals that were strained for staff, and resources, including shortages of medication and 
hospital beds (Erasmus et al. 2016). By 2002, researchers estimated that 29% of pregnant (urban) 
women aged 20-24 were HIV positive (UNAIDS and W.H.O 2002; Shisana et al. 2009). Protest rallies, 
pickets, and marches continued throughout Thabo Mbeki’s presidency (BBC 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding the myriad of challenges, at the general election in June 1999, the ANC was returned 
to government, its majority growing to over 66%, while the New National Party shrank into near-
oblivion. The Democratic Party became the official opposition, with roughly 10% of the vote, with the 
IFP’s support hovering near 9%. Thabo Mbeki replaced Mandela as president of the ANC in December 
1997 and became president of the country after the elections (in 1999) pledging to address economic 
woes and to fix municipal governance (Nattrass 2017: 235).  
 
Around the time of the first democratic elections, the ANC abandoned its adherence to Socialism for a 
‘moderate economic policy’, which in reality was a neoliberal73 macroeconomic platform. Government, 
aiming to keep inflation low, stabilise public finances, attract foreign investment, while simultaneously 
remaining cautious about capital flight (capital controls were largely removed after 1994), and about 
maintaining the image of South Africa as ‘investment-friendly’, was careful not to appear as rash or 
radical in its reforms. This guarded approach to societal transformation, along with slow economic 
growth (joined by the allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and favouritism attendant to all 
politics), meant that resistance to government policies continued – including protests over ideological 
positions by the ANC, poor or non-existent municipal services, landlessness, government corruption, 
high levels of crime, the quality of health and education respectively (and policies surrounding these, 
local management, etc), among many other sources of dissatisfaction. Similarly, labour disputes did not 
melt away, but reflected the slow change in working conditions, lingering racism of management, unfair 
laws, new forms of exploitation, and the long shadow of apartheid.  
 
Phases of post-apartheid protest 
                                               
73 Neoliberalism is the label given to contemporary fiscal liberalism (Stiglitz 2014) advocating economic 
liberalisation, open markets, privatisation, deregulation, and decreasing the size of the public sector while 





Ngwane (2011) identifies three phases for protest movements.74 From 1994 to about 2000, protests 
typically related to discontent over municipal services, housing and the lack of infrastructure.75 Over 
the next ten years, a series of relatively formal social movements (examples include the Anti-
Privatisation Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, and the Democratic Left Front) came to 
prominence, with some, such as the Treatment Action Campaign, gaining significant traction in 
National and International media and policy influence. A third stage followed: the post-2010 era, which 
presented more local Community protests and national strikes, but which (in Ngwane’s assessment) 
represent ‘a fragmented and inchoate challenge to the post-apartheid neoliberal order’ lacking both 
ideological purity76 and organisational rigour (referring to processes, structure and leadership), and as 
such do not pose ‘a serious challenge to the present order’ (2011: 2). 
 
Others, such as Steven Friedman, testified to continuities in government over the past 50 years. As such, 
Friedman states that, under the ANC, the newly-liberated South Africa was always going to follow the 
capitalist trajectory set by the apartheid regime, and that no other route would have been conceivable 
amid globalised capitalism.77 Moreover, Friedman argues that while the regimes may have changed, the 
current wave of protests stretches back to the 1970s, based on a longstanding culture of resistance78 
(2013). 
 
Injustices over living conditions, workplace rights, and political participation have not been resolved 
for millions of South Africans post 1994, and with that, the expectation of a ‘better life for all’, the 
ANC’s 1994 campaign slogan, has never vanished, but has, as I will argue, turned into a festering 
wound. 
 
                                               
74 Echoing Cronin’s three phases in the post-apartheid economy: ‘1994–1999, when macro-economic policy was 
assumed as the driver of growth, 1999–2002 when privatisation was supposed to be the key catalyst of growth, 
and post-2002 when infrastructural investment is the key catalyst’ (Cronin in Legassick 2007: 10). 
75 Some identify this as a “lull” in protest action between 1994 and 1999 (Ballard et al. 2005), with some saying 
this particular lull might actually have been shorter in duration (Dawson 2014), and that protests recommenced 
soon after the democratic elections. 
76 To Ngwane, such ideological opaqueness sits at the root of “anti-social” elements exhibited in mass actions – 
including populist chauvinism, xenophobic attacks, mob justice (2011). However, it is not clear how ideological 
purity could be (re)imposed upon the working class and pure, or, to our analysis, whether, for example, 
“xenophobic” attacks may be consistent with the pattern of escalating actions. 
77 Moreover, a non-capitalist route would, in his estimation, have simply disappointed people even more – since 
the redistribution of power/goods could never be as radical as some activists may have suggested, and academics 
may have hoped for: ‘Had the dissidents won the argument, and had deeper and broader popular organization 
followed, the available evidence suggests that the outcome would not have been socialism but a more egalitarian 
capitalism...’ and ‘...the effect would have been precisely the opposite: to demoralize participants who would see 
their efforts to alter the distribution of power and privilege constantly come to nought and would therefore 
conclude not that radical change was needed but that no change was possible…’  (Friedman 2012: 1) 
78 ‘Poor people have been out on the streets for many years. Protest is almost a daily event. And, while it is 
common to claim that it began a few years ago, a more accurate view is that there has been almost continuous 




3.3 Strikes as political  
The principle of the workers’ struggle and the communities’ struggle being ‘different battlefronts of the 
same war’ is not novel, nor exclusively South African. The idea of the “General Strike” in Britain was, 
‘from the beginning, conceived as something that might include “the community”, in the geographic 
sense’ (Chaplin 1933: 27). Similarly, South African workers’ movements are historically not just related 
to, but in many cases inseparable from the wider struggle. 
 
One example is how Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC Youth League, described the general 
strike on 26 June 1950 as a “political strike” (Giliomee and Mbenga 2007: 430; see also  Hirson  1961) 
with a character indivisible into worker strikes and Community protest.  Moreover, after the wholesale 
banning of the ANC, PAC, Communist Party and others, trade unions were one of the few ways in 
which grievances over societal concerns – alongside workplace injustices – could be raised at all, with 
most avenues for political mobilisation shut.  
  
Another instructive example comes from the founding conference of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), where Cyril Ramaphosa (1986: 1), who organised the meeting, opened 
proceedings with a speech reminding attendees that:  
 
We also have to realise that organised workers are not representative of the working class 
as a whole but are its most effective weapon.  ...it is important that organisation on the shop 
floor be strengthened and in this way we will be able to contribute to the struggle of the 
working class as a whole and to the struggle of the oppressed people in this country. 
 
This ‘proletarian community of fate’ (Zeilig and Ceruti 2008), which includes full-time workers, the 
marginally employed and the unemployed, places workers and the communities from which they are 
drawn, as immanently intertwined sharing social capital, due to what Putnam would call their 
‘horizontal bonds of mutual solidarity’ (Putnam 2001). Others, such as Alexander, agree that ‘... the 
survival of the poor is bound up with income from workers...’, but reiterates that there are also important 
differences between the nature of Community protest and strikes (Alexander 2015).79 
                                               
79 Alexander uses the image of a hinge interlocking “via capitalism” to illustrate the relation of workers and 
communities. Thus, the hinge’s wings can be more or less apart where the hinge can be closed (aligned) or open 
(interests opposed) (2015). Alexander points out that the tactics of workers, on the one hand, and the unemployed, 
on the other, are often different, due to different relationships to the means of protest – ‘When workers protest 
against their conditions, they organise at work, engage in strike action, build unions and, perhaps, develop a 
federation that provides a political voice. None of this involves the unemployed and underemployed, who are 
neither needed nor, in most cases, wanted…. [whereas the unemployed] ...have time to organise and the ability to 
mobilise in the name of a community as a whole; they have the capacity to win backing from workers and to 
mount dramatic protests that threaten the rule of the state; and they can unseat politicians and undermine the 
legitimacy of established politics…. [Here,] workers are marginal and sometimes disparaged’ (Alexander and 
Pfaffe 2014). They also claim that community protests are typically shorter in duration than workers’ strikes,  and 
more significantly, that in some cases the poor can be victims of strikes. Thus, there remain enough significant 
changes (different rhythms, in Tilly’s language) to declare that workers and poor communities are, paraphrasing 
Castells (1983), “allies not comrades”. This hinge-view draws on the Northern tradition, exemplified by Piven 
and Cloward (1975: 87): ‘workers protest by striking. They are able to do so because they are drawn together in 
the factory setting, and their protests consist mainly in defying the rules and authorities associated with the 
workplace. The unemployed do not and cannot strike, even when they perceive that those who own the factories 
and businesses are to blame for their troubles. Instead, they riot in the streets where they are forced to linger ... 





Considering present-day trade unionism in South Africa, they look on themselves as stewards of the 
revolutionary traditions, and are not limited to grievances relating to workplaces in the limited sense,80 
instead, mobilising around grievances over capitalism, conditions of unemployment, against 
xenophobic attacks, against water and electricity cuts in communities, against toll road systems, and 
political corruption in the period post-2000. 
 
3.4 Legacies of the struggle 
3.4.1 Structures and units in the streets 
Civil society organisations, or civic associations (known as civics), proliferated during the 1970s, and 
rose as a coalition ‘straddling the whole [non-white] urban space’ (Glaser 1997: 6); they constituted 
local residents, representing their material and political needs to various degrees (Van Kessel 2000). 
Here, material needs were issues such as municipal services, public transport, child-care facilities, and 
lower rents, whereas the broad political aim was the overthrow of municipal and national apartheid, but 
was often expressed in simply opposing municipal authorities, largely regarded as illegitimate and 
unrepresentative, foisted on black townships by the apartheid regime (Glaser 1997). 
 
This collective spanned varied levels of formality (Seekings 1992); some were poorly organised, while 
the best-organised civics were effective in mobilising support (rooted in branches at street and block 
level) and in forcing concessions from the government. When civics united under the ANC-aligned 
UDF-banner, it was primarily to challenge reformed influx control measures, the government-imposed 
Black Local Authorities and the 1983 constitution (along with the tricameral parliament, which 
excluded blacks). The actions of the UDF gave rise to the state of emergency, discussed above. 
However, notwithstanding the UDF, for most civics, most actions remained spontaneous rather than 
orchestrated (Van Kessel 2000: 55). 
 
In general, civics have been in “crisis” post-1994, and have declined in numbers, membership, 
organisation capacity and influence (Brooks 2017; Weideman 2015). However, their tactics have 
endured, especially as ad hoc community structures have felt the need to mobilise. Significantly, despite 
civics’ legitimacy resting on their representative nature and on their ability to bring a measure of law 
and order to otherwise lawless townships – their ability to mobilise has been their most enduring legacy. 
Moreover, civics (and, historically, the underground military wings of the ANC and PAC) provided 
young children, especially boys (Van Kessel 2000: 11, 38), with role models – street fighters (whose 
knowledge and use of disruptive tactics, may have a bearing on present protests). 
 
                                               
80 For example, COSATU’s “aims and objectives” include ‘advancing or opposing any law, action or policy of 
any authority or body affecting the interests of affiliates in particular, or the working class in general’ (“Aims and 
Objectives – COSATU” n.d.). Elsewhere, NUMSA resolves to ‘build a united front of organisations that are 





3.4.2 Township ungovernability 
As discussed, the UDF reacted to the 1983 constitution with what was effectively a township rebellion 
(Van Kessel 2000: 89-102), which led to the regime announcing a state of emergency, heralding a 
period of increasingly heavy-handed authoritarianism, particularly in non-white living areas. The 
response to this was a call from the exiled leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, for townships to be 
rendered “ungovernable”, a job the UDF took on.  
 
Ungovernability included rent boycotts, blocking of entrances to townships, and attacks on black 
policemen, urban councillors, official buildings, and state property. ‘An atmosphere of mass 
insurrection prevailed in many townships and rural areas’ (Deegan 2001: 59;  also Sales 1984: 7), and 
while ungovernability can be traced to “overwhelmance” strategies of the 1950s, the 1980s revolt was 
significantly more violent and millenarian in spirit.  
 
3.4.3 Funerals and other tactics  
One more consideration is that protest had to operate within the coordinates of the state – by either 
using inventive ways to operate within the law, or creative ways to escape the wrath of the regime.  
 
Among others, Habib (2005) pointed out the irony that the very legal space that allowed for the creation 
of the civics and the UDF was created by one of State President Botha’s reforms, which was anticipated 
by the regime to have a conciliatory and pacifying effect on the black majority.  
 
In a similar vein, but with a much longer history, is the fact that funerals were one of the few types of 
mass meetings generally permitted by the minority regime. Thus, South Africa has a long tradition of 
the eulogies and speeches at funerals containing political content, and represents a platform for protest 
as well as mourning.  
 
One informative example was the funeral of Anton Lembede, in 1947. Lembede was the first president 
of the ANC Youth League (in 1944), and the ‘principal architect of South Africa's first full-fledged 
ideology of African nationalism’ (Gerhart 1979: 51). For his funeral, thousands of people attended, 
mostly travelling on foot, including  ‘over fifty private cars, 25 lorries and six municipal double-decker 
buses’ (Lembede, Edgar, and Msumza 1996: 171). Govan Mbeki, a prominent leader in the ANC spoke, 
as did JB Marks (who would become chairman of the South African Communist Party and treasurer-
general of the ANC), railing against the regime, and assuring attendees of the struggle’s continuation 
(Manenzhe 2007). The practice of using funerals to mount heightened protest campaigns, indeed, of 
funerals being a mass-meeting that constitutes protest, would continue with the passing of AB Xuma in 
1962, Biko in 1977, among many others, as it does, to a degree, to the present day. 
 
3.5 The present: Still unequal in every way 
Apartheid was to some degree a ‘discriminatory welfare state’ (Seekings 2007), where legislated racial 
segregation created the “two economies” phenomenon, where there came to be a white, ‘well-educated, 
dynamic, adaptive society’ juxtaposed with a ‘large world of poverty, exclusion and humiliation’ 
typifying non-white life (Hirsch 2006: 233). 
 
The fall of the white minority regime, and the victory of the ANC at the 1994 elections translated into 
equal rights for all South Africans, but not into an erasure of the social inequalities created by several 
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centuries of injustices. The largely unaltered dual-economy system, with protected elites, appears intact, 
albeit the bourgeoisie is no longer whites-only. Despite a rise in economic output, most measures for 
country-wide poverty, inequality, employment, and land ownership have not improved significantly, 
with some indices even moving in the wrong direction.  
 
Following the RDP, discussed above, the Mandela government adopted the Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution report (GEAR),81 which linked the state’s social objectives to economic growth rates, 
and positioned the enacting of neoliberal policies as the only way in which to achieve a business climate 
attractive for foreign investors, seen as a crucial component to economic growth (Peet 2002; Sinwell 
2011). 
 
The various policy frameworks have been significantly less effective than envisioned. As discussed, the 
government achieved less than 1% of the intended land reform, with the majority of  land by area owned 
by whites fifteen years after the end of apartheid (Atuahene 2011; Lodge 2018). The spatial segregation 
of apartheid also translates into other factors, such as access to decent schooling. In 2011, more than a 
quarter of 12-year-olds were functionally illiterate (Spaull 2013); this rate was only 4% among the 25% 
wealthiest schools.  
 
Levels of employment and inequality have moved in the wrong direction. In 1992, the World Bank 
estimated that 28% of the labour force was unemployed; this moved to 29% in 2019 (although it was 
estimated to be above 33% in 2002, and below 23% in 2008). South Africa has around 4.5 million 
unemployed adults, many of whom had no formal work experience whatsoever (Leibbrandt et al., 
2010). “No-worker households” have increased in the post-apartheid period, swelling the number of 
families that rely on social grants as their main form of income (Finn, Leibbrandt and Oosthuizen 2014), 
and deepening poverty.  
 
The Country’s Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, was 0.59 (or 59%) in 1993, and by 2015 
measured at 0.63 – the highest in the world (from the countries listed by the World Bank82 [n.d.]). In 
2010, South Africa’s richest 10% held around 70% of net wealth, while the bottom 60%  held only 7% 
of the net wealth (Durrheim, Mtose and Brown 2011).  
 
Leibbrandt and colleagues (2010) argue that South Africa’s decreased levels of poverty (comparing 
2010 to 1994) is the effect of the state’s social grant system, not from the labour market. Instead, they 
go on to suggest that, post-1994, labour markets have played an important role in exacerbating 
inequality.  
 
Even though the average share of wage income in total income has remained constant at 
around 70 per cent over the post-apartheid period, wage income has contributed between 
85 per cent and 90 per cent of the total inequality in household income over the years 1993, 
2000 and 2008. In contrast, state transfers are shown to make up less than 1 per cent of the 
overall Gini coefficient. 
 
                                               
81  A document compiled by the SA Department of Finance, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South 
African Reserve Bank, and representatives from the World Bank. 
82 However, several highly unequal countries are not listed by the World Bank, including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf 
States, Cuba, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea. 
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The legacy of apartheid also means that poverty, unemployment, and inequality (as poor schooling and 
other service disparities) remains socio-economically stratified by race. Approximately 90% of the 
country’s poor are black, and the unemployment rate is highest among blacks (30.4%) and lowest 
among whites, at 7.6% (Statistics South Africa 2016). 
 
3.6 Incomplete revolution     
While the majority of South Africans indicated hopes that were modest and, probably, achievable 
(Reynolds 1994), a few also carried “messianic expectations” of impending and total liberation towards 
the end of the apartheid years (Van Kessel 2000: xvii), a hope that was not immediately dashed, but 
rather, died a slow death: political liberation came at once, while economic parity, dignified public 
services, and meaningful political participation have, in the main, never arrived for ordinary South 
Africans.   
 
Webster and Adler describe South Africa’s socio-political conditions as stuck between the first and 
second stage of a “double transition” from a system of racialised socio-economic segregation and 
political subjugation, towards a socialist democracy (Webster and Adler 1999). This incomplete 
conversion83 has placed South Africans at the mercy of the violence84 inherent to global capitalism. This 
context is the background that contextualises all other grievances. Sinwell (2011) adds that, instead of 
providing full liberation, its policies have reproduced intergenerationally the vulnerabilities of poor 
South Africans, by commodifying basic services in a way that creates a sense of competition among 
the poor. These have the added pernicious effect of maintaining poor-against-poor rivalries, which in 
some cases include the effect which is labelled post-hoc as “xenophobic” attacks. 
 
3.7 Lack of political alternatives     
Elections are the main tool used by participative democratic states to formally express collective desires 
and to transfer power (Popper, Havel and Gombrich 2011: 368). The reality is, however, more complex: 
in South Africa, many citizens experience their political options as severely constrained. South Africa 
is sometimes depicted as having a dominant-party system (e.g., Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer 
2001; Habib and Schulz-Herzenberg 2011), with several reasons suggested for people’s reluctance to 
vote for another party but the ANC85.  
 
While the ANC commonly ascribe their success as reflecting popular satisfaction with socio-economic 
gains since 1994 (ANC 2019), scholars seek to explain party dominance despite socio-economic 
privation. One such reason offered is loyalty to the ANC, as the party of liberation, despite the lack of 
                                               
83 Having nominal political rights, but remaining within fundamentally the same economic relations/mode of 
production. 
84 This is what Žižek would call objective violence. Subjective violence is ‘visible and direct’ harm that which is 
enacted by an agent, whereas objective violence is systematic, symbolic, and hidden from view. When a food riot 
happens, thus, there are at least two “violences” taking place – the hunger caused by state (or IFI) policies, and 
the violent resistance itself. For Žižek, the standard rhetoric against subjective violence, such as riots, are 
symptomatic of liberalism’s preoccupation with ‘all-too-visible subjective violence’ (2006) and blindness towards 
in the violence inherent to societal structures essential to ‘the smooth functioning of our economic and political 
systems’. 
85 However, the ANC’s decreasing electoral support and the emergence on both the right and the left, of coherent 
opposition groups, is beginning to draw this formulation into question.   
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socio-economic improvements for most people (Paret 2016). The “liberator thesis” holds that a political 
party is seen as the political liberator from colonial or minority rule and automatically commands a 
loyalty that wears off much slower than political capital does in Western democracies. Drawing on 
popular nostalgia and projects of nationalistic myth-making, liberators are hedged by “halo effect” 
heuristics offering a moral hegemony, and are all but guaranteed votes for some time – so that elections 
are mostly procedural rituals. To wit, not one of SA’s northern neighbours has changed regime since 
liberation inasmuch as liberator parties have ruled uninterruptedly – 47 years in Botswana, 38 years in 
Mozambique, 33 years in Zimbabwe and 23 years in Namibia. The ANC’s apparent moral hegemony 
has implied that, to some observers, even the people moved to participate in protests, come national 
elections, routinely return the ANC to power (Booysen 2007). Others have interpreted this “dual 
repertoire” (of protesting as a fight for better services, and nonetheless remaining dedicated to the ANC) 
as a sign of protesters not seeking a revolution, but yearning for inclusion into the system – among 
others, Friedman argues that it is quite implausible that people ‘are too loyal to the governing party to 
vote against [it, but will] be willing to overthrow it’ (2013: 1). 
 
Other reasons for voting patterns include the possibility that people simply do not attribute poor public 
services to governmental/municipal non-performance, especially in isolated rural areas, where the state 
may be experienced as all but absent, or in near-mining communities, who may have come to expect 
municipal services “delivered” by the mines, whom they see as the legitimate providers of social care, 
based on the ground reality. 
 
One should  also note that overall voting turnout in South Africa had decreased in every election since 
1994 (when 86% of the voting-age population voted), with less than 58% of the voting-age population 
voting in 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg 2014). Yet others have pointed out that the largest opposition party, 
the Democratic Alliance, symbolises a “white” or “sell-out” vote, which may be an unfeasible electoral 
alternative to the masses. It has also been pointed out that in the past decade, opposition parties have 
come to define themselves as “parties of protest” (Runciman, Bekker and Maggott 2019), eroding the 
relevance of the dual repertoire thesis. 
 
All told, whether voters generally remain bound to the ANC via loyalty, ideological principle, or other, 
more prosaic considerations, the poor – almost universally, when subject to global capital – have access 
to limited strategies to enhance their social and economic interests, and thus, in many cases, experience 
the need to resort to protest (Albritton in Mottiar and Bond 2011: 5). 
 
3.8  The Rebellion of the Poor, and Popcorn Protests 
Perhaps the two most prominent contemporary theories of South African protest are the “Rebellion of 
the Poor” and “Popcorn Protest” theses.  
  
Peter/Kate Alexander was the first scholar to theorise on the scale of South African protests in the post-
2004 period, which was regarded as confrontational, radical, sufficiently large to herald an 
insurrectionist rebellion of the poor86 (2010), which was in fact a “twin-rebellion”, with workers and 
                                               
86 This phrase comes from Hannah Arendt, which Alexander is here reclaiming for the Left. Arendt’s On 
Revolution (1963), where the phrase was first used, rejected the contemporary leftist position that the French 




communities each forming separate tiers (2015). Drawing on a 4 000-record sample of public order 
police records, Alexander asserted the view that South Africa is unmatched for ‘a similar level of 
ongoing urban unrest’ (2015), and, comparing SA to 39 other countries (ILO Online 2012), that the 
country probably87 has ‘more strike days per capita than in any other country’ (in 2012), leading them 
to declare South Africa the ‘protest capital of the world’ (2015). 
 
Alexander uses “rebellion”, neither for the levels of turmoil witnessed, nor to describe the influence 
protests have hitherto had on state hegemony, but by the sheer number of protest incidents, which have 
shown an upsurge around 2004, with wide geographic distribution, possibly ongoing88  (Alexander and 
Pfaffe 2014; Alexander 2010). The rebellion-nomenclature has also been adopted by other social 
scientists to describe South African protest (e.g., Pithouse 2008). 
 
This moniker does not seek justification on the ground of the contemporary technical definition.89 
Instead, Alexander motivates for using “rebellion” on the basis of protests being militant, political and 
a massive movement (2010). While many protests certainly have a combative character, Alexander 
(with colleagues) points out that protest violence is generally avoided and unplanned (Runciman et al. 
2016), and mostly the outcome of police heavy-handedness: conceivably, “militant” may be regarded 
as a stretch. The term “political” is also somewhat Delphic – it would not be accurate to suggest the 
protests are political in the way that anti-apartheid protest was political (in the sense of demanding the 
unbanning of political organisations, the lifting of the state of emergency, the extension of the franchise, 
or the unbanning and release of political prisoners); that said, all protest is a priori political – in other 
words, “political” is either too narrow to describe the present phenomenon, or so wide as to be a truism.  
 
With respect to the urban youth, Alexander (with Pfaffe) observes that the post-2004 rebellion by 
communities have the capacity to ‘threaten the rule of the state’ (2014: 205) and that these are well-
organised (in comparison to strikes) owing to the fact that communities have more time available to 
plan, may be overstating the organisational resources available to most organisers of Community protest 
(vis-à-vis the resources available to the state to respond to protests), and their potential impact on the 
state, which appears to have been marginal over the past 15 years. Moreover, it may be possible that 
protests contain an element of the phatic (see Chapter 2.2) or portions that seek incorporation, and thus 
seek not to threaten the state, but instead long for recognition by, or (re)integration into the state, 
accepting our current ideological coordinates, disheartening though they may be.  
 
                                               
Arendt saw the French Revolution as a failure to address the “social question” inasmuch as their self-appointed 
leaders generally saw themselves as the “embodiment of the will of the people”, foreshadowing Stalinism.  
87 Alexander suggests that SA has the world’s highest number of “days lost” per capita per annum. This appears 
to be false. The same ILO dataset suggests that Cyprus had 0.33 protests per 1 000 workers, whereas SA had 0.15 
(in 2012). One may also reflect that person-strike-days (companies report workers’ lost days) should be conceived 
of differently to the count of participation in Community protest, where unemployed community members may 
well feel that a day of protest action was “worth the struggle”, and a day would not necessarily be “lost” in any 
way.  
88 Note how this diverges from the once-off pitchforks-and-torches spectacle that Friedman criticises in his Calm 
down, the poor are not about to revolt article (Friedman 2013).  
89 As explained in Chapter 2.2, although often used loosely, “rebellion” strictu sensu implies the taking up of 




Nevertheless, the fact remains that the scale of manifested discontent should not be dismissed. Akin to 
Naipaul’s ‘million little mutinies’90 Alexander sees the unabating torrent of protests as undeniable proof 
of some inflexion, perhaps culminating in the Marikana massacre in 2102, which Alexander views as a 
“turning point” (Alexander 2013). 
 
On the contrary, protest has also been placed in a framework based on its apparent lack of emancipatory 
potential. Patrick Bond has described several direct political actions post-2000 as “Popcorn Protests”, 
owing to the apparent tendency to appear and immediately disappear, neither drawing upon nor leaving 
behind any conventional “social movement” structures (Bond 2010; Bond and Mottair 2013: 289, c.f. 
Snow and Moss 2014). In late 2017,91 they are adamant that the evidence of scores of geographically 
and politically isolated events, which invariably fail to “link up” (i.e., generate national strategies and 
national solidarity), supports the relevance of his maize-metaphor.   
 
Bond takes the allegory further – while ‘up in the air’ (presumably while an event is taking place), the 
‘winds’ of local popular opinion may wave the popcorn to the political right, which serves as an 
explanation of so-called xenophobic elements attending certain protest events. To Bond, protests can 
‘turn xenophobic’,92 as a function of their ideological ambivalence, but also owing to the human 
propensity to react to material problems by blaming the “other” (Amisi et al. 2011).93  
 
In response, Runciman (2011) problematises the concept of popcorn protests, arguing that such 
arguments fail to consider how authentic collective action outside formal organisations are less 
constrained by institutional coordinates, and may in fact be more disruptive and subversive to existing 
power structures than Bond appreciates.94 One should also keep in mind that up to 2012 in South Africa, 
the majority of trade unions were affiliated with the Confederation of South African Trade Unions, an 
ANC “alliance partner”, and thus to a degree co-opted into the regime, with its revolutionary ‘teeth’, 
pulled (see e.g., Ngwane 2011).  
 
As for the rebellion argument, it may be the case that protests have increased or intensified post-2004, 
or not: the data will tell. Nevertheless, apropos “popcorn”, and in particular, Bond’s insistence that 
xenophobic attacks are the result of project-less, localised, naïve and uncoordinated protests seized 
upon by sinister forces – skyjacked popcorn, perhaps – seems unpersuasive. Instead, I will present 
evidence that xenophobic attacks are, in some cases, a protest device, and show cases of xenophobic 
                                               
90 Suggesting that the period of British colonialism and first 40 years of independence began ‘increasingly to 
appear as part of the same historical period - the idea of freedom has gone everywhere in India…  (but) the 
liberation of spirit that has come to India could not come as release alone. In India, with its layer below layer of 
distress and cruelty, it had to come as disturbance. It had to come as rage and revolt. India was now a country of 
a million little mutinies.’ (Naipaul, 1990) 
91 And in contradiction of Duncan, who notes courageous coordination behind all protest (2016). 
92 Suggesting a backwards-looking localism rather than a progressive insurrection (Bond 2015). 
93 To all but concede (to media commentators) the “criminal element” argument is, I claim, is a step too far. The 
“other” that is attacked, may be a scapegoat for the transgressions of the state, say, or be a target selected to 
undermine the protesters, or indeed be victims of criminal opportunism: but it may equally be a signal of pent-up 
frustration and total impotence against a callous and impervious state, juxtaposed by a measure of personal 
potency against the weak and close-by – whether this be a councillor’s unguarded house, a mining company’s 
entrance gate, a local library or a Somali spaza-shop. Instead of Lacan’s big Other, i.e., God, we may well be 
talking about what is, in essence, the nearest dog. 
94 Drawing on a line of argumentation also run by Piven and Cloward (1979). 
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attacks preceded by a long build-up chain of slowly escalating tactics, and as such being meticulously 
calculated, semiotically well-understood, and reluctantly used, with the popular disavowal pre-figured.  
 
3.9 Other perspective on South African protest 
The prominence of the above two theories notwithstanding, the would-be scholar of contemporary 
South African is presented with several avenues to approach the subject. The quantitative approach, 
which I will ultimately elect is suited for analysis directed at an aggregate, perhaps holistic picture, 
while lower-level, qualitative analysis offers revelations about the injustices endured by specific 
communities, narratives of the journey towards mobilisation and explorations of community-level 
injustices. Extant literature provides examples of the micro-drivers of protest, and sheds light on the 
mechanics of mobilisation (e.g., Alexander and Pfaffe 2014; Leonard and Pelling 2010; Lockwood 
2019; Mottiar 2013; Nleya 2011; Piper et al 2011; Tournadre 2018). Other studies, considering focus 
group data (e.g., Bekker and Leilde 2003) and survey data (Lavery 2012; Seekings and Matisonn 2006)  
explore local-level grievances and the social base of protests. For an important intervention on 
discourses around ‘failed redistribution’ and ‘failed administration’, see Paret 2015. For a discussion of 
the role of ‘nano-media’ (including the role of songs and dress), see Dawson 2012. 
 
3.10 Contemporary protest, as seen by the state  
Finally, I consider how the South African government talks and possibly thinks about protest.95 Today, 
South Africans can gather, protest, and strike – this right is granted by Section 17 of the country’s post-
apartheid constitution. The act that regulates such actions, the Gatherings Act (205 of 1993), defines a 
gathering as any ‘assembly, concourse or procession’ of 15 or more people, in any open or public space. 
In situ adherence to the act is maintained by the Public Order Police, of which there are 28 units 
stationed country-wide (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3).  
 
While no state has an exhaustively coherent voice, the official narrative around protests in South Africa 
has been fairly uniform – and has become somewhat predictable. Since 2000, there are four recurring 
public assertions: 
 
a) There are a lot of protests. The number of protests is, naturally, a cause of concern to the state, 
and this narrative is sustained by politicians and state bureaucrats. Examples include the acting 
police commissioner, Kgomotso Phahlane, announcing in 2016 that protests are his ‘main 
challenge’ (Mofokeng 2017), or police minister Nathi Nhleko appealing for a larger part of a 
national fiscus to be allocated to police, owing to a ‘surge’ of crowd incidents in 2015 
(Nicolson, 2015). Incidentally, the number of crowd incidents are, of course, not to be equated 
with protests, but this conflation is both easy and convenient.96 
 
b) Protesters are violent, criminal, and often xenophobic. One way of delegitimising protesters, 
deflecting attention away from their grievances (specifically, grievances around state policies, 
                                               
95 One should consider that this has a measure of bearing on how journalists and police alike record protests 
incidents. 
96 Several reporters (e.g., City Press 9 Feb 2014) have made this mistake. Similarly, Runciman et al. (2016) point 
out that, in 2013, Police Minister Mthethwa announced that South Africa experienced over 46 000 protests 
between 2009 and 2013, all of which were “successfully stabilised”, conflating crowd events and protest events. 
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state neglect, and state failure to regulate) and to gather support for the police, appears to be by 
depicting the protestors as violent. Associations on unreasonableness, dangerous, and – 
possibly in some cases – being uncivilised, helps to limit sympathy, and possibly effect fear or 
abhorrence. An infamous example of this was the then-deputy president, writing about the 
striking mineworkers at Marikana, as ‘plainly dastardly criminals’ (Sowetan 24 October 2012), 
or police commissioner Phahlane explaining that ‘...if you look at public violence‚ the unrest 
which has been on the increase and it is mainly people trying to express their concerns with 
authorities… That in itself is taking the police away from what they are supposed to be doing: 
dealing with serious crimes’ (Jordaan 2016). Thus, Police Minister Mbalula’s comments about 
protesters being ‘rented mobs’97 that wantonly vandalise, or his thinly veiled threat that ‘...I 
don’t want another Marikana here ... People must understand that protesting doesn’t mean to 
destroy property of the democratic state’, is not anomalous, but instead consistent with the 
protest-as-violent narrative (EWN 4 April 2017). The apparently violent nature of protests has 
also birthed much speculation, with prominent politicians98 asking whether there may not be a 
‘third force’ (presumably the IFP or UDM) involved, which led to reports of the Public 
Protector and the National Intelligence Agency having investigated this possibility (Hough 
2008).  
 
c) Protesters have ‘unrealistic expectations’. In the early days of South African democracy, 
President Mandela felt moved to admonish South Africans against ‘the culture of entitlement 
which leads to the expectation that the government must promptly deliver whatever it is that 
we demand...’ (Hansard 1995), echoed by President Mbeki, and in a different context, President 
Ramaphosa (2018) along with several cabinet ministers.99 The image of a greedy and 
unappreciative mob, reproduced by the discourse of entitlement and expectancy, serves as a 
tool which misdirects attention from human rights and government duties, such as performing 
the requirements as set out by the state’s legal framework100 towards the skewed view that it is 
the protesters that stand between the state and its responsibilities101 regarding service delivery.  
 
d) Protests are mostly about services. While it is true that inadequate government services play a 
role in the grievances of ordinary South Africans, the very term “service delivery”, as part of 
the state narrative,102  may be a distraction of sorts, away from discourses about state 
obligations, democratic participation, consultation, or the prioritisation of certain public goods 
over others. It seems to intimate that protesters’ demands are tantamount to seeking more 
determined and effective state machinery, not a more attuned disposition, a different ideological 
stance, or a more participatory model of governance. Nonetheless, when the Zuma government 
                                               
97 This happened not long after higher education minister Nzimande described campus protests as committing 
“thuggery” (EWN 22 September 2017). 
98 Then-President Thabo Mbeki, as well as the erstwhile Gauteng Premier Sam Shilowa. 
99 e.g., Minister Nzimande referred to ‘a creeping dangerous culture of entitlement’ (BizNews 22 October 2015). 
100 Chiefly the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000), the Police Service Act (68 of 1995) and the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act (22 of 1994). 
101 The Local Government Turnaround Strategy sees ‘communities engaging in destructive forms of protest 
including withholding of payment for local taxes and services’ as a key contributor to poor services, not as the 
fruit thereof (COGTA 2009: 19). 
102 Then-President Thabo Mbeki expressed his concern about this phenomenon in (Media24.com 7 June 2005). 
Police used the term in our earliest records (1997), and in 2002 noted 14 protests about “service delivery”, this 
rose to 145 IRIS police reports using this term by 2006. 
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tasked a committee to report back on the causes of protests, the committee suggested that, while 
services play some role, ‘the interface of politics and administration, the quality and frequency 
of public participation, [and] responsiveness to citizens [overrode] all other factors’ (in Mottiar 
and Bond 2011). 
 
In all, the state’s disposition to protest is one of defensiveness and “othering”. Similarly, organs of the 
state have pushed back in various nefarious ways against the right to protest, including ‘unlawful 
procedural prohibitions of protest’ (Royeppen 2016). Hereby one sees that protests have thus increased 
despite  a state increasingly hostile towards protesters and protesting. 
 
3.11 Reflection 
Three hundred years of the denial of humanity via systems of slavery, servitude, and apartheid, with 
the total subjugation of rights on non-whites, including the state's hegemonic claims to legitimate 
political discourse, resulted in not just material deprivation and vastly asymmetrical social relations, 
but a form of "mental enslavement" (using Fanon's 1967 terms).  In the early 1980s, Orkin described 
how the apartheid ideology's ‘divisive strategies [have] become rationalised [among ordinary South 
African youths] in the jargon of ethnicity’, hoping that such mental models, all ‘conducive to servitude’ 
will be transcended (1983). However, it appears that this did not happen – instead of becoming a 
politicised civil society, where groups of individuals can routinely bring the formal processes for the 
state to address their grievances (Orkin 1995), three phenomena appear to have emerged, instead. 
 
Firstly, it may be that people have adhered to political parties in the way people do to sports-teams, 
through "thick and thin", out of loyalty (or worse, out of fear for losing their social grants – five million 
families' primary source of income), but not in a transactional manner associated with social contract 
theory, where services (and say over services) are part of the "deal". 
 
Secondly, the logic of neoliberalism has been accepted by the state. This has meant that several formerly 
state-run services have been outsourced to non-state actors – in rural areas of South Africa, these are 
often mining companies, who have been given social-development obligations (such as the provision 
of health, water, transport, and supporting local schools, see Bekker 2014). This implies that local 
communities often regard local companies, not the state, as a kind of services cornucopia, and are by 
no means clear as to "who is responsible" for the services they should be, but are not receiving, further 
blurring the social contract.  
 
Thirdly, the perpetuation of an abstract and distant state, shaped for the whims of the rich; the 
entfremdung of never-having-known-the-state, coupled with the continuation of powerlessness, implies 
a form of political alienation: people do not see their role in shaping the discourse of power. 
 
The result of this is, I claim, that for many, voting is reduced to a ritualistic function, not a pragmatic 
intervention understood within the coordinates of a social contract. But then, the very notion of a social 
contract may be an inappropriate frame. Mary Midgley has warned about the perils of clinging to this 
fiction – not that this theory pretends to explain fully the moral arrangements between states and 
individuals, but that it has  
 
the pernicious tendency to numb social scientists into thinking that moral relations are at 
all understood, when in fact they are not. Part of this has to do with the couching of words 
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like “rights” and “duties” into legal pigeonholes, while they have significantly broader 
meanings. Moreover, in a fully considered moral framework, in other words in the real 
world, rights and duties extend to obligations to ourselves, to community, to nature and a 
host of other categories of subjects. It also involves the vital virtues of compassion, respect 
and fairness (regardless of a civil law’s opinion about these) without which society could 
scarcely be called such (Midgley 2003: 180). 
 
Of course, democratic governance is not a “natural” state, but contingent on voters and leaders forming 
an agreement of sorts, which happens only in the abstract, and one may argue that whatever legitimacy 
a democratic state’s political leadership holds, is related to its intention and ability to serve the will of 
the people. However, this is quite speculative. Still, in principle, the substance of the resulting state 
relies on an agreement that an administration should govern and care for its populace, including the 
expectation that a government would uplift the general standard of living in society (Moon 2019), thus, 
there is an anticipation that a state would be the primary agency responsible for “development” (Chang 
2011; Easterly 2001). 
 
If this assessment is true, even only in part, contemporary socio-economic metrics would then lead one 
to observe two classes of citizens in South Africa, and, based on the above, that this would manifest in 
differential thinking about citizenship: with a minority viewing SA as a participatory democracy, and a 
majority finding themselves on the growing periphery of political exclusion, facing precarious 
livelihoods and landlessness and, viewing the country as either a failed democracy, or a formal 
democracy (insofar voting is allowed), but with a disconnected, intangible state, not “for us”. If this is 
true, this implies an alternative, alienated conception of citizenship, with people’s relation with the state 
(possibly extending to political parties) not being structured as a European-conceived social contract. 
 
3.12 Conclusion  
South Africa has a history of institutionalised racial division, the denial of human rights, violent political 
repression, and state-engineered socio-economic inequalities. South Africa also has a well-established, 
and justly proud, history of mass mobilisation to express collective grievances and to achieve popular 
aims, rooted in a culture of resistance to the apartheid regime.  
 
During the struggle for liberation, scores of “radical” organisations, including the ANC, SACP and 
PAC, organised resistance using a range of direct political actions. Newly-promulgated laws were often 
protested, and protests were often met by waves of repression – arraignments, incarceration, 
banishments, or capital punishment, and almost invariably stricter laws. For liberation-oriented 
organisations, disruption, “overwhelmance”, and ungovernability were all politically-shaped 
stratagems, chiefly emanating from black townships.  
 
The significance of the workers’ struggle, in the context of the wider resistance and political challenge 
to the state, established South Africa’s trade unions as revolutionary agents, beyond their role of 
mobilising support in order to address shop-floor grievances. The lacuna created by the banning of 
several organisations also placed the civics, under the UDF-banner, at the centre of popular resistance 
in the 1980s. 
 
The end of apartheid did not imply a restoration of material and social relations. Instead, apartheid-era 
patterns of wealth, employment, education, and housing have, in the main, persisted, and in some cases, 
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these appear to have been reproduced by the post-apartheid state. Several development indices, 
including employment levels and inequality measures, suggest that at least some socio-economic 
dimensions have worsened since 1994. At present, socio-economics continue to be stratified by race, 
and race, consequently, continues to play an important role in South Africa’s electoral politics (Mattes 
2014).  
  
Neither the practice  nor culture of protest vanished at once with the advent of democracy, and to some 
degree, present-day protests represent the state’s failure to deliver the promised ‘better life for all’, 
while some ‘attempt to defend and deepen the victory against apartheid’ (Ngwane 2011). Present-day 
protest tactics, from processions by workers to mass funerals, have historical precedent, tracing back to 
apartheid-era births, or earlier.    
 
The “Rebellion of the Poor” presents a powerful way to think about the groundswell of protest. This 
theorises an important inflection point around 2004, after which protests presented a more militant 
spirit, as well as numerical growth either in the number or size of events, while the “Popcorn” theory 
laments protests’ lack of organisational momentum, mutual connections, and emancipatory potential. 
Rebellion may be easier to test, using quantitative methods, while whether protests are, in fact, really 
just consequence-free “Popcorn” might be, in Deng Xiaoping’s words, too early to tell.  
 
As for the state, public responses from officials admit that protests are numerous, and increasing, and 
generally locate the grievances as about “service delivery”, which is interpreted as a call for “more 
government”. The state’s view is, naturally, couched in its own benevolence, but has also inherited a 
propensity for the laager-mentality of the Old South Africa. While protests are generally still tolerated, 
they are also actively delegitimised by routinely depicting them as having unrealistic expectations, 
using tactics which are often portrayed as violent, illegitimate and, in some cases, xenophobic. Finally, 
by recasting demands as calls for “service delivery”, government presents a need for technical solutions, 
as opposed to radical reforms.  
 
In all, this chapter demonstrated the way in which context shapes how people think about, mobilise, 
and conduct protest, as well as how responses to protest are context-specific; that is, protest is a 
phenomenon located within culture (Mottiar and Bond 2015). Having surveyed the history and 
ostensible continuation of struggle in South Africa, the present background violence of an unjust global 
and local order, with many people indigent, amid patterns of low social mobility, within one of the 
world’s most unequal countries, encapsulated by a state increasingly hostile to criticism, one might 
generally appreciate that protest levels are high. However, levels of various socio-economic (and other) 
indicators vary significantly across the country, as do levels of protest. This seems to indicate that 
protest is not only generated by national-level fears and interests, but by parochial concerns, too. In 
fact, as the next chapter will show, most literature accounting for levels of protest relate not to general, 
but to local, conditions. For my purposes, “local conditions” conveys a potential of measurability, and 





Chapter 4: Claims 
4.1 Introduction 
Writing about an adjacent phenomenon, that of so-called xenophobic attacks in South Africa, 
Christopher Claassen reflects that ‘our problem is not a scarcity of explanations, but an overabundance’ 
(Claassen 2017: 1). This is also true of protest. While few theorists make explicit, exclusive, causal 
assertions concerning protest, most scholars concerned with South African protest advance positions or 
evaluations attempting to address what moves people to protest.   
 
In this chapter, I identify diverse claims specific to South African protest. By “claims”, I refer to theories 
concerning the conditions that produce protest. These range from instances where theorists use the term 
“cause” (e.g., Hough 2008: 3), but extends to arguments implying that something strongly influences 
protest (such as Nwafor’s ‘drivers’ 2016: 30, or Alexander’s ‘structural determinants’ 2010: 32), and 
finally to reports of factors strongly associated (e.g., Fox and Bell 2016: 54) or correlated (e.g., Morudu 
2017: 8) with protest.  
 
Such a list of claims is by no means exhaustive, but hopes to present the most common scholarly 
insights, and represent a spectrum of political points-of-view. An added consideration was to present 
only claims that could be quantified, for which data is publicly available. I identified thirteen such 
claims, which I categorise into eight groups, each denoted by a “D”. These are desperation, deprivation, 
density, demography, democracy, delivery, designation, and diplomas. Hereby, the “Ds” serve as the 
organising principle for this chapter, but also for the eventual “testing of claims” conducted in Chapter 
7.  
 
For each “D”, I provide a precis of the literature, and present a summative proposition, which presents 
the claims into workable hypotheses.  
 
4.2 Desperation – Poverty 
The struggle for survival and the indignity of indigence appear to many as the primary claim and most 
comprehensible motivation behind protest. Differently formulated, an ostensible cause of protest is the 
poor’s search for social justice, or simply release from unbearable poverty.  
 
Links between poverty and protest have a long lineage. For David Ricardo, physiological needs, which 
are the outcome of scarcity, may drive individuals to action. This argument was later reformulated into 
Maslow’s ‘drive toward homeostasis’, whereby satisfaction of physiological needs is the base 
motivation of individuals (Maslow 1943). 
  
Another approach can be traced to Adam Smith, who pointed to the need to appreciate not only the 
material but also the social dimensions of commodities: it is not only necessary to have sufficient 
survival goods, but one needs the type of goods which ‘whatever the custom of the country renders it 
indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without.’ Failing to secure these basic 
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commodities, a person ‘would be ashamed to appear in public’. Smith’s position is today echoed by 
Amartya Sen, who claims that ‘the ability to go about without shame’ is a necessary basic capability of 
human existence (Nussbaum and Sen 1993).  
 
Related to Robert Merton’s strain theory (i.e., societal pressure to achieve socially accepted goals leads 
to strain among those who lack the means of attainment) is the argument that poverty produces 
frustration, and consequently aggression, which may mobilise into direct political actions (Dollard et 
al. 1939). 
 
Marx advanced both positions, explaining that material conditions, social items and social standing may 
not only motivate individual behaviour, but also lead to class consciousness. Marx further posits that 
this awakening – of the poor’s awareness of their exploitation by other social classes, and of their 
communal interests as a socio-economic station – is key to sparking systemic social change (Marx 
1852). He also saw the poor, motivated by the hope for a better life, as susceptible to campaigns 
(revolutionary or not) couched in the language of relief from poverty (Marx 1852). Drawing on Marx, 
Przeworski reminds us that apparently neutral social resources affect the rich and poor differently – and 
that ‘particular institutional devices’ (for example, the judicial system or media houses) may amplify 
privileged perspectives while ‘making the voice of the poor inaudible’ (Przeworski 2012: 145). 
 
Included in the argument that protest is politics of the last resort, is the idea that material conditions 
may be linked to protest. Whether approached as physical need, or viewed through the lens of the shame 
and indignity of indigence, or by yet another attendant mechanism that motivates behaviour, an 
ostensible cause of protest is the poor’s search for social justice, or simply release from unbearable 
poverty. Divergences in the above positions notwithstanding, they all argue that the poor, by virtue of 
being deprived of the basics of human existence, have cause to protest. 
 
4.2.1 Income poverty   
Poverty is multidimensional,103 and alongside income, definitions of poverty often include elements 
relating to health, education, social support, household goods, private property, and personal savings, 
among others. Thus, while monetary measures of economic immiseration cannot paint a complete 
picture of poverty – consider how equal sums of money have different purchasing power between urban 
and rural settings – income measures are often used as an incomplete but sufficient proxy for poverty. 
For example, seeing protests as emanating from poorer neighbourhoods, Alexander (2010) highlights 
poverty as one of several factors contributing to the lack of dignity that may lead to protest. 
 
In the contemporary South African context, the scourges of poverty and inequality104 – both of which 
are visited upon the majority of the population – are often viewed as causal factors of protest. For 
instance, Østby and Urdal (2011) identifies poverty (together with inequality) as playing a meaningful 
role in protest. Similarly, Bond (e.g., Amisi et al. 2011; Bond 2010), Booysen (2007), and Ballard et 
                                               
103 Among others, Andries du Toit (in Amisi et al. 2011) identifies divergent poverty discourses in South Africa. 
104 For analytical reasons, I draw a distinction between poverty and inequality. Economic inequality (or wealth 
and income inequality) is the difference found in various measures of economic well-being among individuals in 
a group, as pioneered by Simon Kuznets, and will be discussed in the next section. In contrast, poverty is a 
multifaceted concept, which may include social, economic, and political elements. Drawing on the UN’s 
definition, extreme poverty, or destitution, is the condition when a family's income fails to meet an established 
threshold deemed necessary to meet basic personal needs such as food, clothing and shelter. 
 
 47 
al. (2005) echo the role played by poverty and inequality as a (systemic) violence, manifesting as 
subjective social violence. In other words, poverty and inequality beget protest.  
 
4.2.2 Employment 
Over the past two decades South Africa’s unemployment rate has hovered between 20% and 30%, 
generally tending upwards. Unemployment figures may obscure “real” unemployment, since 
discouraged job seekers are excluded from the labour force. In 2010, 33 million people aged between 
16 and 65 lived in South Africa, but only around 8.3 million were employed.  
 
‘Sharp tears in the social fabric caused by widespread unemployment or by major military defeat’, wrote 
Tilly, ‘are highly favourable to mass politics’ (1977: 47). A link between unemployment and protest is 
generally theorised (e.g., Ortiz et al. 2013: 8), and mentioned by the main theorists of protest in South 
Africa, including Alexander (2010), Bond (2010), Seekings (2007), and Nyar and Wray (2016).  
 
That said, some commentators, such as Allan and Heese, suggest that, while communities that protest 
are ‘...desperately poor and contain some of the highest unemployment rates in the country, they still 
have better access to local services than residents in the poorest municipalities in our rural areas and 
indeed than a national average’ (Allan and Heese, no date). 
 
Propositions: 
a) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different proportions of 
income-poor. 
b) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different proportions of 
unemployment. 
 
4.3 Deprivation – Inequality 
After poverty, inequality appears as the most-cited cause of protests, often eliciting universal claims. 
 
The most essential long-term economic problem of this century is the risk that income 
inequality will get substantially worse… economic growth will be a positive development 
only if we do not see at the same time a huge increase in inequality, which could mean that 
the economic gains are concentrated in a rich class. The mere prospect of a winner-takes-
all world ought to strike fear into our hearts (Shiller 1988: 1). 
 
Discourses about the deleterious effects of different types of inequality date from antiquity (Muller 
1985) but gained recent prominence with the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-
First Century (2014). Vast disparities in household means have a negative influence upon a country’s 
social mobility (Lansley 2011), with inequality often reproduced intergenerationally. Inequality has 
been shown to be bad for economic growth, via exacerbating hoarding behaviour among the rich, and 
by diminishing not only the purchasing power of the poor, but also by inhibiting their very means to 
participate in economic life, via limits to education, health, and dignity (Chang 2014: 317-334). Most 
of all, inequality bodes ill for democracy, as it allows for the outward formal appearance of democratic 
rule while simultaneously obscuring the tendency towards a system run by and serving the interests of 




Such economic polarisation leads to an elite aggrandising its influence on policy, and resultant political 
marginalisation of the poor. Experiencing plutocracy as powerlessness, the poor may become 
disillusioned with formal politics or apathetic when it comes to voting. Both of these results may move 
people who face lives of ever deepening socio-political and economic relegation to choose the risks of 
protest.   
  
In all, severe wealth disparities are associated with a breakdown in social relations, which may result 
in protests, among other outcomes. There is an abundance of evidence that inequality and social conflict 
are intertwined (e.g., Alkire 2005; Cramer 2003; Ikejiaku 2009; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002).  
 
Considering the relationship between inequality and social conflict – which may or may not manifest 
in protest – theorists may be divided into five groups: 
  
i. Those who see a positive linear relationship (e.g., Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Russet, Singer, 
and Small 1968); 
ii. Those who see a quadratic relationship between inequality and conflict; that is, the probability 
of conflict is high when inequality is very low or high (e.g., Hirschman 1970); 
iii. Those who see an inverse of a quadratic relationship between inequality and conflict; that is, 
the probability of conflict is lowest in extremely equal or unequal society (with the highest 
probability at some moderate level of inequality (e.g., Nagel 1974); 
iv. Those who hold that there are several other factors that have to be included along with 
inequality to be able to predict social conflict (e.g., Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009); and 
v. Those who discount inequality altogether as a useful measure to predict social conflict (e.g., 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). 
  
Notwithstanding the disputes suggested by the theoretical positions above, inequality appears a key 
factor in social grievance. The types of “social grievance” and “conflict” to which most of the above-
mentioned scholars105 refer, are violent strains of social conflict or civil wars. However, one should 
consider the “continuum of contestation” (Chapter 2.2), which spans civil war to sub-protest actions of 
resistance – which maintains that the same family of grievances may lead to conflicts at varied scales 
and levels of tumult.  
 
Among countries with a population above five million, South Africa is the most unequal society in the 
world106, this inequality constituting a violent and ‘unstable social order’ (von Holdt 2012). In light of 
such relative deprivation, Alexander proposes that ‘income inequality must rank highly among the 
structural determinants’ of South African community protests (2010). Following Alexander, there 
appears a near-consensus that inequality plays some role in causing protest in South Africa (e.g., Allan 
and Heese, n.d.; Breckenridge 2014; Bond and Maharaj 2011; Booysen 2007; Ngwane 2011; Pithouse 
2010; Seekings 2007; Sinwell 2010; von Holdt and Alexander 2012). Alexander (2010: 34) argues that, 
‘[c]omparative poverty, that is, impoverishment relative to some locally important reference group, is 
probably more significant’ than absolute poverty. It thus stands to reason that the reported increase in 
protests has happened against the backdrop of an increase in inequality in South Africa over the last 20 
years. 
                                               
105 Notably Nafziger and Auvinen; Russet, Singer and Small; Østby, Nordås, and Rød; and Collier, Hoeffler and 
Rohner. 




Some voices advocate caution. Noble and Wright, studying disparities between urban localities and 
former “homeland” areas, remind us that there is a difference between conceptions of what constitutes 
“essential goods or services” – particularly when surveying rural against urban populations. 
Nonetheless, they too find that inequality seems to help explain protests, because ‘people living in 
informal urban areas may have had little direct experience of good service delivery, [but they] live in 
closer proximity to those who enjoy better service delivery than people living in rural areas, and people 
living in rural former homeland areas in particular’ (2013: 260). Thus, it may be that rural inhabitants, 
albeit poor, generally do not feel the weight of the comparative as much as urban inhabitants.   
 
However, one must ask how per capita calculations would affect such predictions. While it is likely that 
the majority of protests, however calculated, occur in urban areas, it may be the case that, viewed in 
relation to population size, rural areas present commensurate levels of protest. Rural areas are likely to 
be poorer than urban areas (especially on aggregate), but they are unlikely to be more unequal: our data 
will guide us.  
 
Proposition: 
From the above, I expect inequality and protest to be positively related. However, instead of assigning 
direction, at this stage, I simply propose that 
 
c) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different inequality 
measures. 
  
4.4 Density – townships and informal settlements 
Informal settlements, typically slums at the urban edge, are a well-documented artefact of global 
neoliberalism,107 and are seen to both cause and host protests.  
 
Informal settlements, variously classified as squatter camps, peri-urban ghettos, favelas, purlieus, 
townships, and shantytowns, house more than a third of the world’s population (Davis 2006). As 
described in the previous chapter, South Africa’s informal areas claim rather different origins. Informal 
areas originated as black-, Indian- or coloured-designated townships, primarily as labour “dormitories” 
adjacent to white-designated settlements. Fourteen percent of dwellings in South Africa were classified 
as “informal” in 2011 (Stats SA 2012). Disconcertingly, the apartheid spatial logic has been both 
preserved and reproduced by the post-apartheid government (Greenberg 2004). By retaining much of 
the former zoning logic, by protecting elite property rights, and by incorporating landed chieftaincies 
into the legitimate post-apartheid order (primarily by reproducing Bantustan land laws in the form of 
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No. 41 of 2003), some 16 million South 
Africans remain without a claim to title deeds, while the formerly “designated areas” retain most of 
their erstwhile characteristics. 
 
Since 1994, several informal settlements have been formalised via RDP-related projects (see 3.2.5). At 
the same time, new post-apartheid informal settlements have formed in the intervening years (Chinguno 
2013), often adhering to the “logic coordinates” of apartheid-era town-planning. In line with this, 
                                               




Alexander observes that most community protests emerge from geographic and economic peripheries 
(2010).  
 
Two characteristics of informal settlements are relevant to the idea of “causes” of protest. The first point 
of interest is evoked by the name itself. Informality refers to the absence of formal stands allocated and 
serviced by municipalities, and often means that no bulk services are present at all (Samson 2007). 
Thus, the basic necessities of water provision and sanitation are generally all but absent, and “non-
improved sanitation” (e.g., bucket systems, pit latrines, or the complete absence of toilets) exist 
alongside an absence of reticulated potable water. Added to this squalor, is the second notable 
characteristic of informal settlements: the extreme proximity of households. A lack of demarcated 
stands, amid a lack of funds for building material, and the danger of forced removals, means that 
informal settlements are densely packed (e.g., Pithouse 2008). Without much in the way of inter-house 
barriers, such propinquity means more than just incessant noise and inescapable stenches – it implies a 
lack of privacy, and a lack of security, which conspire to create an especially precarious position for 
women and children. 
  
There are several approaches linking housing arrangements to protests. Since the majority of both 
protest-event analyses and case studies draw on urban localities, many scholars write about “urban 
protest”. While protest patterns are likely to roughly correlate to population patterns (i.e., more protests 
where there are more people),108 in the South African case, history dictates that it is additionally 
probable that, as Alexander suggests, most protests emanate from townships and informal settlements 
(2010; Dawson 2014). Few go so far as to imply that protests – even only a subsection, such as “service 
delivery protests” – are an exclusively metropolitan, urban, and/or semi-urban phenomenon (see 
Booysen 2007: 23), and none claim that informal settlements cause riots. However, there is a seemingly 
indirect-but-unbreakable association109 between protest and the conditions inherent to informal 
settlements – their dangerous and overcrowded nature, poor services, general precarity and 
discomfort110 (Alexander 2010). 
 
Proposition: 
From the arguments above, it appears that some scholars expect levels of informality and protest to be 
positively related. Instead of assigning direction, at this stage, I simply propose that 
 
d) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different proportions of 
informality. 
 
                                               
108 Others, such as Fox and Bell (2016) also reminds one that urban population size and the number of large cities 
in a country are positively associated with protest incidence. 
109 According to Thomas (2010) , many ‘protests are rooted in a problematic rights discourse of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, and in the new constitution's recognition of the right of access to adequate housing, which is nonetheless 
subjected to fiscal constraints.... Failure to realise the right to housing fuels some of the most important conflict 
that will shape future organisation of state institutions and relations between the state and society’. 




There are four commonly-stated theoretical statements of protest relating to matters demographic. 
These include observations involving population movement, gender compositions, age profiles, and 
ethnic composition (particularly, the proportion of non-South African Africans in an area).  
 
4.5.1 Geographic movement 
The “demographic strain hypothesis” holds that the change from rural to urban – particularly migration 
towards informal areas – heightens both social strain and intensifies resource competition (e.g., 
Goldstone 2017). It follows that the rate of change in the urban population may serve as a source of 
potential grievance that may catalyse protest or other forms of direct political action. However, several 
empirical studies – all located outside of South Africa, or including South Africa as a single data point 
– have failed to validate such claims (Blanco and Grier 2009; Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Fox and Bell 
2016; Hibbs 1973).  
 
Nonetheless, some commentators, such as Allan and Heese, take not only the “service delivery protest” 
moniker at face value, but also the strain hypothesis. They explain that  
 
...most migrants [moving from rural to urban loci] find themselves unemployed, living in 
one of the many hundreds of informal settlements on the periphery of these large metros, 
effectively marginalised from both access to economic opportunity, as well as housing and 
services. The rapid growth of informal settlements as well as metros’ (until recent) 
unwillingness to accept them as a permanent reality in their midst has meant a slow 
response to the service delivery needs of communities in these areas (Allan and Heese n.d.: 
1). 
 
This leads them to insist that ‘there is a strong statistical link between high levels of migration and 
service delivery protests’ in South Africa (Allan and Heese n.d.: 2). 
 
4.5.2 Gender 
The gender profile of an area has been linked to propensities for direct political action. In his classic 
Why men rebel, Ted Gurr claims that ‘men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to 
anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations’ (1970: 58). Meanwhile 
Connell's (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) notion of hegemonic masculinity111 suggests that men 
face different social expectations than do women; expectations which, if unsatisfied, may be conducive 
to social upheaval, including protest. Drawing on the latter argument, Langa and Kiguwa, writing about 
protest in Mpumalanga province in South Africa, advance the claim that ‘the current socio-economic 
pressures seem to be influencing young men to become involved in violent service delivery protests as 
a way of imagining and reimaging new forms of masculinities in post-apartheid South Africa’ (Langa 
and Kiguwa 2013: 20). 
 
More prosaically, a gender-imbalanced area may be a signal of labour migration – a system still deeply 
embedded in South African economic modalities, and which continues to mimic and perpetuate 
                                               
111 Which refers to dominant cultural stereotypes in which men are expected to aspire to power, status, and wealth. 
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apartheid-era labour migration patterns (Posel 2003). For instance, one would expect mining areas to 
have more men than women, while labour-sending areas, such as rural parts of the Eastern Cape, would 
be presumed to lack men (i.e., have significantly more women than men in the population).  
 
4.5.3 Age 
In 2013, Klomp and De Haan found that there is an association between the dependency ratio and extent 
of protest (using data from 65 countries over 30 years). The dependency ratio is an age-population ratio 
of those not in the labour force (the old and young) and those typically in the labour force, as a measure 
of “pressure” on the productive population. Klomp and De Haan were testing whether governments 
facing popular protest are more likely to use fiscal policy for re-election purposes; and it appears that 
little was done with this arguably surprising finding. 
 
The mechanisms linking age and protest are contested, and include psycho-social anxieties leading to 
risk behaviours (Hogan and Astone 1986), and socio-economic challenges, which can produce psycho-
social anxieties (e.g., Weiner, Russell and Lerman 1978: 84). For instance, Weiner, Russell and 
Lerman’s theory holds that, relative to other life phases, people in their late 20s generally struggle the 
most in terms of integrating themselves into the prevailing mode of social organisation, are uneasy with 
their supposedly assigned social roles and status, and are confronted with a disconnect between their 
social reality and their expectations regarding quality-of-life, influence, and affluence (the latter 
especially intensified by ideal-types projected in both mainstream and social media). The result is that, 
in comparison to older cohorts, young people (even those in the elite) tend to feel 
marginalised/excluded, in personal turmoil, socially aggrieved, and that they have more to gain than to 
lose by participating in direct political action. 
  
Such theories lead demographers to claim that ‘it is difficult to regard any country with a low median 
age as firmly democratic’ (Dyson 2013: 98), that young populations are “ripe” for upheaval (Weber 
2013), and that the urbanising effects of the demographic transition makes struggle – and the overthrow 
of undemocratic elites – more likely (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). In short,112 as a population ages, ‘a 
country’s chances of meaningful democracy increase’ (Cincotta 2008: 80). 
 
Studies of particular protest events or waves often mention that the average age of protesters is between 
25 and 35. Such instances include the 2011 protests in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, “Occupy” movements, 
European anti-war protesters, or the portion of the population in Latin America generally oriented 
towards ‘unauthorised marches, protests or traffic blockades’ (e.g., Barreto et al. 2009; or Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012). While the median age of protesters and the median age of the general population are, at 
best, only loosely related, the argument linking an area’s demographic profile with social unrest, asserts 
universal applicability: for instance, Urdal (2012) reports that ‘...a general statistical relationship 
between age structure and political violence has been identified...’ and that ‘youth bulges113 affect all 
three forms of violence [parochial, intergroup, and civil war]’.  
 
                                               
112 Based on an historical, cross-country analysis, the argument is that low age structures correlate with violent 
uprisings (since a mean age of a population initially decreases in “the demographic transition”, coinciding with 
population growth, before increasing amid a slow-down in population growth) (Cincotta 2008). 
113 A high proportion of youth. 
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South Africa's median age, 26.6 in 2011, is low; and as low as 22.2 years in Jozini Local Municipality, 
a rural area in KwaZulu Natal. Dependable age-related data, which fortuitously is available in South 
Africa, may thus be considered as potentially predictive of an area’s propensity for protest. 
 
4.5.4 Ethnic composition  
South Africa has a reputation as a particularly hostile destination for African migrants (Claassen 2017: 
1). The standard theory of intergroup conflict, tensions and violence, posits such hostility as a function 
of intergroup competition over scarce resources, with competition and conflict increasing when 
economic conditions deteriorate. Established formulations of this theory include literature on “realistic 
conflict” in social psychology (Sherif 1966) and “ethnic competition” in sociology (Bonacich 1976; 
Olzak 1994). 
 
Similarly, many studies explain South African xenophobic violence as largely due to resource 
competition, with two particular resources identified as possible flashpoints: jobs and government 
housing (Everatt 2011; HSRC 2008; Misago 2019; Steinberg 2008; von Holdt et al. 2011). 
 
Arguments about the causes of xenophobia can sometimes apply to protests, if seen as the manifestation 
of intergroup conflict. Moreover, while public grievances may spring from insufficient resources, this 
does not necessitate scapegoating (say of foreigners), as discussed in 2.6.1, but also does not exclude 
its possibility.  
 
Propositions: 
From the arguments above, it appears that various dimensions of an area’s demographic contours might 
be expected to predict a propensity for protest. These dimensions, each playing a hypothetically positive 
role in measures of protest, comprise patterns of migration, and profiles relating to gender, age, and 
ethnicity. At this stage, I propose that 
 
e) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different patterns of in- 
and out-migration. 
f) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with dissimilar gender-ratio 
measures.  
g) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with dissimilar age profiles. 
h) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas hosting dissimilar proportions 
of non-South Africans.  
 
4.6 Democracy 
Democracy, particularly the lack thereof, is consistently linked to political resistance and direct political 
actions, including protests. The ability to choose one’s political leadership, and that such a leadership 
would be accountable to the electorate, has been described as a universal ideal (Sen 1999), its 
philosophical roots dating to at least 500 BCE, following the lawmaker Cleisthenes’ reforms in ancient 
Athens (Ostwald 1987: 15-18). 
 
Political scientists often respond to a society’s failure to meet this ideal by framing it as an instance of 
the principal-agent problem, where one person or group (the agent) is mandated to make decisions and 
take actions on behalf of, or which impact, another person or entity (the principal). This creates a 
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dilemma, as real-world circumstances often imply that agents are motivated to act in their own best 
interests, which are not completely aligned to those of their principals (Ross 1973). Political scientists 
often formulate responses to unmet democracy – or to grievance in general – using Hirschman’s rubric 
of exit, voice, and loyalty (as developed in Section 2.3). 
 
According to Hirschman, exit (i.e., to withdraw from the relationship), and voice (i.e., to attempt to 
repair or improve the relationship through communication of the grievance or proposal for change, 
which includes direct and indirect political actions), are the dual conditions for accountable political 
conditions. Accountable, democratic systems present the populace with both options, and thus allay the 
principle-agent problem. Loyalty matters too, and tends to act as a solvent upon the exercise of exit and 
voice: one may be loyal to a political party, seeing its success as one’s own, and thus reluctant to 
abandon or act against it. Where neither exit nor voice exist as options – social responses draw on 
loyalty, and when this fades, alienation or apathy enters.114  
 
In a pioneering study, Marvin Olsen found that political alienation correlates strongly with people’s 
approval of protest actions (Olsen 2014). In South Africa, the lack of political participation and 
accountability is often cited as a contributor to protest (e.g., Alexander 2010; Mottiar and Bond 2012; 
Sinwell et al. 2009). For Stephen Friedman, political marginalisation is a central driver of (community) 
protest, which is animated by the poor's search for recognition and voice (2013). Meaningful political 
engagement is, Friedman argues, a function of inclusivity, which in turn is a function of consultation. 
He further contends that government’s “high-handedness” is paradigmatic of a lack of consultation and 
a general disregard for grassroots engagement among elected officials. This is not just disrespectful, 
but ‘antidemocratic… because it assumes that the test of democratic government is not whether it does 
what the people want, but whether it is technically good at forcing on the people the technical solutions 
that appeal to the elite’ (2009: 1). 
 
The above hints at a breakdown in democracy, or at least the operation of a system appearing as 
democratic from the top, and as undemocratic from the bottom. Perhaps owing to the two-economies 
phenomenon in SA (see 3.5), or to their already being aligned with the bourgeoisie, once elected, local 
political elites’ interests often follow radically different trajectories to those of the working class and 
poor, with the latter not having much by way of influencing the former. As a result, communities often 
find themselves without sanctioned recourse to impose their interests on elected officials, with 
frustration and grievance the inevitable outcome. Apropos this phenomenon, Pithouse (2009: 44) 
comments:  
 
Once a community has realised that their local councillor is hostile to their interests, there 
are often no viable alternatives for engaging with the state. Attempts at making use of 
official public participation channels generally fail to get any further than a solid wall of 
bureaucratic contempt in which everyone is permanently in a meeting. Polite demands for 
attention are frequently responded to as if they were outrageous. 
 
Theories about the influence of the lack of participative, meaningful democracy on protest are not 
confined to leftist thinkers such as Friedman, Pithouse, Alexander and Sinwell: South African 
                                               
114 As for the political engagements of people who have participated in protests, research by Runciman (2016) 
suggests that protesters may be more likely to abstain from electoral politics, corroborating findings from Brazil 




commentators towards the right of the political spectrum appear to agree. One such example is that of 
Duvenhage. who, drawing on Huntington’s familiar formulation, finds South Africa to typify a 
“Praetorian society”; that is, one which ‘lacks law, authority and discipline and consensus, where 
private interests dominate public ones, where there is an absence of civic duty, where... political 
institutions are weak and social forces strong’ (2016: 416). Such a society is one where ‘... the wealthy 
bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup’ (Huntington 2006: 196). 
In South Africa, this translates to a situation where the ANC has plummeted the country into a near-
chaotic spiral in which political agents are, in fact, dominated by their principals to the extent of being 
frozen in obsequious fear, and where ‘ANC politics’ is driven by appeasement of the masses. That said, 
the ruling party retains power based on (poor) people’s fear of losing government-administered social 
grants (of which there are 16 million recipients in 2011), rather than on the merit of political 
accountability. Even amid evidence of declining voting, rising protests, and growing inequality, such 
claims are hard to square with reality – political agents are unlikely to be both excessively weak and 
hegemonically strong. Similar inconsistencies also slip into a student of Duvenhage’s, Frans Cronje’s 
claims, for example: SA’s democracy is especially precarious in the wake of the ANC having 
‘weakened’ the IFP as a viable black opposition, and as such the poor experience a lack of political 
choice (Cronje 2018: 4). In response, one may only consider the many pro-poor parties (by their own 
claims), one such being the Economic Freedom Fighters, which was already more than double the size 
of the IFP (by support) in 2013.  
 
Differences between ideological communities notwithstanding, South Africa’s political landscape does 
typify a dominant party system (Giliomee, Myburgh, and Schlemmer 2001; Habib and Schulz-
Herzenberg 2011), with most scholarly positions suggesting that officials within the ruling party 
generally experience themselves beholden upwards – instead of accountable downwards. 
 
Proposition: 
From the above, there is contention about the direction of the influence of political participation on an 
area’s propensity to protest. For the present purposes, I propose that 
 
i) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
participation in electoral politics. 
 
4.7 Delivery 
Protests are often associated with poor public services, not least because such grievances are routinely 
noted in the placards of participants of Community protests. Public services include road building and 
maintenance, water reticulation and quality, sanitation connections, refuse removal, and electricity 
connections, but also extend to public services regarded as “non-municipal” in South Africa, such as 
the quality of education and healthcare, and the care and maintenance of related facilities. Linked to 
inadequate services is “poor governance”, which refers not to concerns of democracy per se, but rather 
questions why the rightful representatives are unable to fulfil their mandates. 
 
4.7.1 Services 
With an overwhelming burden of service backlogs, poorly trained management, rampant corruption and 
fiscal shortages, local government in South Africa is often said to be “in crisis” (Ngwane 2011; Bond 
1998; Franks 2014). Meanwhile, issues around services – poor quality, interruptions (planned or 
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resulting from poor management), including their complete absence – are cited as a key animator of 
protest. Reticulated water is the most-frequently cited service in relation to protest, while inadequate 
public sanitation, irregular (or non-existent) refuse removal, insufficient electricity supply, the low 
quality of primary healthcare, poor policing, and unmaintained road surfaces also commonly feature 
(Akinboade, Mokwena, and Kinfack 2014; Alexander 2013; De Juan and Wegner 2019; Mottiar and 
Bond 2011; McLennan and Munslow 2009; Nyar and Wray 2016; Von Holdt et al. 2011; Samson 
2007;). However, Morudu (2017) found a positive correlation between the ‘number of consumer units 
receiving water in 2013’ and community protests, using municipalities as a frame, implying that the 
influence of water on protest may not be straightforward. 
 
Scholars on the left generally interpret the crisis of poor municipal services as the product of neoliberal 
policy (Amisi et al. 2011; Bond 1998, 2000, 2010; Ngwane 2010). They argue that policies such as 
fiscal austerity, outsourcing, and privatisation helped usher-in the predicament,115 and that the ensuing 
service-related protests thus ‘represent a profound working-class critique of neoliberalism at local 
government level’ (Ngwane 2011: 383. See also Alexander 2010; Booysen 2007; Friedman 2009; 
Hemson and Owusu-Ampomah 2005; Pithouse 2009; Sinwell et al. 2009; von Holdt et al. 2011).  
 
Starting around 2006, commentators began applying the label “service delivery protests” to Community 
protests that included grievances about municipal performance. While some scholars use this term 
uncritically (e.g., Booysen 2007; Hough 2008), many others criticise it for its inconsistent usage116 and 
oversimplification of the larger phenomenon – state retreat under neoliberal policies – which steers the 
discourse towards questions of services and away from questioning the logic coordinates of 
neoliberalism, democratic participation, and responsive governance.117 
 
Two ideologically diverging sub-arguments follow the claims around “service delivery protests” 
(SDPs). The first argues that levels of services are not as important as people’s expectations about those 
services. Right-leaning commentators like Labuschagne (2011), suggest that the actual material 
conditions or grievances are irrelevant; in other words, the gap between expectations and reality is more 
important than the actual levels of services (or other phenomenon, e.g., poverty, repression, etc.). This 
view also sees revolution-seeking grievances as something that can be manufactured, as far as 
discontent about the rate of material improvement can be fomented. Seizing upon this, Labuschagne 
points to the EFF political party, which, in his estimation, has based its identity upon fanning the flames 
                                               
115 For instance, since 2015, residents of Ditsobotla Local Municipality in the North West province reportedly 
never have more than a few hours of flowing water per day. The municipality reported having no “Water Services 
Operations and Maintenance Plan” in its annual report (Ditsobotla Local Municipality 2015; Gray, Holley and 
Rayfuse 2016; News24.com 2016). 
116 It presents itself as simultaneously both a type of protest (e.g., ‘protest action within a local area which directly 
targets municipal government or targets municipal government as a proxy to express grievances against the state 
more widely’ [Powell, O’Donovan and De Visser 2015]), and a type of grievance (i.e., the desperation over an 
absence of, say, reticulated potable water to a group of households). 
117 Nyar and Wray call SDPs a ‘label of convenience’, pointing to the dangers of using conceptually weak but 
seductively simple explanations, belying a complex phenomenon (2016). Alexander points to the potential 
reification of this catch-all label, reminding that these are ‘locally-organised protests that place demands on people 
who hold or benefit from political power (which includes, but is not limited to, local politicians)’ instead of simply 
a concern over services. Thus, they propose that a more prudent designation could be ‘local political protests’ 
(2010: 26). Runciman (2016) rejects the notion and uses Community protest, which connotes municipal services, 




of discontent by exploiting the gap between what people have and what they believe they ought to have. 
In short, this line of reasoning suggests that poor people’s unrealistic expectations of humane living 
conditions are likely to drive protest.118 
 
This argument can be further extended, to say almost the reverse – that some improvement in services 
will create expectations of continued improvements, and that this ‘culture of rising expectations’ 
(Duvenhage 2016: 920; Greffrath and Duvenhage 2014: 206; this argument is repeated, for the Latin 
American context, in Moseley 2018) among the black underclass means that protests are likely to be 
seen in areas with above-rural levels of services. Following this approach, Duvenhage feels that protest 
may be occurring in areas that have had improvements in levels of services, such that poor people, 
having now tasted the fruits of public services, will demand more. 
 
The second argument also presents a kind of reversal, although one that is ideologically at odds with 
the previous point. Friedman claims that the services themselves are not what people want, but rather 
public service. According to Friedman, ‘...in a democracy, the government’s job is not to “deliver” to 
citizens… in some cases, people do want cleaner water or better neighbourhoods. But that does not 
mean they want officials to “deliver” to them… the protesters are demanding public service’ (2009). 
The democratic maxim of a government that ‘works for citizens and that it cannot do this unless it 
listens to them’ is inviolable; and so, this distinction between “service delivery” and “public service” 
(and the failure of participatory democracy its convolution implies), leads him to claim that ‘citizens 
are protesting not because they want “service delivery” but because they want to escape it’ (2009). 
 
Elsewhere, Ngwane reminds that ‘the ANC senior leadership has responded to the most volatile service-
related protests by firing mayors and councillors seen as responsible for poor service delivery in a 
particular area’ (2011) – indicating that, at least at the level of appearances, South Africa’s ruling party 
appreciates that better services will go some ways towards a less insurrectionist electorate. Thus, 
measuring service delivery (based on the average proportion of a selected in-group of households in the 
municipality that receive certain services), and its predictive effect on protests (in his case, xenophobic 
attacks) merits investigation in itself. 
 
4.7.2 Governance 
Going beyond the level of the services themselves, we arrive at the management behind the services, or 
governance – a concept commonly evoked in the literature on South African protest. Poor management, 
organisational inefficiencies, corruption, and lack of consultation not only tend to render poor services, 
but present government as undemocratic, uncaring, and self-serving (Alexander 2010: 25). Sethulego 
Matebesi posits that citizens’ understanding of their relationship towards governance structures and 
policies is an important factor in South African protest, and writes how ‘the cognitive system of 
individuals... is largely influenced by beliefs and attitudes towards formal political structures and 
                                               
118 While there are many possible responses to this formulation – including Labuschagne’s ostensible 
misrepresentation of the EFF as merely an agitating agent – it is the lack of historical context that is the most 
pressing omission. In one commentary, Labuschagne appears genuinely surprised that people in the town of 
Hermanus, among others, are unhappy about the fact that they are landless. Similarly, he sees the “land issue” as 
somewhat disconnected from the litany of other legitimate grievances, some of which generate significantly more 




processes... [and when] changes enter the cognitive system of individuals, they set in motion cognitive 
processes that may create incentives to protest’ (Matebesi 2017: 56).  
 
Poor governance is often cited as a likely influence on the propensity for local protest (e.g., Claassen 
2017; Nwafor 2016; Nyar and Wray 2016). For instance, Piper and Nadvi (2010) propose that there is 
a relationship between local institutions of public participation in local governance, and the options for 
civil society (which they formulate as a combination of the NGO-sector and social movements) are to 
either disengage or protest, when local governance structures appear not to be well-run. Others go 
further, and postulate a ‘clear link’ between local perceptions of municipal governance and local 
participation in protest (Akinboade, Mokwena and Kinfack 2014). 
 
Propositions: 
From the arguments above, we see the role of local municipal governance and service delivery as 
apparent drivers of protest. While most scholars argue that poor services are a key catalyst, some 
contend that improved services lead to protests. Instead of assigning direction to the relationships, at 
this stage I propose that: 
 
j) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
services. 
k) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
municipal governance.   
 
4.8 Designation 
Part of the insidious nature of apartheid’s racial classification system was both the material and mental 
differentials that were assumed and imposed on those classified as “white” and “non-white”, 
respectively. Material states include poverty, inequality, and landlessness – all of which can be 
measured to some degree of accuracy. Mental states, and the psychological transmission mechanism 
from spatial designation to protest, are beyond the scope of this thesis. That said, the idea that protest 
may not just be the outcome of economic pressures and expectations around politics and governance, 
but may also stem from various unmeasured “legacy” conditions, warrants further consideration.  
 
To that point, at the moment of political liberation, scholars are often tempted to turn their gaze to issues 
of politics, economics, and governance at the cost of studying the effects of repression, which linger, 
and are often reproduced intergenerationally (Mallett 2010). That is, violent repression is associated 
with violent behaviour on the part of the repressed, including participation in protests, riots, vigilantism 
and other forms of collective violence (Langa and Kiguwa 2013). Apartheid, and the liberation struggle 
against it, involved extremely violent modes of coercion, suppression, and purging (e.g., SA TRC 
Report 1998), the effects of which cannot be left out of contention when presenting factors animating 
post-apartheid protest.   
 
4.8.1 Historical trauma 
A more elusive and abstruse factor, but no less important in explaining protests, is the concept of 




The black majority’s daily experiences of apartheid were not confined to a lack of services, 
landlessness, and democratic exclusion, but also to humiliation, indignity, and physical violence. While 
South Africa’s white population was largely shielded from both subjective violence and systemic 
violence, the African, Indian and Coloured communities were subjected to inescapable violence, with 
long-lasting traumatic effects (Hirschowitz and Orkin 1997; Simpson, Mokwena and Segal 1992). 
Social-psychological studies on mental health in South Africa show that a high proportion of black 
South Africans report symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, far more than the other races (Atwoli 
et al. 2013; Magwaza et al. 1993). 
 
Proposition: 
While Spears et al. emphasised how ‘it is notoriously difficult to distinguish internalized and 
intrapsychic from self-presentational or strategic dimension of expressed behaviour’ (2001: 334), I 
nevertheless propose that people (and their offspring) classified as “white” and “non-white” by the 
apartheid system may, all other factors being equal, present different propensities to protest. Thus: 
 
l) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of whites 
and other racial groups.  
 
4.9 Diplomas  
Educational attainment is presented, often in non-academic discourse,119 as a cause of protest.  
 
Education functions as a signal of employability (Harvey 2000), and is likely to signal the likelihood of 
employment. Marvin Olson’s 1960s studies in the US found that, under extensively controlled 
conditions, ‘the variable of education remained the strongest predictor of protest action scores’ (Olsen 
2014). Similarly, Urdal (2012) found that governments that invest in secondary education experience 
lower risks of civil conflicts, including protests. Likewise, in a South African study, focusing on a single 
municipality, Nwafor established that intra-political disagreements correlated strongly with levels of 
education (Nwafor 2016). 
 
Grade 12 (referred to as “Matric” in South Africa), the endpoint of secondary education, serves as an 
important marker in South Africa. While, to the best of my knowledge, there are no theoretical claims 
directly linking levels of education with South Africans’ propensity to protest, the empirical patterns 
highlighted above suggest that this factor may be salient.  
 
Proposition: 
m) There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
education. 
 
4. 10 Reflection 
In reviewing literature on protest with the explicit aim of identifying claims around causes, I also 
encountered several issues that appear to be associated (possibly statistically) with protest, but not to 
be a cause in and of itself. Rurality is such a factor: it may be so that patterns of protest are measurably 
different between rural and urban settings. Naturally, it would not be the fact that an area is rural that 
                                               
119 (e.g., “The Middle Class Can Save South Africa from Zuma” in News24 2015) 
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“causes” more or less protests, but what “being rural” means, i.e., having a lower and less dense 
population; being physically isolated, being less likely to receive services such as reticulated water, 
sanitation, and refuse removal; a higher chance of being a traditionally-administered community or an 
agricultural community. In this way, I tried to keep to factors which may animate protest, not merely to 
describe characteristics of a community. 
 
One plausible cause of protest that I omitted is that of landlessness, owing to my concerns over how to 
isolate this for measuring. However, landlessness is, to a degree, “located within” (or is likely to 
correlate strongly with) measures such as informality, poverty, delivery, and designation.120 
 
Another, more tangential rumination, is that the differences across scholars regarding their perspectives 
on protest, allude not only to differences in training and observation, but to different ethical views. One 
may consider, for example, several popular designations of the human species, and how these tend to 
highlight “what makes us human”, which I now extend to “what would make us engage in protest”. 
There is homo biologicus, seeing humans as agents motivated by basic necessity (this responds to 
theories of poverty and demographics leading to protest). Then there is homo economicus, seeing 
humans as motivated by self-interest: one could relate this to theories of greed and expectations 
motivating protest. On the other hand, conceptualising us as homo reciprocans – humans as cooperative 
actors motivated by improving their environments through reciprocity, even when lacking foreseeable 
benefit to themselves – may be a frame relating to inequality as driving protest. There is homo politicus, 
positing humans as interested in the affairs of state, and ever yearning to understand the dynamics of 
power, which one could relate to claims around the influence of the lack of democracy and governance 
on protest. Homo juridicus, the view that we are perceptive to the normative primacy of law, could be 
linked to theories of “delivery”; or instead, homo ethicus – humans as ethical agents above all – may 
lead to theories of inequality causing protest. Finally, the idea of homo patiens (humans as agents 
proficient of remembering and suffering) may perhaps be operative in theories linking protest with 
historical trauma.  
 
Finally, one cannot disregard the possibility that the “Ds” will turn out to be “necessary but not 
sufficient”. Studying xenophobic violence in SA, Misago determined that 
  
...while macro and micro-level socio-economic and political circumstances are important 
elements in heightening tensions and creating collective discontent, anger and resentment 
towards foreign nationals, it is the mobilization of this discontent and not the discontent 
itself that triggers xenophobic attacks in locations where they occur (2016: 1; emphasis 
added). 
 
This suggests the very real possibility that the error terms in the eventual statistical regressions will be 
large – i.e., that socio-economic and other descriptors perform poorly in explaining protest, despite 
being important preconditions.   
 
                                               
120 During statistical analysis, residual analysis might well point to unmeasured but important factors, with this 




In this chapter, I showed that there has been considerable debate about “causes” – understood to 
incorporate “drivers”, “catalysts”, “spurs”, and so on – of protest. Many scholars offer explanations, 
and this chapter could not be exhaustive of all writing on the subject, even if just focusing on theories 
commenting on post-apartheid SA. However, instead of concluding that explanations of South Africa’s 
massive and possibly growing wave of protests has become something of a cottage industry, it appears 
that every claim carries merit.   
 
Owing to the type of analysis I anticipate, I have omitted several comparative studies, and have not 
delved into the substantial literature of case studies, where animating inferences are a secondary concern 
to protests as the outcomes of processes, shaped by the exploration of official and unofficial channels 
of collective grievances, official responses, including repression. This implies that several notable 
discussion of protest were not presented above. 
 
Claims straddle several fields of inquiry, covering eight “Ds”, namely “desperation”: poverty and the 
denial of basic material goods; “deprivation”: the role of inequality, social injustice and humiliation; 
“density”: the role of informal living and adherence to the spatial logic of apartheid town-planning; 
“demography”: the role of the local compositions of age, gender and citizenship; “democracy”: the role 
of available mechanisms for participatory democracy, voting behaviour, electoral choice and loyalty; 
“delivery”: the role of public services and accountable governance; “designation”: the role of historical 
trauma; and “diplomas”: the role of education and qualification in predicting local propensities for 
protest.  
 
Claims are generally made in “clusters”: one scholar might emphasise the combination of poverty, 
inequality, and the lack of inclusive, responsive local governance, while another may underscore 
dissatisfaction over crime, and pressure on municipal services owing to migration, as the real factor 
leading to protest. Just as the assumptions, simplifications, and recommendations coming from different 
schools of thought occasionally contradict each other, I showed that some views about causes are 
incompatible. In the case of “service delivery” I presented hypothesised relationships running in 
opposite directions, with one camp suggesting decent services amid unreasonable expectations drive 
protest, and the other that protest is instead explained by unacceptable services amid reasonable 
expectations. While not presented above, the (implied or overt) recommendations flowing from these 
positions will follow these worldviews, and differ sharply.    
 
Incompatible arguments indicate disputes, which make plain the need for investigation. Making 
arguments and assumptions explicit, and identifying possibly faulty premises, is fundamental to rational 
criticism. Popper’s critical rationalism, which relies on the idea that scientific progress is the result of 
the falsification of empirical hypotheses, is one approach. Another, is that of grounded theory, which 
iterates and oscillates between theoretical claims and empirical evidence, reviewing each, and 
constructing an understanding of reality grounded in the dance between reality and our interpretation 
thereof. Chapter 5 will develop this assertion, and present a methodology for testing these claims. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter outlines a methodology for using Machine Learning techniques to determine whether 
police-recorded events are protest events (including its level of tumult), allocating each incident to a 
municipality, and for testing the resulting dataset against a set of proxies representing possible causes 
or structural determinants of protest, using regression analysis. 
 
As discussed before, South Africa hosts a high volume of protests per year, and has a long history of 
protest. Several theoretical positions account for the high levels of protest, and for the melee often 
associated with protest. 
 
This chapter has seven parts, each linked to a goal. First, I discuss the approach, and philosophical 
positions assumed in this study. Next, I operationalise the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. 
Third, I identify the most appropriate data sources to test the diverse hypotheses, bearing in mind that 
the ground reality might be a messy combination of the various claims, but also considering that it is 
possible that none of the hypotheses, as operationalised, covary systematically with levels of protest (at 
least, at the municipal level). After having identified the appropriate data sources, I find that some of 
these are poorly structured, and wholly inadequately labelled. The raw dataset will need pre-processing: 
including reformatting, cleaning, imputation, geolocating, feature engineering and several other data 
munging applications. Thus, a workable dataset is my fourth goal. My fifth goal is to classify records 
as protests/non-protests, and for protests, into the level of tumult they represent. Once this is done, I 
parse, juxtapose, and visualise data to present meaningful descriptive insights into the entire police-
recorded protest landscape. My final goal is to test the predictive power of the hypotheses. I reflect once 
more on this process at the close of the chapter. 
 
 




5.2  Approach and method 
This thesis relies on grounded theory as hermeneutic Marxism in a numerically informed arrangement. 
As such, I followed the classical hermeneutical process by regarding the nature of reality as socially 
and iteratively structured. While we may understand culture through a structure – modelled on language 
– this structure differs from concrete reality and abstract ideas. In line with the Continental tradition, I 
maintain that to understand an object (e.g., protest), it is necessary to study both the object and the 
systems of knowledge that produced it. This implies that, despite using positivist121 quantitative 
methods, I will nonetheless follow an interpretivist approach to the findings.  
 
5.2.1  Grounded theory 
Perhaps the best way of overcoming the abovementioned tension between the inductive and deductive 
approach is to use the system of grounded theorising. 
 
Glaser and Strauss introduced Grounded Theory in the late 1960s as a codified method of generating 
theory based on (or “grounded in”) social realities. The method involves approaching a social 
phenomenon without a unified pre-formulated theory (i.e., either with several possible ideas or none at 
all), and to allow for relationships to emerge from the data by revisiting it and coding it in a variety of 
ways, and over a period of time: this allows different interpretations of the same phenomenon to arise 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). This process, the “constant comparison method”,122 requires the availability 
of accurate evidence, which initiates a data-led inductive process of developing theory, and 
hermeneutically improves such theory over a series of iterations (Rennie 2000). 
 
Primary to this method is the desire to link a “core phenomenon” (in this case protests), to its “causal 
conditions”, where the relative influence of the causal conditions, are not known, but knowable (Heath 
and Cowley 2004). Contemporary scholarship has added that the recent availability of large datasets 
(especially) post-2010, has created fertile soil for grounded approaches (Ridgway 2016), especially in 
areas where there may be an “opportunistic use of theories” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 7), i.e., theories 
that have not been brought into conjunction with the available data. Thus, Glaser and Strauss’ 
methodology can be extended towards looking at a multitude of theories (Bryman 2006), and verifying 
or reformulating them, contingent on the availability of quality data. 
 
5.2.2 Computational integrity 
Permitting iterative passes over the data, as suggested by the Grounded Theory approach, I will use 
artificial intelligence and regression analysis techniques to draw out insights into protest. I will seek to 
make this process not only reproducible, but also explainable. This means that, while I will show the 
results of certain “black box” artificial intelligence processes, such as Artificial Neural Networks, I only 
use this to illustrate that these find commensurate results to explainable machine learning processes – 
                                               
121 Where a number of propositions are generated for empirical verification (Babbie 2005), where considerable 
data are used to analyse large-scale phenomena (Travers 2001), and where the aim is to measure phenomena as 
objective “things” (Hughes and Sharrock 1997) – we are primed for positivist analysis. Moreover, I will use 
standard statistical tools to test the veracity of researchers’ claims about protest. However, we are dealing with a 
context-specific phenomenon, and need to consider context-sensitive readings of the phenomena.  
122 Also described as “analytical hermeneutics” (Orkin 1981). 
 
 64 
where I reveal the logic, hyperparameters, variable coefficients, and standard statistical measures, such 
as R2 and p-values.  
 
I have made the python code available in ipyn format on a GitHub repository, located at 
https://github.com/RandomForestRanger/PhD.  
 
5.3 Protest Event Analysis 
Northern protest literature has long drawn on a tradition of “Protest Event Analysis” (PEA) to study 
direct political actions. Ruud Koopmans and Dieter Rucht (in Klandermans and Staggenborg (eds) 
2002: 321) provide a summary outline of PEA, explaining that ‘in the past few decades … [PEA] has 
been developed to systematically map, analyse, and interpret the occurrence and properties of large 
numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and police 
records’. Moreover, they add that ‘these protest data, in turn, can be linked to other kinds of data to 
study the cause and consequences of protest. … It is a method that allows for the quantification of many 
properties of protest, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, size, forms, carriers, and 
targets, as well as immediate consequence and reactions.’ 
 
PEA grew out of, among others, strike statistics, which were published, in some cases, by government 
agencies in the global North since early in the previous century. Such data included the dates of work 
stoppages, the numbers of disputes, the numbers of workers involved, and the length of the strike or 
workdays lost. While the availability and veracity varied across countries, by 1921 Alvin Hansen was 
able to argue that strike waves (in the US, Great Britain and Germany) correlated with business cycles 
(with increased strike activity being associated with the upswing), using official strike statistics, among 
other sources. In the 1950s, others revealed a more complex reality, with the “business cycle” argument 
breaking down by the 1940s (Berg 1979: 141); now, levels and intensity of action that were linked to 
union organization (Lincoln 1978) , and high levels of militancy associated with workers constituting 
an “isolated mass”, as is often the case with miners (Lincoln 1978: 199-206). Later, Edward Shorter 
and Charles Tilly (Tilly 1977) developed a different mode of analysis, showing that in France there was 
a dramatic change in the “shape” of a typical strike, from small and long in the nineteenth century, to 
large and short after the emergence of the Popular Front in the mid-1930s, and then World War Two. 
They argued that this was associated with the development of large national unions. In South Africa, 
Alexander (Alexander 2000: 127-131) collected data on the strikes that occurred between 1939 and 
1948. Their analysis highlighted the importance of low pay as a driver of militancy and demonstrated 
that strike rates were higher among “new” workers (white women and black men) than among white 
men, who tended to be organised by older and pro-war unions. 
 
Classic PEA relies on the construction of a database (an “event catalogue”) that is comprehensive and 
designed to test relationships between various aspects of the protests (e.g., methods and issues) and 
possible associations between these and factors extraneous to the events (e.g., unemployment). More 
recently, the big data revolution in the 2000s has made more readily available several new alternatives 
to official data – including company records published online, social media records of protest 
participation, geo-tagged location databases, and electronically searchable media archives.  
 
Hanna (2017; 2014) suggests that one of the factors holding back PEA at the scale of the now-available 
data is the fact that most endeavours involve the human coding of events, which is limited and 
particularly time-consuming. She suggests, instead, that machine learning techniques, a field presenting 
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ever-more sophisticated power, offers a way to perform PEA with unparalleled efficiency, lower costs, 
and reduced bias. She claims that past attempts have been “less than optimal”, reminding that in 
conjunction to contemporary machine learning techniques (and other AI innovations, such as Natural 
Language Processing), analysis should have domain-appropriate knowledge of social movements, and 
context-specific knowledge of local histories and institutions.  
 
 
5.4 Operationalising Causal Claims 
Given the theoretical positions based on scholars’ claims, as set out in Chapter 4, I attempted to 
operationalise the most salient positions, using the most widely-trusted sources.123 To this end, I 
advance the following hypothesis: 
 
Protest := ∫(#$%&'$()*,#$%&'$(),, #$-./(01ℎ)3, #$-./(01ℎ)4, #$56&7), 85$9:0%&7),
#$-.;(0;), #$6&/507&.5, #$61$(07&.5, <.($&/5$(6, =)			 
 
Where Protest is the number of protests in a South African municipality over a set time-period (a 
frequency, or frequency per capita, or participant-days per capita, any of which may be transformed to 
a normally-distributed target), DeliveryW is the percentage of households in a municipality that receives 
reticulated water (inside their stand/yard, or piped directly into their house), DeliveryG is a measure of 
governance in the given municipality, DemographyA is a measure of the age profile of people living in 
the municipality, DemographyB is the percentage of males living within the municipality, Density is 
the percentage of the population living in informal housing, Inequality is a measure for income 
inequality within the municipality, such as the Gini coefficient, or a derivative of the Palma index, 
Desperation is the proportion of households within the municipality earning less than a certain amount 
(R401, in my case) per month, Democracy is the proportion of eligible voters casting their votes in a 
general election (2009 in this case), Designation is the percentage of people living in a particular 
municipality who would have been classified as “non-white” under apartheid, Foreigners is the 
percentage of the households in the municipality with a home language other than South Africa’s 
official languages, and E is the error term.  
 
Graphically depicted, this appears as Figure 5.2, below. Such an initial formulation is, naturally, overly 
crude and simplistic, and would not withstand critical scrutiny. 
 
                                               




Figure 5.2: Stylised diagram of proposed first exploratory regression 
          
5.4.1 Frame 
 
I propose to test the above hypotheses for the period between 1997 and 2013 (or between 2009 and 
2013, where more prudent) in South Africa, considering the entire census-enumerated population, using 
the local municipality as the unit. In tests that do not include the population in the calculations, I will 
use the entire dataset of 17 years; for those that are per capita calculations, I will use protest data from 
the census year and two years before and after (i.e., there was a national census in 2011, so I will use 
protest data from 2009-2013 when my calculations consider protests per capita).  
 
In South Africa, government is administered at three tiers – the national, provincial and municipal. 
Municipalities are charged with the responsibility for several124 public services. This makes the 
municipal frame handy in measuring both the local socio-economic conditions, and citizens’ responses 
to these. Moreover, since much protest is, by some accounts, against poor “service delivery”, this is 
more likely to relate protest to the administration at the municipal level than at higher governmental 
tiers.  
 
For illustration, below is a representation of the 19 municipalities (grouped into four district 
municipalities) in one of South Africa’s nine provinces, the Free State. 
                                               
124 This includes water reticulation, refuse collection, facilitation of electricity connections (and collecting 
municipal rates that pay for these), road and storm water drains maintenance (excluding provincial and national 




Figure 5.3: Local Municipalities of the Free State (named), and District Municipalities (by colour).  
Source: municipalities.co.za 
 
Every frame selection implies opportunity costs. The municipal frame may very well be still too “high” 
a level of measurement – such that measurement will yield no discernible patterns. In such a case, ways 
of obtaining lower-level data will have to be pursued (for instance, see De Juan and Wegner 2019 for 
an approach based on limited reading of IRIS, and using Police districts as frame). The municipal frame 
will likely also be too large to identify many of the smaller-area frictions that turn into grievances, and 
will average out acute-but-localised social conditions, blending them with the rest of the municipality, 
and present merely an aggregate picture. To be sure, municipalities don’t protest, communities do. 
Contrarywise, the municipal frame will be too small to identify province-wide, national, and supra-
national trends – and one could speculate that studying higher-level trends is vital to understanding 
protest, given protests’ contagious and wave-like nature. Nonetheless, the availability of data and the 
space implications for this study preclude such frames from consideration, and regressions attempting 
a province-by-province approach would be compromised by having too few observations (as will be 
explained below, each municipality will serve as a single observation. Thus, for the Free State, we have 
19 observations). 
 
It should also be borne in mind that one cannot assume that municipalities are “natural units”, nor 
homogeneously populated. The municipal frame binds one to the effects of border-setting and 
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gerrymandering. The shapes of municipalities often do not follow natural boundaries, and may be set 
for political expediency125.  
 
Another noteworthy challenge inherent to the municipal frame is the phenomenon of courthouse 
protests. The court assigned to deal with a case may not necessarily be in the province of the alleged 
crime. Thus, several protests heard before the Magistrate’s court in Groblersdal (in KZN in 2011) were 
from alleged crimes originating in neighbouring Mpumalanga. To deal with this, courthouse protests 
and other Destination Protests (including protests at Parliament and the Union Buildings) will be treated 
as a separate category of protest, and excluded from municipal-level analysis (so that municipal protest 
figures are generally representative of protests by people from that municipality, not simply of protests 
in the municipality). 
 
The decision to only focus on South Africa prohibits all but the most cursory application of my findings 
to explain protest outside the country. The elected time, which spans 1997 to 2013, brings several 
benefits in its traversing several crucial periods in the country’s recent history, but with the last date 
being now over seven years into the past, one would have to err on the side of modesty by not claiming 
any forward-looking predictive power to flow from the models. 
 
5.5 Data 
To have confidence in the findings, sufficiently large and trustworthy data are essential. 
 
For socio-economic data, the most widely trusted (and used) data about South African demographics 
and household-economic conditions is generated by the national statistical service of South Africa, 
Statistics South Africa (henceforth Stats SA). I will use their data from the 2001 and 2011 national 
censuses. 
 
For data about municipal governance, I will use the Auditor General’s reports, which reviews the 
financial management results from all of SA’s municipalities annually. I will also include the South 
African Local Government Association's126 assessment regarding municipal performances. 
 
For the data on protest, I was presented with the IRIS-set at the outset of this research. The IRIS-set is 
large (in comparison to other sources of protest information), covers the entire SA, and is presently 
under-analysed. Below, I discuss IRIS, as well as alternative sources of protest data: media aggregation 
and risk management services. 
 
                                               
125 For instance, the northern border of the City of Tshwane, was expanded to include parts of the former 
Garankuwa (the Winterveldt, etc.) – ostensibly since the latter is staunchly ANC territory, at a time where parts 
of Tshwane begun to shift support towards opposition parties. In another example, the Hibiscus Coast (in KZN) 
is a long, elongated stretch along the coast, however, and possibly owing to the danger of the relatively wealthy 
and white coast-dwellers supporting opposition parties, this municipality includes a piece of disconnected inland 
geography with a rural characteristic, which seemingly retains a strong majority of ruling-party support within the 
municipal chambers. 
126 Which falls under the ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, COGTA. 
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5.5.1 Police-recorded data 
The Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) dataset is generated by the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) from logged callouts or planned events involving groups or crowds of people.  
 
IRIS is captured by public order police at the unit-level, and is used to monitor public order 
interventions, in order to ‘inform policy and motivate for increased funding’ (Alexander, Runciman, 
and Maruping 2015: 10). IRIS captures, at the risk of oversimplification, all ‘assemblies, 
demonstrations and all gatherings … whether recreational, peaceful, or of an unrest nature’ (SAPS 
2014). The Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) of 1993 considers ‘any assembly, concourse or 
procession of more than 15 persons in or on any open road ... or any public place or premises wholly or 
partly open to the air’ as a ‘gathering’ (Republic of South Africa 1993). However, as we will see, neither 
the RGA’s definition nor the National Instruction, are strictly maintained. For a discussion on the 
various definitions employed, as well as the development of IRIS and public order policing in SA, see 
Alexander et al. (2018) and Runciman et al. (2016). For a study using a small sample of IRIS for 
instructive multiple regressions, see De Juan and Wegner (2019).  
 
5.5.2 Advantages and limitations of police data 
IRIS was not collected with the present research in mind: instead, the researcher comes to the set as an 
already-constructed artefact. This implies that several of the details about a given protest incident – 
such as the avenues sought by groups and communities before resorting to mobilise for protest action, 
the background of the organisers, and the circumstances around the trigger event – are generally not 
captured, and hard, if not impossible, to deduce. As discussions have noted (especially Runciman et al. 
2016), the police-assigned categories (specifically “motive”, “residential”, and “eventuality”) are 
captured in such an inconsistent manner as to render them of very limited value for my aggregations.  
 
Furthermore, as Runciman et al. have shown, the volume of events captured reflect the available funding 
to an alarming degree: when the number of units was reduced (in 2006) and police priorities shifted, 
likewise, the total number of captured events decreased. The IRIS database must therefore be 
understood as a catalogue of the events that public order police managed to attend to, as opposed to a 
compendium of all events that took place.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, IRIS’ not being assembled with the present research in mind presents 
distinct advantages. The South African Police Service is, naturally, better funded than any local news-
organisation, and has several large data-gathering systems. Moreover, in a world where information is 
considered “intelligence”, it is rare to find unguarded comments to reveal how police officers perceive 
information, without euphemism, and public-image considerations. The inclusion of incidents is not 
subject to newsworthiness criteria, as in the case of media articles – police attend according to their 
interpretations of a scenario, framed by their understanding of police instructions, and legal definitions, 
as far as resources and knowledge of events allow – means far greater coverage, both in terms of 
geography (all municipalities in the country are included) and size (IRIS includes more than 100 000 
event records for the period 1997-2013). As has been argued elsewhere (Bruce 2016), police are likely 
to be incentivised to include all possible events to which they attend (or err on the side of over-reporting, 
not under-reporting), as opposed to leaving out certain events for convenience’s sake, since the 





The timespan is also propitious – it covers the end of the Mandela presidency, crosses the Mbeki and 
Motlanthe years, and includes most of President Zuma’s first term in office. By this, it also crosses the 
theoretical thresholds of the millennium, the start of the Rebellion of the Poor (2004), and the global 
financial crisis (2008). According to Runciman et al., IRIS provides researchers ‘an unparalleled source 
of information for protest analysis’, provided one is aware of its limitations. For these reasons, I selected 
IRIS as the best-suited dataset by which to test common theories.  
 
5.5.3 Media-generated protest data 
Given the number of protests in SA, and the media attention given to the phenomenon, there are several 
options of pre-populated data sources that bear considering, assembled from collections of media 
articles. Below, I briefly discuss five “families” of such datasets, and highlight paradigmatic examples. 
 
GDELT 
The Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) is an online platform, with an impressive 
scope, described as ‘an initiative to construct a catalogue of human societal-scale behaviour and beliefs 
across all countries of the world, connecting every person, organization, location, count, theme, news 
source, and events’ into a single network, which captures events, actors and sentiments (The GDELT 
Project, no date). The project monitors the world's broadcast, print, and web news in over 100 
languages, scrubbing online content to identify people and organisations, events, locations, quotes, 
using, among other techniques, Natural Language Programming (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013). While 
there are concerns about their munging algorithms,127 their biggest pitfall is that, in South Africa’s case, 
they simply do not cover enough events, and in the period 1997 to 2017, GDELT was only able to 
identify 4400 protest events in SA, which represents less than 10% of the incidents of other datasets for 
the same period. On this basis alone, this project, which in years to come may well emerge the global 
reference source for PEA, does not yet provide sufficient data points. 
 
Protest Maps 
Several online services offer (interactive) maps of SA protest incidents. This includes Code for South 
Africa’s Protest Map,128 The Eyewitness News Protest Tracker,129 and The South Africa Protest 
Tracker,130 run by Master of Public Administration students at Columbia University's School of 
International Public Affairs. 
 
Such maps are handy visualisation tools,131 especially when comparing urban protest over time, where 
place names are common. The abovementioned maps each rely on less than 2000 protest incidents, 
which is less than 5% of the incidents (as per other databases), and thus of limited use. 
 
Municipal IQ 
Municipal IQ is a company that collects proprietary media-generated data, mostly to sell the assembled 
data to South African municipalities. Their datasets begin in 2004.  
                                               
127 https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/another-note-on-the-limitations-of-event-data/ 
128 https://bit.ly/30xoaGD  
129 https://bit.ly/2HFNMbR 
130 http://africasecuritytracker.com/ 




Apart from their data being used by municipalities, Municipal IQ themselves are frequently quoted in 
the media (e.g., Gous 2018; September 2018). Their analysis, and definitions of what constitute protest, 
is somewhat controversial and disputed (Davis 2018). Like other sources, their well-documented 
undercount (less than 1 000 for 2004-2014) (discussed in Alexander et al. 2018), exacerbated by the 
fact that they only consider “major protests” (events with more than 100 participants) and principally 
only events that protest against “local government services”, is a monition against using this dataset. 
 
ACLED 
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) is an NGO research initiative that 
collects and assembles data about political violence, including “public protests”, for several countries. 
ACLED data is captured in a disaggregated manner, including hand-captured dates, actors, types of 
violence, geolocations, and fatalities related to protests.  
 
Using media reports to populate their datasets, ACLED’s set contains over 10 300 records of South 
African conflict for the period 1997-2017, the largest category covering "rioting/protesting" incidents.  
 
ACLED’s definitions appear at variance with Alexander et al. For ACLED data, protest is not so much 
reflections of always-already present violence; protests are significant insofar as they foreshadow public 
violence: ‘a politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more 
groups toward a political end, although some non-violent instances – including protests and strategic 
developments – are included in the dataset to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a 
violent conflict’ (ACLED 2019: 6). Formally, "protests" are classified as ‘a public demonstration in 
which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them. Often – 
though not always – protests are against a government institution’, whereas rioting is ‘a violent form of 
demonstration where the participants engage in violent acts, including but not limited to rock-throwing, 
property destruction, etc. (ACLED 2019: 13). 
 
While the definitional mismatch with local scholars may merit exploration elsewhere, again, the relative 
dearth (less than 20% of the hypothesised total) of data points makes this unsatisfactory for a study 
hoping to cover as many protest incidents as possible.  
 
Media monitoring services 
There are several media monitoring services and clipping services scanning and archiving South 
African media. Such services are proprietary, providing clients with copies of relevant media content, 
which can be identified by theme, location, or subject, among others.  
 
Prominent media monitoring services include Sabinet, SA Press Cuttings, Africlip, Newsclip, 
SAMMA, ROi Africa, Highlight Media, and Meltwater. While all of these services collect clippings 
from a wide variety of SA sources, their datasets typically include significant over-reporting of large 
events (a single event covered by several data sources), which, for a study involving a large timespan, 
will need meticulous cleaning to not include multiple counts of the same events132 and possibly, 
weighting, to account for the urban bias. 
 
                                               
132 See Gaur et al. (2013) for a discussion about setting up an online news clipping database. 
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5.5.4 Challenges related to media-based datasets 
Media-based datasets can only be as good as the press whose news articles it aggregates. This means 
that, by default, media-based datasets fall prey to the logic of newsworthiness criteria of the newspapers 
– whose aims are commercial viability – which includes proximity (implying an urban bias), size (which 
means that small protests are very likely to be omitted), significance (implying that many protests are 
omitted as they are unlikely to be deemed relevant to readers, who are often educated and relatively 
well-off) and violent (implying a preference for reporting on spectacle – fire, glass, blood and tears). 
The imperative of newsworthiness leads to Jane Duncan (2016: 183) referring to much reporting on 
protest (what is covered, and how coverage is done) as “riot porn”, which omits critical scrutiny into 
causes, oversimplifies nuance when grievances are reported, and tends to neglect the development of 
events (meetings, correspondences, the weeks of mobilisation, and the dialectic of persuasion and 
intimidation), before the actual protest event. 
 
The argument above implies that media-based datasets, regardless of provenance, are inferior to the 
administered data from law enforcement authorities, and are unlikely to give a realistic picture of the 
scope and volume of protest (especially rural and nonviolent) at the country-level. 
 
5.5.5 Integrated risk management companies 
Several agencies monitor protests in real-time, including risk management companies,133 such as 
WorldAware (WorldAware, no date) and TopicWorx (TopixWorx, no date). Such companies help their 
clients – typically wealthy individuals or staff employed by multinational corporations – to prepare for, 
monitor and respond to “threats”, including people taking direct political action in ways that might put 
their clients’ staff, projects, or reputations at risk.  
 
The data (“intelligence”) assembled is often a mix of media monitoring (including newswire alerts and 
social media), information from within law enforcement, and on-the-ground informers. I have contacted 
the local risk management companies noted above, but was unable to obtain access to any of their 
databases. 
 
5.6 Understanding IRIS 
5.6.1 A general limitation  
IRIS is thus significantly larger, and also less biased with regard to size, geography, and violence (and, 
of course, publicly available), which renders it better placed to test theories of countrywide protest at 
the municipal level. Notwithstanding this, it bears reflecting that the objective of IRIS is not by any 
means to measure “all protest” in South Africa. Many direct political actions, ranging from letters 
written to bombs planted134 – would not be captured in what is essentially a crowd-incident register, nor 
would media-generated dataset include the former, and the latter would likely be a story of domestic 
terrorism. This implies that I am aware of the need to be modest about equating the incidents in IRIS 
as the true size of civil discontent. 
 
                                               
133 Or “Crisis Management Consultants”. 
134 Though stay-always, boycotts and incidents of “work to rule”. 
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5.6.2 IRIS Background 
The central value and development of IRIS is thoroughly presented by Alexander et al. (2015). Omar 
(2007) notes important changes in South African public order policing during the 1997-2013 period. 
Public Order Policing units were established in 1996 (Omar 2007: ix), with around 11 000 members, 
who began to record data about crowd management incidents. POP units were converted to Area Crime 
Combating Units (ACCUs), ostensibly owing to a shift of priorities from gatherings towards crime, in 
2002. ACCUs consisted of 7 327 members (Omar 2007). The strategy of “policing areas” was 
abandoned in 2006, and units were placed under central command (now rebranded as Crime Combating 
Units (CCUs), with a staffing complement of 2 595 members. The total number of members assigned 
to crowd management duties thus fell by more than 75% over six years, just as the original 42 units 
dwindled to 23. The episodes of xenophobic violence in 2008, and the looming football world cup, led 
to CCUs being expanded, and by 2013, the units were again called POPs, of which there were now 4 
642 (Omar 2007).  
 
5.6.3 IRIS Data gathering 
IRIS incidents are collected via reports from field officers, and often include several time markers in a 
single case, as field officers update the control room on developments.  
 
Sample IRIS Note (details redacted with “X”): 
 
 
Events are limited to a day, and unless reporting officers follow the movement of a group (during a 
procession, for instance) are confined to a single location. This means that a five-day strike would be 
recorded as five separate events, and that a gathering organised by the same trade union of, say, 
municipal workers at two separate municipalities (on the same day, about the same issue) would be 
recorded as two events.  
 
Moreover, since the RGA determines whether a phenomenon is a “crowd incident”, many of the events 
captured are not protests by any definition – these include sports matches, large open-air church 
gatherings, music festivals and cultural exhibitions, as well as “group violence” incidents, such as 
shootouts between groups representing opposing taxi associations. 
 
5.6.4 IRIS Variables: Features 
The IRIS set includes the following features: Date Occurred, Eventuality Classification 
(Peaceful/Unrest), Province (One of ten variables: nine provinces, plus Head Office), Residential (an 
indication of where the event occurred – 2400 unique values), Environment (a classification of the 
ON SATURDAY 2009/01/24 AT ABOUT 14:00 MEMBERS OF X CCU, X SAPS AND X CLUSTER WERE 
MOBILISED BY SUPT X ABOUT ROAD BARRICADED AT X BY RESIDENTS OF X.ON ARRIVAL FOUND +-
100 PEOPLE BARRICADED THE ROAD WITH TREES, ROCKS, BURNINGTYRES, OBSTRUCTING OTHER 
ROAD USERS OR MOTORIST BY OFFLOAD PASSANGERS FROMBUSES AND TURNING BACK BUSES TO X 
NOT YET REACHED THEIR DESTINATION. AT 17:30 SUPT X WARNED THE CROWD TO DISPERS WITHIN 
FIVE MINUTES,THEYCONTINUED WITH THEIR TOY-TOYING ACTIONS. THEN AT 17:40 SUPT X THREW 
ONE STUN GRENADE TO DISPERSE THE CROWD AND RUBBERBATON WERE USED AND FIFTY(50) 
PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED FOR PUBLIC VIOLENCEPER X CAS X AND DETAINED AT DIFFERENT POLICE 
STATIONS.ONE MEMBER WAS INJURED NO. X  R/CST. X BEATEN ON HIS RIGHTPOINTING FINGER BY 
SUSPECT.NO.X SUPT X FIRED ONE(1)STUN GRENADENO. X  SUPT X TWO(2)STUN AND TWO RUBBER 
BATON MUSLER AM X  SGT X ONE(1)STUN AND SEVEN(7)RUBBER BATON MUSLER AM X  CST X FOUR(4) 
RUBBER BATON MUSLER AM X. 
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location – such as a sport stadium, residential area, or public road. 74 unique values), Motive (the key 
grievance, 79 unique values), Incident number (all unique, save for duplications), and Notes (a brief 
report of the event). 
 
As explained elsewhere,135 only the Dates Occurred, Province, Residential (in order to derive 
municipalities) and Notes are of clear value, save for the Motive, which, while highly inconsistent, but 
can be used to help identify certain classes of events (in identifying taxi violence and labour disputes, 
among others).  
 
5.6.5 IRIS Language 
IRIS was captured in Afrikaans and English (roughly 70% English, 30% Afrikaans in 1997), with a 
shift towards English, so that by 2013, all records were recorded in English. 
 
The register of the language in the notes varies between formal and informal, and spans bureaucratic 
jargon, technical policing terms, and vulgar expressions. Many terms are used interchangeably, 
including, for example “shacks” (which can denote an entire informal township/slum), “squatter camp”, 
“informal settlement”, “township”, “mjondolo” and “location”.136 The actual structures, commonly 
“shacks”, are also captured as “shantys” and “mokhukhus”. Grammar and spelling are poor (e.g., 
“shacks” is often captured as “sharks”), with unexpected spaces breaking up words, as well as spaces 
often missing between words. Especially the spelling of place names is highly variable. This all means 
that most Natural Language Processing systems would struggle to neatly parse the text, and that vertical 
lookup tables will not suffice for location attribution.  
 
5.6.6 Other considerations related to data gathering conditions 
South Africa is a violent society, by several measures (Seedat et al. 2009). Moreover, the national fiscus 
falls well short of the financial needs of government department and ministries. Thus, the police work 
with severely constrained resources, under constant threat of physical harm, and with a wide range of 
demands from politicians, commanding structures and the general population.  
 
Several studies suggest that SAPS officers are insufficiently supported and poorly managed137 to deal 
with the stress and trauma attendant to their work (Young, Koortzen, and Oosthuizen 2012). SAPS 
officers are generally overstretched by the scope of their duties, have inadequate or poor quality 
equipment, receive inadequate salaries, and are routinely exposed to other stressors, such as seeing 
criminals go free, personal injuries, and the death of colleagues (Pienaar and Rothmann 2006; Plani, 
Bowley, and Goosen 2003). 
 
5.6.7 IRIS summarised 
IRIS is a logging system, in which the South African public order police attempt to record all instances 
of crowd events. As such, it is rather a curate’s egg – it is unguarded insofar as it was not assembled for 
                                               
135 Runciman et al. (2016), who also laments the lack of methodological care, high prevalence of clear 
misclassification, and inconsistent use of terms. 
136 From the Afrikaans “lokasie” – the informal word for a historical non-white ghetto. 
137 Regarding training, psychosocial counselling, time off work and other human resource interventions. 
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the public gaze or scholarly scrutiny, but its lack of consistency, lack of information into several matters 
key to understanding a protest event (including actions taken before resorting to protest, triggers, and 
leadership) and poor geolocation strategy are all problematic. Despite having an adequate number of 
records, IRIS does thus not make “good data” without significant pre-processing. I will now turn to my 
protocols and pre-processing strategies.  
 
5.7 Data handling safety protocols 
The IRIS set contains sensitive and private information, both about police officers and civilians. This 
includes personal identification numbers, phone numbers, people’s whereabouts and alleged activities 
on given dates, alleged criminal activities and, in the case of police officers, the names of officers 
discharging weapons (including the number of rounds fired during ‘crowd containment’ actions). 
 
To ensure that this information remains secure, I used a secure file transfer protocol when I had to send 
the information electronically, and performed my workings on an air-gapped computer. My machine 
learning working was done online, since I used online Python notebooks, running a GPU-backed 
learning environment. Access to this was protected by a two-stage password. However, the bulk of 
online work did not require personally identifying data, so the Notes feature was omitted when it was 
possible. Where this was not possible, all data was removed from online repositories once I completed 
the analysis. For ethical reasons, I have also redacted all personal-identifiable information from this 
thesis.  
 
5.8 High-level process overview 
To get the various datasets in a shape that would allow me to pursue machine learning strategies, quite 





Figure 5.4: Stylised depiction of data assembly and pre-processing components 
 
From the original IRIS-set, which was subjected to much cleaning and feature engineering, I created a 
keyword set (a sparse, many-hot encoded matrix), as well as a training and testing dataset (adding a 
label to each incident). Based on the labels from the training set, and the features from the keyword set, 
I ran various machine learners to predict the labels for the unlabelled portion of the keyword set. The 
outcome of this is the scored IRIS set.  
 
The scored IRIS set was then transformed to allocate protests (including types of protest) into 
municipalities – creating a much smaller dataset: the municipal protest set. 
 
Using the census data from Statistics South Africa, the municipal audit reports from the Auditor 
General, and municipal ratings from COGTA, I created a combined set, the municipal socio-economic 
and governance set (henceforth the MSG-set). The MSG-set then allowed me to see which (if any) 
features would prove good predictors of the outcomes captured in the municipal protest set. I have made 
this dataset publicly available at http://dx.doi.org/10.21227/mm8n-3286. 
 
5.9 Principles of Machine Learning 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an area of computer science working on the creation of intelligent 
machines; machines that, in certain domains, react like humans. Machine Learning (ML) lies within the 
domain of AI, but is also closely related to applied statistics (Alpaydin 2016). ML is applied to a wide 
range of problems where an explicit, hand-coded solution is hard or undesirable to obtain. The rise in 
interest in ML over the past decade is partly due to the explosion in big data (its availability, and jobs 
related to data mining) but also to the increasing accessibility of ML techniques. Today, ML is used, 
among a growing number of domains, in demand forecasting, fraud detection, targeted marketing, 
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preventative maintenance, online recommenders, speech recognition, predicting medical outcomes, and 
spam detection. It is also used to reshape the Social Sciences, bringing big data and computer scientific 
techniques to scholars working on problems related to the study of society, human association and 
patterns of social relationships, social interaction, and culture. The field that deals with this has come 
to be known as Computational Social Science.  
 
5.9.1 Terms 
For a brief discussion on ML models and their assumptions, the principle of loss, and the standard ML 
workflow, see Appendix 1: Principles of Machine Learning. 
 
In ML, independent/explanatory/covariate/predictor variables are known as features (the x variable in 
simple linear regression), and dependent variables are known as labels or targets (the y variable in 
simple linear regression): I will maintain this convention. Considering the IRIS-set, the “Notes” could 
be regarded as a feature, whereas the column recording whether the incident was protest or not, is the 
label.  
 
Parameters are variables internal to the model and whose values can be estimated from data, such as 
the coefficients in a linear regression. Hyperparameters are configurations that are external to the model, 
specified by the user of the model (before the model is run). Examples of hyperparameter are C and 
sigma for support vector machines.138 
 
Finally, so-called supervised ML learners are typically “regressors” or “classifiers”, where regressors 
predict a continuous target, and classifiers predict a discrete/categorical target.  
 
Typical classifiers include Logistic Regressions, Naive Bayes Classifiers, Support Vector Machines, 
Decision Trees, Boosted Trees, Random Forests, and Neural Networks. 
 
Environment, language, libraries 
‘Python’ is the most commonly used programming language for ML and related data science 
applications, owing to its ability to incorporate scores of user-developed libraries and additional 
functions, among others. User-developed libraries include Numpy (a toolkit for scientific computing), 
Pandas (a column-oriented data analysis library), Statsmodels139 and Scikit-Learn (statistical and 
machine-learning libraries), and Seaborn (a visualisation package), all of which I drew upon. I 
programmed the ML functions on the Collaboratory platform, a free integrated development 
environment offered by Google.  
 
5.10  Dataset 1: The IRIS-set  
The largest dataset with which I dealt was the IRIS-set, which also required the most complex pre-
processing, including ML techniques.  
 
My aim for this was to label each case as protest or non-protest, in order to eliminate the non-protest 
events. This would allow me to classify the protest event by main issue (among others, Community 
                                               
138 For more information, see Tong and Koller (2001), and discussion about support vector machines, below.  
139 Developed by Seabold and Perktold (2010). 
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protest, Labour-related protest, Destination protest, and Health and Education-related protest) as well 
as by level of tumult (orderly, disruptive, or violent). However, it became apparent that this task could 
hardly be hand-coded, as this would take one several years. Using ML techniques, on the other hand, it 
would be possible to create the desired dataset in a matter of months. 
 
5.10.1 Data Pre-processing  
Raw data rarely come in the form that is ideal for optimum performance of learning algorithms. Thus, 
pre-processing is a vital step in ML application (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 12). I spent some months 
familiarising myself with the set, reading and annotating around 3 000 cases and attributing several 
labels to a subset. The steps outlined varied in the time they took to perform – for instance, removing 
missing values took a few minutes while the location attribution spanned over 160 hours. 
 
Combine datasets 
SAPS captures IRIS in a proprietary format. The data I received, from the Centre for Social Change at 
the University of Johannesburg, was presented in 34 separate csv-files: two files per year, one with all 
incidents labelled “Unrest”, and another labelled “Peaceful”. These I combined into a single table, 
which covered 169 000 event records.  
 
Consolidate “Notes”  
The “Notes” feature, the recorded chronicle of each event, was limited to roughly 500 characters per 
line. However, comments ranged up to 320 lines, which then appeared as 320 cases. Using a series of 
logic functions, I consolidated all related comments into single cells.  
 
Remove duplicates and missing values  
The IRIS-set included a non-trivial number of duplicates, which seemed to be automatically generated 
by repeating every record for the number of motives assigned to an event. Each row continued only one 
value in the “Motive” column, and if three motives were assigned to one event, the record appeared 
thrice. However, since the police-assigned motive was not particularly useful, I could eliminate records 
that were duplicates in all respects except for motives. This reduced the dataset from 169 047 to 153 
571 records. 
 
Several incidents were recorded without a value in the “Notes” feature. For prudency’s sake, I removed 
test data, blanks, and “near-blanks” (some cases had notes that were not actual event data, unintelligible 
or intended as tests – e.g., “     ”, “aaaaa”, “testing pls ignore”, or “qwerty”). This reduced the dataset 
by 2401 (missing values) plus 721 (not readable) cases.   
 
Location Attribution 
The IRIS dataset includes a column of “Residential”, where data-capturers recorded the location of the 
event. However, for the period 1997-2013, SAPS did not use a fixed convention to guide what an 
appropriate value within “Residential” should be. In some cases, the nearest police station was used, in 
others, the common name for the suburb, town or township was used. Non-official colloquialisms were 
frequently listed. For instance, a single event in the Northern Cape may be labelled “De Aar” (the town), 
“Nonzwakazi” (the township), “Monwabisi” (the section within the township), or by a parochially local 
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name, such as “Gold Dollar”. The result is that IRIS comprises 2445 unique values for “Residential”, 
which does not correspond to any commensurate list of places.140  
 
Unfortunately, neither South Africa’s roughly 24 000 subplaces,141 nor the roughly 4 000 mainplaces, 
as used in official statistics, could be of use – the records were simply not sufficiently fine-grained. This 
necessitated going over every previously uncategorised example, and assigning these to one of the 
country’s 226 local municipalities (or into one of the eight Category A municipalities – the metropolitan 
municipalities) as per their demarcation in 2011.  
 
Table 5.1: Count of Unique Residential Values per Province 
Province Count of unique "Residential" locations 
KwaZulu Natal 556 
Gauteng 326 
Eastern Cape 314 
North West 268 
Western Cape 264 
Mpumalanga 243 
Free State 194 
Northern Cape 143 
Limpopo 137 
 
This proved a challenge. The volume, as depicted in Table 5.1 above, was compounded by the fact that 
many locations’ names were misleading in subtle ways. Examples include cases where a single word 
(e.g., “Ventersdorp”) could be a town or a municipality; where places share the same name (e.g., there 
are two towns called “Hartbeesfontein”, both in the North West, a village called “Majakaneng” in both 
Limpopo and the North West, not to be confused with “Makayaneng”, also in the North West, and 
seven places across South Africa called “Berea”). There are municipalities with the same name, e.g., 
Emalahleni Local Municipality (Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape Provinces) or Naledi Local 
Municipality (Free State and North West Provinces), or with similar names, e.g., “Ngquza Hill Local 
Municipality” and “Ngqushwa Local Municipality”); or where an area is related to the police base (e.g., 
there is Bapong[Brits] and Bapong[Rustenburg], which is the same place, and in Madibeng Local 
Municipality, not Rustenburg Local Municipality). Police allocated “Residential” areas marked as 
“Scottburgh” were found to be in four separate municipalities. Moreover, the IRIS-set contains many 
spelling errors, and while “Setlagoli”, “Setlegolie” and “Setlagodi” all refer to the same place, 
“Mogwase” and “Makwassie” (the same place, a large village) are not to be confused with “Maquassi”, 
which is a distant municipality. There is a “Pixley ka Seme” local municipality in Mpumalanga, and a 
“Pixley ka Seme” district municipality in the Northern Cape. There are scores of similar examples as 
the above. 
 
Another feature, “Province”, provided guidance – especially in dealing with village-name duplicates. 
However, police units are often deployed across provincial boundaries. This happens in routine work, 
where police station areas cross provincial lines by demarcation (especially the case where Moretele 
and the City of Tshwane meet, in an intricate zig-zag pattern), but also when large events necessitate 
the deployment of police across provincial borders (e.g., North West police working in KZN for major 
                                               
140 For a definitive overview, see Runciman et al. (2016). They explicitly suggest that further research should 
place “residentials” within municipalities (2016: 51). 
141 Referring to the geographic subdivisions as demarcated by the State. 
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events – sometimes the POP unit will capture the event as “North West”, ostensibly to show which 
resources were drawn upon). 
 
This all required meticulous reading of many of the “Notes” features, studying detailed maps, and 
making reference to Statistics SA’s 22 000 subplace names, to ensure correct allocation. In addition, 
reference to the Independent Electoral Commission’s official election results (which lists names of 
schools and other voting stations), newspaper articles, and internet sources, also proved helpful. Some 
“Residential” allocation (e.g., Lebanon, North West), which is not a listed mainplace, subplace, election 
venue, not searchable on online maps, needed to be established via finding news articles.  
 
A final hitch came with the shifting of provincial and municipal boundaries, a common occurrence in 
the 1997-2013 period. My strategy was to keep locations in the municipality where they were in 2011, 
so that I would be able to compare like with like throughout the study.  
 
5.11  Enhanced data processing techniques  
Data preparation for ML classification included feature engineering. This included developing a 
taxonomy of keywords, and creating a vectorised dataset to allow for modelling predictions. 
 
A strategy for assigning municipal Tumult Scores  
Once I had developed a database of the number of protests per municipality, it became apparent that 
the degree of upheaval would be particularly informative.142 I used the following calculation for the 
tumult score of each municipality: 
 




Municipal tumult ranged from 0 (in two Local Municipalities, which had no recorded protest between 
2009 and 2013) to 1 (in Ubuntu Local Municipality, where all protest events between 2009 and 2013 
were deemed “violent”). 
 
Development of a rule-based taxonomy  
I developed a series of bilingual keywords which act as signifiers for a framework of concepts, so as to 
classify incidents as protest or not, and if protest, of which kind, and of which level of tumult. The 
concepts were then grouped into thematic categories – following the components as developed in 







                                               
142 This step does not follow the presented sequence of feature engineering, but rather reflects the iterative nature 
of the Grounded Theorising method. It was only after I considered the outcome of the machine-learning scoring 
that the value of this strategy presented itself. 
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Table 5.2: A subsample of a rule-based taxonomy for IRIS 
Type Category Keywords English Keywords Afrikaans 
Grievance Police Police AND (crime, policing, incident, drugs, 
gangs, arrests, suspects, wrongful, violence) 
(Polisie OR SAPS) AND (misdaad, 
poliseering, dwelms, bendes, gangs, 
arresteer, verkeerde, geweld, 
ongelukkig, kwaad ) 
Grievance Housing Housing, land, stands, Behuising, erwe, grond 
Grievance Electricity (Electricity OR Power OR connections ) and cost, 
price, supply, cut, disconnect 
(Elektrisiteit OR krag OR konneksie) 




(Work(ers) OR Company OR Employ(er) OR 
Labour OR Industrial OR Bosses OR strike OR 
management OR ?) AND (corrupt, fired, 
dismissed, policy, other people, hours, overtime, 
equipment, tools, salary, wages, cheque, food, 
water, transport, housing, accommodation, health, 
safety, living conditions, management, race, 
racism, racist, discrimination, subsidy, allowance, 
training, white, promotion, working conditions, 
increase  
Werkers, Maatskappy, Base, 
Industriele, Staking, Lone 
Grievance Foreigners Foreigners, Somali, Zimbabwe, xenophobic/a, Uitlanders, inkommers, vreemdelinge, 
somaliers, zimbabweers 
Trigger Dismissals Fired, suspended, dismissed, disciplin* afgedank, geskors,  
Trigger Wage 
disputes 
Payment, salary, cheque, overtime, wage, wages, 
remuneration, not paid, bonus, bonuses, percent, 
unfair 
betaling, salaris, oortyd, onbetaal, 
persent 
Trigger Evictions Evicted, relocated, red ants, demolition, relocation, 
removal, demolished 
Uitgesit, geskuif, afgebreek,  
Trigger Utility 
connections 
Disconnected, power is down, electricity is down, 
power AND cut, electricity AND cut, water, 
prepaid  
Krag, elektrisiteit,  
Tactic Attack Atack, Attack, Throw, threw, pelt, torch, chaos, 
lost control, threatened, death threat 
aanval, gegooi, aangeval, getref, 
geslaan, gedreig, beheer verloor 
Tactic Disrupt Tyre, Block, tire, burn, Fire, Bricks, Stones, 
Rubbish, Refuse, Binns, Bins, blokade, blockade, 
prevented, entrace, road, refuse to, prevent, disrupt, 
switch off, riot* 
Bande, blok, brand, brandgesteek, 
vullis, afblikke, verhoed, ingang, 
afgeskakel 
Tactic M&M March AND Memorandum Optog AND Memorandum 
Actors Civic org association, residents, concerned, ratepayers, 
taxpayers, NGO, organisation,  
assosiasie, inwoners, burgers, 
organisasie 
Location Church church, congregation, believers, temple, shrine, 
mosque, muslim, jewish 
kerk, gemeente, gelowigers, tempel, 
joods, jode, moslem 
Location School Teacher, teachers, headmaster, school, primary, 
secondary, highschool, learners, pupils 
Onderwysers, skoolhoof, hoof, 
laerskool, hoerskool, leerders 
Weapons Crowd 
weapons 
Weapon, Gun, Knife, Traditional weapons, 
knobkieries, kieries, spears 
wapen, mes, sambok, sjambok,  
Weapons Crowd 
projectiles 
(Throw OR Threw OR Attack(ed) ) AND ( Stones, 
rocks, bricks, brike, ) 
(Gooi OR Gegooi OR aangeval OR 





As illustrated in Appendix 2: Keyword Framework, there are 36 grievance categories, 13 trigger 
categories, 14 tactic categories, 4 actor categories, 7 location categories, and 11 categories of non-
protests.  
 
With generous assistance from the SAS Institute, the Keyword Framework was converted to LITI code 
(a proprietary Boolean syntax used by SAS), and 105 columns with binary features were added to the 
original IRIS-set. 
 
In the Keyword Framework, I allowed for multiple grievances, triggers, actors, locations and non-
protest themes, but the tactic for a given event was one-hot-encoded, based on the level of disruption 
(so that only the most disruptive tactic would be retained).    
 
Isolating non-protest events 
The added features allowed me to isolate non-protest events. These included sporting events, church-
gatherings and funerals, inaugurations and unveilings, meetings (indabas, conferences, public 
consultations), political rallies and electioneering, exhibitions and road-shows, fêtes/fairs and festivals, 
plus taxi-violence and gang-related violence. 
 
I removed these from the IRIS-set. The criteria for removal was that an event must (a) include one of 
the non-protest keywords, and must (b) also not have any keywords linked to any of the grievance 
categories present. The prudency measure (b) implies that certain non-protest events would nonetheless 
be retained in the set; however, it prevents the removal of events that start off as non-protest, but which 
develop into protests, as is sometimes the case with, say, large funerals. 
 
Size of protest events 
In order to extract the reported number of people protesting per event (where this is recorded), I made 
use of a User Defined Function in Visual Basic script (available at GitHub) that identified the largest 
integer in the “Notes” feature. Thus, in the case of the following fictitious note “a group of 10 men 
gathered, it grew to 15 people, eventually 25 people marched, later only 20 remained before dispersing” 
– the number 25 would be returned. 
 
However, this also returned many unlikely crowd-numbers: telephone numbers, identification and 
passport numbers, car registrations, etc. In order to eliminate non-probable crowd numbers, I retained 
probable crowd numbers, as listed in Appendix 3: Crowd Size Counts. This returned the distribution in 





Figure 5.5: Count of Crowd Sizes, Protests from MSG-set, 1997-2013 
 
The figure above is based on the 41 146 cases where a probable size was discernible from the “Notes” 
feature; in the majority of cases (47 906), this was not possible. This appears to follow a modified 
logarithmic scale with a roughly Gaussian distribution, presenting modes at 50, 100, and 200. I should 
also point out that the prominent modes are a function of police rounding up – there are for example no 
protests with 190 participants: presumably, such events would have been captured as 200. Differently 
considered, one can group the protests into ever-increasing “bins”, as does Figure 5.6, below. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Grouped crowd sizes, SA protests 1997-2013 
 
The above shows that, for probable crowd numbers, there are two typical crowd sizes, one between 20-
50 people, and another between 90 and 330. 
 
I table average size protest size by type in Chapter 6.2.3, and average protest size per municipality in 
Appendix 4: Average protest per municipality. The volume of size-identifiable events meant that, for 
events of unidentified size, I was also able to impute values, creating three additional features, where 
gatherings of uncertain sizes are all assigned to 50, then to 100, and finally to 200 people participating, 
respectively. These values are prudent in light of the averages presented, above. Owing to my frame 
selection, I decided to impute based on a set average (for instance, 200), or based on the municipal 
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average, instead of by the type of protest. In the consequent analysis, I present separately, regressions 
with and without imputations.  
 
Reversing the order of selected features 
To ease the interpretation of the regression coefficients, I ensured that, as far as possible, feature values 
run “good to bad”. Most variables contain normative cues about what “good” means, and have these as 
the low end (e.g., low poverty to high poverty, or low levels of informal dwelling to high levels of 
informal dwelling). However, some ran in the opposite direction, and made the reading of coefficients 
(and especially of the coefficients of interaction variables) unnecessarily complicated. For example, I 
changed DeliveryW, which contains the percentage of households with reticulated water on their stands 
or inside the house, to be “100%-DeliveryW”, or the percentage of households without reticulated water 
on their stands or inside the house.  
 
Feature transformation  
For the regressions (not for the ML phase), I was concerned that the scale of some of the targets would 
prove troublesome. Consider the violin-plot of Count of protests, below.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Violin-plot of the distribution of protest counts among municipalities (N:234, Min = 2, Max = 6564) 
 
From Figure 5.7, it is apparent that, while most municipalities have less than 1 000 protests for the 
period under review, some (viz. the urban metros) present significantly more protests. These high values 
are of course not data-errors, and should therefore be retained. However, to deal with such a skewed 
distribution, I tested using transformations for normally-distributed targets where appropriate. 
 
In cases where the labels were count data, I used the appropriate GLM regression models instead of 
OLS, as will be elaborated in Chapter 7. 
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5.11.1 Creating a testing and training set  
Before turning the dataset over to ML techniques, I had to create a training and testing (validation) set, 
which meant I needed to affix labels to a number of cases. I hand-coded labels for 1 000 cases, 
classifying each as “Non-protest”, “Orderly Protest”, “Disruptive Protest” or “Violent Protest”, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.3: Class counts by level of tumult for the ML training/testing set 
 Count of events 
Non-protest 427 
Orderly Protest 409 
Disruptive Protest   87 
Violent Protest  85 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the training set was class-imbalanced. This was despite an oversampling for violent 
protest, which, according to Runciman et al. (2016: 62), should be roughly 10% of protest cases.  
 
5.12   Machine Learning Techniques 
Note: for the reader unfamiliar with ML, please consider Appendix 1: Principles of Machine Learning. 
 
My aim for the first phase of data preparation was to classify each case as protest or not, and if protest, 
what kind and at which level of tumult. This required ML, since the number of records precluded 
physical reading and coding for the entire set. The steps outlined above comprised the most salient pre-
processing actions I took, which meant that I was now able to train, test, evaluate, and deploy ML 
models. 
 
ML scholars generally maintains the principle of “no free lunch” (Wolpert and Macready 1997), which 
holds that no ML algorithm is the best at all problems within its field, but that each method presents 
advantages and disadvantages. This means that one cannot a priori know which model would perform 
best on a given problem. Good practice is thus to use various models, and to experiment with different 
hyperparameter values; this was aligned with the iterative nature of a study based on Grounded Theory.  
 
Seeking to establish acceptable misclassification rates, I decided to consider binary models (classifying 
the remaining cases as protest or non-protest), and then multiclass models (classifying the cases 
according to the level of tumult). For the former, I used a logistic regression learner and a support vector 
classifier (SVC), and for the latter, multiclass logistic regressions (OvR, see Appendix 1), Decision 
Trees, a bootstrap aggregation learner, and a series of Naïve Bayesian models.    
   
To complement this, I received assistance from SAS Institute, who ran their own series of tests on the 
same data (using Logistic, SVC, Decision Tree and boosted models). 
 
In addition to the above, I used Google’s AutoML function, to see whether a Deep Convolutional Neural 
Network could achieve better classification results “out of the box”, than my self-coded predictions, 




I used the keyword set, a vectorised matrix of dimensions (1183, 106) as my features. As noted below, 
I also returned to the “Notes” (such that the dataframe would be 1183, 2) to see how Natural Language 
Processed data would fare subjected to selected learners.  
 
5.12.1 Classification  
Classification is a subset of supervised ML where the goal is to use features to predict labels of new 
cases, based on the observation of past cases. Here, labels are discrete values that imply membership of 
some conceptual group (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 3). 
 
Working with the SAS Institute, as a first strategy, we decided to test the degree to which we could 
identify whether a given case in the IRIS-set is protest or not: thus, a binary clarification task. 
 
Logistic Regressions 
The logistic regression is one of the most basic classification models, yet performs very well on linearly 
separable classes (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 59). Logistic regression tries to maximise the 
conditional likelihoods of the training data. Afifi et al. provide a detailed discussion about the 
mathematics behind logistic regression (2012). In short, the operation uses the sigmoid function to take 
real number values as input and transforms them into values in the range [0,1] with an intercept at φ(0) 
= 0.5.  
 
After feature engineering and hyperparameter tuning, SAS achieved a validation misclassification rate 
of 0.0533, and a K-S score143 of 0.95.  
 
Support Vector Machine (Classifier) 
Another approach is the Support Vector Classifier, a common and powerful learning algorithm. The 
SVC’s objective is to draw a decision boundary (generally a hyperplane) which maximises the distance 
between the closest data points of two distinct classes (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 76). 
 
After feature engineering and hyperparameter tuning, SAS achieved a validation misclassification rate 
of 0.0287, and a K-S score of 0.829.  
 
5.12.2 Classifying protests as Orderly, Disruptive or Violent (multilabel) 
Having established some idea of acceptable accuracy,144 I set out to see whether I could eliminate non-
protest cases while also classifying the protest cases by their level of tumult. The 1 000 hand-coded 
cases already included the labels “non-protest”, “orderly”, “disruptive” or “violent” (NODV). 
 
Appendix 5 discusses the first learners I built and details their performances. These include, from the 
Naïve Bayesian family of learners, a Multinomial, a Complement, and a Bernoulli model; a Multiclass 
Logistic Regression; a Multiclass Support Vector Classifier; and a Decision Tree. For the reader 
unfamiliar with ML, please see above appendix, especially for an introduction to Decision Trees. 
                                               
143 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov score measures the performance of classification models by listing the degree of 
separation between class distributions (1 is a performance of perfect separation, 0 of random separation). For more 
information see Massey (1951).   




Ensemble method: several incomplete Decision Trees (Random Forests) 
It is also possible to combine the predictions from multiple decision trees to create Random Forests.  
This method creates several Decision Trees, but restricts each tree by “showing” each tree only a subset 
of the features. This means that the respective decision trees will vary slightly. However, the 
combination of a sufficient number of “weakly predicting” trees can yield a highly robust model, when 
the prediction for each node of the collective outcome is decided by majority vote among the assembled 
trees (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 98).    
 
Using my 1 000 labelled cases (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved the following evaluation scores:  
 
Accuracy:   0.68 
Precision: 0.72/0.63 
Recall:  0.79/0.75 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Confusion matrix for Random Forest classifier performance on IRIS-set sample  





Gradient Boosting is an advancement on Random Forests, where an “ensemble” of trees is constructed 
using learners which learn sequentially (so that the first trees fit simple models, and that every 
consequent tree attempts to solve for the net error of the prior tree). Gradient Boosting also uses the 
gradient descent algorithm145 which can optimise any differentiable loss function.  
 
The SAS-team fitted these, using a maximum depth of 6, leaf size of 5, a minimum value of 1, and 
maximum branches at 2, and achieved a validation misclassification rate of 0.38 and a validation K-S 
score of 0.86. 
 
                                               




Based on the model performances, as outlined above, I decided to use the Gradient Boosted model. 
While its misclassification rate on the validation sample was slightly higher than that of the Decision 
Tree model, it achieved a better K-S score. Moreover, it being an ensemble learner inspired more 
confidence in me than did other multiclass classification learners, with regard to scoring the unseen part 
of the IRIS-set. 
 
5.13 Phase 2: Stats SA Data and Auditor General Data 
I obtained socio-economic data from Statistics South Africa, through a formal data request. Stats SA 
shared their census data for 2001 and 2011 with me for the requested categories, as explained below. 
Stats SA is regarded as the authoritative source of demographic and household data, notwithstanding 
well-documented problems with reliability and validity (e.g., Merrino 2020). For measures of municipal 
governance, I used two sources: the Auditor-General’s ‘Consolidated General Report on the Audit 
Outcomes of Local Government 2010-2011’ (Auditor General South Africa 2011), and the South 
African Local Government Association municipal rating for 2009 (COGTA 2009).  
 
5.13.1 Data selection  
In order to avoid excessive multicollinearity (although I anticipated that there would be cognate 
constructs, regardless), I decided to select one proxy measure per hypothesised factor, as developed in 
Section 3, above. Of course, an entirely different set of measures could have been selected, and these 
may illuminate different patterns.146 However, considerations of prudence and data-ethics, and 
specifically avoiding the practice of “p-hacking”, meant that I did not substitute proxies or use 
alternative measures, many though there were. Below, I briefly discuss each selection. 
 
5.13.2 Delivery: Municipal Services proxy 
The “delivery” thesis holds that levels of protest are related to the relative levels of municipal services 
communities receive. From the suite of services rendered by municipalities,147 I selected water.148 In 
South Africa, municipalities are the de jure “water service provider”.149 Water is a frequently-cited 
source of conflict in IRIS, the word “water” occurring in 3 193 notes of the IRIS-set. 
 
Percentage Households Without Water is thus 100% less the percentage of households in a municipality 
that receives reticulated water within their plot, stand, or yard, or piped directly into their house in 2011 
                                               
146 However, our residual analysis, discussed in Chapter 7, provides assurance that we did not exclude any crucial 
concepts.  
147 “Delivery” involves a range of tasks rendered by the state (or parties designated by the state), including refuse 
removal, electricity supply, and water reticulation – but of course the policing of crime or running of state schools 
could also be argued to be part of “delivery”. 
148 Mary Galvin convincingly argues that water is ‘the most crucial resource that people access from the state’ 
(Galvin 2018).  




(from Stats SA data). This ranges from 94% of households in Nyandeni Local Municipality (in the 
Eastern Cape) to 1% in Kgatelopele Local Municipality (in the Northern Cape). 
 
5.13.3 Delivery: Municipal Governance proxy 
A variant of the “delivery” thesis is that people protest not the lack of services, but poor governance, 
instead. A proxy measure for governance was established in 2009 within the National Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. This was through an intervention that would come to 
be known as the “Back 2 Basics” programme (from 2013 onwards); at the onset, each municipality was 
rated among 4 categories, as seen below.150 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates that the number of municipalities in each of the categories (which were tentative at 
the time) were kept similar – a dimension to keep in mind when considering the feature’s predictive 
power. 
 
Table 5.4: Number of municipalities, per COGTA categories 
 Number of Local Municipalities 
Most Vulnerable 57 
2nd Most Vulnerable  58 
2nd Highest Performing 58 
Highest Performing 58 
Note:  Source: COGTA (2009) 
 
A plausible alternative measure for governance is the municipal audit reports, issued by the South 
African Auditor General. For the 2010-2011 financial year, each municipality was given an audit report 
with 30 categories, summated in an audit opinion. The Audit Opinions are summated in Table 5.5, 
below. 
 
Table 5.5: Number of South African municipalities at various levels of audit opinions awarded in 2011 
Audit Opinion Number of municipalities  
Financially unqualified with no findings 7 
Financially unqualified with findings 91 
Qualified 43 
Adverse 5 
Disclaimer / Not finalised / Other 88 
 
Thus, COGTA Score is a 4-level measure of governance, and AG Rating is a 5-level measure of 
governance in the given municipality. 
 
5.13.4 Age profile  
Given the hypothesised relationships between the age profiles of areas and protest, one is presented 
with several options of possible variables, including the percentage of population in the working ages 
(e.g., 18-60 years), variants of the dependency ratio of an area,151 or the ratio of “youth” (a political 
                                               
150 I used the four-level classification because it provided more variance, but also because it was implemented 
closer to the period under statistical review. 
151 The count of the population aged 0-14 and over the age of 65, divided by the population aged 15 to 64. 
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construction in South Africa, denoting people aged 16-35) to the rest of the population, among others. 
The Dependency Ratio (the ratio of the population aged 0-18 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 
19-64) is a common way to measure demographic pressure, thus included as a possible feature. To ease 
interpretability (a simple calculation, and easily understandable number), I added the Mean Age per 
municipality of people living in the municipality. Mean Age ranges from 22.56 years (Jozini Local 
Municipality in KZN), to 34.74 (Overstrand Local Municipality in the Western Cape). The country-
wide mean age was 27.8 in 2011. I also considered the Percentage Youth (the percentage of people aged 
16-35 as proportion of total population) as a feature possibly revealing the bearing of demographic 
forces on protest.  
 
5.13.5 Gender-balance proxy 
Stats SA collects and reports gender as binary. Thus, considering theories suggesting a relationship 
between the gender profile and protest, I considered the gender ratio and a gender-odds ratio, among 
others, but decided to take the percentage of the municipal population that self-identifies as male, for 
reasons of intuitive understandability. Percentage Males is the percentage of males living within the 
municipality. This ranges from 43.44% (Msinga Local Municipality in KZN) to 58.52% (Thabazimbi 
Local Municipality on Limpopo). The country-wide percentage of males was 48.48% in 2011. 
 
5.13.6 Informal settlement proxy 
Several routes of inquiry presented themselves as candidates to test the hypotheses that relate to 
informal settlement and protest. This included density (people in informal areas live in extreme 
proximity) and access to municipal services (which are often absent in informal settlements), among 
others. One of the reasons I decided not to use density, was that the municipal frame implies that 
community-level measures of density would be lost. Certainly, a large sprawling rural municipal 
territory, even if host to several large and particularly dense informal settlements, would be “less dense” 
than a more urban municipality with a smaller percentage of people in informal areas.  
 
Fortunately, Stats SA classifies households by dwelling type, one of which is “informal”. Thus, 
Percentage Informal is the percentage of the population living in informal housing.152 Informality is 
highest in Ventersdorp Local Municipality (39.67% of dwellings), while over 50 municipalities, were 
listed not to have any informal dwellings. The national average was 3.28% among municipalities. 
 
5.13.7 Presence of foreigners-proxy 
In light of theories hypothesising a relationship between “foreign” Africans (although this category 
would include others, such as Bangladeshi traders, too) and increased protest (and violence), I sought a 
suitable variable to indicate the presence of foreigners. I decided to use the percentage, again at the 
municipal level, of people who selected a home language other than one of South Africa’s eleven 
official languages in the 2011 census, as a proxy measure for “Non-South African”. 
 
                                               
152 For the first exploratory regression (“all-in”), I also included “the percentage of households with fewer than 4 
members” (Small Households), “the percentage of households with more than 4 members” (Large Households), 
and “the percentage of households living in traditional or informal dwelling” (Rural). 
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Percentage NSL is thus the percentage of the households in the municipality with a home language 
other than South Africa’s official languages. This ranges from 0.14% (Impendle Local Municipality in 
KZN) to 14.89% (Musina Local Municipality in Limpopo). The national average was 2.69% among 
municipalities. 
 
5.13.8 Inequality proxy 
There are many ways of measuring income inequality, including the Gini Coefficient, the 20:20 ratio, 
the Hoover Index, the Coefficient of Variation, the Theil Index, and the Palma Ratio. The most common 
method is the Gini Coefficient. However, the Gini is generally oversensitive to “changes in the middle 
of the income distribution, and by extension, [is insensitive] to changes in the bottom and top ends of 
the income distribution, [implying that] its ability to serve as a singular headline indicator is limited” 
(Stats SA 2019: 150). Gini coefficients for small samples (consider some municipalities have less than 
10 000 households) suffer from several biases (Deltas 2003) and numerous authors as well as 
international institutions, such as the World Bank and UN, have taken to the Palma index to replace or 
supplement the Gini (Stats SA 2019: 151).   
 
The Palma Ratio is a fairly intuitive measure,153 with several useful applications (Fukuda-Parr 2003). 
This indicator is the ratio of the highest 10% per cent share of (typically national) income, relative to 
the lowest 40%’s share, using households as the economic units (Palma and Stiglitz 2016).  
 
Based on the above, I decided to use both the municipal Gini and a Palma-like measure. For the latter, 
I calculated a municipal Rich-Poor Ratio as a measure of the proportion of the richest income groups 
(within a municipality) in terms of the poorest income groups. Stats SA enumerates households into 
one of 12 categories. 
 
Table 5.6: Official categories of household income, showing the percentage of households distributed according 
to monthly household income, by province, for South Africa 2011 
 Provinces (distributions in percentage) 
Income brackets EC LP FS KZN MP NW NC GA WC 
No income 23 20 18 21 19 20 15 18 13 
R1 - R400 7 10 9 7 8 6 6 4 3 
R401 - R800 16 17 14 13 14 13 13 8 7 
R801 - R1 600 19 19 19 17 18 18 19 14 14 
R1 601 - R3 200 15 16 16 16 17 17 18 16 18 
R3 201 - R6 400 8 8 10 10 11 12 12 13 16 
R6 401 - R12 800 5 5 7 7 7 7 8 10 13 
R12 801 - R25 600 4 3 4 5 4 4 5 8 9 
R25 601 - R51 200 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 6 5 
R51 201 - R102 400 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 2.5 1.9 
R102 401 - R204 800 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.6 
R204 801 or more 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 
Note: EC = Eastern Cape, LP = Limpopo, FS = Freestate, KZN = KwaZulu Natal, NC = Northern Cape, GA = 
Gauteng, WC = Western Cape. Colour represents eminent percentages 
                                               
153 According to Fukuda-Parr: this measure ‘captures shifts at the top and bottom ends of the distribution and 
overcomes the problem with the Gini coefficient which is sensitive to shifts in the middle’ (2003). 
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Source: Stats SA, own calculations 
 
Gini is thus the canonical measure for inequality (as calculated by Statistics South Africa 2018 for 
2011), while the Rich-Poor Ratio is an alternative measure for income inequality within the 







Where H1 is a household with an income of R51 201 or more per month, and H2 is a household with a 
monthly income of R3 200 or less per month.  
 
I compared these values, per municipality, with the municipal Gini coefficients: these have a Pearson 
correlation of 0.78, and, as Figure 5.9 demonstrates, correspond closely.    
 
Figure 5.9: Relationship between Gini coefficients and the Palma-derived inequality measure (data points 
represent municipalities, x-axis is logarithmic) 
 
The Rich-Poor Ratio ranged from 0.18 (in Aganang Local Municipality in Limpopo, the least unequal) 
to 8.49 in City of Tshwane. Given equal weights to the 234 municipalities, the mean municipal 
inequality for South Africa was 1.29 in 2011. Gini ranged from 0.37 (or 37%) in Maphumulo (KZN) to 
.60 (60%) in the City of Johannesburg.  
 
5.13.9 Apartheid-designation Proxy 
South Africa is long-yet to step out of the drawn-out shadow of slavery, colonialism, and the systematic 
subjugation of people by systems of minority rule, including apartheid. Historical trauma is lodged 
deep, and the effects of dispossessions and injustice reproduce themselves (for instance, landlessness 
or lack of education is perpetuated intergenerationally), just as narratives of exploitation are internalised 
intergenerationally. Moreover, as Chapter 4 showed, the post-apartheid state has, in several ways, failed 
to restore both psychosocial normality and material subsistence in ways that could be called 




As a very broad proxy,154 Percentage White represents the percentage of people living in a particular 
municipality (in 2011) who would have been classified as “white” under apartheid (i.e., in 1981). This 
ranges from 0.05% in Ntabankulu Local Municipality (in the Eastern Cape) to 38.88% in Midvaal Local 
Municipality (in Gauteng). The average among municipalities was 7.06% in 2011. 
 
5.13.10 Poverty Proxy 
Poverty is widely-attributed as leading to protest. Percentage Poor is the proportion of households 
within each respective municipality that earn less than R401 per month as self-reported. This ranges 
from 9.09% (in Bergrivier Local Municipality in the Western Cape) to 39.7% (in Mbizana Local 
Municipality in KZN). The 2011 average among municipalities is 25.56%. 
 
5.13.11  Target Variable: protest 
There are several ways of capturing levels of protest across municipalities. First, one could use counts, 
which range from 2 in Ndwedwe Local Municipality, to 6564 in the City of Tshwane (for the period 
1997-2013).  
 
The time-range may be varied (for instance, I also tested the effect of restricting the counts to the period 
between 2009 and 2013). Another target variable is count-per-capita; for this, one can use the Stats SA 
census population counts per municipality (which ranges from 7005 in Mier Local Municipality to over 
4 million people in the City of Johannesburg). However, since the number of protests is fairly small for 
many municipalities, this measure is likely to introduce unnecessary noise into the target variables.  
 
A more sophisticated measure may be to take the average number of person-days spent protesting (per 
municipality), which can then also be divided by the population of each respective municipality. Person-
days for protest (for the period 1997-2013) varies from 51.67 in the Kamiesberg Local Municipality, to 
3223.28 in Nongoma Local Municipality.  
 
5.13.12   Weighting 
Unless noted, I did not introduce any additional weighting.155 
 
5.13.13   Standardisation 
Unless stated otherwise, all features were standardised, using Scikit-learn’s StandardScaler tool, which 
brings all features to unit scale.156 Most features were not normally distributed, however, the presence 
of extreme outliers implied that min-max normalisation would not be appropriate to bring features to 
commensurate scales.  
 
                                               
154 Which raises several concerns about what race means, and methodologically, issues of collinearity, since 
measures of geographic wealth and geographic percentage of white people covary in South Africa. 
155 However, the 2001-portion of the MSG-set was weighted by Stats SA in order to be commensurate to the 
municipal populations of 2011. 
156 Such that the means are centred on 0, and that standard deviation for each feature is 1, i.e., Z-score scaling. 
 
 94 
5.14 Regression analysis 
Regression analysis is the most widely accepted statistical tool to investigate functional relationships 
among variables (Afifi et al. 2012; Chatterjee and Hadi 2015; Field 2017). I fitted the regressions using 
python, and checked the results using other software packages. Guided by the principles of Grounded 
Theory, I went over thousands of iterations, seeking to ensure that all of the hypotheses were given a 
reasonable chance of producing significant predictive insights.  
 
My exploratory phase involved fitting an “all-in”/enter regression, with 32 consequent iterations, each 
reinterpreting the target values, while keeping the features constant throughout (from regression 2 
onwards, after the additional variables157 were discarded).  
 
5.14.1   Linear Models 
As explained above, my first inclination was to see whether there is any relationship between either the 
counts, count per capita or the number of protesters capita per municipality, on the one hand, and the 
demographic, socio-economic and governance conditions, on the other. 
 
After this, I considered disaggregated by types of protest (Community protest, Labour-related protest, 
Health and Education-related protests, and Destination protests), to see whether they yielded any 
relationships, and whether they return coefficients bearing statistical significance.  
 
Assuming that some models would present sufficiently robust results, I then planned to explore sub-
categories with variations in how the target is constituted, including: 
a) whether all protests or only certain types were considered; 
b) whether the entire time-period or certain portions were considered; 
c) whether the average crowd size per municipality was taken into account or not; 
d) whether the levels of tumult were taken into account or not; 
e) whether only proxies that were operationalised theoretical positions were included, or whether 
others were allowed, too.  
  
My initial exploration of regressions is summarised in Appendix 6. I discuss the rest of the iterative and 
layered analytical process, wherein the tests were refined by eliminating ill-suited or poorly-performing 
features, as well as the results of the regressions, in Chapter 7.  
 
5.15 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have chronicled the steps I took to move from theoretical postulations about factors 
likely to predict protest, variously made, to testing these against what is claimed to be the best source, 
anywhere, of recorded protests publicly available, and the largest available dataset of its kind. 
 
This involved operationalising theoretical positions by employing proxy measures. Every proxy 
selection could have been different – and was thus accompanied by opportunity costs. For a service 
proxy, for instance, I could just as well have chosen refuse removal instead of reticulated water. Such 
swaps may yield different, possibly contrary results. 
                                               




Having decided and justified my proxies, I considered the various data sources, and explained why 
settling on IRIS and Stats SA data appears most reasonable, based on their levels of general acceptance. 
IRIS also represents a more complete ‘universe’ of data than media generated sets, survey-data or case 
studies are able to do. 
 
I explained that IRIS is a logging system, in which the South African public order police attempt to 
record all instances of crowd events (over a 17-year period). As such, it is unguarded, insofar as it was 
not assembled for the public gaze or scholarly scrutiny, but its lack of consistency, poor formatting, 
inconsistent spelling, poor location attribution, haphazard motive-allocation, inconsistent violent-or-not 
triage, and lack of information into several matters key to understanding a protest event, implied the 
need for significant pre-processing. 
 
I explained the various hand-coding and labelling steps, as well as wrangling and munging processes, 
whereby I built a register of municipal-framed protest incidents, classified by its main motivational 
drive, and by levels of tumult. To do this, I brought the techniques of Machine Learning to bear on the 
IRIS-set. I used all of the basic algorithms for classification of labelled datasets, and justified my 
selection of the best performing model, with which the rest of the data was scored. I discovered that, as 
Boschetti and Massaron (2016) suggested, simple models can be as effective as complex ones provided 
one has enough data. Machine Learning is, of course, limited by the quality of data, and my accuracy 
rate was lower than I hoped, while opportunely sufficient to continue testing.  
  
I justified the need to fit a sufficient number of regressions to answer to scholars’ varied conceptions of 
protest; I also explained that fitting several regressions, in this case, should not be viewed as multiple 
testing in the normal sense. I argued how South Africa can be regarded as a collection of municipalities, 
with widely-ranging inter-municipal constituencies and profiles, and that this could constitute a fair unit 
for regressions, given the available data. 
 
The Grounded Theory approach was a great boon in this journey. Several of the steps I made took much 
revisiting, and data pre-processing and Machine Learning happened over many iterations. Of course, 
the fitting of thousands of regressions itself was a frequentative process. I also realised that my own 
understanding of the data and of protest developed hermeneutically during this process: months of 
reading accounts of protests imbues one with an appreciation for the courage and coordination that 
protests require, and brings the plight – especially of landlessness and homelessness – into sharp relief.    
 
Protest, which I took to include strikes, courtside solidarity, municipal insurrections, and other public 
gatherings that constitute the visible heart of social movements and direct political actions, signals not 
just discontent over an isolated grievance, but is often part of a broader drive towards systemic change 
from below. This may turn into revolution, or remain unfulfilled. Ultimately, the exact pressure-points 
and trigger-moments that lead to protests may be near-impossible to divine, notwithstanding vivid 
theories of why people protest. However, a robust method promises to show to what extent lessons 
about causes can be extracted. I now turn to some of the findings, presented as descriptive statistics 
(Chapter 6), before reporting the regressions (Chapter 7 ).  
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Chapter 6: Descriptive Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present descriptive findings about various forms of protest in South Africa between 
1997 and 2013. Chapter 5 ended with an overview of the regressions; their results are saved for the 
chapter hereafter. The steps taken to prepare data for the regressions unearthed valuable data-artefacts. 
Thus, the findings below are drawn from sets such as the early-stage IRIS, the hand-coded IRIS-set (1 
000 rows and 3 000 rows, respectively), and the Keyword Model.  
 
Stylised protest formation process: 
(a) Concern ®  (b) Grievance ®  (c) General injustice ®  (d) Trigger ®  (e) Gesture ® (f) 
Tactic ® (g) Emergent level of tumult 
 
The above process, developed in Chapter 2, will also guide this chapter. To recapitulate this sequence, 
in a given community (which may be a workplace, a “geographic” settlement such as a neighbourhood, 
or an associational community, such as a church) unaddressed private concerns (a) may become shared 
or public grievances (b), which can mount or intensify over time, which, under certain circumstances, 
may coagulate into a sense of wrong essentialised as a general injustice (c), which in many cases are 
linked to an identifiable target, in some cases depicted as either culprit or scapegoat. Concerned groups 
morph into organised actors, or the grievances are picked up by already-established bodies or actors 
(at the request of the aggrieved, through mobilisation actions by the aggrieved, out of principle by the 
organisations, or out of political expediency by the organisation). The above consolidation may set in 
gradually (as discussed in Chapter 2), but is often catalysed by a trigger event (d). The group enacting 
a protest endeavour may have some gesture (e) in mind, which they perceive will bring them closer to 
a fairer set of circumstances, signal defiance in the face of asymmetrical power relations, or act as phatic 
signalling. Protest actions, or tactics (f), may be spontaneous, for example, attacking police members 
who are instructed to dismantle people’s homes, but is often caucused, calculated, and coordinated, 
such as a protest march accompanied by the handing-over of a memorandum of grievances (such a 
document is often drafted collectively, and informed by consultation of members of the aggrieved 
group). While disruption or violence may be implied by the selected tactic, orderly tactics do not 
guarantee that the event, when it takes place, will be such. Contingent factors, not least of which is the 
police’s response to the tactic, means that the intended tactic and the level of tumult (g) are only loosely 
related. The respective elements of this process (a-g) act as the organising principle of this chapter.   
 
I begin by considering the scale, size, and distribution of protest in South Africa. Thereafter, I adhere 
to the sequence of concepts as presented above. For each section, I will first discuss findings from the 
keyword model, and then from the machine learning model. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I will also include snippets of actual IRIS notes. These will be mostly kept in 
the original format (i.e., with poor spelling, etc.), but personal details are redacted, and the notes will 





6.2 Key Findings 
6.2.1 Scale  
By my analysis of IRIS data, South Africa had 89 052 protests in the period 1997-2013. This implies 
around 14 protests, on average, per day. The rate of protests per day starts lower and escalates over 
time. By 2013, protests occurred at a rate of just under 22 per day, or 152 per week.158 This figure is 
higher than the 67 750 protests for the same period, as offered by Runciman et al. (2016). Their 
estimate, based on a sample of 4 000 records only made use of hand-recorded classification, with a high 
error rate, and was a direct scaling of the percentage of protest incidents they found from the  
4 000 records they considered.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Total protest 1997-2013, from the ML set 
 
Figure 6.1 depicts this upward trend. While the decline in recorded protests for the period between 
2006-2008, as discussed by Alexander, Runciman and Maruping (2015), is a function of a temporary 
diversion of police resources rather than a decline in events (i.e., less data capturing, not fewer protests), 
the upward trend, similar to that depicted by Runciman et al. (2016), is self-evident.  
 
Community protests, a subset of “protests”, followed the same pattern. In 1997 there were 1064, 
whereas in 2013, 2137 were recorded. See Appendix 7. for a related discussion about the rise of the 
term “service delivery protest” over this period. Labour-related protests increased, too. While, to some 
degree, there remains a cyclical pattern regarding intra-industry protest (with local peaks in 1998, 2001, 
2005/6, and 2011; perhaps related to wage renegotiation schedules) the trend is also upwards, ranging 
from 681 in 1997 to 2413 in 2013. Table 6.1 shows the escalation of the various types of protests over 
time. 
 
                                               
























Table 6.1: Protests by type (1997 to 2013), from the ML set  
Community 
related 








1997 1 064 681 381 187 456 85 1 292 
1998 1 169 1 324 624 230 623 113 1 738 
1999 1 082 1 050 497 198 445 61 1 539 
2000 964 840 497 187 412 69 1 326 
2001 851 1 048 712 208 375 86 1 233 
2002 726 775 640 176 315 57 1 078 
2003 748 834 642 218 298 62 1 111 
2004 845 977 528 248 337 72 1 018 
2005 1 076 1 668 566 376 378 122 1 515 
2006 1 038 1 756 752 353 345 136 1 891 
2007 781 1 503 541 272 559 118 832 
2008 753 747 502 233 227 105 811 
2009 1 274 1 300 547 286 261 116 950 
2010 1 351 2 073 740 483 655 130 1 249 
2011 1 436 2 349 861 384 344 138 1 356 
2012 2 108 2 226 984 376 468 170 1 236 
2013 2 137 2 413 1 016 394 416 181 1 336 
Total 19 403 23 564 11 030 4 809 6 914 1 821 21 511 
 
 













Community related Labour related
Destination Nat. Govt. directed




From Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2, one notes there are roughly commensurate numbers of Community 
protests and Labour-related protests over the observed timespan, and that the sharpest increase occurs 
around 2008 for both classes. Destination protests, where actors take their protest to a landmark which 
may be outside the local municipality, as well as the “other” category (protests which could not be 
classified by the models), will include both Community- and Labour-related protests. Figure 6.2 
visualises what appears to be a local inflection point at 2009; before this, Community- and Labour-
related protests traded positions, after this, Labour-related protests were consistently more than 
Community protests. The overall reduction in protests recorded between 2007 and 2010 appears mostly 
a reduction in the recording of Labour-related protests, with other classes seemingly less severely 
affected over this period. 
 
6.2.2 Distribution 
Protests were found in every municipality of South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that protest is 
perceived to be a principally urban activity. Protest counts ranged from two in Ndwedwe Local 
Municipality (and four in Kamiesberg LM), to 6 564 in the City of Tshwane (with 6 274 in the City of 
Johannesburg) for the 1997-2013 timespan. Kamiesberg and Ndwedwe are small municipalities, by 
population, while Tshwane (the capital) and Johannesburg are among the most populous municipalities 
in the country (respectively 5th and 1st most populated). Protests recorded in Tshwane include protests 
at the Union Buildings (seat of the Executive Branch of Government), and protests at the headquarters 
of various government departments and agencies, most of which are located in the capital, which helps 
to explain why it should host more protests than the more populated Johannesburg.159  
 
It is at this stage instructive to consider the distribution of protests by municipality. Plotting the number 
of protests against the municipal tumult score, Figure 6.3 below considers protest events for 2009-2013. 
                                               




Figure 6.3: Scatterplot of the frequency of protest against mean tumult of protest, 2009-2013, from the ML set. 
Note: Each bubble represents a municipality, its size represents the municipal population in 2011. Colours indicate 
province. This measurement is centred on 2011, and thus only includes observations between 2009 and 2013. 
 
The plot in Figure 6.3 illustrates the variation between municipalities, in terms of the number of protests, 
the levels of tumult, as well as the more obvious variation – municipal size. The uppermost pink bubbles 
represent Tshwane and Johannesburg, respectively. The small blue bubbles in the bottom right-hand 
corner represent municipalities in the Northern Cape – small, but going by disorder attendant to local 
protest, highly tumultuous. One can see that the number of protests increase broadly with municipal 
size (i.e., bigger bubbles tend to be higher), but that the level of tumult is unrelated to size (i.e., the size 
of the bubble does not determine whether it will be closer to the left or right: that is, peaceful or violent). 
Some provinces appeared concentrated in one area of the plane, e.g., most municipalities in the Northern 
Cape (in blue) tend to be placed toward the right (i.e., the more violent side of the spectrum). In fact, 
all the protests in a certain municipality in the Northern Cape, Ubuntu Local Municipality, were violent. 
There are also several municipalities (located in KZN and the Eastern Cape) where none of the protests 
was disruptive or violent (hence the score of 0.1 in Figure 6.3). The most apparent quality, however, is 
that protest is an ubiquitous phenomenon in South Africa, and certainly not confined to metropolitan or 
urban settings. An interactive version of this plot is available at Github,160 which presents the name and 
values of each municipality when hovered over.  
 
Another way to show the spread of protests is to consider a nation-wide map. First, to orientate the 
reader, a map depicting South Africa. I used the QGIS software package for all maps in this chapter.  





Figure 6.4: Map of South African provinces, local municipalities and major cities (2011 demarcation) 
 
Next, we consider the population distribution of South Africa, and compare this to the distribution of 
protest, illustrated in Figure 6.5. From this, we see how protests occur in major population centres.    
 
Note: The Geographic units represent local municipalities using their 2011 demarcation. Colour grading runs from 
light to dark. 
 
From Figure 6.5, we note population centres in Cape Town (and surrounds) in the South West, and 
Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria) in the Northern interior. The dark patch on the East Coast is 
eThekwini (Durban), the maroon municipality in the Eastern Cape is Nelson Mandela Bay (Port 
Elizabeth). Note also the high population along the coast in the municipalities to the South of 




eThekwini. In contrast, municipalities in the Western half of the country tend to be sparsely populated, 
save for those near Cape Town. Figure 6.5 confirms the theoretically rudimentary assumption that more 
protests occur in places where there are more people. At first glance, the representation of protest counts 
roughly mimic settlement patterns. Below is a reproduction of the right-hand half of Figure 6.5. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Choropleth map of South Africa depicting protests, 1997-2013 (from the ML set) 
Note: The Geographic units represent local municipalities using their 2011 demarcation. The lowest count for 
protests for a municipality was 2. 
 
Figure 6.6 is the first depiction of its kind – to the best of my knowledge, IRIS’s 89 000 protest events 
have never before been differentiated, or represented cartographically. The most prominent places are 
the municipalities hosting provincial capitals (Bhisho, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, 
Polokwane, Mbombela, Mahikeng, Kimberley, and Cape Town) and those comprising sites of major 
industry or mining (Port Elizabeth, East London, Richards Bay, Rustenburg, and Welkom).  
 
Viewed through the lens of provinces, again, more populous provinces (e.g., Gauteng, with more than 
10 million inhabitants) see more protests than more sparsely populated princes, such as the Northern 






















1997 701 662 785 475 251 180 446 124 521 
1998 1 076 645 1 247 533 370 293 634 114 909 
1999 1 103 414 847 416 262 224 632 101 873 
2000 1 046 357 831 355 225 158 543 142 638 
2001 1 029 374 749 478 370 163 583 154 613 
2002 555 250 858 496 312 121 547 126 502 
2003 619 298 844 664 296 117 495 86 494 
2004 510 273 839 697 430 211 518 79 468 
2005 1 015 537 1 077 690 503 334 747 222 576 
2006 1 457 568 1 115 816 547 403 637 179 549 
2007 672 288 1 029 553 497 90 802 193 482 
2008 286 212 1 113 286 344 59 606 107 365 
2009 374 312 1 317 632 480 199 849 162 409 
2010 796 543 1 511 796 849 518 778 224 666 
2011 815 514 1 710 816 722 453 829 271 738 
2012 1 024 482 1 521 879 939 507 1041 278 897 
2013 1 352 427 1 953 1 006 807 340 772 173 1 063 
Total 14 430 7 156 19 346 10 588 8 204 4 370 11 459 2 735 10 763 
Protest per 
capita* 
2.2 5.3 1.2 1.4 2.7 3.6 4.1 12.6 2.5 
Note: * = Protest per capita is multiplied by 1 000 in each case, to facilitate interpretation. 
 
However, the protests per capita calculations tell a different story. The Northern Cape has the most 
protests, per capita, of all provinces (along with having a profile of violent protests). This may be due 
to the presence of extractive industries (at Alexander Bay and Kathu, among others), the influx of 
economic migrants from the Eastern Cape, poor government service extensions, and the Khoisan 
population not being recognised as an official ethnic group, and their languages not officially recognised 
by the state. Communities in the sparsely-populated Northern Cape may also experience themselves 
most disconnected from the state and polity. Thus, neglect, exploitation, and alienation are all possible 
explanations for this high rate. Conversely, the urban, populous and densely inhabited Gauteng has the 
lowest per capita measure of protests, possibly for the same reasons – a wider variety of jobs, relatively 
more government services, and a more connected polity. 
 
6.2.3 Size 
In addition to the above, the size of protests increased almost negligibly over time. The estimated 
average crowd size was 435 people per protest in 1997 and 452 in 2013. Despite regional variation, the 
increase in the number of protests did not translate directly into bigger protests. Protest by type is 
discussed in more depth in the “main issue” section, below. 
 
As previously mentioned, using a “day” to frame protest events implies certain analytical drawbacks. 
Foremost is the manner in which protests that last several days – with crescendos and diminuendos over 
time – implies that removing and analysing any day-slice without regard for events prior and afterwards 
can lead one to an incomplete conception of said instance (including misunderstanding the grievances, 
 
 104 
actors and triggers at play, etc.), not to mention the danger of making fallacy-of-composition-style 
inferences about the entire phenomenon.   
 
Crowd size calculations allow us to consider the concept of “person-days of protest” (or possibly 
“workdays lost”) over the period of consideration, calculated as the product of average crowd size and 
the number of protests (within the municipal frame). See Appendix 3 for the full table. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Choropleth map of average crowd size for protests per municipality, 1997-2013 
 
Figure 6.7 shows that protest gatherings in the east of the country was demonstrably larger than those 
in the west. In particular, the Eastern Cape appears to be divisible into eastern (large crowds) and 
western (small crowd) halves. Similarly, the largest average crowd size was observed in 
uMhlabuyalingana, the country’s easternmost local municipality. Further research into the rural 
character of large protests (by attendance) may unearth insight into this pattern.  
 
In total, South Africa had over 22.4 million person-days of protest over a 17-year period, at an average 
of 1.3 million person-days per year. This calculation assumes there was a negligible number of people 
joining multiple protests on the same day, which may not be the case. For a scale comparison, one may 
consider that the cumulative attendance to all professional football matches in South Africa is less than 
2.5 million per year.161 
 
 
                                               
161 See Grant Thornton report (2014). There are 435 PSL matches per season, with mean attendance of 5098 per 




For the various types of events, the averages presented as follows:  
 
Table 6.3: Average size of protest types (Only considering162 protests where size <	11 000; N= 40 972) 
 Average Size 
Community Protest 436.9 
Labour-related Protest 382.7 
Destination Protest 369.8 
National Government Protest 639.4 
Education and Health-related Protest 533.1 
Crime and Police-related Protest 459.3 
Other 408.9 
 
Table 6.3 shows that protests against the National Government – typically large rallies and processions 
– had the largest groups, followed by Education and Health-related protests. Destination protests, 
despite its high numerical frequency, had the smallest crowds, possibly owing to many small (less than 
100 people) gatherings at court proceedings.  
 
Disaggregated for Community Protests, person-days of protest came to 4.8 million, and for Labour-
related protests, 5.3 million person-days over the period. These figures exclude the very significant 
“unidentified/other” class, which is likely to contain a large number of both types of protest, and could 
change the ratio significantly. However, from the above figures, and judging by the large turnouts they 
are able to mobilise, often country-wide, it appears that trade unions are better placed to mobilise people 
to protest than are community structures.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the average size of protest varies widely among municipalities. Appendix 4 presents a 
table which sets this out. My method of calculating protest size (explained in Chapter 5.11) artificially 
limits protests to 100 000 people. Several church gatherings, which are typically not devoid of political 
content (but mostly excluded from the final IRIS-set) exceeded this limit – for instance, both factions 




I now return to the stylised protest process, looking particularly at grievances, general injustices, 
triggers, tactics, and tumult. For each element in the sequence, I recapitulate the concept, present 
considerations from the reading of IRIS, report the most salient findings from the Keyword Model, and 
end with the most notable findings from the ML-model. 
 
As developed before, social ills come not in isolation, but are bundled together: landlessness, lack of 
money, poor education facilities, poor healthcare facilities, and general government neglect are the fate 
of most township-dwellers in South Africa. For the minority that is employed, workplace exploitation 
is likely to be part of one’s circumstances. Grievances, understood as articulated concerns about 
perceived injustices, likewise, tend to come in clusters, all the more so when these are sufficiently dire 
to motivate mobilisation towards direct political action. 
 
                                               
162 For prudence’s sake. Large protests may skew averages, despite N-counts.  
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This is evident from scores upon scores of IRIS notes capturing multiple grievances, often to the point 
of making it hard to classify which type of protest took place. Below is a glimpse into such examples 
(text unedited, save for redactions): 
 
‘… labour dispute and service delivery that is dissatisfactory’ 
‘…the purpo se of the gathering is against poor living wages and poor working condition...’ 
‘…the regulation of boses pay and more taxes for the rich, disclosure of company profits, ban 
labour brokers, land for the people not for golf estates, decent housing, the department of 
labour to prosecute all employers who are violating the   labour laws and regulations’ 
‘…another high school be built to address the issue of overcrowding in onesecondary school, 
that a community library be build before the end of august, that [name] combined school uses 
a duel medium of instruction toaccomodate black learners who can't speak Afrikaans, Service 
delivery: stand allocation in ext 12 that has been awaited for more than 5 years be availed to 
their rihtful owners before the end of august this year, that services are being paid are given 
for e.g. dustbins be provided as indicated in the account and new sections be provided with 
dustbins, that the mayor be changed because we cannot continously be colonized by [name]‘ 
‘…against escom; water cut; thari transport; incomplete taxi rank..’  
 ‘…high cost of living, dissatisfaction with education system and demand wage increases and 
labour dispute…’ 
‘…the murder of [name], the dismissal of 28 nurses at [name] hospital, and removing the 
newly appointed mayor…’ 
 ‘…donations of mine owners, maladministration at the tribalchief ,working condition 
workers at projec ts …’ 
 ‘…poor services,  unempl oyment,cutting of electricity when  not paid,graveyard unsecure  
and dity,  projects are favour [certain] residents only…’ 
‘….to have the community relocated to [another province], councillors role in communities, 
mining issue at [company], role of tribal leadership…’ 
 
Very often, examples appear that include the gamut of municipal inaction, corruption, concerns about 
education and health, poor conditions of taxi-ranks, and refuse sites. 
 
‘…dissatisfied with councillor [name] and wanted to hand over a memorandum but no one 
wanted to receive it on [date]. The residents of [name] community is dissatisfied with service 
delivery in ward 6 as well as corruption, greediness and nepotism on the side of councillor 
[name], they also complain about the lack of schools and clinics and poor state of dump sites 
which causes health hazards. The [name] association is dissatisfied with the poor state of the 
taxi rank and no development as R500,000 was allocated for this purpose but only R150,000 
was used, and they want to know where the other money was lost. They demand shelters at 
the taxi rank and also the replacement of the councilllor…’ 
 
Even where there is a “core injustice” such as a labour dispute, the picture is almost always more 
complex than a single issue: 
 
‘…dis missal of workers unlawfully,favourisim,no working tools,workers safety equip ments, 
increment and good working conditions…’ 
‘… wage increament, racism,expired food and the re-instate of the workers who were fired...’ 




‘…housing allowance, back pay, away with absentees project, allow elected officials 
participate without threats, stop four murder cases until court outcomes, pay [union] office 
bearers full pay including benefits…’ 
 
This is also true for protests against the police: 
 
‘… replace detective,vispolicing be improved , drunkeness on duty is too high and stockt heft 
and rape must be priorities… …poor service delivery by the SAPS, poor policing and 
favouritism and they want the station commissioner transferred…’ 
    
It should be noted, too, that protest events often gather people with disparate and sometimes 
unconnected grievances. Even where they are related – such as several grievances indicating that 
‘workers are unhappy with management’, this may be due to racism, sexism, unpaid work and overtime, 
unmet promises, favouritism, company food, worker transport, unsafe conditions or equipment, among 
many – and while the general approach by the media is to equate worker unrest with demands for higher 
wages (a common theme, but certainly not the only one), the above examples point to how grievances 
can blend into each other, shift, and coagulate over time. From one perspective, one may consider that 
there will be grievances that are, in their finer description, contingent upon contextual factors – 
community, geography, cultural, historical, etc. Further research should be done in this regard. The 
IRIS grievances would benefit greatly from being “cascaded” into distal and proximate “causes”, 
although the reality of this will be a formally complex picture. Future researchers would benefit in 
particular by following the development of protests in Danielskuil in the Northern Cape in 2011. Over 
a period of 40 days, grievances are added, altered, and fused, and a range of tactics are employed before 
an ultimately victorious outcome for the community. A full exposition of the twisting and turning of 
events is beyond my present scope. 
 
A related dimension, that will also have to be explored elsewhere, is the phenomenon of arcs. The 
alluded-to events in Danielskuil have a narrative that leads to a climax. In some cases, such as protests 
in Verulam in KZN in 2011, police even note the street-celebrations after a Community protest has 
succeeded. Mostly, however, IRIS does not note the outcomes of protest arcs.  
 
Reading police accounts of protests leaves one indelibly with an impression of the complexity and broad 
range of grievances. People’s concerns are nuanced, intertwined, and often hard to fully articulate – 
public grievances follow this pattern. Moreover, the SAPS officers recording “events” were of course 
not focused on unearthing grievances to their core, instead reporting on that which could be observed 
(such as numbers of people in attendance, their tactics, and the presence or absence of weapons). 
However, the patient reader will find that there is much to learn from these accounts, especially if one 
arranges protest events in the right geographic and chronological order. 
 
Early in the process, I read several hundred event notes from each province. For the events from 
Gauteng in 2011, I labelled each record’s conspicuous grievances. During this process, I identified 70 
types of grievances; the scope reminding one of the breadth of social concerns, and the complexity of 
grievance formation. The twenty most common of these were, in order of frequency: employment 
unhappiness (general), low wages at place of employment, poor services (mostly municipal), poor 
representation at municipal level, the lack of housing, high levels of crime, unacceptable working 
conditions, unfair labour practices, landlessness, police heavy-handedness, companies’ employment 
policies, the lack of electricity supply, unemployment, the actions of labour brokers, fears about judicial 
proceedings, municipal inaction in the face of community requests, poor representation by local 
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government officials, proscribed events at education facilities, the cost of education, dismissals of 
workers, and municipal corruption. From this process, I established that objections related to the 
workplace are likely to be the most common grievances to surface in IRIS, or that they may be the 
easiest to identify.  
 
6.3.1 Grievances and the Keyword Model 
Turning to the keyword model, the outline of which is provided in Appendix 2: Keyword Model, I begin 
with several caveats.  
 
First, as with standard practice for keyword models, I permitted keywords to “flag” in multiple 
categories for a single record. One should thus, for instance, be circumspect in inferring from the map 
that, for instance, there are more labour-related grievances, than community-related grievances, but 
instead that keywords might appear to indicate labour-related grievances were more readily identified, 
using the chosen keywords, than keywords associated with municipal service-related grievances.  
 
Second, keyword models are not sensitive to context, and are generally not semantically sensitive. To 
illustrate the inherent pitfalls, consider the following three note-extracts: 
 
A. ‘…threw rocks at the police…’ 
B. ‘…were ready to thowing rocks at the police…’ 
C. ‘…one of NUMSA participants through a brike at Const [name]…’  
 
Here, the keyword model will flag A and B as examples of the “Weapons: crowd projectiles” and thus 
also “violent” categories, despite example B indicating the contrary. Case C, which in theory should be 
flagged, will not, since the misspellings were not anticipated (and including wildcards for too many 
misspellings introduces even more noise, via the inclusion of false positives to the class).  
 
Similarly, while cases of taxi violence were marked for deletion (i.e., marked as non-protest events), 
there were cases identified as taxi violence which were, in fact, the community protesting against taxi 
drivers. For instance,  
 
‘…[the grievance was that the] taxi assosiation was not supporting them when they protes 
about the poor service delivery…’ 
 
or even taxi drivers protesting their bosses’ internal disciplinary processes,  
 
‘…[association] city taxi members, who halted working in solidarity of a fellow taxi driver, 
who was disciplined by disciplinary taxi committee,they were +-30 taxi drivers who said they 
would not operate from [name] taxi rank to [name] and commuters were standing in long 
queues for the taxis…’ 
 
Then there are also occasional matters that needed close reading, such as protests against occult 




‘…200 people barricaded the gravel road from [name] to [name] community of [name] 
accused [name] for witchcraft and further that local chief is delaying to intervene in that 
matter…’ 
 
‘…150 community members gathered together with their chief … to observe [name] who was 
buried in 2009 afterh ewas murdered by his girlfriend was suspected to be alive and was 
sometimes seen by community members. The traditional healer from [name] promised the 
family that he will reveal the truth by bringing the deceased alive…’ 
 
Keyword models are blunt tools, and future research may replace this altogether with a suitably 
sophisticated NLP reader. 
 
Finally, when I refer to the keyword model, this includes non-protest events. The reader will recall that 
it was the Keyword Model that allowed for the eventual removal of non-protest events to create the 
final IRIS-set. 
 
Such warnings heeded when we consider the 36 categories of grievances, terms associated with labour 




Figure 6.8: Grievances attending South African protests 1997-2013, as identified by the Keyword Model 































































































































































































































































































































































6.4 Main concern / Motive / General Injustice 
If one approach analyses events by identified individual grievances, another approach would be to 
attempt to distil grievances to what may be called a “general injustice”. To reduce the number of 
grievances, the chasm between, say, corporate favouritism and workplace sanitation, may simply be 
subsumed to a category of “labour injustices”. 
 
While, in the light of the discussion above, much nuance is sacrificed by such a move, it does help to 
consider that all protest is performed in some way in relation to the state (as developed in Chapter 2, 
this is, of course, a single dimension of a complex nexus), and, more prosaically, allows for easier data 
handling.  
 
The Keyword Model was informed by my reading of 1 292 cases (all from 2011, spanning all 9 
provinces), during which I identified what I regarded the “main motive” of the protest event. These 
“motives” which were later refined into the categories presented in the Keyword Model, are, in order 
of frequency, workplace injustices, problems with local governance and public services, dissatisfaction 
with political representatives, government-as-workplace injustices (e.g., municipal workers), crime and 
policing, injustice in juridical proceedings and courtside solidarity, education-related grievances, and 
local conditions (chiefly poverty and unemployment).  
 
The Keyword Model would be prone to flag multiple categories, since, as discussed above, multiple 
grievances were a common trait. To ease this classification, I set a sequence of priority for placing 
protests with presenting multiple “types” (e.g., labour and community) into a single category. This order 
runs: 
 
1. Destination protests (if, say, a courthouse is mentioned, the event was classified here, regardless 
of any other categories flagged);  
2. Labour-related protests (protests that include an element of labour grievances, regardless of 
other concerns, as long as they were not Destination protests;  
3. Community protests; 
4. Nationally-directed protests; 
5. Health and Education-related protests; 
6. Police and crime-related protests; 
7. Other (events that are identified as protest, but without a sufficiently clear grievance, to merit 
placing in any of the above categories, are placed here) 
 
With the above sequence of priority in mind, the total count of protests, by type, was as follows. 
 
Table 6.4: Count of protests by type, from the ML set 
    Total count 
Labour-related Protest 23 564 
Community Protest 19 403 
Destination Protests 11 030 
Health and Education-related Protest 6 914 
National-directed Protest 4 809 
Police and Crime-related 1 821 
Other/Unidentified 21 511 
Note: The “unidentified” class holds the second-most records, which implies one should treat the ratio between 
the rest of the classes with caution. The Destination protests class is in a large way used to reduce noise in the 
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rest of the dataset, since these protests would take place outside the municipality where the protesters reside. 
However, this implies an artificial reduction in the other classes. 
 
Visualising the distribution of protests by type, particularly Labour-related protests and Community 
protests, is improved by considering these per capita. For reasons discussed in Chapter 5.4.1, maps 
depicting counts generally appear alike, with the vast majority of protests of any type taking place in 
the country’s populous metropoles. However, bringing this in conjunction with local population sizes 
presents informative patterns. 
 
Figure 6.9: Choropleth map of Labour-related protest per capita (South Africa, 2009-2013) 
 
Figure 6.9 presents Labour-related protests per capita. The prominent belt across the north of the 
country mimics the location of extractive industries: diamonds and iron in the Northern Cape; Gold, 
Platinum and Chrome in the North-West, and collieries along the Waterberg coalfield, in Limpopo. The 
dark area around the southern coast corresponds to automotive manufacturing plants and related 




Figure 6.10: Choropleth map of Community protest per capita (South Africa, 2009-2013) 
 
Figure 6.10 is the map for Community protest per capita, based on the same choropleth scale as the 
labour per capita map (i.e., level 1 = 0-25 protests per capita, level 2 = 25-50, etc.). One notes how the 
eastern part of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo present few 
municipalities with more than 50 protests per 100 000 residents, but that the converse is the case in the 
other provinces. The municipality coloured red in KZN represents the rural Mkhabathini (containing 
Camperdown), in which 47% of households are without reticulated water (the average across 
municipalities in SA is 33%). This map, as others, calls for further investigation.  
 
6.5 Triggers 
Direct political action appears often to be sparked off by trigger events – incidents that act as a catalyst 
for the formation of mobilisation capital (courage and coordination). However, in a dataset, the 
unearthing of triggers is not straightforward, since police arrive after this stimulus, and of course, are 
primarily concerned with “what they see”, i.e., particulars such as crowd size, composition, the presence 
or not of weapons, and the tactic employed by the crowd.  
 
In many examples of otherwise informative reports, triggers (as well as grievances and motives) are 
completely absent. One example may be: 
 
‘On tuesday 2011-11-08 at about 18:00 members of [name] pop information were posted at 
[name] village for unrest situation and situation report is as followed: 19:00 ±500 community 




Moreover, many triggers are simply very hard to pin down. Where a boiling point is gradually reached 
– say over many years of empty promises to get reticulated water, where the humiliation and desperation 
finally manifest in action – the trigger event is hard to identify, and is never the most salient feature for 
analysis in the first instance. 
 
‘ they ask for houses, water, electricity,toilets.they  waited for five years for all this, not even 
asingle promise fulfilled...’ 
 
This does not mean that the police comments were devoid of clues around triggers. Some, such as:  
 
‘…release of suspects and better service delivery…’ 
 
The above allows one to surmise that the arrest of community members may well have acted as the 
trigger event; this is often also true (in the case of Labour-related protests) for the dismissal or 
suspension of colleagues at work.  
 
Another class of trigger moments is obvious, and speaks directly to humanity and morality – a child is 
raped, and a community is left grieving, traumatised, and angry. Below is an extract from such a record.  
  
‘…50 residents .... blocked the ... road and burned tyres.they were angry that a 14year old 
girl was raped and that the suspect known to them was not arrested yet by the police…’ 
 
The Keyword Model was informed by the hand-coding process, from a sample of 1 265 cases. The 
following triggers were the most common twelve (in order of frequency, subject to the caveats from 
6.4, above) from 25 identified triggers: national strike, wage increase perceived as unfair, electoral list 
circulation (2011 was an election year), electricity disconnected, dismissals at place of employment, 
end of projects (employment terminated), wages unpaid, police heavy-handedness, non-response from 
officials, government subsidised houses handed over (disputes arising from), disciplinary hearing at 
workplace, amenities discontinued (e.g., water and electricity cuts). The hand-coded triggers were then 
supplanted by the much larger set as identified by the Keyword Model. 
 
One should be sympathetic that the police report on what they see. Thus, some triggers are easier to be 
identified by default (such as a court hearing). On the other hand, many triggers would require a closer 
reading than what a keyword model can present, to have confidence in the findings. However, as 
suggested above, when police mention a strike demanding the “reinstitution” of a colleague, to draw on 
a common example, one can readily assume that a workplace dismissal took place. Figure 6.11, below, 





Figure 6.11: Frequency of Triggers (from the Keyword Model) 
 
Based on the keywords, court hearings and crime events are the most common (or, rather, the most 
commonly identifiable) triggers. Courthouse events are very clearly indicated as such in IRIS-notes, 
making this the easiest to identify of all triggers. It also appears that trauma in the wake of a crime 
event is not just a common mobilising factor, but that police notes capture these with some clarity. This 
is likely to be related to police officers’ primary training, which involves identifying crime events. 
These two triggers are followed by injustices at the workplace (such as unfair dismissals), and wage 
disputes (which have predetermined “negotiation windows” – allocated times when pay-raises are 
discussed and haggled over).  
 
Certain triggers require nuance to the point of being ill-suited for keyword models, for example the 
circulation of a party list (of candidates for official positions) or as another example, “rumours of 
relocation”; such matters require an understanding of context which is hard to establish using only pre-
selected keywords. National strikes are also likely to be underrepresented in the counts – often POP 
notes seem to assume that a certain labour strike will be understood to be in the wake of a national strike 
announcement, and only by clustering events temporally will this trigger become easier to identify.   
 
6.6 Actors 
Protest is a communal act, or at the very least, a collective action event, that is based on leveraging 
mobilisation capital. This process requires a social vehicle – which may be an ad-hoc body of people, 
or an established group.  
 
As tallied by the Keyword Model, Figure 6.12 shows the counts of four classes of groups. 
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Figure 6.12: Actors as identified by the Keyword Model 
 
The reader should once more note that these figures (which are 28 420, 14 910, 14 356 and 5 340, 
respectively) represent a crude approximation of the true number of times certain organisational forces 
orchestrated protests. The groups behind protests were often left out of IRIS records, and the keywords 
had to be vague to capture potential organising parties (with the downside of introducing noise into the 
data). Moreover, the four groups are broad and contestable concepts.  
 
Once more, Figure 6.12’s appearance may also be a function of certain keywords being easier to identify 
than other groups. For grievances, labour-related issues tended to be easier to identify, for actors, 
community-related groups tend to be easier to identify with pre-set keywords. Accordingly, the overall 
actor picture should be viewed in combination with the Keyword Model for grievances, where labour-
related keywords were more frequent than those responding to other categories. That said, it appears as 
if protest events led by community organisations outnumber those of trade unions. Civics, as previously 
established, operate under a broad range of mandates, from ratepayers’ associations and municipal 
pressure groups to vehicles for vigilantism. Similarly, civics range from long-established organisations 
to ad-hoc groupings (which may or may not answer to “popcorn” characteristics). The relatively low 
number of trade union-led protests appears to contradict Table 6.4, which suggested that there are more 
Labour-related protests than Community protests. However, one should not discount the large 
“unidentified” category – which thus appears to include a higher proportion of Community- than 
Labour-related protests. Moreover, in many cases the POP notes omit unions’ names, or other 
appropriate keywords (e.g., shop steward), while a close (human) reading might identify trade union 
mobilisation. Churches, once an important source of inspiration and legitimation for the struggle for 
political liberation as for mobilisation towards better public services (Van Kessel 2000), continue to 
play a measurable role.  
 
Figure 6.12 shows that civic organisations represent over 45% of keyword-identified actors. So as to 
examine this category in more detail, Table 6.5 identifies the words that flagged this category and their 



























Table 6.5: Main contributing keywords to "Civic Organisations", from the Keyword Model 
 Frequency of keyword 
Association 2 414 
Civic 1 989 
Community 12 717 
Concerned 1 646 
Residents 7 978 
NGO 100 
Organisation 1 236 
 
 
“Civic organisations” is a broad term, and the table shows that “community” was the biggest contributor 
to this category’s numerical dominance. The word “community” in a police note does not, of course, 
imply the definite presence of a civic organisation, at least not with the same confidence that words 
such as “organisation”, “association” or even “concerned,163, does. Note that bigrams such as 





Figure 6.13: Actors by province (from the Keyword Model) 
Note: Provinces are ordered from most to least populous. 
 
By pure count, KZN had the most actor-identified protest events (political actors contributing the most), 





                                               
163 The adjective “concerned” is often used in the names of parochial community groups, such as the “Concerned 
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Table 6.6: Actors per province in the Keyword Model identified protests 1997-2013 
 Count  Per 100 000 people  
Civic Union Political Church  Civic Union Political Church 
Gauteng 5 654 3 312 2 039 1 456  46.1 27.0 16.6 11.9 
KZN 4 677 1 852 5 183 1 185  45.6 18.0 50.5 11.5 
Eastern Cape 2 094 1 911 1 632 684  31.9 29.1 24.9 10.4 
Western Cape 2 609 1 606 1 482 703  44.8 27.6 25.5 12.1 
Limpopo 2 326 891 641 189  43.0 16.5 11.9 3.5 
Mpumalanga 1 713 680 424 49  42.4 16.8 10.5 1.2 
North West 6 087 2 321 2 035 774  173.4 66.1 58.0 22.1 
Free State 2 352 1 228 738 192  85.7 44.7 26.9 7.0 
Northern Cape 910 555 736 105  79.4 48.4 64.2 9.2 
 
The pattern displayed by the Keyword Model, for actors by province, is that civic organisations is 
identified as the most-commonly-cited class of actor, followed by trade unions and political actors. In 
some cases, such as the North West province, the ratio of community actors cited to trade unions is 
more than 2:1; again, this is a function of what the model is able to identify, plus the frequency of 
protests per class. 
 
One exception to the above trend is KZN, where political parties came out tops, and did so with a very 
large count, relative to other provinces, of apparent protest actions led or influenced by political parties. 
In KZN, where political contestation is fierce, and violent – often involving political killings – during 
the years covered by the IRIS-set, the locally dominant IFP was not only battling the ANC (including 
tactics of protests effectively functioning as political rallies), but was also beset by an internal rebellion 
that led to an internal factionalisation, and eventually a breakaway political party (The NFP), which 
contested (with some successes) the 2011 local government elections.  
 
The other exception is the Northern Cape, where community organisations were the most-identified 
class of actors, but political parties preceded trade unions. The Northern Cape thus appears less 
unionised, possibly owing to a large portion of wage labour related to agriculture in the province. Also 
supporting this finding of a higher frequency of political actors than trade unions, is that the Northern 
Cape was the central battleground for the nascent COPE political party (formed in 2008 as a breakaway 
from the ANC), with several political protests and counter-protests surfacing in the lead-up to the 2011 
polls. 
 
Viewed over time, however, the prominence of civic organisations remains constant, with the gap 






Figure 6.14: Frequency of actors over time from the Keyword Model 
 
From Figure 6.14, also note that in six of the 17 years (1997, 1998, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2010), trade 
unions were the second most commonly identified actor. This overlaps with large public sector strikes 
in 2007 and 2010, where the figure confirms the influence of unions in those particular years. However, 
this graph suggests that future research, especially about the build-up to the 2007 strike (a period during 
which Civic organisations’ role ostensibly declined), is warranted.   
 
6.7 Tactics 
The type of protest action – the tactic – is defined as the means of signalling to other parties, the state, 
and the wider community, the severity of the grievances to the people represented by the actors.  
 
From the vantage point of the police, tactics are the most obviously-visible dimension of a crowd event, 
and thus, unsurprisingly, one of the keyword categories that later on provided the most reliable guidance 
to the ML models. The Keyword Model was informed by the reading of 1 276 hand-coded cases (from 
all provinces, all from 2011), which presented the following tactics (in order of frequency): gatherings, 
blocking of public thoroughfares, march and memorandum combinations, demonstrations, marches, 
picketing, meetings, attacks, refusal to work, arson, intimidating colleagues, blocking workplace 
entrances, picket and march combinations, vandalism, land invasions, disruptions of schools, hostage-
takings, rallies, ad hoc electricity connections, lock-outs sit-ins, and vigils. 
 
I have previously developed the notion of the distance between gesture (intended tactic) and tactic(s) 
(actual actions). I also showed how events often include multiple tactics, indeed, that one of the most 
common stock progressions in the South African repertoire is the gathering-march-memorandum 
sequence. However, for the Keyword Model’s needs, it was necessary to “rank” the various tactics by 
the intended levels of disruption (see Appendix 2). Thus, for an event with three tactics, the most 
disruptive of the three would be flagged, and the other two discarded: in essence, an event with peaceful 
intent that turns violent, is, in the final analysis, a violent event, even if the initial tactic did not involve 
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Extracts from the IRIS-set quickly confirms just how ritualised many gatherings are. This may be part 
of a tradition of protest, but may simply reflect what “works”. Large protests in Durban, eThekwini, for 
instance, start, almost as a rule, at the King Dinuzulu Gardens (historically “Botha’s Gardens” – a 
conveniently sized and sufficiently central meeting place. This bigram returned 95 hits, from the KZN 
subset). This observation is in line with Tilly’s expectations, insofar as it conforms to the idea of a 
“limited repertoire” – although I should immediately add that, by IRIS’ nature, we are a priori dealing 
with a limited set of activities, since the police would not regard many acts of protest as crowd incidents, 
such as the mass-mailing of petitions, or staging of a boycott, or a hunger strike.  
 
However, Tilly’s argument falls short164 when considered from the viewpoint of his “two rhythms” 
insistence – i.e., that the “old repertoire” (parades and turnouts,165 land invasions, destruction of toll-
gates and other barriers, parades, expulsion of foreign workers, pulling down of private houses, forced 
illuminations,166 etc.) was all but irrevocably replaced by a “new repertoire” (of electoral campaigns, 
electoral rallies, social movements, public meetings, strikes, petition marches, and invasion of official 
assemblies). While elements of what could be called “new repertoire” are very much present in 
contemporary South African political actions, we may note many examples of “old repertoire-style 
tactics” present in the many cases of barricading and blocking of thoroughfares, workplace-to-
workplace mobilisation and walkouts, door-to-door community mobilisations, land invasions, arson 
(typically to the house of a local municipal councillor), “xenophobia” (attacks and expulsion of 
foreigners), and the burning of tyres to attract attention. The findings here reflect that repertoire is a 
function of circumstance, too – impoverished people will use the resources available to them, and will 
improvise on the catalogue of theorised gestures. The historical course of repertoire-selection is 
certainly not a one-way street. 
 















                                               
164 Tiratelli has offered a similar critique, based on observations in the UK (2018). 
165 ‘…were the routines by which workers in a given craft who had a grievance against their employer of their 
locality went from shop to shop, calling out the workers to join them in a march through town…’ followed by 
behaviour that looks suspiciously “unionised” – caucusing demands and negotiating with the bosses (Tilly 1977: 
14). 
166 Where supporters of a cause run through streets, demanding that households light lantern or fires to show 
solidarity with a cause (Tilly 1983/2017). 
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Table 6.7: Most commonly-identified concepts relating to protest tactics, from the Keyword Model  
Frequency 
Memorandum 26 811 
March 25 710 
Group 24 360 
Meeting 23 878 
Gathering 21 658 
Block 14 745 
Attack 9 741 
Placards 8 195 
Leader 4 629 
Burn 2 092 
Damage 2 048 
 
Table 6.7 presents the ten most-frequently flagged concepts (out of roughly twenty). I allowed for 
double-counting, which meant that the top thirteen concepts added to 166 847 hits. In the next step, 
only the most disruptive tactic was retained per incident, so that there were roughly 89 000 incidents 
and the same number of tactics. Certain tactics were combined, e.g., “disrupt” (for concepts, see 




Figure 6.15: Frequency of main tactic (from the Keyword Model) 
  
Despite precedence given to keywords in such a way as to depict a given event by its most disruptive 
qualities, we see that non-violent tactics – gatherings, meetings, marches, the handing-over of 
memoranda and pickets, are the most common tactics. The second-most common tactic is “disruption”, 
which is the class of activities that involves civic disorder but not overt violence – with the burning of 









































































Related to tactics is the level of tumult of an event. By default – a violent tactic implies a violent event, 
but as explained before, this does not imply violent intentions pre-hoc, and often, disruption and 
violence are caused by rogue groups, or in response to heavy-handed police “containment” measures.   
 
With the aim of eventually arriving at a three-way classification (orderly, disruptive, and violent), I first 
created a five-way classification, based on the following criteria. 
 
Table 6.8: Eventuality potential classification parameters 
 Criteria 
Potential non-protest event None of the categories below flagged, and any of the “non-protest” 
categories flagged. 
Potential peaceful protest event None of the categories below flagged. 
Event with disorderly protest 
potential 
Any of the keywords under the “weapons” label flagged, keywords 
“split” or “chaos” flagged, a crowd size over 200 people identified 
(and none of the categories below flagged). 
Event with disruptive protest 
potential 
Any of the tactic concepts of “hostage”, “disrupt”, “vandalism” or 
“lock-out” flagged, or any of the keywords “refused”, “prevented”, or 
“riot*” present (and not including any of the qualities of the class 
below).  
Event with violent protest potential Any of the keywords included under the concepts of “attack”, “crowd 
projectiles”, or “police weapons” flagged, or any of the keywords 
“blood”, “bleed*”, “casualty”, “killed”, “shot”, “injur*”, “sustained”, 
“out of control”, “out of hand”, “lost control”. 
Note: This was not the sole criterion used by the machine learning algorithms, but it was one of the more influential 
of the 136 features. 
 
This process identified most events as “potential peaceful protest events”, followed by “potential non-
protest events”, “events with disruptive protest potential”, “events with violent protest potential”, and 
finally “events with disorderly protest potential”. “Events with violent protest potential” made up 8% 
of the roughly 156 000 cases. 
 
This aided the ML-process in removing non-protest events, as well as in classifying the remainder into 
one of three categories, in line with the definitions as discussed in the theory chapter. Levels of tumult 





Figure 6.16: Choropleth map for protest tumult per municipality 
 
Figure 6.16 presents a summary of municipal tumult patterns. Urban centres, such as Tshwane, 
Johannesburg and eThekwini present tumult levels in the third of five categories, ostensibly owing to 
the number of protests they host (which implies the municipal tumult level is calculated by a large 
denominator). Note that several municipalities in the Northern Cape are in the most tumultuous 
category, bearing in mind that they also host relatively few protests per count, but many per capita. 
Another striking finding is the pattern presented by Mpumalanga, where every municipality is 
categorised at Level 3 or above, vis-à-vis Limpopo where only one municipality is placed in the third 
category, all others being below. This is explored further in Figure 6.17. See Appendix 8 for the tumult 
per municipality.  
 
Table 6.9: Tumult scores by types of protest 
  Tumult score 
Police and crime-related protests    0.32 
Community Protests    0.19 
Health and education-related protests    0.12 
National Government Protests    0.10 
Labour-related protests    0.09 
Other     0.08 
Destination Protests    0.07 
Note: See Chapter 5.4 for tumult scale calculation 
 
Considering tumult per types of protest, police and crime-related protests appear as the most 
tumultuous, possibly because the police themselves are the target of protest, and thus may be more 
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likely to experience the necessity to contain protesters. Save for “other” and destination protests – 
comprising mostly courthouse protests – Labour-related protests appear the least tumultuous.   
 
Viewed over time, tumult increased gradually, but almost negligibly. In the period between 1997 and 
2013 – the average municipal tumult was 0.351, for 2009-2013, this figure rose to 0.356.167 Table 6.10 
presents the overall class frequencies, which again shows that most protest in South Africa is peaceful, 
and more specifically, orderly. 
 
Table 6.10: Frequencies of levels of tumult, South African municipalities 1997-2013, from the ML model 
 Frequency 
Orderly 73 502 
Disruptive 6 718 
Violent 8 832 
 
 
The weapons present at an event, as identified by the police, was an instructive keyword category for 
the level of tumult likely to have developed. Table 6.11 illustrates that, when weapons do get flagged 
by the Keyword Model, protestors most often use rocks (signalling, to some sense, an improvised 
dimension to defence/attack); the proportion of mentions of rubber bullets suggest that so-called 
nonlethal police weapons are fairly ubiquitous in such situations.   
 
Table 6.11: Common concepts under "weapons", from the keyword model 
 Frequency 
Rocks (Civilians) 8 415 
Rubber bullets (Police) 6 708 
Stun grenades (Police) 1 104 
Weapon unclear (Civilians) 864 
Guns (Civilians or police) 503 
Water cannon (Police) 334 
Traditional Weapons (Civilians) 239 
Teargas (Police) 154 
Knife (Civilians) 133 
Batons and shields (Police) 96 
 
Note: Multiple hits were permitted per row. 
 
The Keyword Model identified only 18 549 instances of weapons in the IRIS-set. Despite the vast 
majority of events being orderly (and thus, per definition, also peaceful), which generally corresponds 
to Runciman et al. (2016) and Duncan (2016), a fine-tuning of the underlying keywords is likely to 
yield more hits. 
 
Returning to the overall levels of tumult, now disaggregated by province, we note that in every province 
there are more orderly protests than disruptive or violent protests. 
 
                                               
167 This calculation applies a uniform weighting to municipalities. 
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Table 6.12: Frequency and proportion of Tumult of protests, South Africa 1997 – 2013, from the ML model 
 Frequency  Per 100 000 people 
 Orderly Disruptive Violent Total  Orderly Disruptive Violent Total 
Gauteng 15 901 847 2 598 19 346  129.6 6.9 21.2 157.7 
KZN 8 652 967 969 10 588  84.3 9.4 9.4 103.1 
Eastern Cape 12 481 1 093 856 14 430  190.2 16.7 13.0 219.9 
Western Cape 8 437 994 1 332 10 763  144.9 17.1 22.9 184.9 
Limpopo 6 665 1 155 384 8 204  123.3 21.4 7.1 151.8 
Mpumalanga 2 843 1 088 439 4 370  70.4 26.9 10.9 108.2 
North West 10 104 143 1 212 11 459  287.9 4.1 34.5 326.5 
Free State 6 341 55 760 7 156  231.0 2.0 27.7 260.7 
Northern Cape 2 077 376 282 2 735  181.3 32.8 24.6 238.7 
 
However, Table 6.12 also shows that for disorderly protests (i.e., disruptive and violent protests), there 
is not a uniform pattern – in five provinces there are more violent protests than disruptive ones. As 
previously established, Gauteng has the most protests, followed by the Eastern Cape. From Table 6.12, 
we also see that the Free State has very few disruptive protests, and that, notably, the Western Cape has 
more disruptive and violent protests than the populous KZN. In fact, the Western Cape is host to the 




Figure 6.17: Rates of various levels of tumult per 100 000 inhabitants, per province, South Africa 1997-2013, 
from the ML model 
 
When viewed per capita, previously identified trends are confirmed: the North West, Free State and 
Northern Cape present the most protests. The North West also has the highest per capita number of 
violent protests over the period under consideration. On the other side of the spectrum, KZN and 












































































To further explore the relationship between the number of protests and municipal tumult, I return to the 
“bubble” scatterplot introduced in Figure 6.3, where the x-axis represents the orderly-to-violent 
spectrum, and the y-axis is number of protests per municipality (bubble size represents population size, 
colour represents province). Juxtaposing the Western Cape and Limpopo (the latter included for 
reference), we note that municipalities in the Western Cape do, in the main, have more tumultuous 





Figure 6.18: Bubble-chart for number of protests (2009-2013) against levels of tumult for the Western Cape and 
Limpopo (from the ML model) 
 
 
Another province that presents almost all municipalities at the top-half of the tumult-score is 






Figure 6.19: Bubble-chart for number of protests (2009-2013) against levels of tumult for Mpumalanga and 
Limpopo (from the ML model) 
 
In this instance, the two provinces are almost linearly separable, again, by protest tumult more than by 
the number of protests. The above figure also presents an apparent anomaly – the red dot among the 
green cloud – signalling a municipality in Mpumalanga presenting a profile akin to those in 
neighbouring Limpopo province. This may warrant a small diversion: the municipality in question is 




Figure 6.20: Map depicting the location of Dr JS Moroka Local Municipality (red) 
  
Figure 6.20 maps Dr JS Moroka Local Municipality in geographic relation to the rest of Mpumalanga 
province (in pink), Gauteng Province (in blue), and Limpopo (in green). Limpopo envelops this 
municipality from the north, east, and to some extent, the west. Here, Dr JS Moroka appears more “part 




Turning to the levels of tumult associated with different types of protest, we see in the table below that 
Community protests and Labour-related protests account for over half of all orderly protests, as well as 
half of all disruptive protests, and over 60% of all violent protests, when the effects of destination and 
unidentified protests are discounted. 
 
 
Table 6.13: Types of protest by levels of tumult, South Africa 1997-2013, from ML set 
 Count of type  Percentage of type (%)  
Orderly Disruptive Violent 
 
Orderly Disruptive Violent 
Destination protests 9 965 491 574 
 
90 5 5 
Community protests 14 495 1 537 3 371 
 
75 8 17 
Labour-related protests 19 571 2 217 1 776 
 
83 9 8 
National govt. protests 4 001 396 412 
 
83 8 9 
Health/Education protests 5 439 762 713 
 
79 11 10 
Police/Crime protests 975 304 542 
 
54 17 30 
Other/Unidentified 19 056 1 011 1 444 
 
89 5 7 
 
Moreover, Table 6.13 confirms that 90% of all destination protests are peaceful, and that peaceful 
protests are the most common category for all types of protest. Of the various types, Labour-related 
protests made the biggest contribution to disruptive protests, perhaps surprisingly, given the public 
association between Community protests and the blocking of thoroughfares. Equally arresting, is the 
finding that any randomly-selected crime/police-related protest is almost just as likely to be disruptive 
or violent than to be orderly, suggesting that protesting against the police is demonstrably more perilous 
than protesting against employers or local government. 
 
6.9 Identified locations of protest 
Finally, the Keyword Model included a category of “locations”. As other categories, this required the 
explicit mention of, say, the word “shacks” (to flag an “informal area”), and since police routinely note 
the area, but not the type of location as readily, this is not a particularly informative aspect of the 
Keyword Model. However, it served an important purpose in helping the ML algorithms to identify 
Health and Education related protests. 
 
Table 6.14 summates the locations in relation to each other, showing how (before non-protests were 
removed), schools and universities, stadia, businesses, and courthouses accounted for over 80% of text-
identifiable locations. 
 
Table 6.14: Inter-relations of identified protest location classes as proportions of all identified locations  
(from the Keyword Model) 




Court of law 13.5 
Tertiary Education Facilities 11.4 
Township 9.0 




One way to interpret Table 6.14, which is limited, insofar as IRIS notes rarely mention easily identifying 
keywords for informal areas, but almost always explicitly mention that they were deployed at a school, 
is that police are more likely to record the type of location if this is deemed “unusual” (this also accounts 
for the larger-than expected percentage of places of worship in the Keyword Model). 
  
6.10 Protests pre and post-2004  
Alexander’s (2010) “Rebellion of the Poor” thesis bears revisiting, in light of the above general 
descriptive trends. To the question “Did something change in the South African protest landscape 
around 2004?” – the answer must be “yes”.  
 
The increase in volume of protests is well documented. However, the data does not present an obvious 
inflection point at 2004; instead, the general upward-trend continues throughout the dataset.168 That 
said, during this time, the distribution of protest shifts, and actions in non-urban townships and what 
could be considered rural protests, increase. Note for instance in the maps below, the spread of events 




The figures present another way of illustrating the finding that the count view of protests increased over 
time, and that the formerly urban phenomenon (with the overwhelming majority of protests happening 
in the metropoles of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg-Tshwane/Pretoria) was supplanted by a 
picture including protests in several rural municipalities, as evidenced in the flare-up in especially the 
northern provinces of the North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga.  
 
 
                                               
168 Granted, Alexander et al. focused primarily on Community protests, not the overall protest landscape. 
Figure 6.21: Choropleth maps of counts of South African protests 1999-2003 (left) and 2009-2013 (right), from 
the ML model 
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6.11 The rhythm and the beat 
There seems to be an annual cadence to protest: less in the summer months, more in the winter months. 
From Figure 6.22, one can see that, in general, the colder months (April-August) see more protests than 
the rest of the year. Further research may be able to link the peaks and troughs to “institutionalised” 
dates, such as predetermined dates for wage negotiations (during the winter months), just as summer 
holidays typically see labour migrants leaving their places of employment, and returning to their “home 
provinces” for the Christmas break.  
 
 
Figure 6.22: Number of community protests and labour-related protests per month, with monthly averages 
overlaid, 2009-2013, from the ML model. (cf. Runciman, Bekker and Maggot 2019) 
 
To illustrate how this might look in a single year, we may consider the run of events in Gauteng province 
in 2013. Figure 6.23, below, confirms the pattern: in this limited case, there is a decline and lull in 

































































































































Community-related Protest Labour-related Protest




Figure 6.23: Frequency of protests in Gauteng, South Africa, 2013, from the ML model 
 
Figure 6.23 presented roughly six peaks in protest activities: 
a) the peak around the 30th of January was related to various Community protests; 
b) the peak around the 21st of February was a combination of a post office workers’ strike and 
several Community protests; 
c) the peak around 16 April was a national strike by the trade union NEHAWU;   
d) most of the activities in June and July relate to Community protests (trade unions SATAWU, 
GIWUSA and FAWU also mobilised protests during this time); 
e) the peak around 3 September was a national strike by the trade union NUMSA, as well as 
several Community protests; 
f) the peak around 9 October was a strike by the trade unions NUM and SATAWU, as well as the 
fact that several communities protested about electricity, municipal services, landlessness, and 
taxi-fares. 
 
Of course, each year presents a unique picture, however, the general trend as discussed above, appears 
to be consistent. 
 
A final observation. The presence of singing and dancing is almost ubiquitous at South African protest 
actions. This is not restricted to Community protest, and seems to be used by all political parties, too. 
Perhaps moving with the cathartic power of the hymn at a funeral, the energising drive of a witty chant, 
the soothing of a collective swaying-step, or even the intimidating effect of a steady and unrelenting 
rhythm – this aspect seems to be highly sought for in protests in South Africa. Music acts, at face value, 
as both a tool of mobilisation, a coping mechanism, and possibly a way of connecting a current concern 










Table 6.15: Concepts and keywords related to singing and dancing at South African protests, 1997-2013 (from 
the ML model)  
Count 
Singing 








    “TOYI*” 
 
2 891 
Note: keywords are written in quotation marks. 
 
Considering the counts of the keywords above, it may be possible to end our descriptive overview on a 
lighter note: if it comes, the revolution will be sung.  
 
6.12 Conclusion 
By my calculations, South Africa had 89 052 police-recorded protests between 1997 and 2013. This 
presents a refinement of Runciman et al.’s (2016) estimation that there are more than 71 000 protests 
in this period. The figure presented implies an average of 5 238 protest events per year, or 14.3 per day. 
Over this period there were, on average, 3 562 people protesting every day.169 This volume appears 
justification enough for political concern, and moreover, for arguments depicting some sort of 
breakdown in normal political discourse. From a consideration of pure volume, thus, calling South 
Africa’s protest phenomenon a “rebellion” appears not to be a hysterical reaction.170 
 
With the aid of choropleth maps, I showed the distribution of people and protests, and we saw that 
counts of protest events generally mimic settlements patterns, that is, there are more protest events in 
municipalities with higher populations. When considering protest per capita, the sparsely-populated 
municipalities of the Free State, North West and Northern Cape presented the highest proportions of 
protest. Compared to other provinces, municipalities in the North West and the Northern Cape also 
presented the highest number of violent protests per capita; in fact per capita, the North West had three 
times more violent protests than the outwardly “violent” KZN (if one only takes into account raw 
counts). 
 
In this chapter, we saw that protests have increased over time, as did the geographic spread of protests. 
The sizes of protest gatherings have, however, stayed constant between 1997 and 2013. Similarly, while 
parochial trends may suggest otherwise, in general, levels of tumult remained mostly unchanged, 
increasing very little over the 17-year span. This may be related to people’s general reluctance to resort 
to violence. We also noted that during this time, novel protest-related nomenclature took hold, including 
the inexact moniker of “service delivery protests”, as a stand-in for Community protests.  
 
The important role of movements dominated by industrial workers or the urban middle classes are often 
highlighted in protest literature (e.g., Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig 2019). From readings of the police 
notes, we saw that community grievances seldom queue in single file, but that despite its eventual 
                                               
169 This is the minimum – I use the most conservative calculation for this – equating protests of “uncertain” size 
to 15 people gathering. 
170 E.g., Friendman's (2013) rebuke: ‘Calm down, the poor are not about to rebel’. 
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coagulation into a “main issue”, most communities feel themselves beset by several troubles jostling to 
be addressed. These grievances often crossed conceptual boundaries, and it is common to have a protest 
include elements of both Community protest and Labour-related protest.  
 
Trigger events are often the ‘push over the edge’, from passive discontent to direct political actions. 
We saw that trigger events tend to be violent or disruptive – at least where they can be identified from 
police accounts of protests – but that the ensuing protests are, in the main, nonviolent. In fact, our ML 
model suggested that only 9.9% of South African protests, for the period considered, were violent. 
 
For methodological completeness, in each section (which related to the protest formation process), I 
alluded to the initial findings from the hand-coding process, which informed the building of the 
Keyword Model.  
 
A dimension that deserves further investigation, is conflict mitigation in rural municipalities – 
especially in areas that were classified as “homelands” during apartheid, and operate as traditional 
communities under the democratic dispensation. Participatory governance and customary law 
mediation, as well as the role of large churches, are possible ways of explaining why areas like rural 
KwaZulu-Natal, while populous, sees few protests.   
 
I discussed the various perils of a keyword model: it is particularly advantageous to teach a ML-process, 
but by itself not a duteous heuristic. I also pointed out that my findings are painfully subject to the 
assumption that police are consistent across provincial and municipal boundaries in their descriptions 
of events. This may be a problematic assumption, and also justifies future investigation. 
 
This chapter also presented a novel series of choropleth maps depicting municipality-framed protests 
by count, size, type, and levels of tumult; a feat made possible by juxtaposing the ML-model and the 
Keyword Model data. 
 
If we assume that police-reporting is by and large consistent, at least sufficiently so to allow for intra-
municipal and intra-provincial comparison, then we note that there are definite differences among 
municipalities and provinces – volume and violence vary, but not in completely obvious ways. 
Moreover, perhaps in contrast to the “standard line” by the government (e.g., as put forward by COGTA 
2009), protest does not help the casual observer to discover the “weak” municipalities – for that, and 






Chapter 7: Regression analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I detail the process of regression analysis, its outcomes, and the implications for various 
theoretical claims about protests in South Africa.  
Mindful that the theories of protest I have hitherto presented originate from different sources, are 
couched in varied contexts, and are the products of diverse epistemic communities, I have taken several 
steps to address potential objections to the operationalised variables. However, scholars may also 
question “what is predicted”: some theorists confine their writings to Community protests (perhaps 
framed as “service delivery protests”), others have a strong focus on strikes and industrial action, many 
single out xenophobic violence, while others look at all protests and uprisings.  
Moreover, my subject matter covers a field where even simple adjectives may not necessarily be clear: 
when one talks of “more protests”,171 does one mean a numerical increase in the number of protests, or 
a per-capita increase, or that more people are protesting? Similarly, some scholars suggest that levels 
of turmoil matter, while many exclude acts described as “xenophobic” from other, presumably less 
violent, actions. 
There is thus a fine line to be walked. On one hand, allowing for every possible causal factor to be 
included in a broad model of protest would be tantamount to “p-hacking” (Head et al. 2015), while on 
the other hand, not permitting various formulations of the resultant phenomenon may be cause for 
criticisms of “strawmanning” (Friedman 2004). My solution is to present one regression model as my 
principal reading of scholars’ theoretical intentions, to be supplemented by alternative models and 
“families of models”, which all begin with an identical set of features, as explained in Chapter 5.14.  
In this chapter, I arrive at the target I term “General propensity for protest”, suggesting that this might 
be the fairest framework to analyse claims around protest. This is a synthetic target, comprising the 
product of counts of protest occurrence and average crowd size, divided by municipal population. In 
other words, the sum of protest attendees, divided by the number of people residing in that particular 
municipality. I also test simpler targets – Occurrence (count of incidents), Proportional occurrence 
(count of incidents per capita), and Tumult.  
 
The reader is reminded that, since this dissertation seeks to test the validity of hypothetical claims, I 
am, for a start, more interested in significance levels of regression coefficients than I am in the 
magnitude and direction (although both will become essential as the models develop). It remains my 
intention to be able to comment on the veracity of apparent “causes” of protest, not to formulate 
arguments about proximal and distal structural dimensions, or why one feature appears to be more 
influential than another. One hopes that such latter analyses would be the subject of further studies. 
 
The statement above does not imply that p-values, by themselves, prove anything. To this point, 
discussions over the abandoning of p-values altogether, owing to abuse of this metric in perhaps a 
majority of social science publications, have been growing in number and clout (see Ioannidis 2019). 
                                               
171 For instance, ‘Since 2005 the rate of increase in community protests has been greater than for other kinds of 
protest’ (Runciman et al. 2016: 5). 
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These discussions stem, by and large, from publications following the common misconception that p-
values can tell one the probability that a result occurred by chance. In response, the American Statistical 
Association issued a statement on the usage of p-values; the second point in their statement reminds 
one that “p-values do not measure the probability that the studied hypothesis is true, or the probability 
that the data were produced by random chance alone” (quoted in Ioannidis 2019). They go on to restate 
that p-values do not convey the size of an effect, the strength of the evidence, or the importance of a 
result. However, if we accept that p-values convey the probability of our data, given the various 
hypotheses (of course, this sounds tantalisingly similar to “the probability of your hypothesis given 
your data”, which it is not), they remain a robust index of “surprise, assuming your hypothesis was 
false” (Trafimow 2017). Thus, p-values will not be used as evidence of “cause” (as cautioned against 
by Schervish 1996), but as a decision-making guide for better regression models. Moreover, I will retain 
and report standardised coefficients and other descriptive measures. The python code for all regression 
models is available on a Github repository located at https://github.com/RandomForestRanger/PhD, 
which, if run, will provide other regression results, including t-scores, confidence intervals, etc.  
 
Below is an overview of the chapter’s flow, which progresses in seven phases. I begin with exploratory 
regressions (available in Appendix 6), which leads me to identify the different families of regressions. 
I also acknowledge the need to consider, within the families, analysis isolating Community protest and 
Labour-related protest, respectively. I explore the features and their close interrelations (in some cases 
implying that several features will have to be omitted in analysis). I compare different types of 
regressions, hoping to use the fairest estimator for each family. For the first family, I display the residual 




























Table 7.1: Stylised process of regression analysis followed  
 Target Families 
a) Exploratory regressions         
   i.  Different target formulations         
b) Overview of families         
   ii. Identification of families 1. 2. 2.(c) 2.(l) 3. 3.(c) 3.(l) 4. 
c) Overview of features         
   iii. Descriptive          
   iv. Correlations         
   v.  Bivariate visualisation         
d) Regression model selection         
   vi.  Negative binomial x        
   vii. OLS  x   x   x 
   viii. Log-linear OLS x x x x x x x  
   ix. WLS  x       
   x. Robust Regression  x       
e) Feature Selection         
   xi.  VIF         
   xii. Eigenvalues         
   xiii. RFE top 14 x x x x x x x x 
   xiv. Retain features with p-value below 0.001 x x x x x x x x 
f) Statistical regressions (backward deletion)         
   xv.    Regression with selected features x x x x x x x x 
   xvi.   Regression after removing features with p> 0.5 x x x x x x x x 
   xvii.  Regression after removing features with p> 0.1 x x x x x x x x 
   xviii. Regression after removing features with p> 0.05 x x x x x x x x 
   xix.  ‘Best regression’, features unstandardised x x x x x x x x 
g) Consider influence of additional dummies         
   xx.   Urban x x x x x x x x 
   xxi.  Province x x x x x x x x 
   xxii. Urban and Province combined x x x x x x x x 
Note: 1. = Occurrence, 2. = Proportional occurrence, 2.(c) = Proportional occurrence of community protest, 2.(l) 
= Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest, 3. = General propensity for protest, 3.(c) = Propensity for 
community protest, 3.(l) = Propensity for labour-related protest, 4. = Tumult of protest 
 
The steps outlined in Table 7.1 are all taken after the pre-processing and data preparation discussed in 
Chapter 5. For example, as discussed in Section 5.13.13, the analysis was done on standardised data 
(i.e., Z-scored), and standardised features can be assumed for the regressions. Moreover, the vast 
majority of workings are not displayed in this chapter (this process was developed over 16 months of 
fitting regression models, and seeking the fairest tests for theoretical claims). Similarly, mundane 
iterations are omitted – for example, a step such as xvii in the table above (the regression fit after 
removing features with p> 0.1) would have been repeated multiple times in backwards deletion 
procedures until no values present a p-value above 0.1.    
 
A note on nomenclature 
 
I retain the data science community’s convention of predicting “targets” or “labels” (for dependent 
variables) using “features” (for independent variables), by “fitting” (not running) regressions, as 






For this step, I reproduce some elements of exploratory data analysis, the sub-discipline of statistical 
analysis that, according to Behrens (1997: 132): 
 
…addresses the broad question of “what is going on here?”; places an emphasis on graphic 
representations of data; focuses on tentative model building and hypothesis generation in 
an iterative process of model specification, residual analysis, and model specification; 
insists on the use of robust measures, re-expression, and subset analysis; and reiterates the 
need for positions of scepticism, flexibility, and ecumenism regarding which methods to 
apply.  
 
This includes waves of exploratory regressions, familiarisation with potential features, and various 
strategies of feature reduction.  
 
7.2.1 Exploratory regressions 
I began with an initial round of exploratory regressions discussed in 5.14 (results in Appendix 6, see 
also Bivariate exploration, Appendix 9), which tested different implied metrics, which may insouciantly 
be called “protest”, against the same set of features. This yielded “families” of targets – Occurrence 
models, Proportional occurrence models, General propensity models, and Tumult models. Features 
tended to behave consistently within families, but varied between families.  
 
7.2.2 Family introductions 
Occurrence, the first family, is the count of protest per municipality. Thus, regardless of municipal size, 
if a municipality had five records of protests, the target variable would be “5”. This metric has the 
advantage of including all observations (i.e., spanning 1997-2013), but is limited by the omission of 
population size and size of protests. This omission should not be trivialised, because population size 
and number of protests are correlated: there are more protests where there are more people. To wit, one 
can engineer a highly predictive model (R2 > .70), of doubtful value, by testing Occurrence models and 
including the natural logarithm of local population as a feature (See regression 33, Appendix 6).     
 
Visualising the count of protests helps to display the demographic realities of urbanisation and the 
uneven human density distributions between urban and rural geographic units in South Africa. Figure 
7.1 reminds one that four municipalities – the City of Tshwane, the City of Johannesburg, the City of 
Cape Town, and Nelson Mandela Bay – host the bulk of protests in in the country, and thus contribute 






Figure 7.1: Choropleth map of count of protests, South Africa 1997-2013  
 
In response to this, the second family are the Proportional occurrence models, which is the count of 
protest divided by the population size of each municipality. Such a per capita model represents an 
improvement172 on Occurrence models, being sensitive to the size of the population. However, the 
drawback is that, in order to maintain a fair target, the number of protests are collected only from the 
years around the population headcount. As discussed (in Section 5.4.1), Proportional occurrence 
models will be limited to observations from 2009-2013, owing to the national census having being taken 
in 2011. Proportional occurrence models are further disaggregated into Proportional occurrence of 
community protest, and Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest. 
 
Figure 7.2, below, compares counts (Occurrence) and counts per capita (Proportional occurrence). 
Viewed per population count, the urban centres and provincial capitals tend not to be the sites of high 
Proportional occurrence. Instead, areas with specific types of economic activities, or other local 
characteristics (discussed below) appear with higher protest per capita profiles. 
 
                                               
172 Consider a fictional example: if the City of Johannesburg and Mier Local Municipality (in the Northern Cape) 
both host 1 000 protests in a year, it cannot be reasonably reported that they have the same levels of protest. Mier’s 
population is 7 000 (thus 14.3 protests per capita), while the Johannesburg population is around 4 000 000 (thus 




Figure 7.2: Choropleth maps depicting total protest per municipality (left) and protest per capita per municipality 
(right), South Africa 1997-2013 
 
Similarly, from the discussion in Chapter 6, we know that most Labour-related protests occur in the 
urban centres of South Africa. However, when plotting this per capita, one notes that neither Cape 
Town, eThekwini (Durban), nor Johannesburg are placed in the highest category of protests per capita. 
Instead, Figure 7.2 intimates that, the iron, platinum, chrome, and diamond mining areas near the 
country’s northern border, on the one hand, and the manufacturing sites at the southern coastal ports 
(plus some agricultural areas in the Free State and Southern Cape), on the other, see proportionally the 
most protests. 
 
Perhaps the closest one can get to measuring “propensity to protest” is to consider the number of 
participants across all protests, per capita – this is the third family: models of General propensity. For 
this target, I consider the product of the count of protests and the average crowd size for each 
municipality, divided by the municipal population.  
 
Just as the per capita calculation brings a measure of proportionality to protest counts which would 
otherwise overestimate the influence of areas with high populations, taking crowd sizes into 
consideration implies that the biases introduced when small and large protests are treated as equal, are 
largely corrected. For example, one might consider municipality A with 10 protests, each attended by 
20 people, contrasted to municipality B, with 5 protests of 100 people each. Common approaches would 
see this example as a case of 10 protests against 5 (suggesting A has more protests), instead of 200 
protesters (or participants) versus 500 (which shows that B has more protesters). In addition, the per 
capita calculation ensures that municipal population size is also factored in.   
 
So far, no one has been able to use crowd sizes of protests in South Africa to inform calculations of 
propensities to protest. This is most likely owing to most scholars relying on media reports by 
journalists, which, unlike police reports, generally do not include crowd sizes (especially for small 
gatherings), or if they do, use conveniently rounded figures. 
 
The drawback of this family is that, owing to its per capita calculation, it would be prudent to confine 
the protest data to the period around the census (i.e., when the population was measured), as was done 
in the Proportionate Occurrence models. However, I was only able to establish crowd sizes for two-
thirds of protests. This means that low-n municipalities (say, those with protest counts below 5) would 
be vulnerable to the effect of my aggregating crowd sizes. There are more than 25 such municipalities 
(that is, more than 10% of the sample). This challenge is exacerbated when one seeks to subdivide 
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General propensity into Community and Labour-related protests: in which case there are respectively 
52 and 87 municipalities with less than five protests. The subdivision of General propensity is thus a 
precarious exercise, and for Propensity for community protest and Propensity for labour-related protest 
I reverted to use data spanning 1997-2013, to ensure my average municipal crowd size calculations 
would be as accurate as possible.173 For incidents where crowd sizes were not noted, I assumed the 
minimum count (i.e., imputed 15 people, or the minimum in the dataset, for missing values) as the most 
conservative value.174 
 
The fourth family, Tumult, is tested to see whether any of the operationalised proxies present predictive 
power for municipal levels of Tumult. In this analysis, I report the unadjusted levels of Tumult (as 
calculated in Section 5.11) as target, but I also tested for Tumult per capita (a model that yielded no 
features of significance, and an Adjusted R2 below 0.1). 
 
Tumult is instructive, if somewhat inscrutable – levels of Tumult do not mimic population patterns, nor 
do they appear to be obviously associated with large sites of labour-intensive employment (i.e., within 
municipalities that host mining and manufacturing-related activities). Instead, as Figure 7.3 reveals, 
certain rural municipalities – possibly where communities perceive themselves neglected or disregarded 
by government, or where agricultural activities are the main livelihood – appear to be the localities often 
facing heightened levels of Tumult.  
 
Figure 7.3: Choropleth map depicting levels of tumult attending South African protests 2009-2013 
 
                                               
173 From Chapter 6, we saw that crowd sizes did not increase significantly in the 1997-2013 period. 
174 Other methods, such as mean substitution, or various forms of deletion, are discouraged by Graham, Cumsille, 
and Elek-Fisk (2003). 
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Figure 7.3 also shows that while there is much within-province variation, this appears less than between-
province variation in levels of Tumult, as evidenced by the low levels of Tumult in Limpopo, and the 
high levels in adjacent Mpumalanga (as discussed in Chapter 6).  
 
7.2.3 Overview of features  
I considered 21 potential features, incorporating all the proposed proxy values operationalised in 
Section 5.4. Below is a table of their basic distributions. The units are the 234 municipalities (local and 
metropolitan), meaning there are 234 observations for each of the features. The abbreviations are 
defined in the footnote to the table. 
 
Table 7.2: Summary statistics for potential features 
Numeric Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum 50
th percentile Maximum 
  Change in population 11.27 16.52 -20.00 9.00 79.00 
  % Unemployed 41.16 14.47 8.00 40.00 76.00 
  % Poor 18.13 4.20 7.00 19.00 27.00 
  Voter turnout 75.94 4.55 62.09 76.43 85.78 
  Mean Age 27.76 2.38 22.56 28.01 34.74 
  % Small Households 37.22 7.75 16.99 37.22 61.32 
  % Youth 34.30 3.54 25.89 33.79 45.41 
  Dependency Ratio 46.70 6.69 28.50 46.36 60.50 
  % White 7.06 6.59 0.05 6.35 38.88 
  % HWW 32.96 27.36 1.45 21.95 93.57 
  R-P Ratio 12.98 12.85 1.82 8.92 84.93 
  Gini175 0.48 0.04 0.37 0.47 0.60 
  % PWM 78.43 7.51 53.35 79.85 92.27 
  % NSL 2.69 2.02 0.15 2.31 14.90 
  % Tribal 35.52 40.34 0.00 6.89 100.00 
  % Male 48.48 2.27 43.44 48.44 58.52 
  % Informal 3.28 5.09 0.00 1.04 39.67 
  % Rural 38.76 38.16 0.00 16.99 99.78 
  Count of protests 380.67 926.70     2.00 109.00 6 564.00 
 Categorical variables  Levels     
Ordinal (good to poor)      
  COGTA Score 4     
  AG Rating 5     
Nominal      
  Province 9     
Binary      
  Urban 2     
Note: HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL 
= Not speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
Features unscaled 
 
                                               
175 For a more appropriate scale, I used the percentage convention (range 0-100) for Gini, in the rare cases where 




My initial exploration included looking at the relations between variables, using a pair plot (pairwise 
scatterplots) function. Space constraints do not permit displaying all 153 plots (for the 18 continuous 
features); however, Figure 7.4 presents a sample of 10 pair plots. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Pair-wise scatterplots of relationships between selected features 
Note: Features unscaled for visualisation. 
HWW = Households without water, Dep Ratio = Dependency Ratio 
Dots represent municipalities, the colour of the dots is determined by the Gini measure, where red/pink is least 




From Table 7.2, one notes that some features, such as Percentage Tribal, range from 0% to 100%, 
presenting large variance, while others, such as the average age, ranged relatively narrowly. The table 
also confirms that every municipality had at least one protest, with an intermunicipal mean of 380.6 for 
the 17-year period. From Figure 7.4 it is apparent that not all the continuous features are normally 
distributed, nor are all recorded on the same scale. One also anticipates that some might be closely 
correlated, such as “% Poor” and “% Unemployed”, which are positively related. Such relationships are 





Figure 7.5: Pearson product-moment correlation on unstandardised features 
Note: COGTA Scores and AG Ratings treated as continuous. 
Dep Ratio = Dependency Ratio, HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without 
matric (Grade 12), NSL = Not speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
 
Presenting a welter of options, Figure 7.5 reiterates the need for variable selection and pruning. It also 
reminds us of “how the world is” – several features are near-cognates, such as “Tribal” and “Rural”. It 
confirms general demographic dicta, such as high male populations will have low dependency ratios, 
or that rural populations tend to be older than urban populations. It also points to certain artefacts of 
South Africa’s history – that areas classified as “Tribal” tend to have poor water services, high 
unemployment, and few people classified as white. 
 
A note on provinces 
 
One is constantly tempted to include “province” as a predictive feature. This should be approached with 
some caution. Province is, of course, not a socio-economic factor, nor a demographic proxy, nor even 
a measure of local governance. However, in the South African context, these factors are indelibly 
captured within the constructs of province – we have provinces answering to “urban” and “rural” 
characteristics, just as we have “poor” provinces, and “underserviced” (with regard to municipal 
services, for historical reasons). South Africa’s nine provinces, to a lesser degree, are also coarse vessels 
of ethnic groupings, and to cloud matters further, provincial economies are subject to locally-hegemonic 
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economic modalities, such as mining or agriculture. However, it would be a mistake to replace, say, 
“water reticulation” with a convenient (if unprincipled) feature of “province”, where province thus 
covers for a range of vague local conditions. That said, I will include province, not in the initial feature 
sets, but as the very last model within each of the families. My reservations notwithstanding, it may be 
that provinces help – all other factors considered – to highlight certain dynamics that may otherwise be 
missing from the regressions. I used the Eastern Cape as my reference category, based on sufficient 
constituent municipalities (39), moderate levels of protest by count and Proportional occurrence, and 
middling levels of Tumult. 
 
7.2.4 Regression model selection 
It was not clear a priori which types of regression models would be the most appropriate, given the data. 




Two strategies presented themselves for the handling of count data. The counts were discrete 
observations, all above zero, over an unbounded positive range, whose sample variance exceeds the 
sample mean,176 as illustrated in Figure 7.6, below. Thus, the observations could be said to be 
“overdispersed” with respect to a Poisson distribution, which suggested a Negative Binomial regression 
as the appropriate test (Cameron and Trivedi 2013).  
 
 
Figure 7.6: Histogram of number of protests per municipality 
 
The disadvantage of relying on Negative Binomial regressions is that they do not return coefficients of 
determination, nor do they offer collinearity statistics, which will be essential in eliminating cognate 
features that may present the model with mathematical problems. 
 
One strategy is to use the natural logarithm of the count, which presents a continuous variable that also 
happens to be roughly normally distributed, as shown in Figure 7.7 below. This allows one to use 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions for consequent analysis. 
 
                                               
176 Most municipalities present less than 2 000 protests; however, importantly, some municipalities have more 




Figure 7.7: Histogram and distribution plot of the natural logarithm of the number of protests per municipality 
 
Juxtaposed below, in Table 7.3, are the results from the Negative Binomial and OLS linear regressions. 
One notes that, minor variations permitting for the actual p-values of the feature coefficients, roughly 
the same features are statistically significant in both regressions. 
 
Table 7.3: OLS and Negative Binomial regressions for count of protests per municipality, SA 1997-2013 
 Log-linear OLS  Negative Binomial 
 J SE  J SE 
Intercept 4.21 0.39  4.47 0.35 
Change in population 0.03 0.09  0.00 0.09 
% Unemployed 0.02 0.18  0.05 0.16 
% Poor 0.27* 0.11  0.29** 0.10 
Voter turnout -0.29*** 0.07  -0.21** 0.07 
Mean Age -0.01 0.18  -0.09 0.18 
% Small Households -0.38** 0.12  -0.35** 0.11 
% Youth -0.04 0.21  -0.10 0.20 
Dependency Ratio -0.80* 0.34  -0.99** 0.33 
% White -0.22 0.15  -0.23 0.15 
% HWW 0.30 0.17  0.37* 0.16 
R-P Ratio -0.11 0.11  0.03 0.09 
Gini 0.56*** 0.11  0.53*** 0.09 
% PWM -0.62** 0.19  -0.44* 0.18 
% NSL 0.04 0.09  0.05 0.08 
% Tribal 0.33 0.38  0.41 0.38 
% Male -0.28* 0.13  -0.34** 0.13 
% Informal 0.12 0.09  0.13 0.08 
% Rural -0.37 0.44  -0.42 0.42 
AG Rating [2] 0.67 0.36  0.77* 0.31 
AG Rating [3] 0.75* 0.36  0.76* 0.31 
AG Rating [4] 0.77 0.53  0.70 0.47 
AG Rating [5] 0.83* 0.35  0.92** 0.32 
COGTA Score [2] -0.19 0.20  -0.21 0.18 
COGTA Score [3] 0.08 0.26  -0.03 0.24 
COGTA Score [4] -0.20 0.38  -0.26 0.36 
No. Observations 234   234  
Adjusted R2 0.623     
Note:  J = Standardised coefficients. SE = Standard error of J.   
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*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively. 
HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL = Not 
speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
Highlights to aid identification of significant features 
 
Table 7.3 reports the results of a Negative Binomial regression where the log likelihood parameter was 
estimated with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation, which indicated that there was a significant effect 
between the potential features and the count of protest per municipality (model df = 25, residuals df = 
208, log-likelihood: -1419, LLR p > 0.001, Pseudo R2 = .110). It also reports an OLS model to predict 
the natural logarithm of the count of protest per municipality. The resultant multiple linear regression 
indicates that there was a collective significant effect between several features and count of protest 
(F(25, 208) = 16.42, p < .001, R2 = .664, Adjusted R2 = .623). 
 
Features significant177 to the model include % poor, the voter turnout at the 2009 elections, the 
percentage of households with less than three members (z = -2.6, p = .009), the Dependency Ratio, the 
municipal Gini coefficient, the percentage of the population without a Grade 12 certificate, the 
percentage males, and the third and fifth levels of municipal ratings by the Auditor-General. In the case 
of the Negative Binomial model, the second level of municipal rating by the Auditor-General was also 
a significant feature. 
 
As stated above, one notes that the two models do not return identical coefficients, however, the profile 
of the significance of the features appears to be narrowly aligned, and the standard errors of significant 
features also correspond persuasively. This suggests that we can, with caution, use these two models 
interchangeably. In light of warnings about relying on pseudo R2 to interpret model outcomes (e.g., 
Heinzl, Waldhör, and Mittlböck 2005), I will henceforth proceed reporting the outcomes of the log-
linear OLS models (with the ln-transformed Occurrence target), which allows us to enjoy the benefits 
attendant to OLS models (R2 reporting, etc.).  
 
 
Proportional occurrence  
 
Proportional occurrence is based on a continuous target, thereby allowing for OLS regressions. 
However, the target is right-skewed (as Figure 7.8 below shows). In addition, the per capita calculation 
means that observations for municipalities carry equal weight – Johannesburg’s count of over 4 000 
incidents is reduced to a single per capita figure, now on equal footing, so to speak, with much smaller 
municipalities. I thus perform two extra checks: first, the Robust Regression, to ensure the assumptions 
of OLS are respected (i.e., that the skew is not caused by problematic outliers); second, I fit a Weighted 
Least Squares regression, with municipal population counts operating as the weighting factor, in order 
to make big population centres “count more”.   
                                               





Figure 7.8: Histogram and distribution of Proportional occurrence, South Africa 2009-2013 
 
Table 7.4, below, juxtaposes the models: an OLS predicting Proportional occurrence; an OLS 
predicting a transformed target (the natural logarithm of protest events per capita); and the prudency 
checks, a WLS (after Cunia 1964) and a Robust Regression (after Huber 1973). 
 
Table 7.4: Comparison of OLS predicting protest per capita, WLS predicting protest per capita, Robust 
Regression predicting protest per capita, and OLS predicting the natural log of protest per capita, for protests per 
municipality, South Africa 1997-2013 
 OLS  WLS  Robust Regr.  Log-Linear OLS 
 J SE  J SE  J SE  J SE 
Intercept 7.80 5.02  8.51 6.58  5.39 4.03  2.04 0.32 
Change in population 3.54** 1.16  4.31** 1.38  2.80** 0.93  0.16* 0.07 
% Unemployed 3.64 2.30  8.12** 2.43  2.94 1.84  0.23 0.15 
% Poor 0.83 1.35  -2.98* 1.40  0.59 1.08  0.01 0.09 
Voter turnout -1.49 0.95  -0.59 0.94  -1.87* 0.76  -0.17** 0.06 
Mean Age -2.37 2.35  -3.04 2.58  -1.65 1.88  -0.06 0.15 
% Small Households -0.74 1.51  0.79 1.65  -0.82 1.21  -0.03 0.10 
% Youth -5.77* 2.71  -9.97** 3.23  -3.68 2.17  -0.22 0.17 
Dependency Ratio -12.65** 4.36  -18.16*** 4.58  -9.95** 3.50  -0.78** 0.28 
% White 0.07 1.87  0.39 1.76  -0.02 1.50  0.02 0.12 
% HWW 0.67 2.17  -2.71 2.21  0.81 1.74  -0.01 0.14 
R-P Ratio -3.58** 1.37  -3.60*** 0.76  -2.75* 1.10  -0.23* 0.09 
Gini 2.82* 1.39  6.74*** 1.34  2.09 1.11  0.21* 0.09 
% PWM -0.94 2.43  3.54 2.49  -1.33 1.95  -0.07 0.16 
% NSL -0.09 1.08  2.29 1.31  -0.23 0.87  -0.01 0.07 
% Tribal 0.30 4.91  -1.00 5.02  -0.69 3.94  0.13 0.31 
% Male -1.59 1.62  -5.03** 1.77  -1.10 1.30  -0.16 0.10 
% Informal 0.56 1.10  -0.36 1.19  0.85 0.88  0.03 0.07 
% Rural -4.46 5.60  3.45 5.83  -3.44 4.49  -0.41 0.36 
AG Rating [2] 8.70 4.53  10.07 6.08  7.83* 3.63  0.29 0.29 
AG Rating [3] 6.76 4.59  7.64 6.07  7.15 3.68  0.25 0.29 
AG Rating [4] 12.45 6.77  11.96 7.31  13.11* 5.43  0.47 0.43 
AG Rating [5] 9.44* 4.52  11.70 6.06  9.91** 3.62  0.35 0.29 
COGTA Score [2] -0.89 2.59  -2.17 2.69  0.68 2.08  0.12 0.17 
COGTA Score [3] 3.34 3.36  -1.38 3.97  4.44 2.69  0.43* 0.22 
COGTA Score [4] 0.99 4.80  -4.20 5.34  2.64 3.85  0.15 0.31 
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No. Observations 234   234   234   234  
Adjusted R2   .309   .423   –    .433   
Note: HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL 
= Not speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
Highlights to aid identification of significant features 
 
 
Reporting on the log-linear OLS model, the results of the multiple linear regression indicates that there 
was a collective significant effect between several features and the measure of protest, (F(25, 208) = 
8.13, p < .001, R2 = .494, Adjusted R2 = .433). The individual features indicated that the change in 
population between the 2001 and 2011 census, Voter Turnout, the Dependency Ratio, the Rich-Poor 
Ratio and Gini inequality, and the third level of COGTA Scores, were significant predictors in the 
model. 
 
The four models performed commensurably. The Robust Regression, which has the advantage of being 
robust to violations of the assumptions of OLS, nevertheless has some drawbacks – the Gauss-Markov 
theorem (Zyskind and Martin 1969) reminds one that OLS will be the most efficient predictor in a class 
of unbiased estimators, unless the residuals present a non-normal distribution (e.g., correlated or 
heteroscedastic errors), or if the model includes spurious outliers. Residuals were reviewed and found 
to be normally distributed. Moreover, model outliers (for which the Robust Regression model 
compensates), which in the case of the present data are the MSG-set, are likely to be the large 
metropolitan municipalities – observations that we deem not errors, but vital to inclusion in our models. 
The WLS performed similarly to the OLS. However, it was outperformed by the log-linear model on 
account of the latter having a higher R2, amid more conservative specifications (fewer significant 
features, and lower AIC and BIC scores). 
 
The OLS predicting the natural log of Proportional occurrence also performed better than the OLS 
with untransformed targets178 – presenting a higher model coefficient of determination, and also lower 
relative quality (goodness of fit and overfitting compensation) scores. AIC and BIC scores for the first 
model calculated as 1798 and 1888, respectively, and correspondingly in the second model at 511 and 
601. Furthermore, despite the transformation not yielding a normally distributed target (see Figure 7.9, 
below), the ensuing regression’s residuals passed the Breusch-Pagan and White tests for 
homoscedasticity of residuals, while those of the untransformed target did not. Thus, based on better 
quality scores and model performance, as in the case of the Occurrence models, I proceed with the most 
defensible course: a log-linear OLS model.    
 
 
                                               








For General propensity, both OLS and log-linear OLS were tested, with the latter performing better as 




Tumult models were based on a continuous target, and met all the assumptions for OLS.   
 
7.3 Feature selection and reduction  
The list of potential features presented above includes several strongly-related concepts that imply 
model multicollinearity. For instance, mean age, the percentage of the population classified as “youth”, 
and the dependency ratio, are all based on age metrics.  
 
In order to eliminate near-equivalent features and to retain the most relevant metric, I used the recursive 
feature elimination technique (RFE) developed by Guyon and colleagues (Guyon et al. 2002), 
commonly used in the ML-community.179 A form of backward selection/elimination, this is a machine 
learning technique that selects features by recursively considering smaller and smaller sets of features, 
using accuracy to identify which features contribute most to predicting the target (see Appendix 2). It 
thus iteratively removes features and proposes a model based on the best combination of the features 
that remain.180 I decided to consider the 14 highest-ranked features for each family.  
 
Next, I looked at feature collinearity (of the estimated regression coefficients), using variance inflation 
factor scores as a guide (with the hypothesised cut-off score set at ten),181 but permitting all scores, 
provided I remove cognate features.  
                                               
179 RFE has been called the “Gold Standard” for feature identification in certain instances (e.g., Sanz et al. 2018). 
180 The initial estimator is trained on the full set of features and the importance of each feature is obtained as a 
combination of coefficient attributes and mean decrease impurity. At each step, the least important feature is 
removed from the set of features; this is repeated on the pruned set until the desired number of features, which is 
pre-specified, is reached. By contrast, backward elimination considers the model AIC score, and seeks to lower 
this by recursively eliminating features. 






As a supplementary provision, I used eigenvalues to detect associations across features, as described by 
Boschetti and Massaron (2016), where low values (0.02 and below) represent sources of 
multicollinearity. Table 7.5 describes the results of this strategy.  
 
Table 7.5: Presentation of feature reduction metrics: p-values and RFE scores for Occurrence, Proportional 
occurrence, General propensity and Tumult models, VIF Scores and Eigenvalues 
 Occ  PO  GP  Tumult    
 p RFE  p RFE  p RFE  p RFE  VIF Eigenvalues 
Change in population .724 23  .031 13  .290 20  .345 18  2.6 10.51 
% Unemployed   .899 24  .119 4  .113 2  .443 4  10.8 2.70 
% Poor .012 8  .943 24  .332 19  .577 22  3.7 1.56 
Voter turnout .000 12  .006 5  .000 7  .499 24  1.8 1.44 
Mean Age .949 25  .701 18  .894 24  .566 15  11.2 1.34 
% Small Households .002 6  .766 21  .075 12  .144 12  4.6 1.14 
% Youth .833 22  .201 14  .663 18  .739 14  15.0 1.03 
Dependency Ratio .020 7  .006 1  .037 1  .624 16  38.7 0.93 
% White .128 14  .859 22  .777 23  .676 23  7.1 0.84 
% HWW .079 10  .959 23  .301 13  .191 8  9.3 0.68 
R-P Ratio .303 19  .010 7  .039 11  .434 19  3.8 0.58 
Gini .000 1  .018 6  .001 3   21  3.9 0.48 
% PWM .001 9  .665 17  .009 6  .843 20  11.8 0.34 
% NSL .600 21  .935 25  .963 25  .447 17  2.4 0.27 
% Tribal .392 17  .686 19  .203 16  .713 7  49.2 0.24 
% Male .028 13  .131 12  .086 14  .776 25  5.3 0.23 
% Informal .156 18  .695 20  .065 17  .136 6  2.5 0.20 
% Rural .403 16  .249 2  .192 15  .237 5  63.5 0.13 
AG Rating [2] .061 2  .317 10  .241 10  .357 9  3.9 0.11 
AG Rating [3] .039 4  .396 11  .188 9  .543 11  2.8 0.08 
AG Rating [4] .149 5  .283 8  .206 4  .683 13  1.3 0.07 
AG Rating [5] .020 3  .223 9  .134 8  .336 10  4.7 0.04 
COGTA Score [2] .339 15  .462 15  .636 21  .105 3  2.7 0.04 
COGTA Score [3] .774 20  .049 3  .141 5  .286 2  4.1 0.02 
COGTA Score [4] .591 11  .630 16  .804 22  .142 1  9.4 0.01 
Note:  Occ = Occurrence, PO = Proportional occurrence, GP = General propensity 
p = probability value, RFE = Recursive Feature Elimination, VIF = Variance Inflation Factor 
HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL = Not 
speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
Highlights to aid identification of fourteen best RFE ranked features (blue) and highest VIF scores (red) 
 
 
Features therefore had to pass a two-stage test for retention. First, each feature had to merit inclusion 
based on either a high level of marginal significance (i.e., a p-value below 0.001) or high RFE rank 
(highlighted in blue, above). Second, features had to justify not being removed due to high collinearity, 
as evidenced in a high VIF score, or by presenting an eigenvalue below 0.01. Where a feature with a 
high VIF score (e.g., Dependency Ratio) was included, similar features (e.g., Mean Age and % Youth) 




In addition, some features were included not on the strength of performance, but of theory182 – Change 
in Population, Percentage white, and Percentage NSL did not yield significant results (itself a finding), 
but were retained despite not being highlighted by the Occurrence model RFE-process; it is fortuitous 
that none violated the collinearity warnings. For Community protest models, I added Households 
without water, and for Labour-related protest, % Male. Below I list the selections for each of the 
families.  
 
Table 7.6: Presentation of selected features for Occurrence, Proportional occurrence, General propensity and 
Tumult models 
 Occ.  Prop Occ.  Propensity  Tumult 
   All Com Lab  All Com Lab   
Change in population   X X X       
% Unemployed   X X X  X X X  X 
% Poor X           
Voter Turnout X  X  X  X  X   
Mean Age            
% Small Households X    X  X X X  X 
% Youth           X 
Dependency Ratio X  X X X  X X X   
% White X       X    
% HWW X   X   X    X 
R-P Ratio   X  X  X X X   
Gini X  X X X  X X X   
% PWM     X  X  X   
% NSL    X        
% Tribal    X X      X 
% Male X  X  X  X     
% Informal   X     X   X 
% Rural    X    X X  X 
AG Rating [2] X  X X X  X X X  X 
AG Rating [3] X  X  X  X X X  X 
AG Rating [4] X  X X X  X  X  X 
AG Rating [5] X  X X X  X X   X 
COGTA Score [2]    X       X 
COGTA Score [3]   X X X  X X   X 
COGTA Score [4] X   X X   X X  X 
Note:  Occ = Occurrence, Prop Occ. = Proportional occurrence,  
Com = Community protest, Lab = Labour-related protest 
HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12),  
NSL = Not speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
 
                                               
182 Boschetti and Massaron note that eliminating all collinearity should not override theoretical concerns (2016: 
72). Field suggests that VIF scores below 10 remain acceptable, although only once the average of all VIF scores 




7.4 Statistical Regressions 
With the features identified, I fit a series of statistical (backwards elimination) regressions, iteratively 
removing all features with p-values above .5, then all features with p-values above .1, and finally, all 
non-significant features, until all features were significant. Below I present only the first and last 
regressions of each course.183 This method is controversial, but accepted in instances where the main 
desire is a prediction equation, and where the data includes a large number of observations (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2013: 133-5). 
7.4.1 Occurrence  
Confined to the selected features, the transformed count of protest per municipality presented the 
following: 
 
Table 7.7: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Protest Occurrence for South African municipalities, 
1997-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 4.21 0.32 
  % Poor 0.31*** 0.08 
  Voter Turnout -0.30*** 0.06 
  % Small Households -0.39*** 0.10 
  Dependency Ratio -0.82*** 0.19 
  % White -0.21* 0.10 
  % HWW 0.28* 0.12 
  Gini 0.54*** 0.10 
  % PWM -0.54*** 0.14 
  % Male -0.26* 0.11 
  AG Rating [2] 0.63* 0.33 
  AG Rating [3] 0.73* 0.35 
  AG Rating [4] 0.79 0.50 
  AG Rating [5] 0.83* 0.34 
  COGTA Score [4] -0.26 0.22 
  Adj. R-squared: 0.634  
Model 5 J SE 
  Intercept 4.85 0.05 
  % Poor 0.39*** 0.07 
  Voter Turnout -0.30*** 0.06 
  % Small Households -0.36*** 0.10 
  Dependency Ratio -0.72*** 0.17 
  % White -0.26** 0.10 
  Gini 0.58*** 0.10 
  % PWM -0.48*** 0.13 
  % Male -0.23* 0.11 
  Adj. R-squared: 0.628  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J. 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
HWW = Households without water, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), AG = Auditor-General, 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
                                               





Apropos Occurrence Model 5, the results of the multiple linear regression indicated that there was a 
collective significant effect between the features and the natural log of count of protest per municipality, 
(F(8, 225) = 50.11, p < .001, R2 = .641, Adjusted R2 = .628). The individual features indicated that % 
poor, Voter Turnout, % Small Households, Dependency Ratio, % without grade 12, % white, Gini 
coefficient, and % males were significant predictors in the model. 
 
Loosely, one may say that an increase in the Occurrence of protest is associated with higher poverty, 
less voting, fewer small households, a lower dependency ratio, fewer whites, higher inequality, more 
people with Matric, and fewer males. Model 5 is presented with standardised coefficients, but 
unstandardised coefficients can be exponentiated to give the geometric mean of each of the features, 
when the variance explained by all the other features in the model is controlled for.184 Benoit (2011), 
recalling the Taylor expansion of $K, notes that, for small changes in features, one can approximate log-
linear feature coefficients as the expected percentage change in y for incremental unit changes in x, 
using unstandardised coefficients, where %∆y ≈ 100.β  Table 7.8 presents this, as a simplified 
interpretation of Table 7.7 Model 5’s coefficients.  
 
Table 7.8: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of protest Occurrence per municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point Poverty 9 
1% point Voter Turnout -7 
1%185 pt  Gini Coefficient 15 
1 unit Dependency ratio -11 
1% point Proportion of males -10 
1% point People with Matric -6 
1% point Small households -5 
1% point Proportion of whites -4 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
Lastly, I also checked whether adding a dummy variable for the official (binary) classification of urban 
(“metro” or “secondary city”) or rural (the balance), or dummy variables for provinces, had significant 










                                               
184 One can equally formulate that on a 1 unit increase in an independent variable, for example a one per cent 
increase in percentage poor, the percentage change in outcome is given by 100*(eβ-1), where β is the 
unstandardised multivariable regression coefficient of the independent variable.  




Table 7.9: Results of a log-linear regression with dummy variables for “urban” and “province” added, for Protest 
Occurrence in South African municipalities, 1997-2013.  
 J SE 
Intercept 4.94 0.15 
% Poor 0.15 0.08 
Voter Turnout -0.01 0.08 
% Small Households -0.29** 0.10 
Dependency Ratio -0.39* 0.18 
% White -0.54*** 0.12 
Gini 0.31** 0.10 
% PWM -0.77*** 0.16 
% Male -0.20 0.12 
Urban dummy  0.58* 0.23 
Free State 0.19 0.22 
Gauteng 0.36 0.34 
KZN -0.91*** 0.21 
Limpopo 0.09 0.23 
Mpumalanga -0.51* 0.25 
Northern Cape -0.50* 0.22 
North West 0.89** 0.26 
Western Cape 0.26 0.27 
Adj. R-squared: .691  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12) 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
From Table 7.9, we see that the addition of province and urban dummies reduces the effect sizes, and 
renders Poverty, Voter Turnout, and % Male not significant – ostensibly due to these features also 
varying by province and geographic type. One notes that municipalities classified as urban do, indeed, 
have more Occurrences of protest. The North West has significantly more incidents, and KZN, 





Model 5 did not present features with VIF scores above 10, and had a condition number of 8.54, 
suggesting the feature reduction strategy was successful in removing collinearity.  
 
An inspection of residuals suggests that predicting the log of the count of all types of protests over all 
years returns acceptable results. We find that the symmetry of residuals is close to zero, with kurtosis 
high but acceptable. The White and Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity of residuals returned a 







Figure 7.10: Residual plot of Occurrence Model 5 
 




Figure 7.11: Histogram of residuals of Occurrence Model 5 
 
Thirdly, a Probability-Probability plot186 shows that, with the exception of low and high outliers, the 
assumption of normally distributed residuals bears out.  
 
 
Figure 7.12: P-P Plot of residuals of Occurrence Model 5 
 
Based on the Figures above, one can be satisfied that the model presents unbiased estimates. 
 
                                               
186 Which illustrates how closely empirical and theoretical measures of residuals are aligned. 
 
 155 
7.4.2  Proportional occurrence  
The second family of tests were applied to Proportional occurrence models, that is, the measure 
considering counts of protest per capita. These models represented an improvement on Occurrence 
models, both methodologically, and with regard to analytical insights.  
 
a) Proportional occurrence: considering all types of protests  
 
Using the selected features, I fit a regression on the natural logarithm of Proportional occurrence of 
protests between 2009 and 2013.187 Below follow the results from the statistical multiple regressions. 
 
 
Table 7.10: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Proportional occurrence of protest for South African 
municipalities, 2009-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 2.15 0.26 
  Change in population 0.15* 0.07 
  % Unemployed 0.23* 0.11 
  Voter Turnout -0.19*** 0.05 
  Dependency Ratio -0.52*** 0.13 
  R-P Ratio -0.20* 0.07 
  Gini 0.21* 0.07 
  % Male -0.15 0.08 
  % Rural -0.39*** 0.09 
  AG Rating [2] 0.27 0.27 
  AG Rating [3] 0.25 0.28 
  AG Rating [4] 0.44 0.41 
  AG Rating [5] 0.38 0.27 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.28* 0.11 
  Adj. R-squared: .452  
Model 5 J SE 
  Intercept 2.45 0.05 
  Voter Turnout -0.17** 0.05 
  Dependency Ratio -0.30** 0.09 
  R-P Ratio -0.17* 0.07 
  Gini 0.28*** 0.07 
  % Rural -0.30*** 0.07 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.25* 0.11 
  Adj. R-squared: .441  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model. 
R-P = Rich-poor ratio, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs. 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively. 
 
                                               
187 As discussed, the reader should note that, having elected to base per capita calculations of the municipal 
population counts from the most recent National Census (2011), I elected to centre the data on that year, and 




Noting Proportional occurrence Model 5, the results of the multiple linear regression indicated that 
there was a collective significant effect between the features and the natural log of count of protest per 
municipality per capita, (F(6, 227) = 31.67, p < .001, R2 = .456, Adjusted R2 = .441). The individual 
features indicated that Voter Turnout, Dependency Ratio, Rich-Poor Ratio, the Gini coefficient, and the 
third level of COGTA Scores were significant predictors in the model. 
 
One may say that an increase in the Proportional occurrence of protest is associated with less voting, 
a lower dependency ratio, a lower rich-poor ratio, higher Gini inequality, more urban households, and 
poorer governance. By exponentiating the unstandardised coefficients, one can report the log-linear 
feature coefficients as percentage change in Proportional occurrence for unit changes in features, as 
displayed below.  
 
Table 7.11: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of Proportional occurrence of protest per 
municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point Voter Turnout  -4 
1 unit Dependency Ratio -4 
1 unit R-P Ratio -1 
1% point  Gini 7 
1 % point % Rural -1 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA Score [3] 25 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
R-P = Rich-poor ratio 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
Despite the significance of the % Rural feature, the urban dummy variable was not significant, and 
reduced the overall model R2. However, certain provinces showed a higher Proportional occurrence.  
 
Table 7.12: Results of a regression with dummy variables for “province” added, from Proportional occurrence of 
protest for South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
 J SE 
Intercept 2.35 0.11 
Voter Turnout 0.06 0.07 
Dependency Ratio -0.25** 0.09 
R-P Ratio -0.17* 0.07 
Gini 0.25** 0.07 
% Rural -0.19* 0.09 
COGTA Score [3] 0.26* 0.11 
Free State 0.29 0.19 
Gauteng -0.04 0.27 
KZN -0.29 0.15 
Limpopo 0.32 0.19 
Mpumalanga -0.47* 0.20 
Northern Cape 0.37* 0.18 
North West 0.73*** 0.21 
Western Cape 0.40* 0.20 
Adj. R-squared: .500  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor ratio, COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 




Reiterating the findings from Chapter 6, Table 7.12 shows that the North West, Northern Cape and 
Western Cape have higher Proportional occurrence of protest, with Mpumalanga displaying 
significantly less, relative to the reference category. As with Occurrence, Voter Turnout is negated by 
the province dummies.  
 
 
Proportional occurrence of community protests 
 
The bulk of Community protest, generally understood as protests about political participation, the 
representation of common needs, the perceived accountability of local political representatives, and the 
provision and maintenance of public goods and services, occur in municipalities that constitute South 
Africa’s urban centres.  
 
Recognising differences between the distribution of protest in general, Community protests, and 
Labour-related protests (explained and visualised in Section 6.4), I assumed the most significant 
predictors of the two sub-types of protest will, to some degree, vary. I thus created two subsets as 
subcategories of Proportional occurrence models.  
 
 
Figure 7.13: Choropleth map for community protest per capita, South Africa (2009-2013) 
 
Figure 7.13 helps to illuminate that, notwithstanding its urban count, Proportional occurrence of 
community protests does not appear in the urban centres. To test the influence of socio-economic and 
other proxies in predicting this, I fit a stepwise multiple regression predicting Proportional occurrence 





Table 7.13: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Proportional occurrence of community protest for South 
African municipalities, 2009-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 4.22 0.25 
  Change in population 0.21* 0.09 
  % Unemployed 0.25 0.14 
  Dependency Ratio -0.56** 0.16 
  % HWW -0.18 0.16 
  Gini -0.06 0.09 
  % NSL -0.13 0.09 
  % Tribal 0.29 0.32 
  % Rural -0.54 0.38 
  AG Rating [2] 0.09 0.18 
  AG Rating [4] 0.75 0.43 
  AG Rating [5] 0.33* 0.17 
  COGTA Score [2] 0.22 0.20 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.68* 0.26 
  COGTA Score [4] 0.63 0.40 
  Adj. R-squared: .273  
Model 5 J SE 
  Intercept 4.56 0.08 
  Dependency Ratio -0.33** 0.10 
  % Rural -0.20* 0.10 
  AG Rating [5] 0.32* 0.13 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.31* 0.14 
  Adj. R-squared: .257  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 222 for each model 
HWW = Households without water, NSL = Not speaking a South African language as home language,  
AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
Proportional occurrence of community protest Model 5 reports the results of the multiple linear 
regression, which indicated that there was a collective significant effect between the features and the 
natural log of count of community protest per capita per municipality (F(4, 217) = 20.11, p < .001, R2 
= .270, Adjusted R2 = .257). The individual features indicated that the Dependency Ratio, the % of rural 
households, the fifth level of the AG Rating and the third level of COGTA Scores were significant 
predictors in the model. 
 
Thus, an increase in the Proportional occurrence of community protest is associated with a lower 
dependency ratio, more urban households, and poor governance. Table 7.14 converts the standardised 
coefficients back to unstandardised coefficients, and exponentiates these to estimate the expected effect 









Table 7.14: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of Proportional occurrence of labour-
related protest per municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1 unit Dependency Ratio -5 
1% point % Rural -1 
From AG Rating 1  AG Rating [level 5] 32 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA Score [3] 31 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, AG = Auditor-General 
 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
While the addition of an “urban” dummy variable (corresponding to the classification of municipalities 
as either “metro”/“secondary city” or not) neither presented a significant coefficient, nor improved the 
model R2, the addition of dummy features for provinces presented a reportable finding. 
 
 
Table 7.15: Results of a log-linear regression, with dummy variables for “province”, of Proportional occurrence 
of community protest for South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
 J SE 
Intercept 4.35 0.17 
Dependency Ratio -0.25* 0.11 
% Rural -0.15 0.12 
AG Rating [5] -0.06 0.15 
COGTA Score [3] 0.28* 0.14 
Free State 0.73** 0.27 
Gauteng 0.13 0.35 
KZN -0.09 0.21 
Limpopo 0.50* 0.24 
Mpumalanga 0.51 0.26 
Northern Cape 0.73** 0.25 
North West 1.07*** 0.27 
Western Cape 0.44 0.26 
Adj. R-squared: .319  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
Table 7.15 confirms that governance (as measured by the AG Rating) and % Rural vary by province. 
The North West, Free State, and Northern Cape have a measurably higher Proportional occurrence of 
community protest, while the proportion in KZN is significantly lower than the reference category. 
 
 
Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests 
 
Counts of labour protest are concentrated around urban metropoles, but mapping Labour-related protest 
per capita reveals that neither Cape Town, eThekwini (Durban), nor Johannesburg are placed in the 
highest category of labour protests per capita. Instead, as Figure 7.14 reveals, the iron, platinum, 
chrome, and diamond mining areas near the country’s northern border, and the manufacturing sites at 
the southern coastal ports generally see proportionally more protests than, for example, Johannesburg 





Figure 7.14: Choropleth map of South Africa depicting labour-related protests per capita (2009-2013) 
 
To investigate Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests, I fit a stepwise regression, 
summated in Table 7.16. 
 
 
Table 7.16: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest for 
South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 3.97 0.63 
  Change in population 0.31* 0.16 
  % Unemployed 0.43 0.25 
  Voter Turnout -0.23 0.13 
  % Small Households -0.18 0.18 
  Dependency Ratio -0.77* 0.38 
  R-P Ratio -0.56** 0.19 
  Gini 0.42* 0.18 
  % PWM -0.60* 0.29 
  % Tribal 0.42* 0.21 
  % Male 0.05 0.22 
  AG Rating [2] 0.37 0.63 
  AG Rating [3] 0.29 0.65 
  AG Rating [4] 0.66 0.95 
  AG Rating [5] 0.36 0.63 
  COGTA Score [3] -0.29 0.34 
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  COGTA Score [4] -0.79 0.53 
  Adj. R-squared: .293  
Model 5 J SE 
  Intercept 4.05 0.10 
  Change in population 0.35* 0.14 
  % Unemployed 0.49* 0.21 
  Voter Turnout -0.30* 0.12 
  Dependency Ratio -0.59* 0.26 
  R-P Ratio -0.64*** 0.18 
  Gini 0.39* 0.17 
  % PWM -0.81** 0.25 
  Adj. R-squared: .301  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), HWW = Households without water, NSL = Not 
speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
Considering Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest Model 5, the results of the multiple 
linear regression indicated that there was a collective significant effect between the features and the 
natural log of the count of labour-related protest per municipality per capita, (F(7, 226) = 15.32, p < 
.001, R2 = .322, Adjusted R2 = .301). The individual features indicated that Change in population, % 
Unemployment, Voter Turnout, the Dependency Ratio, the Rich-Poor Ratio, Gini inequality, and % of 
People with Matric were significant predictors in the model. 
 
In simple terms, an increase in the Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest is associated with 
a recent influx of people (to the municipality), higher unemployment, less voting, a lower dependency 
ratio, a lower rich-poor ratio, more inequality, and a more educated populace.   
 
It is notable that Change in population did not have an effect in Proportional occurrence of community 
protest (as predicted by theories of resource pressure), but appears in this measure of Labour-related 
protest, where it may serve to highlight a recent influx of labour-seekers and increased job competition.  
 
Table 7.17 converts the coefficients to interpretable metrics.  
 
Table 7.17: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of Proportional occurrence of labour-
related protest per municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point Change in population 2 
1% point % Unemployed 3 
1% point Voter Turnout -7 
1 unit Dependency Ratio -9 
1 unit R-P Ratio -5 
1% point Gini 10 
1% point % PWM -11 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 








Additional dummy variables 
 
Table 7.18 shows that adding dummy variables for “province” confirms patterns identified in Chapter 
6: provinces associated with mining (Limpopo, the North West, and the Northern Cape) were 
significantly associated with Labour-related protests.    
 
 
Table 7.18: Results of a log-linear regression of Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest with dummy 
variables for “province” for South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
 J SE 
Intercept 3.41 0.27 
Change in population 0.15 0.16 
% Unemployed 0.50* 0.23 
Voter Turnout 0.16 0.16 
Dependency Ratio -0.43 0.29 
R-P Ratio -0.48* 0.20 
Gini 0.27 0.19 
% PWM -0.78** 0.29 
Free State 0.50 0.45 
Gauteng 0.29 0.64 
KZN -0.01 0.38 
Limpopo 1.69*** 0.46 
Mpumalanga 0.27 0.48 
Northern Cape 1.05* 0.41 
North West 2.02*** 0.48 
Western Cape 0.93 0.51 
Adj. R-squared: .354  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), HWW = Households without water 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
The addition of “province” also diminishes the significance of Change in population, Voter Turnout, 
the Dependency Ratio, and Gini inequality. The addition of a dummy of “urban” did not improve the 
model, and did not itself return a significant coefficient.  
 
7.4.3 General propensity 
Turning now to the General propensity to protest, I consider a target metric of the number of protesters 
per capita. I begin with models incorporating all types of protest.  
 











Table 7.19: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of General propensity for protest within South African 
municipalities, 2009-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 4.13 0.60 
  % Unemployed 0.72** 0.24 
  Voter Turnout -0.48*** 0.12 
  % Small Households -0.36* 0.18 
  Dependency Ratio -1.62*** 0.37 
  % HWW 0.42* 0.19 
  R-P Ratio -0.44* 0.18 
  Gini 0.83*** 0.18 
  % PWM -0.96** 0.28 
  % Male -0.33 0.21 
  AG Rating [2] 0.65 0.62 
  AG Rating [3] 0.76 0.64 
  AG Rating [4] 1.27 0.94 
  AG Rating [5] 0.97 0.63 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.59* 0.25 
  Adj. R-squared: .497  
Model 4 J SE 
  Intercept 4.92 0.12 
  % Unemployed 1.00*** 0.21 
  Voter Turnout -0.55*** 0.12 
  Dependency Ratio -0.91** 0.27 
  R-P Ratio -0.41* 0.18 
  Gini 0.85*** 0.18 
  % PWM -1.03*** 0.25 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.54* 0.25 
  Adj. R-squared: .484  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL = Not 
speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
Model 4 in Table 7.19 is the subsequent formulation of General propensity for protest. The results of 
the multiple linear regression indicated that there was a collective significant effect between the features 
and the natural logarithm of the product of count of protest per municipality and average municipal 
crowd size, divided by municipal population. The model outcomes were (F(7, 226) = 32.23, p < .001, 
R2 = .5001, Adjusted R2 = .484), with individual features indicating that % Unemployed, Voter Turnout, 
the Rich-Poor Ratio, the Dependency Ratio, Gini inequality, % of people without Matric, and the third 
level of COGTA Scores were significant predictors in the model. 
 
In common demotic, the General propensity for protest is associated with increased unemployment, 
lower voting, a higher dependency ratio, a lower rich-poor ratio, higher Gini inequality, more people 
with Matric, and poorer governance – in each case when the variance explained by all the other features 






Table 7.20: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of General propensity for protest per 
municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point % Unemployed 7 
1% point Voter Turnout -12 
1 unit  Dependency Ratio -14 
1 unit R-P Ratio -3 
1% point Gini 22 
1% point % PWM -14 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA Score [3] 54 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), COGTA = Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs 
 
While univariate regressions by themselves only reveal potential multivariate associations, Figure 7.15 
below confirms that some of the significant features, when presented as univariate regressions against 










Additional dummy variables 
 
Dummy features for “urban” and “province” returned significant feature coefficients and increased the 
model R2 (in both cases). Table 7.21 combines these. 
 
 
Table 7.21: Results of a log-linear regression, with dummy variables for “urban” and “province”, of General 
propensity for protest within South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
 J SE 
Intercept 4.59 0.29 
% Unemployed 0.85*** 0.24 
Voter Turnout -0.08 0.16 
Dependency Ratio -0.55 0.29 
R-P Ratio -0.41* 0.20 
Gini 0.45* 0.20 
% PWM -1.07*** 0.30 
COGTA Score [3] 0.51* 0.25 
Urban [1] 1.03* 0.45 
Free State 0.75 0.45 
Gauteng 0.31 0.66 
KZN -0.70 0.39 
Limpopo 1.12* 0.47 
Mpumalanga -0.24 0.49 
Northern Cape 0.00 0.42 
North West 1.65** 0.48 
Western Cape 0.63 0.52 
Adj. R-squared: .528  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12),  
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
As seen above, the North West and Limpopo provinces return higher propensities for protest, as do 
municipalities classified as “metro” or “secondary cities”. Once more, Voter Turnout and Dependency 
Ratio loses significance upon inclusion of province, while, notably, in this instance, Gini inequality 
remains significant.   
 
 
a) Propensity for community protest 
 
To investigate the Propensity for community protest among municipalities, I fit a series of statistical 









Table 7.22: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Propensity for community protest within South African 
municipalities, 1997-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 3.81 0.37 
  % Unemployed 0.69*** 0.18 
  % Small Households -0.33* 0.13 
  Dependency Ratio -0.75*** 0.21 
  % White 0.24 0.16 
  R-P Ratio -0.25 0.14 
  Gini 0.29* 0.13 
  % Informal 0.18* 0.09 
  % Rural -0.54** 0.17 
  AG Rating [2] -0.25 0.37 
  AG Rating [3] -0.43 0.39 
  AG Rating [5] -0.33 0.37 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.78** 0.26 
  COGTA Score [4] 0.45 0.40 
  Adj. R-squared: .232  
Model 3 J SE 
  Intercept 3.67 0.09 
  % Unemployed 0.68*** 0.17 
  % Small Households -0.28* 0.13 
  Dependency Ratio -0.60** 0.20 
  Gini 0.22* 0.11 
  % Informal 0.19* 0.09 
  % Rural -0.54*** 0.14 
  COGTA Score [3] 0.56** 0.19 
  Adj. R-squared: .230  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor, AG = Auditor-General,  
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
Propensity for community protest Model 3, above, reports the results of a multiple linear regression. 
This indicated that there was a collective significant effect between the features and the natural 
logarithm of the product of community protests per capita and average municipal crowd sizes at 
protests, (F(7, 226) = 10.94, p < .001, R2 = .253, Adjusted R2 = .230). The individual features indicated 
that % Unemployed, % Small Households, the Dependency Ratio, the municipal Gini, % Informal, % 
Rural, and the third level of the COGTA Score were significant predictors in the model. 
  
One may thus abridge Table 7.23 to indicate that an increase in the Propensity for community protest 
is associated with more unemployed, fewer small households, a lower dependency ratio, more Gini 
inequality, more informal households, more urban households, and poorer governance at the municipal 







Table 7.23: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values on Propensity for community protest per 
municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point % Unemployed 5 
1% point % Small Households -4 
1 unit  Dependency Ratio -9 
1% point Gini 5 
1% point % Informal 4 
1% point % Rural -1 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA Score [3] 56 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
Adding a dummy variable for “urban” did not improve the R2 score; nor was the feature significant. 
However, one could improve the model’s Adjusted R2 score to .256 by adding provincial dummy 
features. However, none of the features themselves were significant.  
 
 
b) Propensity for labour-related protest 
 
The Propensity for labour-related protest among South African municipalities for 1997-2013 was 
calculated in a statistical regression, summarised below. 
 
 
Table 7.24: Results of statistical log-linear regressions of Propensity for labour-related protest within South 
African municipalities, 1997-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 3.20 0.17 
  % Unemployed 0.33 0.23 
  Voter Turnout -0.30* 0.12 
  % Small Households -0.39* 0.16 
  Dependency Ratio -1.29*** 0.28 
  R-P Ratio -0.41* 0.17 
  Gini 0.36* 0.17 
  % PWM -0.42 0.25 
  % Rural 0.40* 0.19 
  AG Rating [2] 0.16 0.25 
  AG Rating [3] 0.17 0.28 
  AG Rating [4] -0.08 0.68 
  COGTA Score [4] -0.26 0.38 
  Adj. R-squared: .275  
Model 4 J SE 
  Intercept 3.23 0.10 
  Voter Turnout -0.25* 0.11 
  % Small Households -0.44** 0.16 
  Dependency Ratio -1.14*** 0.25 
  R-P Ratio -0.46** 0.16 
  Gini 0.36* 0.16 
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  % PWM -0.50* 0.24 
  % Rural 0.49** 0.16 
  Adj. R-squared: .283  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), AG = Auditor-General,  
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
Model 4, above, tables the results of the multiple linear regression, and indicated that there was a 
collective significant effect between the features and the natural log of community protest per capita 
multiplied by average municipal crowd size (F(7, 226) = 14.11, p < .001, R2 = .304, Adjusted R2 = 
.283). The individual features indicated that Voter Turnout, % Small Households, the Dependency 
Ratio, the Rich-Poor Ratio, the Gini coefficient, % People without Matric, and % Rural were significant 
predictors in the model. 
 
In essence, an increase in the Propensity for labour-related protest, measured at the municipal level, is 
associated with a lower voting turnout, fewer small households, a lower dependency ratio, a lower rich-
poor ratio, more inequality, more people with Matric, and more rural households. Below, the expected 
percentage change in Propensity for labour-related protest is tabled for various incremental changes in 
each of the significant features. 
  
 
Table 7.25: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of Propensity for labour-related protest 
per municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point Voter Turnout -6 
1% point % Small Households -6 
1 unit  Dependency Ratio -17 
1 unit R-P Ratio -4 
1% point Gini 9 
1% point % PWM -7 
1% point % Rural 1 
Note: Estimates of effects rounded to nearest full percentage 
R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12) 
 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
Adding a dummy variable for “urban” did not improve the R2 score; nor was the feature significant. 
However, one could improve the model’s Adjusted R2 score to .292 by adding provincial dummy 
features. However, none of the features themselves were significant.  
 
 
7.4.4 Tumult  
To see whether protest-associated levels of Tumult – framed within municipalities and placed on a 
spectrum ranging from orderly protests to violent (transformed into a continuous score [see Chapter 
5.5.2]) – can be predicted using socio-economic and demographic factors, one could consider an OLS 
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pregression redicting Tumult (as explained above in 7.2.2). Another approach might be to consider the 
product of Tumult and the count of protests as a target.188  
 
For the present purposes, I only present tumult levels, fitted using OLS regressions. Note that the 
presented model has the lowest R2 of the families, and, unlike other families’ final models, failed both 
the White and Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity of residuals – suggesting that important 
predictive elements lie outside the set of features considered in this thesis. 
 




Table 7.26: Results of statistical regressions of Protest Tumult for South African municipalities, 2009-2013 
Model 1 J SE 
  Intercept 0.60 0.09 
  % Unemployed 0.05 0.03 
  % Small Households -0.03 0.02 
  % Youth 0.03 0.02 
  % HWW 0.05 0.04 
  % Tribal 0.05 0.10 
  % Informal 0.04* 0.02 
  % Rural -0.14 0.11 
  AG Rating [2] 0.07 0.09 
  AG Rating [3] 0.04 0.09 
  AG Rating [4] 0.03 0.13 
  AG Rating [5] 0.07 0.09 
  COGTA Score [2] -0.11* 0.05 
  COGTA Score [3] -0.10 0.06 
  COGTA Score [4] -0.20* 0.09 
  Adj. R-squared: .117  
Model 6 J SE 
  Intercept 0.64 0.028 
  % Informal 0.04* 0.015 
  COGTA Score [2] -0.09* 0.040 
  COGTA Score [3] -0.09* 0.041 
  COGTA Score [4] -0.17*** 0.042 
  Adj. R-squared: .120  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
HWW = Households without water, AG = Auditor-General,  
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
                                               
188 This target could be justified by the nature of the Tumult calculation, which implies that municipalities with 
few protest events (e.g., <5), all of which were violent, will return a Tumult score of 1, whereas a municipality 
with, say, 1 000 protest events, 200 of which are violent, will return a Tumult score as low as 0.2, if the remaining 
800 are orderly. Thus, one may argue that, when talking about whether a municipality should be described as 
“tumultuous”, the degree of disorderliness and the number of protests matter. 
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Reporting Model 6, in Table 7.26, above: the results of the multiple linear regression indicated that 
there was a collective significant effect between the features and the measure of Tumult per 
municipality, (F(4, 229) = 8.93, p < .001, R2 = .135, Adjusted R2 = .120). The individual features 
indicated that % Informal, and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th levels of COGTA Scores were significant predictors 
in the model. 
 
Put plainly, increased Tumult in municipalities is associated with higher informality on the one hand, 
and by better governance ratings on the other. Table 7.27 expresses this as percentage change in Tumult, 
notwithstanding the artificial nature of the metric. 
 
 
Table 7.27: Effect of incremental change in features on expected values of Tumult per municipality 
Change Feature  Effect on protest (% change)  
1% point % Informal 1 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA [2] -9 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA [3] -9 
From COGTA Score 1 COGTA [4] -17 
 
 
Additional dummy variables 
 
The addition of a dummy variable for “urban” did not improve the model R2, and did not return a 
significant coefficient. However, adding province dummy variables proved insightful. Acknowledging 
all the aforementioned caveats regarding provinces, one nonetheless saw that several provinces 
contained influential factors in predicting protest, as listed in Table 7.28. 
 
 
Table 7.28: Results of a regressions, with dummy variables for “province”, of Protest Tumult for South African 
municipalities, 2009-2013 
 J SE 
Intercept 0.48 0.05 
% Informal 0.05** 0.02 
COGTA Score [2] -0.10* 0.04 
COGTA Score [3] -0.06 0.05 
COGTA Score [4] -0.03 0.05 
Free State 0.27*** 0.06 
Gauteng 0.15 0.08 
KZN 0.05 0.04 
Limpopo 0.02 0.05 
Mpumalanga 0.30*** 0.06 
Northern Cape 0.27*** 0.05 
North West 0.13* 0.06 
Western Cape 0.19** 0.06 
Adj. R-squared: .262  
Note: J = Standardised coefficient, SE = Standard Error of J 
Number of observations: 234 for each model 
COGTA = Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
*, **, *** indicates significance above the 95%, 99% and 99.9% levels, respectively 
 
 
The Free State, Mpumalanga, the Northern Cape, the North West, and the Western Cape all presented 
significant positive relationships (vis-à-vis the Eastern Cape, the reference category) in predicting 
protest. Including province also yielded a model coefficient of determination of .262, a notably higher 
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R2 than other Tumult models. The percentage of households that are informal maintained significance, 
in support of theories that informality is a strong catalyst for disruptive and violent protests. The tumult-




This chapter developed and executed a strategy to analyse the MSG-set. I argued that the most even-
handed way to approach diverse claims about animators of protests is to be generous in allowing for 
several understandings of “what is to be predicted”. As such, I proposed four ways in which protest 
might be metricised, each method labelled as a separate “family”.  
 
I reported a multiphase process wherein I fit exploratory regressions, summated my exploration of 
targets and features, justified the selection of regression types, set out a strategy for feature selection, 
and fit statistical (stepwise) regressions in order to reveal the dynamics of the various features in 
predicting the respective targets.   
 
Table 7.29 combines the findings of each of the statistical regressions, presenting the standardised 
coefficients of significant features only. This same table is repeated in the next chapter, showing effect 








































Table 7.29: Summary of regression models 
 1. 2. 2.(c) 2.(l) 3. 3.(c) 3.(l) 4. 
Change in population    0.35*     
% Unemployed    0.49* 1.00*** 0.68***   
% Poor 0.39***        
Voter Turnout -0.30*** -0.17**  -0.30* -0.55***  -0.25*  
Mean Age         
% Small Households -0.36***     -0.28* -0.44**  
% Youth         
Dependency Ratio -0.72*** -0.30** -0.33** -0.59* -0.91** -0.60** -1.14***  
% White -0.27**        
% HWW         
R-P Ratio  -0.17*  -0.64*** -0.41*  -0.46**  
Gini 0.58*** 0.28***  0.39* 0.85*** 0.22* 0.36*  
% PWM -0.49***   -0.81** -1.03***  -0.50*  
% NSL         
% Tribal         
% Male -0.23*        
% Informal      0.19*  0.04* 
% Rural  -0.30*** -0.20*   -0.54*** 0.49**  
AG Rating [2]         
AG Rating [3]         
AG Rating [4]         
AG Rating [5]   0.32*      
COGTA Score [2]        -0.09* 
COGTA Score [3]  0.25* 0.31*  0.54* 0.56**  -0.09* 
COGTA Score [4]        -0.17*** 
Adjusted R2 .628 .441 .257 .301 .484 .230 .283 .120 
Urban dummy effect         
Province dummies effect         
Note: 1. = Occurrence, 2. = Proportional occurrence, 2.(c) = Proportional occurrence of community protest, 2.(l) 
= Proportional occurrence of labour-related protest, 3. = General propensity for protest, 3.(c) = Propensity for 
community protest, 3.(l) = Propensity for labour-related protest, 4. = Tumult of protest 
Highlights to aid identification of positive (green) and negative (red) standardised coefficients 
 
 
I found that the differences in targets resulted in different features being significant predictors, but that 
overall, a fairly uniform – even formulaic – pattern emerged. 
 
When predicting the Occurrence of protest, increased poverty and inequality, along with less 
participation in voting, a lower dependency ratio, and proportionally fewer whites, men, and small 
households were associated with higher counts. While this model returned the highest coefficient of 
determination,189 and also while Occurrence is probably the most commonly used metric (when 
scholars report, say, “an increase in protests”), I contended that this is not a particularly useful metric, 
since it ignores local population size, the number of participants, and the level of disruption. These vital 
omissions justified the remainder of the “families”.  
 
Proportional occurrence corrected for population size, and although the features explained less of the 
variance in the number of protests per capita, the findings generally conformed to the pattern set by 
                                               
189 Province and urban dummies could improve the model R2. 
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Occurrence. Higher inequality, poorer governance (as indicated by higher COGTA Scores), lower 
voting participation, a lower dependency ratio, a lower rich-poor ratio, and more urban households 
helped to predict Proportional occurrence. Dummies for province yielded an improved model R2. 
 
I explored disaggregating Proportional occurrence by type, and fit regressions on the Proportional 
occurrence of community protests and the Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests. For the 
Proportional occurrence of community protests, I found significant associations with poor governance 
and a lower dependency ratio. This model could explain a quarter of the variance in Proportional 
occurrence of community protests – acceptable for the complex landscape of the social sciences, but 
much lower than the previous models. Dummies for province yielded an improved model R2. For the 
Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests, the significant predictors were changes in the 
municipal population, unemployment, and inequality (all positive associations), and voter turnout, the 
dependency ratio, the rich-poor ratio, and the proportion of people without Matric (all negative 
associations), again, not contradicting any of the findings of the other models. The labour model 
presented a higher R2 than its community-counterpart. Dummies for province yielded an improved 
model R2. 
 
Propensity models represented an improvement on Proportional occurrence by including the number 
of participants in the target. General propensity returned a substantially high R2 (.484), with findings 
largely consistent with previous models. Increased unemployment and inequality, poor governance, 
lower voting rates, and dependency ratios, as well as lower rich-poor ratios and fewer people without 
Matric were associated with General propensity.  
 
When considering the Propensity for community protests (as a subset of General propensity), the same 
dynamics as with Proportional occurrence of community protests emerged – a lower model R2, and 
associations with fewer rural households and poorer governance. However, additional features also 
emerged significant: unemployment, inequality, and informality (all positive associations), as well as 
small households and the dependency ratio (negative associations).  
 
Propensity for labour-related protests appeared akin to Proportional occurrence of labour-related 
protests, with a relatively high model R2, and increased inequality and more people with Matric 
increasing the propensity for protest. Meanwhile, less voting, a lower dependency ratio, a smaller rich-
poor ratio, and fewer small households, all bore negative associations. The only instance of a “sign 
reversing” came up in Propensity for labour-related protests, where % Rural was negatively associated 
with this measure, suggesting that labour-related protesters are more likely to live in rural households 
than urban households, all other things being equal. Of course, not only are farming communities 
predominantly classified as “rural”, but many mining activities take place outside of the metros, in 
municipalities characterised by rural and peri-urban communities; these include Rustenburg Local 
Municipality (mining platinum group metals, 37% rural), Greater Letaba LM (gold mining and 
quarrying, 87% rural), Madibeng LM (stone and granite quarrying, 61% rural), and Ndwedwe Local 
Municipality (kaolin mining, 95% rural).  
 
The last family, protest Tumult, was hard to predict, and I was not able to explain more than 10% of the 
variance based on the present features. In the model tested, informality was the most significant feature, 
with worse-faring municipalities (according to COGTA) presenting less tumultuous protests. Provinces, 
when added to the model, changed matters, and made for a more “predictive” model of Tumult, with an 
R2 of .262. Here, the Free State, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, the Northern Cape, the North West, and the 
Western Cape were all significantly more tumultuous than the Eastern Cape, which served as the 
reference category. It is also notable that all the other features – including the proportion of foreigners, 
levels of inequality, actual service levels (as indicated by water provision), and unemployment – were 
not predictive in any way of levels of tumult. Further research may consider the product of Tumult with 
count or protest per capita, or other improved formulations, considering perhaps a smaller investigative 




The provincial measures, interesting though they were, should not complicate the findings, nor lead one 
to inferences about culture and ethnicity. South Africa’s provinces act as aggregative proxies for many 
characteristics, such as poverty, inequality, and levels of households classified as tribal. To negate these 
qualities by adding a provincial feature to statistical models may add to the statistical explanatory power 
of models, as shown, but not necessarily to a holistic interpretation of animating, perhaps ‘dialectical’, 
forces.   
 
Finally, the non-significance of features was, in many instances, as noteworthy as significance. In light 
of the present analysis, one might shake off the spectre of claims about too many foreigners leading to 
protests, just as one might say, with some confidence, that inequality matters more than poverty in 
explaining protest.  
 
I end with four key findings. Firstly, that ‘what we talk about when we talk about protest’ really matters. 
If scholars writing about ‘an increase in protest’ have an increase in Occurrence in mind, this is 
markedly different to thinking about an increase in the General propensity to protest, and this has an 
effect, as we have seen, in the explanatory power of the local conditions that are claimed to influence 
protest. My second finding was, contrary to some writing, that protest can indeed be anticipated, to an 
impressive degree, at the municipal level in South Africa. Thirdly, at the municipal level, the General 
propensity for protest is a function of local inequality, unemployment, and voter participation – and 
armed with these three metrics, one can go some way towards predicting municipal protest (for the 
period of this study). Fourthly, I found that many of the hypothesised forces do not play a measurable 
role in explaining protest, at least at the municipal level of measurement.  
 
The next chapter will review the research endeavour, the above findings, and comment on the validity 
of each of the hypothesised claims.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Reviewing aim and objectives 
Protest is a large and quotidian phenomenon in South Africa, and perhaps the defining element of post-
apartheid political life. Though it is often depicted as a politically subversive undertaking, protest itself 
is not the malady, but the symptom of severe social distress.  
 
Moreover, for all its efforts, the state has not been able to stem the rising tide of uprisings, increasing 
in size and disruption. Nor has the academe converged on a position regarding the nature of ordinary 
people’s distress, the factors animating it, and how this foments, or explains, the extent and tumult of 
protest. This all implies a gap with regard to the causes and correlates of protest, translating into 
inaccurate or incomplete pronouncements on the nature of the phenomenon by scholars, bureaucrats 
and the media, cascading into suboptimal strategies and policies.  
 
Founded on the conviction that scholarly inquiry is not simply a technical task of providing answers, 
but also needs to show how the way we perceive a problem can be part of the problem, this thesis set 
out to evaluate the mechanisms behind the most common theories of protest. My primary aim was to 
comment on measurable local conditions which may or may not account for local levels of protest, 
using empirical analysis to introduce greater scientific rigour, and so shift the coordinates of the 
discourse on protest in South Africa. 
  
I identified five objectives that would enable me to reach this aim. My first objective was to clarify 
terms and concepts – framing what I and others understand protest to be and not to be, as well as 
delineating different types of protest. Chapter 2 oriented protest in relation to other direct political 
actions; located it as ‘politics by other means’; showed how protest requires both courage and 
coordination; and presented it as the emergent phenomenon of contingent constituent parts, chiefly: the 
accretion of grievances; a traumatic trigger event; and a set of gestures manifesting as tactics. Protest 
was defined as any popular mobilisation in support of a collective grievance, understood as gatherings 
intended to signal opposition to a perceived injustice. The actors, more than grievances, locations, or 
tactics, defined types of protest.  
 
Drawing on insights from the field of psychoanalysis, I also proposed thinking about the protest event, 
as recorded in protest databases, as a limited artefact capturing the real order, as opposed to the symbolic 
or imaginary.  
 
My second goal was to provide context for the theories and for the social conditions on which they 
comment. I did this by reviewing, briefly, the history of repression in South Africa, along with local 
traditions of protest. Despite notable globalising trends, protest remains embedded in local culture, and 
context is therefore essential when studying social acts. I also commented, supported by salient 
numbers, on how the everyday experience in post-apartheid South Africa has seen class apartheid and 
public service segregation outlive the demise of political shackles and the de facto extension of political 




My next objective was to identify diverse claims about catalysts – perhaps even causes – of protest, and 
bring them into commensurable formulations. To do this, I attempted to comb out the applicable skeins 
of certain aspects of sociology, development studies, demography, international relations, and political-
economic studies. Such varied disciplinary fields, scholarly methods, and ideological lenses required a 
broad reading to elicit claims. This kind of a collection could never be exhaustive, and it is likely that 
no representatives of any of the fields will feel completely satisfied with my formulations of their 
theories or predictions. I found that claims come in “clusters”, for example, that one scholar might 
demonstrate how a complex interplay between material inequality, penury, unemployment, 
landlessness, informal living, and poor municipal services explains an episode of protests in a given 
geographic setting. Often, perhaps due to the interrelated nature of these factors, and in the absence of 
data, theorists would be cautious to name one factor as more potent than others; however, this also gives 
such a formulation less explanatory power.  
 
While many of these clusters of grievances overlapped (among scholarly formulations), some were all 
but mutually exclusive, notably, the assertions that the lack of public services animates Community 
protest, vis-à-vis reports that the presence of “good” public services, amid “unrealistic” local 
expectations about better services, are the real drivers of grievances. I also saw a microcosm of the 
grievance versus greed debate play out, with scholars, however, to some degree unaware of each other, 
or at least deciding not to openly challenge each other’s claims. In all, I found that some of the 
suggestions made by different epistemic communities would require quite some ‘doublethink’ to 
reconcile. Even among mutually sympathetic views about protests and the forces animating them, I 
found disputes over the emancipatory potential of the hypothesised post-2004 wave of protests, along 
with disagreements about whether protests were, in fact, increasing towards a critical mass.  
 
I took advantage of the opportunity presented by the South African Police Service’s Incident 
Registration Information System dataset in considering empirically the problem of explaining South 
African protest – an opportunity heightened by the fact that it had not been fully studied so far. My next 
goal was to turn the data I had on hand into a usable dataset, so that I could build and test explanatory 
models. To do this, I demonstrated that the IRIS dataset – which may be the world’s largest publicly-
available set of its kind, assembled without newsworthiness criteria in mind – represented an 
improvement on other, primarily media-derived datasets. However, IRIS also presented several 
challenges, related to the inclusion of thousands of non-protest events, the inconsistent use of terms, 
poor labelling, poor location attribution, and a semi-structured “notes” feature. Based on IRIS, I created 
a keyword model and used this to select among machine learning algorithms to predict which incidents 
were protests, and the levels of tumult of these. Based on model performance, I elected a gradient 
boosted model, scoring the remainder of the 150 000 events. Having removed the non-protest events, I 
then categorised each observation as either Community, Labour-related, Health or Education, Police 
or Crime-related protest, or as a Destination protest. I allocated each record to one of the country’s 234 
municipalities, which permitted my building a dataset where, by using mean values of the variables, 
there were as many records as municipalities. This dataset could now include several conceptions of 
protest, on the one hand, and several socio-economic, demographic and governance metrics, drawn 
from official statistics and reporting at the municipal level, on the other.  
 
This process of building and testing models – especially examining the Keyword Model, and then 
familiarising myself with the machine-learned data – presented me with several insights about protest 




i. I found that South Africa saw more than 89 000 police-recorded protest events over the 17-year 
period from 1997 to 2013, implying an average of more than 14 protests per day. Protest 
incidence increases over this period, beginning at around 11.3, and ending at 21.6 per day. 
ii. While they present commensurate frequencies, I identified more Labour-related protest 
incidents than Community protest incidents. That said, the categories of Destination protest and 
Other also contain a materially large number of incidents, a closer study of which may reverse 
this apparent trend. 
iii. Each of South Africa’s 234 local/metropolitan municipalities hosted at least one protest event 
between 1997 and 2013 (the range is 2 to 6564 events). 
iv. The country experienced 1.3 million person-days of protest per year, on average, over the 
period I reviewed. One person participating in a protest is taken to indicate a person-day, and a 
protest lasting for five days is treated as five protest incidents. 
v. Grievances are complex190 and appear in clusters (e.g., police may comment that a particular 
protest intervention started because of local grievances over landlessness, forced demolitions 
of informal houses, poor water services, the lack of electricity, high levels of crime and high 
measures of unemployment throughout the area). However, protests generally appear to emerge 
in one of four categories, as identified by the main grievance or “issue”: these relate to 
municipal governance and services, labour, education or health, and police or crime. I found 
that keyword models performed unevenly when identifying ‘types’, e.g., civic actors tended to 
be easier to identify by using keyword flags than labour-related actors.  
vi. Patterns of protest differed across South Africa’s nine provinces. Municipalities within the 
same province tend to share certain characteristics, such as rainfall patterns, climate types or 
having deposits of certain minerals or precious metals. Local characteristics may translate into 
being attractive to commercial agriculture, or being the host to a chain of mines. In the latter 
case, this economic modality is typically attended by several additional factors, such as the 
effects of migrant labourers, the presence of a high percentage of males, or very high-income 
inequality, on the social landscape. To wit, the North West, a “mining province”, registered the 
most community actor-led protests, per capita, with the Free State and Northern Cape also 
featuring prominently. The Northern Cape also presented the most political-actor-led protests. 
Provinces are also subject to different political forces, including governing parties, which may 
have a bearing on governance and local willingness to protest. 
vii. Proportionally few protests were classified as “violent”. Using the three-way typology of 
labelling events as orderly, disruptive, or violent, the gradient boosted algorithm classified 9% 
of protests as violent. I found the vast majority of protests to be events involving ordinary 
people voicing their grievances in an orderly fashion. While it otherwise proved futile to seek 
patterns explaining varied levels of local tumult, the provincial lens highlighted notable trends, 
with some provinces (e.g., Mpumalanga) appearing on the whole much more tumultuous than, 
for example, neighbouring Limpopo. 
viii. The idea of the “Rebellion of the poor” is supported by the data – protests are large, common, 
and have increased in frequency over time. However, some of the claims around it may benefit 
from slight modification. There was an undeniable increase in protest over time, however, the 
data does not present a neat inflexion point. Levels of tumult do not increase significantly over 
the time reviewed, nor do crowd sizes present swingeing changes, instead increasing 
arithmetically.    
ix. There is quite a difference in the geographic patterns and findings in general, depending on 
how one “counts” protest, and thus in how one conceives of “an increase in protest”. Shifting 
                                               
190 Confirming McAdam and Paulsen (1993). 
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from counting the number of protests per municipality to counting protest per capita (per 
municipality), alters the national profile of protest from predominantly urban to rural – which 
can be illustrated through maps. In addition to this, a map representing “average crowd size” 
of protests (yet another way of thinking about the subject) displays larger crowd sizes in the 
more populous Eastern half of the country.       
 
 
My final objective was to build and test models that could lead me to verdicts about the explanatory 
power of the various theorised claims around protest. Point ix above helped me understand the 
importance of being generous, perhaps inclusive, when it came to formulating what it is that I was trying 
to explain. Instead of assuming that an increase in protest should necessarily and exclusively be, say, a 
numerical increase, I proposed four families of targets (or dependent variables), each the result of a 
slightly different conception of how protests should be depicted numerically. 
 
8.2 Families and models 
Guided by different formulations of enumerating protest in the aggregate, I proposed “families” of 
models, the best-performing models of which I discuss in turn, below. Table 8.1, reproduced from 
Chapter 7, summarises reportable coefficients within each model, here listed as the percentage change 
in the target variable based on a one-unit change in the feature. To recap, the log-linear regressions 
yielded feature coefficients that can be back-transformed (see formula in 7.4.1) to reveal the estimated 
change in percentage points on the average level of the target (controlling for the other features), as an 











































































































































































 Percentage change in target variable for unit change in feature  
Features         
  Change in population    2     
  % Unemployed     3 7 5   
  % Poor 9        
  Voter Turnout -7 -4  -7 -12  -6  
  Mean Age         
  % Small Households -5     -4 -6  
  % Youth         
  Dependency Ratio -11 -4 -5 -9 -14 -9 -17  
  % White -4        
  % HWW         
  R-P Ratio  -1  -5 -3  -4  
  Gini 15 7  10 22 5 9  
  % PWM -6   -11 -14  -7  
  % NSL         
  % Tribal         
  % Male -10        
  % Informal      4  1 
  % Rural  -1 -1   -1 1  
  AG Rating [2]         
  AG Rating [3]         
  AG Rating [4]         
  AG Rating [5]   32      
  COGTA Score [2]        -9 
  COGTA Score [3]  25 31  54 56  -9 
  COGTA Score [4]        -17 
  Adjusted R2 .628 .441 .257 .301 .484 .230 .283 .120 
Note: HWW = Households without water, R-P = Rich-poor, PWM = Population without matric (Grade 12), NSL 
= Not speaking a South African language as home language, AG = Auditor-General, COGTA = Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
Incremental changes: Dependency ratio and R-P Ratio = 1 unit, Gini = 0.01, AG Rating and  COGTA Score = 
change from reference category to reported level, rest of features = 1% 
Highlights to aid identification of positive (green) and negative (red) percentage changes; those in bold indicate 
significance above 99%.  
Inner dashed-line box highlights approximated expected percentage changes in y yielded by Propensity models. 
Gini coefficient is expressed in percentage. 
AG Rating and COGTA Scores are ordinal features, thus treated as dummy features and compared, respectively, 




General propensity for protest (Model 3 in Table 8.1, above) represents the most inclusive enumeration 
of protest. However, the respective formulations, beginning with Occurrence, each contributes to the 
understanding of protest, and to the final model. Each is summarised below.   
 
8.2.1 Occurrence 
When predicting the Occurrence of protest, increased poverty and inequality, along with less 
participation in voting, a lower dependency ratio191 and proportionally fewer whites, men, and small 
households were associated with higher counts. While this model returned the highest coefficient of 
determination,192 and also while Occurrence is probably the most commonly used metric (when 
scholars report, say, “an increase in protests”), I contended that this is not a particularly useful metric, 
since it ignores local population size, the number of participants, and the level of disruption. 
 
8.2.2 Proportional Occurrence  
Proportional occurrence corrected for population size, and although the features explained less of the 
variance in the number of protests per capita, the findings generally conformed to the pattern set by 
Occurrence. Higher inequality, poorer governance (as indicated by higher COGTA Scores), lower 
voting participation, a lower dependency ratio, a lower rich-poor ratio, and more urban households 
helped to predict Proportional occurrence. Dummies for province yielded an improved model R2 
(.500). 
 
I explored disaggregating Proportional occurrence by type, and fit regressions on the Proportional 
occurrence of community protests and the Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests.  
 
For the Proportional occurrence of community protests, I found significant associations with poor 
governance and a lower dependency ratio. This model could explain a quarter of the variance in 
Proportional occurrence of community protests – acceptable for the complex landscape of the social 
sciences, but much lower than the previous models. Dummies for province yielded an improved model 
R2.  
 
For the Proportional occurrence of labour-related protests, the significant predictors were changes in 
the municipal population, unemployment, inequality (all positive associations) and voter turnout, the 
dependency ratio, the rich-poor ratio, and the proportion of people without Matric (all negative 
associations), again, not contradicting any of the findings of the other models. The labour model 
presented a higher R2 than its community-counterpart. Dummies for province yielded an improved 
model R2. 
 
8.2.3 Protest propensity 
Propensity models represented an improvement on Proportional occurrence by including the number 
of participants in the target (i.e., protests per capita). General propensity returned a substantially high 
R2 (.484), with findings largely consistent with previous models. Increased unemployment and 
                                               
191 The Dependency Ratio was a measure of the number of dependants aged zero to 16 and over the age of 65, 
compared with the total municipal population aged 17 to 64. 
192 Province and urban dummies could improve the model R2. 
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inequality, poor governance, lower voting rates, and dependency ratios, as well as lower rich-poor 
ratios, and fewer people without Matric were associated with General propensity.  
 
When considering the Propensity for community protests (as a subset of General propensity) the same 
dynamics as with Proportional occurrence of community protests emerged – a lower model R2, and 
associations with fewer rural households and poorer governance. However, additional features also 
emerged as significant: unemployment, inequality, informality (all positive associations), as well as 
small households and the dependency ratio (negative associations).  
 
Propensity for labour-related protests appeared akin to Proportional occurrence of labour-related 
protests, with a relatively high model R2, and increased inequality, and more people with Matric 
increasing the propensity for protest. On the other hand, less voting, a lower dependency ratio, a smaller 
rich-poor ratio, and fewer small households all bore negative associations. The only instance of a ‘sign 
reversing’ came up in Propensity for labour-related protests – % Rural was negatively associated with 
this measure, suggesting that labour-related protesters are more likely to live in rural households than 
urban households, all other things being equal. Of course, not only are farming communities 
predominantly classified as “rural”, but many mining activities take place outside of the metros, in 
municipalities characterised by rural and peri-urban communities, such as Rustenburg Local 
Municipality (mining platinum group metals, 37% rural), Greater Letaba LM (Gold mining and 
quarrying, 87% rural), Madibeng LM (Stone and granite, 61% rural), and Ndwedwe Local Municipality 
(Kaolin mining, 95% rural).  
 
8.2.4 Tumult 
The last family, protest Tumult, was hard to predict, and I was not able to explain more than 12% of the 
variance based on the present features. In the model tested, informality was the most significant feature, 
with worse-faring municipalities, according to COGTA, presenting less tumultuous (i.e., more orderly) 
protests. 
 
Provinces, when added to the model as dummy variables, changed matters, and made for a more 
“predictive” model of Tumult, with an R2 of .262. Here, the Free State, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, the 
Northern Cape, the North West and the Western Cape were all significantly more tumultuous than the 
Eastern Cape, which served as the reference category. It is also notable that all the other features – 
including the proportion of foreigners, levels of inequality, actual service levels (as indicated by water 
provision), and unemployment – were not predictive in any way of levels of tumult. Further research 
may consider the product of Tumult with count or protest per capita, or other improved formulations, 
considering perhaps a smaller investigative frame than municipalities, which may present a more 
responsive target. 
 
In all, one should bear in mind that, judging by the present data, protest is essentially a peaceful 
enterprise (adjudged by overall proportions), and that Tumult is often introduced by outside factors, 
such as police provocation, and not a priori by local conditions. As such, claims such that roughly 80% 
of Community protests are “violent” (Heese and Allan 2012: 1), or that ‘the prevalence of violence 






Having satisfied the last of my seven objectives – to build and test models that could lead to verdicts 
about the explanatory power of the various theorised claims around protest – I ultimately find myself 
in a position to comment on each of the features’ explanatory power, and able to review the strength of 
the evidence in the data, given the claims.   
 
I now present each of the features, discussing their influence on variance in the models when the 
variance explained by all the other variables in the model is controlled for.  
  
8.3.1 Desperation – Poverty  
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different 
proportions of income-poor. 
Feature: % Poor represented the percentage of the households within a municipality with a monthly 
household income below R401. 
 
Poverty was not a predictor of the General propensity to protest. However, it was a factor in predicting 
the Occurrence of protest in municipalities – a 1% increase in poverty is associated with a 9% increase 
in protest Occurrence, which is a sizeable influence.  
 
Implication: The role of penury and hardship in animating protest is complex, and it is approached by 
scholars as physical need, or viewed through the lens of the shame and indignity of indigence, or by yet 
another mechanism that motivates behaviour, with the ostensible cause of protest laying in the poor’s 
search for social justice, or, at a more basic level, in the release from unbearable poverty. My analysis 
indicates that there is a demonstrable relationship between these two phenomena. Thus, the link, as 
suggested by most scholars of South African protest, including Alexander, Ballard, Bond, Matlala, 
Noble and Wright, Seekings, as well as both “classic” and contemporary international scholarship (e.g., 
Blair, Blattman and Hartman 2015; Lipsky 1968, respectively) appears validated.193 That said, many 
mitigating factors may also be in operation – such as the consideration that those living with a long-
standing lack of income are under high pressure to find ways to keep their families alive, and simply 
have less time, energy and resources (including data-equipped cell phones) to mobilise, or that the poor 
rely on social grants paid by the state, and would thus be cautious to take actions that could jeopardise 
this support – none of which I have measured or can comment upon.  
 
8.3.2 Desperation – Unemployment  
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different 
proportions of unemployment. 
Feature: % Unemployment was the proportion of the working-age population in the labour force that 
was, by Statistics SA’s definition, unemployed. 
 
A 1% increase in unemployment is associated with a 7% increase in the General propensity to protest. 
Unemployment was also a factor in the Community subdivision of General propensity.   
                                               
193 Although Booysen’s claim that service delivery protests in the early 2000s was driven by “debt traps when 
consumption exceeded free allowances and cut-offs ensued” (2007: 23) appears, upon review, to be more a 




Implication: I hypothesised that Percentage Unemployed would present a positive association with 
protest, such that people unable to find work might, out of frustration and desperation, mobilise to 
publicly voice their grievances. Given the data, I showed how this feature was an important (and 
significant) predictor, where an increase in unemployment indeed predicted several additional person-
days per capita of protest in a municipality. The link between unemployment and protest is generally 
theorised (e.g., Ortiz et al. 2013: 8), and also mentioned by the main theorists of protest in South Africa, 
including Alexander (2010), Bond (2010), Seekings (2007), and Nyar and Wray (2016). Seekings’ 
findings that unemployment and poor education, and the structures that perpetuate them, are directly 
linked to poverty and inequality, appear unimpeachable. Unemployment rates may hint at the structure 
of capital-labour relations, the local economy’s (lack of) reliance on labour-intensive industry and 
production, the shape of the education sector, but also gesture towards more intangible concerns of 
individuals, such as the shame attending unemployment, and effect of mass-dependency on the state for 
social grants. While unemployment did not explain any of the variance in local levels of Tumult, it was 
a strong predictor of the General Propensity, and the strongest predictor of the propensity for Labour-
related protest. The tears in the social fabric caused by widespread unemployment, evoked by Tilly, do 
indeed appear to be ‘highly favourable to mass politics’ (1977: 47).  
 
8.3.3 Deprivation 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different inequality 
measures. 
Features: Gini inequality was the municipal Gini coefficient. Rich-Poor Ratio was a measure calculated 
by dividing the number of top earners, i.e., households with an income of above R51 201 per month, 
by the number of poor households (those with a monthly income of less than R3 200 per month).  
 
Inequality predicted the General propensity for protest. An increase of 0.01 in the Gini coefficient (thus, 
the hypothetical change from a Gini of 0.40 to 0.041, say) was associated with an estimated 22% 
increase in protest (understood as total protesters per capita). Increased inequality was a consistent 
predictor of protest across Occurrence, Proportional occurrence, Proportional occurrence of labour-
related protest, and the Propensity of both Community and Labour-related protests.  
 
Additionally, the Rich-Poor Ratio was a predictor of the General propensity for protest, with a unit 
decrease in the ratio associated with an estimated 3% increase in protest. Thus, having relatively fewer 
people at the extreme rich end (approximating wealth concentration) is a driver of protest, albeit not as 
strong as Gini-inequality. The Ratio was also a significant predictor of Proportional occurrence and 
both models of Labour-related protest.  
 
The reader is reminded that while poverty is comparatively “stable”, insomuch as it ranges from 7% to 
27% (with a standard deviation of 4) between municipalities, the Rich-Poor ratio varies from 2 
(Aganang in Limpopo, Ezingoleni in KZN) to over 80 (Cities of Tshwane and Johannesburg) with a 
standard deviation of 13. This underlines, on the one hand, that the poor are not concentrated in 
geographic pockets in the way that the rich tend to be, and on the other, that not all rural areas are alike. 
Indeed, large-scale commercial farming areas and subsistence farming present disparate social 
dynamics. This measure, therefore, also supplemented the “rural” dimension, which is not able to 
desegregate this. I find that municipalities with proportionally fewer very rich people (the Palma-
derived measure considers the extremes) host more protests. 
 
 184 
Implication: Scholars have long understood that people, regardless of their level of formal education, 
have a sense of equity, fairness, a mentalité, comprehending customs of decency and justice; a sense 
violated when exploitation occurs (Thompson 2015). Alexander’s claims that ‘[c]omparative poverty, 
that is, impoverishment relative to some locally important reference group, is probably more significant’ 
than absolute poverty (2010: 34), thus appears accurate, given the evidence from 1997-2013, as do other 
conceptions of the influence of inequality (e.g., Allan and Heese, n.d.; Bond and Maharaj 2011; 
Breckenridge 2014; Ngwane 2011; Pithouse 2010; Seekings 2007; Sinwell 2010; von Holdt and 
Alexander 2012). On the other hand, Noble and Wright’s (2013) expectation that rural inhabitants, 
albeit poor, generally do not feel the weight of the comparative as much as urban inhabitants – does not 
bear out once I control for rurality: Gini remains significant.  
Of course, the formulations of inequality employed are both income-related, and a narrow or limited 
understanding of the broader phenomenon of social disparities in South Africa, and that there are many 
dimensions of inequality that are simply too hard to measure for the present purposes. Income 
inequality, by no means the only form of inequality, points to the long-lasting and systematically 
reproduced effects of historical racial segregation and differential rights, laws, and public services. Via 
unseen mechanisms – possibly a sense of injustice, humiliation, alienation, and anger (in the face of 
nearby lives of extreme/obscene opulence) – inequality seems to point to an unstable social order. South 
Africa’s status as one of the world’s most unequal societies, and our status as a “protest capital of the 
world” seem, by the evidence, to go hand-in-hand. 
 
8.3.4 Density – Informality  
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different 
proportions of informality. 
Feature: % Informal was the measure of the percentage of the municipal population living in informal 
dwellings.  
 
The percentage of households classified as informal did not predict General propensity for protest – 
but was a significant predictor of Propensity for community protests. I found that a 1% increase in 
informal households in a municipality was associated with a 4% increase in Community protests (total 
protesters engaged in Community protest, per capita). Informality is also associated with increased 
tumult. 
 
Implication: Many scholars have pointed out that apartheid spatial logic has been both preserved and 
reproduced by the post-apartheid government. Percentage Informal served as an important proxy for 
several, not entirely aligned, theoretical positions. These include the circumstances attending dense 
living arrangements (such as high levels of crime and poor policing, and poor services, especially 
sanitation) as well as landlessness, among others. Moreover, not only is it easier to mobilise protests in 
areas where people live in proximity, but historically, protest and resistance to apartheid have emanated 
from townships; recall Alexander’s observation that most community protests emerge from geographic 
and economic peripheries (2010, also Dawson 2014). This claim was validated by the findings. Fox and 
Bell (2016) also remind that urban population size and the number of large cities in a country are 
positively associated with protest incidence (this is true, here, too). Further afield, Booysen is not wrong 
to write that protests tend to be “concentrated in the urban and metropolitan areas” (2007: 23), but rather 
impolitic in her chosen frame (i.e., basing this conclusion on a count model), especially is this leads to 





South Africa’s history of township protests, as well as the precarious nature of informal living, 
compounded inter alia by landlessness and poor services, suggest that Percentage Informal would go 
some way to explain levels of protest. While it does not predict the General propensity, both models in 
which it plays a role are didactic.  
 
8.3.5 Density – Migration profiles 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different migration 
profiles. 
Feature: Change in Population is the percentage change (in municipal population) between 2001 and 
2011. 
 
Change in population was not a predictor of the General propensity to protest. However, a 1% increase 
in population is associated with a roughly 2% increase in the Proportional occurrence of labour-related 
protest. It bore no relation on the Propensity for labour-related protest.  
 
Implication: Change in population approximated local migration profiles, and was expected to be 
positively linked with protest, according to the “demographic strain hypothesis” which claims that 
migration towards urban (often informal) areas heightens both social strain and intensification of 
resource competition (e.g., Goldstone 2017). While some claim a “strong statistical link” between 
migration and protests (Allan and Heese n.d.: 1), others have tested such claims, and have failed to 
validate them (Fox and Bell 2016). My findings seems to corroborate those of Fox and Bell, failing to 
find the link proposed by Allan and Heese. Of course, it may be the case that labour-intensive 
municipalities generally expanded from 2009 to 2013, although this period, coinciding with the global 
financial crisis, more likely meant that employment opportunities declined or remained unchanged, 
while inward migration continued as people sought to find employment. 
 
It appears that Change in population (at the levels of migration witnessed between the 2001 and 2011 
censuses) can predict protest, at the municipal level, but only under very specific circumstances, and is 
so far a spurious predictor of the General propensity, given the data.  
 
8.3.6 Demography – Gender proportions 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with dissimilar gender-
ratio measures. 
Feature: Percentage Male is the percentage of the municipal population that self-identify as male.  
 
The gender balance did not help to predict General propensity for protest. It was significant in one 
model – Occurrence – where a 1% reduction on the overall percentage of men in the population was 
associated with an estimated increase in 10% of Occurrence. This was related to labour-sending 
municipalities (with more women than men) also being the neglected rural municipalities that tend to 
have many, but not large, protest events. 
 
Percentage Male was hypothesised to play a role in explaining protest, ostensibly by the altered local 
character – more combative or confrontational in the case of male-dominated geographies. However, 
another dimension emerged: male demographic dominance signalled the economic modalities of an 
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area, specifically in the case of manual labour, such as the case of Thabazimbi and mining (where 59% 
of the municipality was male in 2011) – these mimic apartheid-era labour migration patterns (e.g., Posel 
2003).  
 
Implication: Langa and Kiguwa, writing about protest in Mpumalanga province in South Africa, 
advance the claim that ‘the current socio-economic pressures seem to be influencing young men to 
become involved in violent service delivery protests as a way of imagining and reimaging new forms 
of masculinities in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2013: 20). They do not make claims that the gender 
balance itself will drive more conflicts, merely that dominant cultural stereotypes in which men are 
expected to aspire to power, status, and wealth play a role in “service delivery protests”; while these 
claims appear appropriate, as well as estimable, I am unable to provide additional evidence thereto. 
 
I found that having proportionally fewer men, at the municipal level, predicts protest Occurrence, 
however, this feature lacked significant explanatory power in other formulations, and could not with 
sufficient certainty explain the dynamics of any of the Labour-related formulations.  
 
8.3.7 Demography – Age profiles 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with dissimilar age 
profiles. 
Feature:194 The Dependency Ratio was a measure of the number of dependants aged zero to 16 and over 
the age of 65, compared with the total municipal population aged 17 to 64. 
 
The Dependency Ratio was an important predictor of the General propensity for protest. A 1 unit 
decrease in the ratio (i.e., proportionally more people in the working ages) was associated with an 
expected 14% increase in protest (total protesters per capita). The Dependency Ratio was also influential 
in each of the other seven models (except for Tumult).  
 
As with other measures, discussed below, metrics relating to age in effect reflected a measure of rural 
(as opposed to urban) conditions, which includes a demographic structure reflective of labour 
(out)migration, presenting an atypical gender-age-pyramid with people, especially men from the 
working-age cohorts, “missing”.   
 
The Dependency Ratio was selected to serve as the age-related feature. I suggested, based on theory, 
that the higher the ratio, the lower the “demographic burden”, such that a highly geared demography 
visits a weighty burden of caring for the old and young – exacerbating other pressures, such as the lack 
of income, landlessness, and poor services. That said, in the South African context, the Dependency 
                                               
194 Mean Age and % Youth were not included in any of the final models, with the dependency ratio being the 
primary age-related metric that offered most predictive value. This does not mean that the aforementioned could 
not help to predict various formulations of protest, but that their contributions were less than that of the 
dependency ratio, and their inclusion would have resulted in overall weaker models. I did consider the claim that 
younger populations are more prone to rebellion, and generally exhibit manifestations of very different priorities 
than older age-cohorts, and that the institution of democracy and rule of law tend to be less consolidated in areas 
with a lower median age. However, two considerations intervened in using Mean Age and % Youth. Both features 
presented high multicollinear with other features, and introduced mathematical problems into the regressions. 
Second, bivariate analysis showed that Mean Age, by itself, yielded an effectively horizontal relationship vis-à-




Ratio communicates diverse elements, including rurality, dominant modalities of employment, social 
cohesion, and demographic burden – but cannot be essentialised or replaced by any of these. One may 
recall that the ratio was highest in areas that are rural and traditional (e.g., Mbizana in the Eastern Cape, 
and Msinga and Indaka in KZN), but the lowest score did not come from urban settings, as one might 
expect, but from the mining community of Thabazimbi. The latter would have many single-person 
households, as typical of receiving communities of migrant labour.  
 
Apropos of household demographic burdens, one should also note that in the case of SA, this is 
influenced more by supporting younger dependants,195 than the elderly. The dependency ratio thus 
communicates something about cultural homogeneity, and economic migrants, as much as it does on 
household demographic burdens; in light of its important influence on the General propensity, it is a 
demographically grey eminence of sorts. This sometimes-overlooked measure of demographic pressure 
may be vital for future research about South African protest. 
 
Implication: Urdal’s (2012: 9) report that ‘...a general statistical relationship between age structure and 
political violence has been identified...’ and that youth bulges affect various forms of violence, are in 
line with my findings. In addition, his argument that the labour market’s inability to ‘absorb’ job-seekers 
leads to a surplus of unemployed youths, which tends to result in strong frustration, cannot be faulted 
by the present evidence (similar arguments were found among other international commentators, e.g., 
Barreto et al. 2009, Tufekci and Wilson 2012). 
 
8.3.8 Demography – Foreigners  
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas hosting dissimilar 
proportions of non-South Africans. 
Feature: Percentage Not South-African Language was the percentage of the municipal population that 
does not speak one of SA’s official languages as a home language (self-reported). This was used as an 
approximation of “foreigners” within a municipality. 
 
The proportion of foreigners did not present any significant associations with any of the families – 
returning what is in essence a null finding.  
 
Implication: Given the data, more foreigners, at the municipal level, do not mean more protests, for any 
of the formulations of measuring protest. Thereby, I fail to validate assertions that resource competition 
lies at the root of public violence. That does not mean that hostility to African migrants can be separated 
from local ‘competition for scarce resources’ (Everatt 2011: 16) – although the focus of conflict must 
relate to the actual resources, not the proportion of foreigners (one suspects Everatt will agree) nor 
common perceptions about an “influx” of foreign African migrants. 
 
Of course, Percentage Not Speaking a South African Language was not intended to test the theoretical 
claims that foreigners are often the victims of violent protests (or rather, the victims of opportunistic 
crime attending violent protest) but instead to test whether foreigners in an area could account for 
protests, measured at the municipal level. It does not appear that this is the case, certainly not in a linear 
fashion, and at the levels of foreigners present in the municipalities 1997-2013.196 However, considering 
                                               
195 SA’s 2011 Total Fertility Rate is 2.6, and life expectancy was estimated at 57. 
196 While xenophobic attacks are generally not regarded as protest, they are sometimes accompanied by protests, 
or happen in the aftermath of protests (which would have been recorded as ‘violent’ events in IRIS). 
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the relative rarity of violent protest in general, and protest-turned-xenophobic attack specifically, it 
seems precarious to forward this to be a driver of South African protest in general. 
 
8.3.9 Democracy – Voter turnout 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
participation in electoral politics. 
Feature: Voter Turnout was the percentage of eligible voters who took to voting in the national election 
in 2009, measured at the municipal level.  
 
The proportion of eligible voters voting in a municipality was a predictor of General propensity to 
protest, with a 1% reduction in voting being associated with an estimated 12% increase in protest (total 
protesters per capita). This measure was also an important factor in predicting Occurrence of protest, 
Proportional occurrence and both Propensity for labour-related protest and Proportional occurrence 
of labour-related protest – in each respective case, a decrease in voting associated with an increase in 
protest.  
 
Implication: Voter Turnout was included as a proxy for participation in official politics, and was not 
taken to be a dialectical force in catalysing protest, as much as a manifestation of already-established 
conditions of political mistrust, disengagement, frustration by a lack of choice, or apathy – all of which 
could imply a heightened propensity for protest.197 This was in line with Olsen’s thesis that political 
alienation correlates strongly with people’s approval of protest actions (2014), and various formulations 
of how a decrease in voting signals disillusionment with political actors or options, or disengagement 
from “the system” altogether, by Mottiar and Bond (2012), Friedman (2013), Alexander (2010), 
Pithouse (2010), Sinwell et al. (2009)198, or classic theories (e.g., Gurr 1970). Most clearly, I provide 
evidence for Runciman (2016) and Paret’s (2018) indications that protesters may be more likely to 
abstain from electoral politics (echoing findings from Brazil, e.g., Power and Roberts 1995). On the 
other hand, Booysen’s claims of “blind loyalty” to the ANC, amid a critical stance as expressed via 
protests, appears incorrect, even for the time at which it was written (2007: 22, akin to Norris et al. 
2005, who wrote similarly of the Belgian experience).  
 
Voter Turnout was sufficiently valuable in predicting General propensity to be said to tap into an 
important dimension of political attitude, calling for further research into apathy, anomie, and the degree 
to which the systemic coordinates are rejected by a sizeable portion of South Africans within the post-
apartheid political landscape. 
 
8.3.10 Delivery – Services  
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
services. 
Feature: Percentage Households Without Water (%HWW) was the percentage of households in a 
municipality that did not receive water (inside their stand/yard, or piped directly into their house) from 
                                               
197 However, a positive association may also be argued; that a party-politically active population, as far as indirect 
political actions are concerned, may also readily participate in direct political actions. 
198 However, I could not test Sinwell et al’s (2009) claim that the protestors’ anger is fuelled by discontent over 
the available mechanisms for participatory democracy. 
 
 189 
the municipality or designated water service provider. This measure can be thought of as 100% minus 
the percentage of households with piped water.  
 
Percentage Households Without Water was intended to serve as a proxy for municipal “service 
delivery”,199 and as discussed in Chapter 5, could have been substituted with other services, such as 
electricity connections, refuse collection, or surfaced roads.  
 
Implication: The role of service delivery is discussed by many scholars (including Akinboade, 
Mokwena, and Kinfack 2014; Alexander 2013; De Juan and Wegner 2019; Friedman 2009; McLennan 
and Munslow 2009; Mottiar and Bond 2011; Nyar and Wray 2016; Pithouse 2009; Samson 2007; 
Sinwell et al. 2009; and Von Holdt et al. 2011) and, while the quality of municipal services undoubtedly 
plays a role in the broader calculus of protest, the proportion of households without water was not a 
predictor of protest, however conceived. This may be due to the municipal frame being too large – by 
incorporating many communities that receive diverse levels of services.200  
 
Morudu (2017) found a positive correlation between the ‘number of consumer units receiving water in 
2013’ and community protests, using municipalities as frame, implying that the influence of water on 
protest may not be straightforward: I agree with his inference, but was unable to replicate this finding. 
 
Further afield, I was unable to find proof or contrary evidence regarding Labuschagne’s suggestion that 
the actual material conditions or grievances are irrelevant (2011), but that the gap between expectations 
and reality is more important than the actual levels of services in driving protest. However, it is worth 
considering that, if such broad definitions are permitted, one may consider that all forms of discontent, 
let alone grievances leading to protests, are the results of mismatches between desired and reality. 
 
Likewise, this finding fails to validate the claims that, owing to “rising expectations”, improved services 
will create expectations of continued improvements, and drive protests (e.g., Cronje 2004:1; Düvenhage 
2016: 920). Also drawn into question are claims that the role of protest in obtaining services was 
“increasingly clear” but also that poor services are a pivotal driver of protest (Booysen 2007), 
notwithstanding the insight that protests are indelibly part of “the politics of getting service delivery”. 
Nevertheless, patterns to either direction may emerge from further, more granular exploration. 
 
8.3.11 Delivery – Governance  
Hypothesis:  There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
municipal governance. 
Features: The COGTA Score was a four-level classification, whereby the National Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs categorised each municipality’s overall performance, 
based on several criteria, including the local tax base, service objectives, RDP-target performance, and 
financial management. The Auditor-General Rating was a five-level classification score, drawn from 
                                               
199 One may have expected that, perhaps in conjunction with the urban/rural dimension, water reticulation might 
be a factor, since it is often the case that no households in a rural-designated area have reticulated water whereas 
in urban/peri-urban areas, RDP-related delivery rollout is generally present, albeit patchy and piecemeal. This 
means that, in the case of near-urban settings, serviced and unserviced areas could be juxtaposed, which may 
engender a sense of unfairness (or of corruption by officials allocating resources and municipal developmental 
plans). Given the present data and levels of measurement, this was not the case. 
200 This may also be due to other factors sufficiently overlapping with water to negate its effect in the regressions, 
or, evoking Occam’s razor, simply to the level of water-services not directly being linked to protest. 
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the integrated report of the office of the South African Auditor General, summating the municipalities’ 
financial performances in 2011. This snapshot-measure of financial management represents a measure 
of governance by municipal leadership. I dummy-coded both measures; I also tested whether treating 
the measures as continuous (after Pasta 2009) would produce more explanatory power, which was not 
the case. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I considered two indices. Ratings of governance was a factor predicting the 
General propensity for protest. The third level in COGTA’s four-level rating system (ranging from 
“least vulnerable” municipalities to those “most vulnerable”), was included in the final model to 
estimate General propensity (a 54% increase in protest when moving from the reference category to the 
3rd level), and also in predicting the Propensity for community protest, Proportional occurrence and 
the Proportional occurrence of community protest. It is notable that it was the third, not the fourth (most 
vulnerable) municipalities that emerged in the various models. The Auditor-General ratings’ fifth 
category (worst level of financial management) was a predictor of the Proportional occurrence of 
community protest. Higher COGTA Scores were associated with a decline in Tumult – where the 
reference category (“least vulnerable municipalities”) hosted more tumultuous protests than the other 
classes. This should be seen in light of the provincial lens. For instance, all the municipalities in the 
Western Cape were placed in the “least vulnerable” (lowest) class, but, as discussed in Chapter 6, hosted 
many of the more disruptive/violent protests. 
 
Implication: It may well be that case that a large public service, staffed to a degree by political 
appointees, perpetuates a system likely to ‘induce citizens or civic associations to resort to disruptive 
actions to express demands and demonstrate political relevance, and thereby secure access to public 
goods’ (Cornell and Grimes 2015: 664). Operationalising claims that citizens’ perceptions of 
governance is an important factor in South African protest (e.g., Matebesi 2017), AG Rating and the 
COGTA Score were rudimentary approximations of governance as another way of looking at “service 
delivery”. Theories that propose a nexus between protest and local institutions of public participation 
in local governance (e.g., Nyar and Wray 2016; Piper and Nadvi 2010), or that there is a ‘clear link’ 
between local perceptions of municipal governance and local participation in protest (Akinboade, 
Mokwena and Kinfack 2014) will draw support from these findings. However, the lenient, “catch-all” 
usage of this term means that “service delivery” appears to be used to evoke matters beyond the 
extension and maintaining of public amenities, for instance to indicate local government’s stewarding 
of resources. Thus, these two metrics could equally be argued to comprehend a measure of “democratic 
accountability” in the restrictive sense of public representatives adhering to the institutions of public 
fiscal management. Finally, these features may also be linked to perceptions of corruption: 
unaccountable expenditure is a common reason for qualified audits (Auditor General 2011). Both 
measures would benefit from refinement, yet indicate that governance does appear to play a role in 
explaining the General propensity.   
 
8.3.12 Designation 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protest between areas with different levels of 
whites and other racial groups. 
Features: % White is the percentage of each municipality self-identifying as white, which ranged 
between 0% and 39%, but with the average among municipalities of 7% (using official designations). 
Under apartheid-era classifications, the complement of the population (100% less % White) would thus 




Self-identified race-classes, as captured by the percentage white, was not a predictor of the General 
propensity to protest. The only model where this feature sustained significant influence was in 
predicting Occurrence, where a 1% reduction in the population self-identification as white was 
associated with a 4% increase in protest.  
 
After theorists positing that the violent repression of apartheid, and the sometimes-violent nature of 
resistance, means that Black Africans today continue to carry the burden of prolonged distress – which 
may manifest in protests and a range of public violence (e.g., Langa and Kiguwa 2013; see also Atwoli 
et al. 2013; Magwaza et al. 1993), % White served as a proxy for race. Here, race was an approximation 
for historical trauma, and is thus a representation of highly complex psychosocial conditions.201 To 
complicate this further, this measure also tested for another, less nuanced caricature – that, glibly stated, 
“whites do not protest”.  
 
Implication: Save for the Occurrence metric, % White generally did not convey predictive power, and 
these findings fail to validate the theories behind psychological conceptions of trauma and mental 
health, at the municipal-level of measurement. The dearth in explanatory power may have been due to 
its crude nature: race is a moot social construct, and apartheid-assigned ideal-typing was always a blunt 
and unrefined tool; some of its biases here are confirmed by our statistical analysis.  
 
8.3.13 Diplomas 
Hypothesis: There will be a difference in the measure of protests between areas with different levels of 
education. 
Feature: Percentage Without Matric represented the portion of the municipal population aged above 18 
without a secondary education diploma, in other words, it is the proportion of the population without at 
least a Grade 12 qualification.  
 
Levels of education was a predictor of the General propensity for protest, with a 1% increase in the 
proportion of people with a Grade 12 certificate associated with an estimated 14% increase in protest.  
 
Implication: Although Urdal (2012) found that governments that invest in secondary education 
experience lower risks of civil conflicts, including protests (which may well be true),202 I do not find, 
at the municipal level, that areas with people of poorer education protest more, but instead that areas of 
people with (relatively) better education, do. Within the present research, I could not determine whether 
this phenomenon was induced by educational attainment being linked to knowledge of individual and 
collective rights (and thus more resolution in mobilising when these are flouted), or whether it was 
reflective of demographic trends, where “employable” people congregate in localities where they 
anticipate finding employment. One also cannot say whether those with higher educational attainment 
are those protesting, of course. Further research may test whether it is indeed the case that municipalities 
hosting or attracting job-eligible people present a high propensity to also host protests, as suggested by 
this feature’s association with both measures of Labour-related protest.  
  
 
                                               
201 In the South African case, it may just as well represent several other constructs, including class, culture, 
employment, or even be an alternative measure for inequality based on its covariance. 
202 Additionally, recall that Nwafor established that intra-political disagreements correlated strongly with levels 





In the process of analysis, other potential predictors were identified. These are more descriptive of local 
characteristics than they are in and of themselves rousing of direct political actions, yet complement 
our understanding of South African protest.  
 
8.3.14 Dwelling size  
Small households was the metric for the percentage of households in each municipality with three or 
less members. Small households was not derived from theoretical claims; instead, when working with 
the data shared by Stats SA, I realised that this measure of household living arrangements might shed 
light on other dimensions, such as migrant-living arrangements, or perhaps be a complement to rural 
households which, by some unscientific accounts, tend to be larger.  
 
The percentage of small households did not have a significant relationship with the General propensity. 
However, in three cases (the Propensity for community protests and the Propensity for labour-related 
protests, respectively, and in estimating Occurrence), it was a significant predictor, in each case 
associated with a decrease in the protest measure as the proportion of small households increased. 
 
Smaller households would typically exemplify labour-intensive municipalities (chiefly mining and 
manufacturing)203 often on urban peripheries; and while it proved important, especially in modelling 
the Propensity for labour-related protest, it did not contribute to the General propensity, with other, 
more salient features, in effect accounting for this dimension.  
 
8.3.15 Tribal 
The measure of the percentage households classified as tribal – largely a replication of apartheid-era 
Bantustans – did not have any significant associations with any of the measures of protest. This metric 
was excluded from the General propensity models, due to high collinearity (and early elimination by 
RFE-testing), but was included in two of the Proportional occurrence models, and Tumult – where it 
was not significant.  
 
8.3.16 Rural-Urban and Province 
Two other geographical dimensions were also tested in various ways. To nuance the interpretation of 
protest-conducive characteristics, I included the Urban dummy and Province, not in the initial features 
sets, but as the very last model within each of the families. 
 
Percent Rural was the complement of the percentage of households classified as urban, for each 
municipality, while Urban was a dummy variable for the official classification of the entire 
municipality. Province was a categorical variable indicating to which of the nine provinces each 
respective municipality belonged.  
 
                                               
203 Recall that Small households was positively correlated with Percentage Male (0.73). To wit, the iron mining 
town of Thabazimbi had the second-highest percentage of small households (58%).   
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There is a difference in patterns of General propensity between municipalities variously classified as 
urban and rural. The percentage of households in a municipality classified as rural/urban was not a 
significant predictor of the General propensity to protest; instead, when using dummy variables that 
correspond to the binary classification of each municipality as “metro”/”secondary city” (urban) or not 
(rural), I estimated a 103% increase when moving from “protesters per capita” in the 207 rural 
municipalities to the 27 urban municipalities. The disparity between the binary and continuous variables 
are related to the fact that 20% of households in “urban” municipalities are classified as “rural”, whereas 
41% of households in “rural” municipalities are classified as “rural” – that is, the binary classification 
is an oversimplification of reality, but helps to point to the demographic factor of density.  
 
The percentage of households classified as rural was negatively associated with Proportional 
occurrence (one percentage point more urban households leading to an estimated 1% increase), 
Proportional occurrence of community protest (one percentage point more urban households also 
leading to an estimated 1% increase), and Propensity for community protest (another one percentage 
point for 1% increase estimation), and positively with the Propensity for labour-related protest. The 
urban/rural dummy was also a significant feature in predicting Occurrence. 
 
Percentage Rural was investigated owing to claims about protest’s urban nature (Alexander 2010; Bond 
2010), on the one hand, and my finding that protest per capita revealed a surprisingly rural profile, 
failing to validate Booysen’s claim that “service delivery protests” are very rare in the rural former 
homeland areas (2007). Similarly, Provinces was a tempting feature for model testing, given the 
diverging patterns revealed in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, conclusions should be circumspect. Province is, 
of course, primarily an administrative delineation, and neither a socio-economic factor, nor a 
demographic proxy, or even a measure of local governance; rurality can scarcely be regarded as a 
causative force in itself. However, in the South African context, many would-be causes of protest are 
indelibly captured within the constructs of province. We have provinces answering to “urban” and 
“rural” characteristics, just as we have “poor” provinces, and “underserviced” areas (with regard to 
municipal services, for historical reasons). Moreover, South Africa’s nine provinces are largely vessels 
of ethnic groupings, and to cloud matters further, provincial economies are subject to locally-hegemonic 
economic modes – as discussed, often mining or agriculture. That said, it would be a mistake to replace, 
say, water reticulation, with a convenient (if non-robust) feature of Province since, while this may cover 
for a range of vague local conditions, it can scarcely be regarded as the rousing force behind protest.  
 
Being urban does not, by itself, animate protest, but is associated with factors that precipitate 
mobilisation at scale. Additionally, although Percentage Rural may lack inherent potency, it does help 
convey to some degree the dimension of “distance from centres of power”, political neglect, and social 
isolation, all of which are difficult to enumerate otherwise. I noted how rurality is complemented by 
patterns of poor service extension (such as few water connections), high unemployment, many people 
of working age not present, and a high correlation with areas under tribal administration. The strength 
of the correlations above also prefigured their collinear nature in relation to other features. This does 
not mean that urban-rural patterns do not exist in explaining protest – they do – but rather that other 
features proved to be more reliable predictors, even while the construct lingers, expressed in factors 




8.4 Contributions of this thesis 
The empirical contribution of this thesis to scientific knowledge is thus to bring two hitherto disparate 
datasets into conjunction in order to create a series of ever more-nuanced models of protest. In order to 
do this, the study:     
 
i. presented a novel characterisation of protest, drawing on and synthesising insights from 
international relations, development studies, sociology, and psychoanalysis. Protest was seen 
as an act guided by an ethical commitment, and local conditions can be thought of as “ripe for 
protest”; 
ii. suggested a stylised protest process model, as a way of thinking about the development of a 
protest event and cycle, combining the effects of various social forces;  
iii. demonstrated how Machine Learning techniques can be used to classify group-incident 
databases into protest and non-protest events, and how protest events can be classified 
according to levels of tumult;  
iv. presented new maps and visualisations of protest counts, protest per capita (all types, Labour-
related and Community), and tumult by assigning each recorded protest event between 1997 
and 2013 into one of SA’s 234 municipalities; 
v. offered the as of yet most descriptive series of descriptive statistics regarding post-apartheid 
protest in South Africa, spanning distribution, types of protest, grievances, triggers, actions and 
eventualities (these, among other findings, challenged claims about protest’s predominantly 
urban characteristics); 
vi. suggested a novel, accessible and explainable way of calculating inequality at the municipal 
level, along with operationalising other constructs such as governance and “service delivery”; 
vii. placed the largest available protest dataset from the chosen period alongside metrics from 
Statistics South Africa, enabling me to comment on both theories supported by the data, and on 
those where the evidence is attenuated. Using Grounded Theorising, I visited and revisited my 
features and targets, creating a generous frame for measurement, without losing critical single-
mindedness on finding good explanations; 
viii. evaluated the metric implied in previous studies of protest, and noting the varied (and often 
poorly defined) ways in which protest is measured, proposed a four-way split of reporting 
protest (and changes in levels of protest) – Occurrence, Proportional occurrence, General 
propensity and Tumult – each of which reveal important aspects on direct political actions. The 
resultant models will allow testing or elaboration of existing theories and, potentially, 
generating a new theory on the measuring of and motivations behind protests in South Africa; 
ix. recommended that the General propensity for protest is the most inclusive and robust 
formulation for thinking about changes in levels of protest;  
x. corroborated theories of protest based on unemployment, political disillusionment, 
demographics (in particular, the dependency ratio), inequality, levels of secondary education 
(possibly indicative of local levels of job-seekers), and poor municipal governance, given the 
data; and simultaneously failed to find evidence attributing protest to local proportions of 
foreigners, a culture of expectations, or that protest is best explained by random agitation by 
radical or anarchic-seeking agents.  
 
In all, I found that the strongest indicators of South African protest action are inequality, voter turnout, 
and the dependency ratio. Other important indicators are unemployment, local proportions of people 
with secondary education, and the quality of municipal governance. If one disaggregates the General 
propensity to protest into propensities for Community protest and Labour-related protest, the former 
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highlights unemployment, the dependency ratio, inequality and governance, adding rurality, 
informality, and small households; while the latter, labour-related protest, highlights the influence of 
voter turnout, the dependency ratio, inequality, local proportions of people with secondary education, 
small households, adding the rurality and the proportion of small households. Given the data and 




Figure 8.1: Venn diagram of features informing the General propensity for protest, their collective overlap 
indicating the most likely conditions for protest (persons per capita).  
 
One way of thinking about these features is that they indicate the confluence of forces that lead to 
protest ripeness. Demographic pressures, as represented by the dependency ratio;204 economic 
disillusionment, as revealed by levels of unemployment and economic pressures of competing 
jobseekers; social disillusionment,205 as manifested in relations of income inequality; and political 
disillusionment, as signified by low levels of voting and poor governance – all play a part in explaining 
why people protest, and in particular can indicate where people will be more likely to protest.  
 
At the risk of repetition, in the following section I recapitulate my findings in relation to other theories. 
 
Quantitatively, my findings are slightly different to previous estimates of protest in South Africa. My 
finding of well over 5 200 protests per year suggests that there were more protests than previously 
thought for the period reviewed. Earlier assessments, such as those by Runciman et al. (2016), relied 
on scaling up samples to estimate the overall size of protests recorded in IRIS. Also in contrast to some 
scholars (e.g., Heese and Allan 2012; Powell et al. 2015; Tsheola 2012), I found that mean levels of 
disruption or protest violence have not increased since 1997.  
 
                                               
204 Which is here reflective of proportionally more people within the working ages, not less. 
205 Which is not without an economic dimension. 
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Regarding the links often made in protest theory between protest and poverty, my findings indirectly 
support the propositions by scholars such as Alexander 2010; Ballard et al. 2017; Bond 2012; Matlala 
2014; Noble and Wright 2013; Seekings 2007 (and, theorising for a global framework, Lipsky 1968; 
Blair, Blattman and Hartman 2015, among others). More specifically, by asking not “who protests”, but 
rather “what are the conditions around those who do”, my findings show the complexity of the role 
penury and hardship play in animating protest206. That is, I found unemployment to be both an important 
factor in the multidimensional nature of poverty, and to play a role in propagating protest. Once more, 
these findings are in line with earlier work by Alexander (2010), Bond (2010), Seekings (2007), and 
Nyar and Wray (2016), inter alia; as well as classical texts (e.g., Tilly 1977) and those discussing protest 
in other geographies (e.g., Ortiz et al. 2013).  
 
My work also unpacks the difference between poverty and inequality when it comes to protest. While 
poverty might feel like unfair misery, inequality feels like unfair punishment – or so it seems, given its 
strong association with mobilisation, whether formally orchestrated or organic. My findings provide 
additional ballast to scholars’ claims that inequality plays a significant role in explaining South African 
protests (prominent concurring theories are found in Alexander 2010, Allan and Heese n.d.; 
Breckenridge 2014; Bond and Maharaj 2011; Ngwane 2011; Pithouse 2010; Seekings 2007; Sinwell 
2010; von Holdt and Alexander 2012, among others). The finding of the association between inequality 
and protest also lends support to a qualified conception of how the reproduction of unfairness jars 
common notions of a general moral compact (e.g., Thompson 2015).  
 
In a modest way, my work contributes to theories concerning the effect of rural versus urban 
geographies on protest. While Noble and Wright’s (2013) expectation that rural inhabitants, albeit poor, 
generally do not feel the weight of relative deprivation as much as urban inhabitants may be true, this 
is not confirmed by my analysis, since inequality, as approximated by the Gini-coefficient, maintains 
significance, even controlling for rurality. I further found that protests are not quintessentially urban 
(ostensibly contrary to Booysen 2007), and that when taking population size into account, South African 
protest is revealed to be rural in nature. That said, I unsurprisingly found that where there are more 
people, more people protest (Fox and Bell 2016), and that the untransformed spatial logic of apartheid 
plays a measurable role in animating protest (in line with the expectations of Alexander 2010, Dawson 
2014, and others). The spatial lens also allowed for testing claims related to the demographic strain 
hypothesis (e.g., Allan and Heese n.d.; Goldstone 2017), but, as with Fox and Bell (2016), I could not 
replicate findings claiming that migration towards urban (often informal) areas heightens social strain, 
or intensifies resource competition, at least not under the municipal frame and for the time reviewed.  
 
Studying the level of municipal services yielded a complex picture. The proportion of households 
without water was not a predictor of protest, possibly cloaking the community-level effects of service 
quality and quantity, as well as service cut-offs, in motivating protest (as explored by, among others, 
Akinboade, Mokwena, and Kinfack 2014; Alexander 2013; Bekker 2014; De Juan and Wegner 2019; 
Friedman 2009; McLennan and Munslow 2009; Morudu 2017; Mottiar and Bond 2011; Nyar and Wray 
2016; Pithouse 2009; Samson 2007; Sinwell et al. 2009; and Von Holdt et al. 2011).  
 
I was unable to support or refute Labuschagne’s (2011) suggestion that the gap between expectations 
and reality are more important in generating unrest than the material conditions themselves. In addition, 
I could not validate the claims that (especially service-related) protests are due to “rising expectations” 
                                               
206 My research design did not allow me to test whether it is the unemployed but not the very poor who protest (as 
suggested by Alexander and Pfaffe 2014). 
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(as claimed by Düvenhage 2016; after Cronje 2004; whose positions correspond somewhat to theories 
of other localities, e.g., Moseley 2018 in Brazil). Moreover, my findings call into question claims that 
the role of protest in obtaining services was “increasingly clear” (Booysen 2007), notwithstanding the 
insight that protests are indelibly part of “the politics of getting service delivery”. 
 
Related to levels of services are levels of governance. My findings support theories that propose a nexus 
between protest and the performance of local institutions or public participation in local governance 
(e.g., Akinboade, Mokwena and Kinfack 2014; Cornell and Grimes 2015; Matebesi 2017; Nyar and 
Wray 2016; Piper and Nadvi 2010). However, the lenient “catch-all” usage of “governance” (as with 
“service delivery”) can evoke matters beyond providing and maintaining public amenities; for instance, 
indicating local government’s stewarding of resources, which relates to democratic accountability.  
 
The role of democracy – as indicated by measures of voter turnout – played an even more important 
bellwether indicating protest propensities. Here, my work confirms the association between a local 
disengagement from formal politics and the prospect of protest (variously formulated by Alexander 
2010; Friedman 2013; Justesen and Schulz-Herzenberg 2018; Mottiar and Bond 2012; Paret 2018; 
Pithouse 2010; Runciman 2016; and Sinwell et al. (2009); but also by ‘classic’ theories, e.g., Gurr 1970; 
or in other contexts, e.g., Olsen 2014; Power and Roberts 1995). Meanwhile, my findings fail to 
corroborate claims of “blind loyalty” to the ruling political party, amid a critical stance as expressed via 
protests (Booysen 2007, elsewhere, Norris et al. 2005).  
 
Although Urdal (2012) found that governments that invest in secondary education experience lower 
risks of civil conflicts, including protests (which may well be true), I do not find, at the municipal level, 
that areas with people of poorer education protest more, but instead that areas of people with (relatively) 
better education, do.  
 
The influence of the racial composition of municipalities, while not fully explored, did not yield 
significant findings, nor did the proportion of non-South Africans (see Everatt 2011). I was also not 
able to illustrate the role played by gender imbalances in the mix of factors leading to conditions that 
are ripe for protest, yet I remain sympathetic to works investigating the role of old and new forms of 
masculinities in public unrest (e.g., Langa and Kiguwa 2013). My data, however, did provide strong 
evidence for claims (as by Urdal 2012 in the SA context; or Barreto et al. 2009, Tufekci and Wilson 
2012, looking elsewhere) associating local age structures and protest. In sum, a comparatively large, 
moderately-educated, politically disillusioned, unemployed, youthful population facing significant 




Dani Rodrik is famous for remarking, to fellow economists, that ‘yours is a model, not the model’ 
(Rodrik 2015). Accordingly, I do not assert any positions of geographic or temporal universality. The 
findings of this study cannot be generalised beyond South Africa’s particular set of socio-political, 
demographic and historical characteristics, and in a restricted manner, they comment solely on the data 




A thesis such as this is bound to fall short in several regards. Every decision implied opportunity costs, 
beginning with the definitions of protest, which may variously be criticised for being either too narrow 
or too permissive of other direct political actions.  
 
As discussed at length, my overview of historical factors could not aspire to be anything but a 
perfunctory overview, and will have excluded many important events, traditions, and conditions. 
Regarding theories of protest, again, only the most common theories were discussed – adjudged by my 
own, subjective reading of the field. Where theories had similar forms yet nuanced disparities, I had to 
offer what might seem a cruel caricature of such well-shaded works. In many cases, where theorists 
made analogous observations, I had to exclude lesser-cited ones in favour of those with more renown.  
 
Methodologically, my selection of Grounded Theory may be questioned by proponents of either 
inductive or deductive approaches, both of which would have implied a different approach to the aim 
and objectives. The decisions regarding my frame (which could have been higher or more granular than 
municipality), the proxies (e.g., percentage of houses with electricity could have been used instead of 
water, to measure “services”) and the formulation of each proxy (I could have used income brackets as 
a discrete variable, instead of Percentage in Poverty, which was treated as continuous) can at each stage 
be questioned. While these selections could not be faultless, I took each step based on logical validity, 
applied uniformly on the available data. Related is a caveat concerning the ecological inference fallacy 
– that inferences cannot be made about individuals based on aggregate data from a group to which they 
happen to belong. Protests can be “place specific” – where place refers to a neighbourhood, section, or 
township, and the municipal frame does little to reveal the actual characteristics of such communities. 
The municipal frame blurs many other factors, too (e.g. poverty, by also including many non-destitute 
and rich). Future studies should attempt smaller aggregations, perhaps based on sub-samples of IRIS. 
 
The Machine Learning process did not yield perfect accuracy (and other metrics of fidelity), and there 
would have been many misclassifications of both protest vs non-protest, and of the three-way tumult 
scores. I take some comfort in the overall volume of events and the fact that, when considered on 
aggregate, the trends were consistent.  
 
The idea of statistical analysis may be criticised for presupposing deterministic path dependence, or for 
being positivistic in the face of a socially complex lattice of forces. For the actual statistical analysis, 
many paths remain unexplored. I did not test any nonlinear relations – an inquiry that may uncover 
hitherto-unseen dimensions of protest event analysis. For fear of losing explanatory power, and owing 
to space constraints, I also did not present any interaction terms in the feature-sets, which bring with 
them different insights. The cross-sectional structure of the data also implies that there is a danger of a 
measure of post-treatment variables included in the analysis (suggesting significant further 
investigations, perhaps using lag variables and repeated measures tests, before I will approach reliable 
claims of causality). 
 
As discussed at length, the measure for province is problematic (and was thus omitted from the 
statistical regressions, but included as a post hoc fixed effects model for each family). The findings of 
this measure may appear to insinuate that the numerically dominant ethnicity, often loosely demarcated 
by province, may have a bearing on protest, or levels of tumult. This would be a hasty generalisation, 
with several dimensions hitherto untested. It may be the case that socio-economic, demographic and 
governance factors are sufficiently different inter-provincially, and sufficiently similar intra-
provincially, that these conditions are reflected in the regressions are fit. It may equally be the case that 
there is a marked difference between policing styles and the quality of protest-data recording between 
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provinces, which translates into marked differences in how the provinces compare. In either case, it 
would be premature to move beyond speculation regarding the forces behind provincial trends. 
 
Finally, it would have been markedly more satisfying to be able to pronounce that “x” causes protest, 
and that “y” does not. However, as the journey of this study revealed, and the reader will appreciate, 
protest is too complex and context-specific to be hermeneutically frozen – and will not yield clear-cut 
answers. My statement in point 8.4.x above, is as far as I may go. I thus do not advance nomothetic 
claims, but do permit a few recommendations.   
 
8.6 Recommendations and next steps 
One of the reasons a protest’s origin is so nebulous and hard to determine is that studies of protest are 
not without ideological baggage. This investigation was not intended to chide commentators, say, for 
depicting irrational and irascible crowds, as much as it was concerned by the overabundance of theories 
about protest, some of which were plainly at odds with others – and this in the face of unexamined data 
on protest. However, deficient or tendentious causal claims, often based on small-n samples or case 
studies, may warrant some expiation, but my primary recommendation would be to guard against vague 
formulations of what is predicted. This thesis showed that scholars of protest would benefit from 
recognising the difference between the families of conceptualising protest, and thus, be much clearer in 
their formulations when commenting on “increases in protests”, etc. Notably, I recommend the measure 
of General propensity, where sufficiently-labelled data are available.   
 
Scholars, but also the police, would benefit from better capturing the specifics of the actors organising 
a protest to better understand the type of protest that occurred. Often, in the notes to the IRIS-set, 
Community and Labour-related protests appeared curiously similar, save for the body organising the 
intervention (that is, the actor). None of the data fields of IRIS is optimally used, and particularly the 
‘Motive’ and ‘Location’ categories should be improved for the system to be truly useful. The police 
also stand to benefit in their understanding of the trends, catalysts, and causes, by sharing the data with 
scholars of protest. 
 
Building on the insights of the present research, but reaching beyond its limitations, there is much more 
to learn about South African protest given the data. Different conceptualisations of protest, different 
theoretical claims, altered lenses, different proxy-values and operationalising of the theories, different 
geographic parsing and different, more complex, statistical tests, may all reveal important, new insights. 
 
Moving beyond the present data and expanding the dataset to include the period 2014 to the present 
would not only allow one to review feature performance given new data, but also measure how the 
nature of protest has changed in the intervening years. Moreover, using the same techniques as 
developed in Chapter 5, other datasets might be classified in the same manner, and rendered practicable 







8.7 Closing reflection 
Studies of the influence of local-level factors’ role in driving protest began with Almond and Verba 's 
The Civic Culture (1960). Moreover, it has been understood for some time that protests are motivated 
by grievances, group obligations and, often, a sense that a victory is obtainable (Finkel, Muller and Opp 
1989). However, we have an incomplete picture of how this plays out in different places, and at different 
times. 
 
Given the data, and the selected time-frame, I have established that the strongest indicators of the 
General Propensity to protest in South Africa are inequality, voter turnout, and the dependency ratio, 
supported by unemployment, local proportions of people with secondary education, and the quality of 
municipal governance. The General Propensity can be further separated into propensities for 
community and labour-related protest, respectively, further nuancing the role of the leading indicators. 
 
It is hard, and possibly futile, to seek to arrange causal factors in perfect conicity – there is not a faultless 
formula or explanatory calculation for protest. However, this does not mean that there is no asymptote 
of accuracy towards which one might strive. Indeed, as demonstrated in this thesis, there are plenty of 
ways to discern poor theories from robust ones, beginning by setting simplistic, monocausal claims 
aside, and proceeding to problematising both historically unreflexive and deterministic positions on 
types of protest.  
 
Historical change, so often the result of upheaval and struggle, happens on the level of the particular, 
with “the universal in the background”. Hegelians might say that apparently chaotic worldly particulars 
are used by “universal Reason” for its own purposes – and that these operate systematically, if 
contingently. 
 
To many commentators, it will be no surprise that South Africa is proclaimed a ‘world leader’ in protest. 
With one of the most unequal patterns of wealth distribution, rampant unemployment, a history of 
violence and segregation, and an incomplete transformation of society; the country reflects a palpably 
violent social order. Despite the passing of apartheid, protest remains a weapon and discourse of the 
powerless – whether seeking revolution, (re)integration, or recognition – and any direct political action 
signalling social distress ought to be regarded as momentous, if not rich with radical potentialities.  
 
In the end, this work is socially pessimistic, at least over the short run. The tide of protest will ebb only 
when either the underlying pressures are removed through a large restructuring of social relations, about 
which the state appears reluctant, or when the state closes down the public space that allows for the 
current forms of protest in the first instance. To many ordinary South Africans, predominantly the 
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Appendix 1:  




• ML is a process of discovering labels on hitherto unseen cases.  
• If labels are present in a dataset, one uses labelled examples to train a model. In IRIS, the labelled 
examples would be individual police records (ML uses “cases” to denote “rows”) that I marked as 
“Non-protest”, “Orderly Protest”, “Disruptive Protest”, or as “Violent Protest”.  
• Data scientists regard data as either labelled (when the labels are already present), or unlabelled, 
where a labelled record includes both feature(s) and label(s). An unlabelled example contains 
features but not the label.  
• Once a model is trained (by showing it labelled examples), I use that model to predict the label on 
unlabelled examples. Thus, the machine learning system effectively learns a function f : X → R 
such that f(xj) is a prediction of the true value (or class) of yj.207  In the protest example, unlabelled 
examples are “new” police records that I have not yet labelled. The data which is used in training 




• Supervised learning is ML based on labelled samples, with the aim of predicting the labels of 
unlabelled data. 
• Unsupervised learning is ML based on unlabelled samples – loosely, where the algorithm is to 




• Models define the relationship between features and label, and are broken into two steps: training 
and inference (or scoring).  
• Training refers to the creating or “learning” of the model. That is, one shows the model labelled 
examples and enables the model to gradually learn the relationships between features and label. 
• Inference involves applying the trained model to unlabelled examples. For example, during 
inference, I can predict “was this a protest?” for new unlabelled examples. 
• The prediction is unlikely to be correct in all instances. For instance, a protest classification model 




• Loss is the penalty for a bad prediction, which is used by a model to improve prediction. That is, 
loss is a number indicating how good or bad the model's prediction was on a single example. 
                                               
207 Thus, given training data consisting of a set of pairs (xi , yi) of samples xi ∈ X and their labels yi ∈ Y, a model 
is learned so that it can predict, to some degree of accuracy, the label yj for a previously unseen sample xj. 
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• In supervised learning, a machine learning algorithm builds a model by examining many examples 
and attempting to find a model that minimises loss; this process is called empirical risk 
minimisation. 
• Training a model simply means learning (determining) good values for all the weights and the bias 
from labelled examples, by going over the labelled examples several times, until loss is minimised 
to an acceptable level.  
 
5. Types of models 
 
In ML, a regression model always predicts continuous values. For example, regression models make 
predictions that answer questions like the following: 
• How many numbers of protests are likely to occur in this province in this year?  
• What is the probability that this protest will be violent?  
 
A classification model predicts discrete values (which may be orderly or not). For example, 
classification models make predictions that answer questions like the following: 
• Is a given incident protest or not protest? 
• Is this case orderly, disruptive or violent?  
 
In the case of the IRIS-set, affixing labels to the not-yet-labelled rows is a multiclass classification 
problem. 
 
6. Assumptions in ML 
 
Generally, ML modelling assumes: 
• That, if one uses labelled samples for supervised learning, one draws examples independently and 
identically at random from the distribution. 
• That the distribution is stationary: It doesn't change over time. 
• That one always deals with the same distribution: including training, validation, and test sets. 
 
7. A typical ML workflow 
 
The big data pipeline is a common guideline for data scientists. The order of processing tasks associated 
with ML typically conforms to this guideline, as outlined below. 
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From the table above, data acquisition refers to the gathering and storing of raw data; cleaning and 
annotation refers to treatments and removals to poor or missing data (including imputations of various 
kinds) in order to remove noise; and integration and aggregation refers to the assembly and structuring 
of data to be conducive to data-mining. 
 
The above process includes several feedback loops, much resembling the iterative nature of grounded 
theorising. Often, engineered data reveals previously hidden sources of noise – in my case, this implied 
that I visited each of the above steps at several times. While the pipeline appears as a linear flow, in 
reality, the data exploration process is non-linear, as each step is repeated as data is refined, noise is 
reduced, and as findings suggest new iterations of analysis.  
 
 
8. Assessment of classification models 
 
I use classification models in this thesis. Assessment of a model’s performance (on a test set, say) is 
done on the basis of correct in incorrect classifications. For this, the visualisation of a confusion matrix 
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 What the actual label was 































False positive True negative 
 
True positives (TP) are thus correctly predicted positive values, and true negatives (TN) correctly 
predicted negative values. On the other hand, false positives (FP) are cases that should have been 
classified as negative but were not, while false negatives (FN) are cases which should have been 
positive, but are not. The assessment values emanate from here. 
 
Accuracy is then the ratio of correctly predicted cases to all cases.  
Thus, Accuracy = [TP+TN / TP+TN+FN+FP] 
 
The misclassification rate is [1 – Accuracy]. 
 
Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted positive cases to the total predicted positive cases. Thus, 
Precision = [TP / TP+FP]. In the thesis, I also provide the “precision” for predicting negative cases, 
hence the X / Y notation in my text.  
 
Recall is the ratio of correctly predicted positive cases to the all cases in the positive class. Thus, Recall 
= [TP / TP+FN]. In the thesis, I also provide the “recall” for predicting negative cases, hence the X / Y 
notation in my text. 
 
9. One Vs. Rest Logistic Regression 
 
In Chapter 5.12, I discussed the “OvR” mode of doing multiclass logistic regressions. This refers to 
“one-vs-rest” logistic regression, where a (separate) model is trained for each class that is predicted, 
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Label Concept Phrases New Phrases Other Notes Rule
Grievance Capitalism Capitalism, neoliberalism, privatisation, privatise Kapitalisme, privatisasie, privatiseer, neoliberalisme - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Values Abuse, against xenophobia, mishandeling, teen xenofobie - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Conditions poverty, unemployment, jobs, armoede, werkloosheid, werke - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Contract end contracts expire, project end, completed einde van, voltooi - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Community recognitiontheir rights, recognition, regte, erkenning - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Demolitions destroyed, evicted, demolished, relocated, removal verskuif, vernietig, verplaas, - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Education (School or university or students) AND (fees, costs, teacher, permission, results, policy, allowed, shortage, not used, closed, residence)(Skool OR Universiteit OR Studente) AND (geld, fooie, koste, onderwyser, toestemming, uitslae, beleid, toegelaat, koshuis, uitslae, gesluit)- Multiple grievanc s ok
Grievance Election outcome Election AND ( (outcome, result, winner ) OR ( unfair, cheat, wrong, councillor ) ) Verkiesing AND (wenner, uitslag, uitslae) OR (onregverdig, verkeerd, wyk)- Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Electricity (Electricity OR Power OR connections ) and cost, price, supply, cut, disconnect (Elektrisiteit OR krag OR konneksie) AND koste, prys, verskaf, gesny, afgesny- Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Labour related (Work(ers) OR Company OR Employ(er) OR Labour OR Industrial OR Bosses OR strike OR management OR ?) AND (corrupt, fired, dismissed, policy, other people, hours, overtime, equipment, tools, salary, wages, cheque, food, water, transport, housing, accommodation, health, safety, living conditions, management, race, racism, racist, discrimination, subsidy, allowance, training, white, promotion, working conditions, increase, ?- Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Foreigners Foreigners, somali, Zimbabwe, xenophobic/a, Uitlanders, inkommers, vreemdelinge, somaliers, zimbabweers- Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Healthcare healthcare, nurses, hospital, clinic, doctors gesondheid, verpleegsters, hospitaal, kliniek, dokters - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Housing Housing, land, stands, Behuising, erwe, grond - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Internat Solidarity Embassy, solidarily with the people of, war, the situation in, - - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Intimidation by criminalintimidate AND (suspect OR criminal) (dreig OR intimideer) AND verdagte - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Judicial Court AND (attend, solidarity, gather, demonstrate, crowd, angry, support, ?) Hof AND (bywoon, ondersteun, groep, drom, skare) - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Labour brokers Labour broker(s) - - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Licencing Licence(s), permit(s) Lesensie, permitte - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Mining Mining, pollution, dirty, air, noise, cracking, cracked Myn, besoedeling, vuil, geraas, - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Muncipal disengage Not arrive, not come, failed to arrive, failed to come, not respond, not answer Nie gekom, nie geantwoord - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Municipal services Municipality and (Bills, billing, rates, council tax, corrupt(ion), illegal, council(lor), mayor, failed, waited, long time, years, consultation, feedback, information, old councillor, reinstate(d), reappointed, put back, toilets, sanitation, pipes, waterMunisipal teit AND (rekeninge, belasting, diens, dienste, korrupsie, raad, burgermees er, onw ttig, lank, jare, toilette, sanitasie, water, vullis, ongelukkig, wag al, aangestel- Multiple grievanc s ok
Grievance National govt Government, National - - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Food inspectors Inspectors, expired Inspekteurs - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Libraries Library Biblioteek - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Police Police AND (crime, policing, incident, drugs, gangs, arrests, suspects, wrongful, violence) (Polisie OR SAPS) AND (misdaad, poliseering, dwelms, bendes, gangs, arresteer, verkeerde, geweld, ongelukkig, kwaad )ADD: SAPS to EnglishMultipl  grievances k
Grievance Disaster response Disaster, flood, collapse, tornado, storm, Noodtoestand, vloed, ineengestort, inmekaar - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Services A  water, poor roads, quality of (the) roads, paaie, gehalte van pad - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Services B  service delivery dienslewering - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Proposed legislation  New law, legislation, proposed voorgestel, wetgewing - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Demarcation  to be part of, incorporated, demarcation, located, boundary deel van, grens - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Premier Premier, ? - - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Social grants  grant toelae - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Traditional governance (Tribal court OR imbizo OR Kgotla OR chief OR kgosi OR induna) AND (problem, dispute, challenge, fight, protest, gather, demonstrate)tradisionele, koning, inheemse - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Ratepayers abuse Ratepayers, taxpayers, association belastingbetalers, assosiasie ADD to English: AND NOT taxiMultiple grievances ok
Grievance Witchcraft Witchcraft, from the dead, muti Towery, moeti - Multiple grievances ok
Grievance Women's empowerment( Empowerment OR Rights) AND (female, women, woman) Vroueregte - Multiple grievances ok
Trigger Court hearing court, hearing, verskyn, hof - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Project begin not local, not from area, outside, only be local, only local people inkommers - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger National Strike COSATU, NUMSA, national strike, staking - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Dismissals Fired, suspended, dismissed, disciplin* afgedank, geskors, - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Wage disputes Payment, salary, cheque, overtime, wage, wages, remuneration, not paid, bonus, bonusses, percent, unfair betaling, salaris, oortyd, onbetaal, persent - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Evictions Evicted, relocated, red ants, demolition, relocation, removal, demolished Uitgesit, geskuif, afgebreek, - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Utility connections Disconnected, power is down, electricity is down, power AND cut, electricity AND cut, water, prepaid, Krag, elektrisiteit, - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Election related Party list, circulate, for councillor, the candidate, on the list, wrong candidate, want another person Lys, kandidaat, - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Non consultation did not arrive, failed to respond, did not come back, did not come Nie opgedaag - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Working conditions food, conditions, health, safety, equipment Kos, (gesondheid AND NOT studente), gereedskap - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Arrests Arrest, release gearresteer, vrygelaat - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Crime Event Crime, murder, kidnapped, was attacked, killed misdaad, moord, ontvoer, aangeval, vermoor - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Trigger Neoliberal logic Capitalism, privatisation, prvatise, privatize, Privatiseer, kapitalisme - One trigger only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Hostage Captive, hostage, lock-in gyselaar, ingesluit, toegesluit - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Attack Atack, Attack, Throw, threw, pelt, torch, choas, lost control, threatened, death threat aanval, gegooi, aangeval, getref, geslaan, gedreig, beheer verloor- One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Disrupt Tyre, Block, tire, burn, Fire, Bricks, Stones, Rubbish, Refuse, Binns, Bins, blokade, blockade, prevented, entrace, road, refuse to, prevent, disrupt, switch offBa de, blok, brand, brandgesteek, vullis, afblikke, verhoed, ingang, afgeskakelADD: Riot, rioting One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic M&M March AND Memorandum Optog AND Memorandum - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Vandalism damaged, vandalised, break, broke beskadig, gebreek, Move to position 4 One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Lock-out Locked, lock-out, lock, sit-in, uitgesluit Move to position 5 One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic March March Optog, Mars, Prosessie ADD: Procession One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Meeting Meet, meeting Vergadering - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Picket Picket, posters, placards, speakers, organiser, leader Plakaat, plakate, spreker, - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Demonstration Demonstrate Betoog, betogers - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Gathering Gather, Memorandum, group, people, sing, dance, dancing, toyi, Saamgedrom, drom, groep - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Vigil vigil waak - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Writter write, petition skryf, petisie - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Tactic Boycott boycot, boycott boikot - One tactic only, listed here in order of precedence
Actors Union COSATU, FOSATU, NEHAWU, SATAWU, Allied, AMCU, Nuhhrccaw, Denosa, HOSPERSA, NPSWU, NUPSAW, SADNU, POPCRU, NASUWU, IMATU, Union, Shop stewart, Shop steward, Shopsteward, Shopstewart, Shop-steward, Shop-stewart- - Multiple actors ok
Actors Political Party ANC, Congress, DA, EFF, IFP, NFP, Cope, UDM, SACP, ACDP Alliansie, (party AND NOT attended, people, DJ, concert, peacfull, ended)- Multiple actors ok
Actors Civic org association, residents, concerned, ratepayers, taxpayers, NGO, organisation, assosiasie, inwoners, burgers, organisasie - Multiple actors ok
Actors Church church, congregation, believers, temple, kerk, kerkgangers, lidmate, tempel, sinagogoe, moskee ADD: mosque, synagogeMultiple actors ok
Location Informal area Shacks, sharks, informal, hostel, squatter, camp, township, the location informele, plakkers, kamp, lokasie - Multiple locations ok
Location Court Court, hearing Hof, verhoor - Multiple locations ok
Location Business premises company, business, gate, premises, factory, Maatskappy, hek, fabriek, - Multiple locations ok
Location Stadium Stadium, sports field stadion - Multiple locations ok
Location Church church, congregation, believers, temple, kerk, gemeente, gelowigers, tempel, joods, jode, moslem ADD: muslim, jewishMultiple locations ok
Location School Teacher, teachers, headmaster, school, primary, secondary, highschool, learners, pupils Onderwysers, skoolhoof, hoof, laerskool, hoerskool, leerders Note: this is new Multiple locations ok
Location Tertiary Edu Students, Campus, Univeristy, college Studente, Universiteit, kampus, kollege Note: this is new Multiple locations ok
Weapons Crowd weapons Weapon, Gun, Knife, Traditional weapons, knobkieries, kieries, spears wapen, mes, sambok, sjambok, Remove: Gun Multiple weapons ok
Weapons Crowd projectiles (Throw OR Threw OR Attack(ed) ) AND ( Stones, rocks, bricks, brike, ) (Gooi OR Gegooi OR aangeval OR bestook OR ) AND (klippe, bakstene, stene)- Multiple weapons ok
Weapons Police weapons Cannon, canon, shotgun, s/gun, rubber, stungrenade, stun grenade, stuntgrenade, tear gas, teargas geweer, kanon, hael, knetterwetter, traangas ADD: Gun Multiple weapons ok
Eventuality Police attack Police AND (beat, raid, injury, rubber, stungrenade, stuntgrenade, tear, resisted, brutality, ) Polisie AND (geweld, beseer, besering, geweer, geskiet, traangas)- Multiple eventualities ok
Eventuality Vigilantism Beat, beating, mob justice, necklace, necklacing, vigilantes, Geslaan, - Multiple eventualities ok
Curiosity Movements Rebel, rebellion, uprising, movement, beweging, - Multiple anomalies ok
Curiosity Special Keywords Lunch, scab(s), swearing, loot, looting, SABC, process, procedure, application, pamphlet, middagete, vloek, buit, skel - Multiple anomalies ok
Non-protest Football matches Football, soccer, PSL, score, sokker - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Other sport Cricket, rugby, games, athletics, race, marathon krieket, sport, atletiek, resies, - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Tribal court meetingsTribal court, traditional court, imbizo, - - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Funerals Memorial, funeral, burial, after tears, mourners begrafnis, - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Church Church service, ZCC, Shembe, prayer, dedication kerkdiens - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Election campaigns Campaign, rally, door to door, register, registration ((car OR cars) AND procession) - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Election debates Debate, Various candidates Debat, kandidate - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Election days Vote, voting, voting station, polling station, Stemlokaal, stem, - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest Taxi violence Taxi, taxis, taxi drivers, over routes Taksie, taksi - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
Non-protest 16 Days of activism days of activism, against women, abuse, aktivisme - Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics OR Actor>
Non-protest Exhibitions Career, hobby, carnival, exhibition, inauguration, unveiling, concert, DJ, loopbaan, loopbane, karnival, uitstalling, inhuldiging, konsert, opening- Can discard, unless comment also contains any Grievance OR Trigger OR Tactics>
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Appendix 3:  
Crowd Size Counts 
 





















Unclear 47906 44 40 400 1038 2900 2 12000 19 
15 934 45 159 450 134 3000 431 13000 5 
16 309 46 43 500 1866 3100 1 14000 3 
17 167 47 40 550 42 3200 4 15000 45 
18 983 48 52 600 611 3400 4 16000 11 
19 100 49 37 650 43 3500 93 17000 3 
20 1904 50 3148 700 379 3600 1 18000 8 
21 169 55 87 750 45 3700 1 19000 1 
22 149 60 1494 800 457 3800 6 20000 15 
23 134 65 70 850 12 3900 1 25000 13 
24 169 70 866 900 103 4000 185 30000 13 
25 606 75 95 950 7 4100 9 35000 6 
26 123 80 1211 1000 1036 4200 4 40000 9 
27 115 85 48 1100 21 4300 2 45000 4 
28 111 90 169 1200 171 4400 1 50000 6 
29 75 95 27 1300 49 4500 27 60000 3 
30 2283 100 3124 1400 28 4700 2 70000 4 
31 93 110 55 1500 484 4800 2 80000 1 
32 113 120 599 1600 30 5000 357 100000 2 
33 87 130 110 1700 7 5500 10   
34 60 140 89 1800 35 6000 110   
35 282 150 2357 1900 4 6500 10   
36 77 160 83 2000 832 7000 73   
37 55 170 39 2100 3 7500 7   
38 102 180 129 2200 24 8000 72   
39 59 190 9 2300 16 8500 2   
40 1465 200 2990 2500 192 9000 16   
41 45 250 1014 2600 5 9500 2   
42 51 300 2382 2700 4 10000 59   
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Appendix 4:  
Average Crowd Size per Municipality 
Table: Average crowd size of main protests types per municipality, South Africa 1997-2013 
 Community protest  Labour-related protest 
!Kheis 490 270 
//Khara Hais 2000 14980 
Abaqulusi 26930 7890 
Aganang 1940 300 
Albert Luthuli 1310 340 
Amahlathi 7760 1010 
Ba-Phalaborwa 6520 26350 
Baviaans 1040 200 
Beaufort West 8060 870 
Bela-Bela 3330 1500 
Bergrivier 1180 410 
Bitou 6500 4910 
Blouberg 12820 10880 
Blue Crane Route 490 430 
Breede Valley 22470 10010 
Buffalo City 147830 250670 
Bushbuckridge 13640 2210 
Camdeboo 930 480 
Cape Agulhas 3980 190 
Cederberg 3630 150 
City of Cape Town 496780 190340 
City of Johannesburg 528130 580430 
City of Matlosana 17090 119480 
City of Tshwane 281710 384850 
Dannhauser 590 170 
Dihlabeng 20550 7590 
Dikgatlong 7420 1590 
Dipaleseng 9930 50 
Ditsobotla 11360 16620 
Dr JS Moroka 14220 87260 
Drakenstein 29700 11280 
eDumbe 8840 11030 
Ekurhuleni 239290 152480 
Elias Motsoaledi 17910 28380 
Elundini 11310 510 
eMadlangeni 5240 1070 
Emakhazeni 3570 630 
Emalahleni 26930 53120 
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Emalahleni EC 8240 1450 
Emfuleni 124450 40340 
Emnambithi/Ladysmith 11850 7580 
Emthanjeni 1270 910 
Endumeni 3260 750 
Engcobo 530 50 
Ephraim Mogale 6900 3180 
eThekwini 178210 222110 
Ezingoleni 2250 200 
Fetakgomo 11910 11190 
Ga-Segonyana 15000 1110 
Gamagara 5250 2730 
Gariep 1070 60 
George 25460 24650 
Govan Mbeki 22490 13680 
Great Kei 890 80 
Greater Giyani 18250 12080 
Greater Kokstad 6840 1000 
Greater Letaba 3650 1420 
Greater Taung 13560 5840 
Greater Tubatse 6020 61970 
Greater Tzaneen 21690 10220 
Hantam 720 470 
Hessequa 3640 210 
Hibiscus Coast 13290 5580 
Hlabisa 8900 6990 
Ikwezi 1370 1110 
Imbabazane 11640 12140 
Impendle 260 300 
Indaka 7000 400 
Ingwe 770 210 
Inkwanca 13400 620 
Intsika Yethu 1150 2600 
Inxuba Yethemba 1130 2680 
Joe Morolong 3330 3640 
Jozini 4240 5180 
Kagisano/Molopo 1450 1240 
Kai !Garib 1010 500 
Kamiesberg 80 0 
Kannaland 4180 520 
Kareeberg 0 40 
Karoo Hoogland 20 0 
Kgatelopele 660 560 
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Kgetlengrivier 2570 9140 
Khai-Ma 910 900 
King Sabata Dalindyebo 20010 33340 
Knysna 16290 3140 
Kopanong 5540 250 
Kou-Kamma 1550 1510 
Kouga 6170 10710 
Kwa Sani 30 100 
KwaDukuza 2860 80 
Laingsburg 20 20 
Langeberg 5700 3800 
Lekwa 1050 6840 
Lekwa-Teemane 2370 4480 
Lepele-Nkumpi 4510 16480 
Lephalale 2900 34000 
Lesedi 32070 29710 
Letsemeng 4860 110 
Lukanji 58160 25030 
Madibeng 38330 55910 
Mafikeng 18590 54880 
Mafube 65160 870 
Magareng 2660 620 
Makana 6790 4890 
Makhado 12490 3360 
Makhuduthamaga 23820 63650 
Maletswai 5910 2450 
Maluti a Phofung 39650 60250 
Mamusa 27720 2990 
Mandeni 12800 13470 
Mangaung 66710 58020 
Mantsopa 1570 1130 
Maphumulo 6850 11670 
Maquassi Hills 11430 2020 
Maruleng 140 1130 
Masilonyana 3880 79050 
Matatiele 680 300 
Matjhabeng 61080 58600 
Matzikama 400 370 
Mbhashe 3120 0 
Mbizana 30 100 
Mbombela 49520 78850 
Merafong City 78600 22450 
Metsimaholo 24350 11800 
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Mfolozi 1060 7970 
Mhlontlo 8590 8670 
Midvaal 23550 3880 
Mier 1240 40 
Mkhambathini 23680 13470 
Mkhondo 2620 570 
Mnquma 9820 2240 
Modimolle 3920 1480 
Mogalakwena 29910 22490 
Mogale City 24610 8670 
Mohokare 6940 100 
Molemole 4270 730 
Mookgopong 800 1960 
Moqhaka 14530 19440 
Moretele 4420 720 
Moses Kotane 4020 16960 
Mossel Bay 12120 15220 
Mpofana 1070 1760 
Msinga 1050 7880 
Msukaligwa 5430 7720 
Mthonjaneni 530 16320 
Mtubatuba 4980 12550 
Musina 710 3410 
Mutale 770 1310 
Nala 29100 1030 
Naledi 9190 5500 
Naledi FS 1540 130 
Nama Khoi 770 12490 
Ndlambe 460 610 
Ndwedwe 0 0 
Nelson Mandela Bay 268990 300260 
Newcastle 5220 18390 
Ngqushwa 2500 120 
Ngquza Hill 21710 10400 
Ngwathe 21110 2890 
Nkandla 230 13260 
Nketoana 7870 3300 
Nkomazi 21990 21850 
Nkonkobe 6320 4070 
Nongoma 120100 7010 
Nqutu 900 140 
Ntabankulu 2710 3230 
Ntambanana 530 20 
 
Bibliography and Appendices 235 
Nxuba 4430 20 
Nyandeni 7640 160 
Okhahlamba 4030 740 
Oudtshoorn 28620 6790 
Overstrand 3680 810 
Phokwane 4920 600 
Phumelela 7290 920 
Pixley Ka Seme 5460 530 
Polokwane 28730 240210 
Port St Johns 9120 6920 
Prince Albert 320 80 
Ramotshere Moiloa 3590 6140 
Randfontein 80880 8530 
Ratlou 3730 2500 
Renosterberg 390 50 
Richmond 9430 1080 
Richtersveld 910 3860 
Rustenburg 47660 269810 
Sakhisizwe 2540 0 
Saldanha Bay 9100 12220 
Senqu 37890 5780 
Setsoto 23460 5310 
Siyacuma 970 890 
Siyathemba 230 200 
Sol Plaatjie 13840 26460 
Stellenbosch 7350 4360 
Steve Tshwete 9680 6250 
Sundays River Valley 2310 22280 
Swartland 1300 4370 
Swellendam 2790 1440 
Thaba Chweu 2220 4680 
Thabazimbi 6890 87800 
The Big 5 False Bay 750 30 
The Msunduzi 71240 113130 
Theewaterskloof 8010 5000 
Thembelihle 390 160 
Thembisile 30180 16190 
Thulamela 26740 51740 
Tlokwe City Council 8060 19860 
Tokologo 1110 480 
Tsantsabane 1440 4120 
Tsolwana 2710 0 
Tswaing 4650 7830 
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Tswelopele 2740 60 
Ubuhlebezwe 20 2330 
Ubuntu 220 670 
Ulundi 20510 32360 
Umdoni 2580 2620 
Umhlabuyalingana 11080 68850 
uMhlathuze 15040 190890 
Umjindi 340 1960 
uMlalazi 2990 550 
uMngeni 2240 9920 
uMshwathi 3190 5690 
Umtshezi 5680 1660 
UMuziwabantu 610 1280 
Umvoti 9560 7150 
Umzimkhulu 570 2790 
Umzimvubu 2830 790 
Umzumbe 11730 720 
UPhongolo 2510 810 
Usobomvu 6190 120 
Ventersdorp 12790 1030 
Victor Khanye 17960 260 
Vulamehlo 2820 760 
Westonaria 29580 147050 
Witzenberg 7630 9380 
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Appendix 5:  
Initial Machine Learning Model Performance 
 
1. Bayesian Models 
 
Bayes’ Theorem is an equation describing the relationship of conditional probabilities of statistical 
quantities.208 Bayesian algorithms use the probabilities of all attributes belonging to a class to make a 
prediction about future class membership. The probability of each class value, given a value of an 
attribute, is called the “conditional probability”. By multiplying the conditional probabilities together 
for each attribute, for a given class value, one has the probability of a case belonging to that class. 
 
a. Naïve Bayesian family 
 
The Naïve Bayesian family of algorithms simplifies the calculation of probabilities by assuming that 
the probability of each attribute belonging to a given class value is independent of all other attributes. 
This is a strong assumption, and not true in the case of the IRIS-set, yet the algorithms generally remain 
robust amid violations of independence (i.e. feature collinearity and multicollinearity [Zhang and Su 




Since the probability of the four possible values of the targets remained constant throughout the ML 
process, and the features were now not text but a matrix of word-counts, my first approach was to test 
the performance of the Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier.209 
 
Implementing the Multinomial Naïve Bayes algorithm (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved the 
following evaluation scores: 
 
Accuracy:  0.66 
Precision:  0.32 / 0.68 
Recall:  0.17 / 0.81 
 
                                               
208 For an in-depth discussion, see Zhang and Su (2004). 
209 For the method, formulae and code examples, see the scikit-learn guide on Naïve Bayes models (https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/modules/naive_bayes.html) or (Pedregosa et al. 2011) 
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Figure 10.1: Confusion matrix for Naive Bayes Multinomial Classifier performance on IRIS-set sample 
 
Using The Natural Language Toolkit for python (Bird, Klein and Loper 2009), and thus reverting to the 
“Notes” as features, as opposed to the Keyword model, the Naïve Bayes Multinomial Classifier still 




Since the test/train set suffers from class imbalance, I next decided to test Complement Naïve Bayes, 
which adapts the Multinomial Naïve Bayes learner by using the complement of each class to compute 
weights.  
 
Implementing this algorithm (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved the following evaluation scores: 
 
Accuracy 0.58 
Precision 0.09 / 0.69 
Recall  0.11 / 0.54 
 
Using The Natural Language Toolkit for python (Bird et al. 2008), and thus reverting to the “Notes” 




Bernoulli Naïve Bayes adjusts the Multinomial Naïve Bayes algorithm by assuming that the data is 
distributed according to multivariate Bernoulli distributions, which implies that the data has to be 
binary. 
 
Implementing the Bernoulli Naïve Bayes algorithm (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved the following 
evaluation scores: 
                                               
210 After the standard process of cleaning, removing stop words, changing text to lower case, removing 
punctuation, removing bad characters, converting the text to a matrix of token counts (Count Vectorizer), and 
transforming the count matrix to a normalized tf-idf representation (text frequency – inter-document frequency 
transformer). See Bird, Klein and Loper (2008), for details of this process. 
211 Depending on the random state. 
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Accuracy:   0.66 
Precision: 0.35 / 0.68  
Recall:  0.22 / 0.78 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Confusion matrix for Bernoulli Naive Bayes Classifier performance on IRIS-set sample 
 
 
2. Multiclass Logistic Regression 
 
The simple logistic regression can be extended to solve multiclass prediction problems by using the 
One-versus-Rest technique. Here, we train one classifier per class, where this particular class is treated 
as the “positive” class, and all other classes are treated as the “negative”. This treatment is then repeated 
so that each of the classes is once held as the “positive class” (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 28). 
 
Having implemented the Multiclass Logistic Regression (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved  evaluation 
scores very similar to that of the Bernoulli Naïve Bayes leaner: 
 
Accuracy: 0.66 
Precision: 0.33 / 0.69 
Recall:  0.17 / 0.80 
 
   
3. Multiclass Support Vector Classifiers 
 
Support Vector Machine algorithms can be extended to implement the “one versus all” (OVA) approach 
for multiclass classification, and generally work well when there are  
nonlinear decision boundaries (Raschka & Mirajalili 2017: 50). 
 
Using my 1000 labelled cases (train-test split at 70/30), I achieved the following evaluation scores:  
 
Accuracy: 0.68 
Precision: 0.38 / 0.72 
Recall:  0.08 / 0.78 
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4. Decision Trees 
 
Decision Trees are models that break down data into categories based on series of “tests”, which are 
presented in order of diminishing information gain. The results are a highly interpretable flowchart of 
decisions, which each divide the remaining cases based on one feature (Raschka and Mirajalili 2017: 
89). 
 
My evaluation metrics: 
Accuracy: 0.60 
Precision: 0.64 / 0.63 
Recall:  0.77 / 0.55 
 
The SAS-team also fitted a Decision Tree; after some hyperparameter tuning, they achieved a validation 
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Appendix 6: Explanations of variables for initial 
exploratory regression models 
The table reminds that count models operated without regard to the size of the population, while Per 





























































































































days  Additional note 
1 X X            15 89 052 n/a n/a  
2 X    X         9 89 052 51 770 589 n/a  
3    X  X        9 33 744 51 770 589 26 505 184  
4 X    X X        9 33 744 51 770 589 26 505 184  
5 X    X X        9 89 052 51 770 589 24 110 291  
6 X    X X        9 33 744 51 770 589 31 294 970  
7 X   X X X        9 33 744 51 770 589 9 249 952  
8    X    X X X X X  9 23 469 n/a n/a  
9    X X X  X X X X X  9 23 469 51 770 589 6 432 024  
10    X   X       9 n/a n/a n/a Per capita not considered 
11    X   X       9 33 744 n/a n/a  
12    X    X      9 8 306 n/a n/a  
13    X X   X      9 8 306 51 770 589 n/a  
14    X     X     9 10 361 n/a n/a  
15    X X    X     9 10 361 51 770 589 n/a  
16 X            X 9 116 391 n/a n/a  
17 X    X        X 9 116 391 51 770 589 n/a  
18  X X     X X X X X  9 23 469 n/a n/a  
19  X X  X   X X X X X  15 23 469 44 819 784 n/a  
20  X X  X   X      15 8 306 44 819 784 n/a  
21  X X  X    X     15 10 361 44 819 784 n/a  
22  X X      X     15 10 361 n/a n/a  
23  X X    X       15 n/a n/a n/a  
24 X X            15 89 052 n/a n/a Target is Ln(Count) 
25 X             9 89 052 n/a n/a Target is Ln(Count) 
26 X             9 89 052 n/a n/a  
27   X     X X X X X  9 23 469 n/a n/a  
28   X  X   X X X X X  9 23 469 44 819 784 n/a  
29   X  X   X      9 8 306 44 819 784 n/a  
30   X  X    X     9 10 361 44 819 784 n/a  
31   X      X     9 10 361 n/a n/a  
32   X    X       9 n/a n/a n/a  
33 X             10 89 052 n/a n/a Added Feature: LnPop) 
 
Listing the first five regressions, they are: 
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i. Regressing (GLM) “DelivG”, “DelivW”, “DemA”, “DemB”, “Dens”, “Desig”, “Depriv”, 
“Desp”, and “Xen” (the features), as well as “Dens3”, “Dens4”, “TradInf”,  “DemC”, “DemD”, 
“Matric” (the additional features) against “Nprot” (all protest incidents between 1997-2013, 
regardless of type of protest), where, for each municipality, a protest event is counted once only 
(234 municipalities, 15 features, sum of all protests = 89 052). See section 9.1. for a discussion 
of the composition of the various features. 
 
ii. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013, where, for each 
municipality, the number of protests is divided by the population as in 2011 (234 municipalities, 
9 features, sum of protests = 89 052, sum of total population = 51 770 589). 
 
iii. Regressing the features against all person-days of protest, where person-days is the number of 
protest incidents between 2009-2013 multiplied with the average size of protest for every 
respective municipality (allocating 50 participants to protests of “uncertain size”). The size of 
the municipality is not taken into account (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum of protests = 
33 744, total person-days = 24 110 291). 
 
iv. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013, where, for each 
municipality, I consider the average size of protest (allocating protests of “uncertain” size to 
the average size of protest for that particular municipality) over the number people of the 
particular municipality in 2011 (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum of protests = 33 744, total 
person-days = 26 505 184, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
v. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013, where, for each 
municipality, I consider the average size of protest (allocating protests of “uncertain” size to 50 
people, which is smaller than the average size of protest for that particular municipality) over 
the number people of the particular municipality in 2011 (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum 
of protests = 89 052, total person-days = 24 110 291, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
vi. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013, where, for each 
municipality, I consider the average size of protest (allocating protests of “uncertain” size to 50 
people, which is smaller than the average size of protest for that particular municipality) over 
the number people of the particular municipality in 2011 (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum 
of protests = 89 052, total person-days = 24 110 291, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
vii. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013, where, for each 
municipality, I consider the average size of protest (allocating protests of “uncertain” size to 
200 people, which is the modal number for the average size of protest for the period 1997-
2013) over the number people of the particular municipality in 2011 (234 municipalities, 9 
features, sum of protests = 33 744, total person-days = 31 294 970, total population = 51 770 
589). 
 
viii. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 2009-2013, where, for each 
municipality, I consider the average size of protest (allocating protests of “uncertain” size to 
200 people, which is the modal number for the average size of protest for the period 1997-
2013) over the number people of the particular municipality in 2011 (234 municipalities, 9 
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ix. Regressing the features against the sum of Community protests, Labour-related protests, 
National-aimed protests, Police and Crime related protests and Education and Health Related 
protests for the period between 2009 and 2013 (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum of protests 
= 23 469). 
 
x. Regressing the features against the sum of Community protests, labour-related protests, 
national-aimed protests, police and crime-related protests, and education and health-related 
protests for the period between 2009 and 2013, multiplied by the size of typical protests for 
each respective municipality (assigning protests of uncertain size to 50 people), divided by the 
2011 population of each respective municipality (234 municipalities, 9 features, sum of protests 
= 23 469, number of person-days protesting = 6 432 024, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
xi. Regressing the features against the levels of tumult per municipality for the period 2009-2013, 
where each of the 234 municipalities is awarded a tumult score (see below). 
 
xii. Regressing the features against the levels of tumult per municipality for the period 2009-2013, 
where each municipality is awarded a tumult score, multiplied by the number of protests in 
each municipality for the same period (234 municipalities, number of protests = 33 744). 
 
xiii. Regressing the features against the count of community protest, per municipality, for the period 
2009-2013 (234 municipalities, number of protests = 8 306). 
 
xiv. Regressing the features against the count of community protest (for the period 2009-2013), per 
municipality, divided by the 2011 population of each respective municipality (234 
municipalities, number of protests = 8 306, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
xv. Regressing the features against the count of Labour-related protest, per municipality, for the 
period 2009-2013 (234 municipalities, number of protests = 10 361). 
 
xvi. Regressing the features against the count of Labour-related protest (for the period 2009-2013) 
per municipality, divided by the 2011 population of each respective municipality (234 
municipalities, number of protests = 10 361, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
xvii. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013 (regardless of type of 
protest), where, for each municipality, a protest event is permitted to be counted more than once 
in the case where it involved grievances related to more than one category of protest. Here, a 
single protest event mobilising people against poor water quality, high rates of crime and the 
corruption of national politicians would be counted as 3 “counts”. The maximum count per 
protest event is 7, the average is 1.31 (234 municipalities, Number of protests = 116 391). 
 
xviii. Regressing the features against all protest incidents between 1997-2013 (regardless of type of 
protest), where, for each municipality, a protest event is permitted to be counted more than once 
in the case where it involved grievances related to more than one category of protest, divided 
by the 2011 population for each respective municipality. (234 municipalities, Number of 
protests = 116 391, total population = 51 770 589). 
 
xix. Regressing the features and the additional features against the sum, per municipality (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all community-
related, labour-related, crime-related, health and education-related and national-directed protest 
for the period between 1999 and 2003 (234 municipalities, incidents = 23 469).  
 
xx. Regressing the features and the additional features against the sum, per municipality (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Community-
related, Labour-related, Crime-related, Health and Education-related and Nationally-directed 
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protest for the period between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal population 
as at 2001 (234 municipalities, incidents = 23 469, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxi. Regressing the features and additional features against the sum, per municipality (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Community-
related protest for the period between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal 
population as at 2001 (234 municipalities, incidents = 8 306, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxii. Regressing the features and additional features against the sum, per municipality (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Labour-related 
protest for the period between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal population 
as at 2001 (234 municipalities, incidents = 10 361, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxiii. Regressing the features and additional features against the sum, per municipality (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Labour-related 
protest for the period between 1999 and 2003 (234 municipalities, incidents = 10 361). 
 
xxiv. Regressing the features and additional features against the level of tumult, for each of the 234 
municipalities (using a weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011). 
 
xxv. Regressing the features and additional features against the logarithm (base 10) of protest per 
municipality 
 
xxvi. Regressing the features against the natural logarithm of protest per municipality. 
 
xxvii. Regressing the features and additional features against the natural logarithm of protest per 
municipality. 
 
xxviii. Regressing the features against the sum, per municipality (using a weighting so that 
municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all community-related, labour-related, 
crime-related, health and education-related and national-directed protest for the period between 
1999 and 2003 (234 municipalities, incidents = 23 469).  
 
xxix. Regressing the features against the sum, per municipality (using a weighting so that 
municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Community-related, Labour-related, 
Crime-related, Health and Education-related and Nationally-directed protest for the period 
between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal population as at 2001 (234 
municipalities, incidents = 23 469, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxx. Regressing the features against the sum, per municipality (using a weighting so that 
municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Community-related protest for the 
period between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal population as at 2001 (234 
municipalities, incidents = 8 306, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxxi. Regressing the features against the sum, per municipality (using a weighting so that 
municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Labour-related protest for the period 
between 1999 and 2003, divided by the respective municipal population as at 2001 (234 
municipalities, incidents = 10 361, population = 44 819 784). 
 
xxxii. Regressing the features against the sum, per municipality (using a weighting so that 
municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011), of all Labour-related protest for the period 
between 1999 and 2003 (234 municipalities, incidents = 10 361). 
 
xxxiii. Regressing the features against the level of tumult, for each of the 234 municipalities (using a 
weighting so that municipalities are presented as demarcated in 2011). 
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Appendix 7:  
The rise of the term “Service Delivery Protests” 
 
 
Community protests, a subset of “protests”, followed the same pattern. In 1997 there were 1064, 
whereas in 2013, 2137 were recorded. It is noteworthy that, over this time, the term “service delivery 
protest” became popular, and began to be used by some (e.g., Booysen 2007) as a proxy term for 
community protest. The South African Police Service followed this trend – from the figure below, it is 






Figure 10.3: Number of protests and number of protest incidents containing the bigram “service delivery”, 1997-
2013, from the ML set.  
 
The figure above shows how the relationship between community protests and total protests remained 























Number of protest incidents "Service Delivery" label used by SAPS
Community Protests
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Appendix 8: Municipal Tumult Scores 
!Kheis 0.79 Elundini 0.10 Ingwe 0.79 Magareng 0.77 Mookgopong 0.60 Oudtshoorn 0.54 Thulamela 0.55 
//Khara Hais 0.61 Emadlangeni 0.10 Inkwanca 0.78 Makana 0.28 Moqhaka 0.74 Overstrand 0.68 Tlokwe City Council 0.36 
Abaqulusi 0.44 Emakhazeni 0.78 Intsika Yethu 0.10 Makhado 0.49 Moretele 0.47 Phokwane 0.81 Tokologo 0.65 
Aganang 0.55 Emalahleni EC 0.55 Inxuba Yethemba 0.37 Makhuduthamaga 0.53 Moses Kotane 0.51 Phumelela 0.79 Tsantsabane 0.77 
Albert Luthuli 0.66 Emalahleni MP 0.72 Joe Morolong 0.55 Maletswai 0.70 Mossel Bay 0.72 Pixley Ka Seme 0.73 Tsolwana 0.57 
Amahlathi 0.20 Emfuleni 0.76 Jozini 0.17 Maluti a Phofung 0.74 Mpofana 0.68 Polokwane 0.39 Tswaing 0.36 
Ba-Phalaborwa 0.22 Emnambithi/Ladysmith 0.33 Kagisano/Molopo 0.50 Mamusa 0.63 Msinga 0.91 Port St Johns 0.47 Tswelopele 0.51 
Baviaans 0.10 Emthanjeni 0.81 Kai !Garib 0.70 Mandeni 0.65 Msukaligwa 0.71 Prince Albert 0.10 Ubuhlebezwe 0.80 
Beaufort West 0.68 Endumeni 0.55 Kamiesberg 0.00 Mangaung 0.54 Mthonjaneni 0.22 Ramotshere Moiloa 0.75 Ubuntu 1.00 
Bela-Bela 0.60 Engcobo 0.45 Kannaland 0.61 Mantsopa 0.80 Mtubatuba 0.38 Randfontein 0.78 Ulundi 0.59 
Bergrivier 0.53 Ephraim Mogale 0.16 Kareeberg 0.93 Maphumulo 0.70 Musina 0.47 Ratlou 0.74 Umdoni 0.52 
Bitou 0.68 eThekwini 0.70 Karoo Hoogland 0.10 Maquassi Hills 0.72 Mutale 0.48 Renosterberg 0.73 Umhlabuyalingana 0.21 
Blouberg 0.37 Ezingoleni 0.77 Kgatelopele 0.80 Maruleng 0.26 Nala 0.68 Richmond 0.49 uMhlathuze 0.52 
Blue Crane Route 0.70 Fetakgomo 0.49 Kgetlengrivier 0.40 Masilonyana 0.56 Naledi FS 0.41 Richtersveld 0.83 Umjindi 0.75 
Breede Valley 0.88 Gamagara 0.79 Khâi-Ma 0.23 Matatiele 0.10 Naledi NW 0.49 Rustenburg 0.60 uMlalazi 0.59 
Buffalo City 0.67 Gariep 0.25 King Sabata Dalindyebo 0.35 Matjhabeng 0.72 Nama Khoi 0.73 Sakhisizwe 0.10 uMngeni 0.40 
Bushbuckridge 0.87 Ga-Segonyana 0.82 Knysna 0.74 Matzikama 0.72 Ndlambe 0.88 Saldanha Bay 0.68 uMshwathi 0.23 
Camdeboo 0.10 George 0.58 Kopanong 0.60 Mbhashe 0.76 Ndwedwe 0.00 Senqu 0.61 Umsobomvu 0.84 
Cape Agulhas 0.42 Govan Mbeki 0.82 Kouga 0.44 Mbizana 0.10 Nelson Mandela Bay 0.53 Setsoto 0.75 Umtshezi 0.64 
Cederberg 0.73 Great Kei 0.10 Kou-Kamma 0.10 Mbombela 0.79 Newcastle 0.12 Siyancuma 0.85 UMuziwabantu 0.10 
City of Cape Town 0.73 Greater Giyani 0.35 Kwa Sani 0.10 Merafong City 0.66 Ngqushwa 0.79 Siyathemba 0.33 Umvoti 0.77 
City of Johannesburg 0.65 Greater Kokstad 0.53 KwaDukuza 0.79 Metsimaholo 0.72 Ngquza Hill 0.53 Sol Plaatjie 0.60 Umzimkhulu 0.56 
City of Matlosana 0.56 Greater Letaba 0.23 Laingsburg 0.10 Mfolozi 0.17 Ngwathe 0.72 Stellenbosch 0.86 Umzimvubu 0.13 
City of Tshwane 0.67 Greater Taung 0.72 Langeberg 0.88 Mhlontlo 0.54 Nkandla 0.52 Steve Tshwete 0.80 Umzumbe 0.64 
Dannhauser 0.10 Greater Tubatse 0.60 Lekwa 0.72 Midvaal 0.64 Nketoana 0.56 Sundays River Valley 0.61 UPhongolo 0.10 
Dihlabeng 0.52 Greater Tzaneen 0.38 Lekwa-Teemane 0.64 Mier 0.92 Nkomazi 0.82 Swartland 0.74 Ventersdorp 0.74 
Dikgatlong 0.82 Hantam 0.33 Lepele-Nkumpi 0.41 Mkhambathini 0.66 Nkonkobe 0.69 Swellendam 0.76 Victor Khanye 0.72 
Dipaleseng 0.74 Hessequa 0.55 Lephalale 0.36 Mkhondo 0.70 Nongoma 0.56 Thaba Chweu 0.74 Vulamehlo 0.60 
Ditsobotla 0.43 Hibiscus Coast 0.61 Lesedi 0.64 Mnquma 0.73 Nqutu 0.10 Thabazimbi 0.59 Westonaria 0.74 
Dr JS Moroka 0.50 Hlabisa 0.57 Letsemeng 0.75 Modimolle 0.37 Ntabankulu 0.68 The Big 5 False Bay 0.55 Witzenberg 0.88 
Drakenstein 0.68 Ikwezi 0.10 Lukanji 0.41 Mogalakwena 0.37 Ntambanana 0.40 The Msunduzi 0.63   
eDumbe 0.81 Imbabazane 0.59 Madibeng 0.54 Mogale City 0.79 Nxuba 0.74 Theewaterskloof 0.91   
Ekurhuleni 0.67 Impendle 0.74 Mafikeng 0.57 Mohokare 0.66 Nyandeni 0.39 Thembelihle 0.77   
Elias Motsoaledi 0.38 Indaka 0.10 Mafube 0.79 Molemole 0.50 Okhahlamba 0.23 Thembisile 0.72   
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Appendix 9:  
Exploratory bivariate OLS regression results 
 
 
First round: Successive bivariate OLS Regression Results 
Dep.Var FullCount 
    
Model: OLS 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019  
    
No. Observations: 234 
    
Df Residuals: 233 
    
Df Model: 1 
    
       
 
Coef SE t P>|t| [0.025 0.975] 
% Voter Turnout 09 6.37 0.12 53.66 >0.001 6.14 6.61 
Mean Age 0.17 0.00 53.50 >0.001 0.17 0.18 
% White 0.39 0.02 17.17 >0.001 0.35 0.44 
% HH Not Water 0.08 0.01 15.43 >0.001 0.07 0.09 
Rich-Poor 0.21 0.01 18.28 >0.001 0.19 0.24 
% pop Not Matric 0.06 0.00 43.22 >0.001 0.06 0.06 
% Not SA Lang 1.20 0.06 20.50 >0.001 1.09 1.32 
% Male 0.10 0.00 54.81 >0.001 0.10 0.10 
% Informal 0.49 0.04 10.98 >0.001 0.40 0.57 
% Poor 0.17 0.01 35.34 >0.001 0.16 0.18 
AG Rating 1.25 0.04 30.00 >0.001 1.17 1.33 
 
